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THESIS ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates and compares how the people directly involved in different levels 
of hotel services outsourcing relationships structure their experiences. The thesis is based 
on the perceptions of those directly involved in the outsourcing interaction between the 
private commercial services providers and their public sector clients. The research is 
informed by literature from outsourcing, resource acquisition theories, Transaction Cost 
Economics, interaction relationship model and structuration theory. The study describes 
eight exploratory case studies from selected NHS trusts in the Greater London area and 
explains the themes behind the structured experiences of those directly involved in these 
public-private sector outsourcing contractual relationships. 
The thesis contributes to our understanding of interaction and relationship model but takes 
its point of departure from networks to extend its focus from reducing transaction costs and 
safeguarding investments to adding value through learning and innovation. The thesis also 
extends our knowledge of structuration theory from a sensitising device and a theory of 
action to a theory of liberation through the power of agency in using resources for change. 
The study also suggests areas where public-private sector management theory could be 
refined for mutual benefit. It demonstrates the validity of resource acquisition theories and 
services outsourcing framework and the suitability of interaction model and the relational 
aspect of Transaction Cost Analysis as governance frameworks. The thesis also proposes 
a wide range of future research agendas to compliment the work done here. 
IV 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
How do the key people involved in the hotel (support) services outsourcing 
relationships structure their experiences? 
DISCLAIMER 
All the names of place, people, hospitals, cases and companies used in this thesis are 
anonymous and fictitious. Any similarities or relationships to known places, people, cases 
companies or organisations are purely coincidental. All the data used in this study are 
confidential and non-attributable to any contributor. This is in accordance with the 
University's Code of Practice Governing the Ethical Conduct of Investigations, Research, 
Demonstrations and Experiments and the Code of Research Good Practice 2007/2008. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the work presented in this thesis and outlines 
its structure and layout. 
The thesis is based on the studies of eight selected National Health Service (NHS) trusts 
in the Greater London area with respect to "hotel services" outsourcing that includes 
cleaning, catering, laundry, portering and housekeeping. These are also called support 
services. Both terms will be used interchangeably as the interviewees used them. The 
economic recession of the 1970's may have forced many companies to focus inwards on 
their basic businesses (M61ler and Wilson, 1995), in favour of outsourcing and alliances to 
leverage resources for sustainable competitive advantage (Cross, 1995; Das and Teng, 
2000). Outsourcing refers to 'subcontracting construction components, sub-assemblies, 
products or services to another company for results' (Fill and Visser, 2000; Jennings, 
2002). For services outsourcing, results become a quest for a continuous, reliable, 
uninterrupted service (Cross, 1995; Fill and Visser, 2000). A resource is defined as an 
asset or input to production that an organisation owns, controls or has access to (Helfat 
and Peteraf, 2003: 999). Thus, outsourcing of non-critical functions enables companies to 
focus on their core businesses, enhance specialisation or build capabilities' for competitive 
advantage (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Teece et al., 1997). 
There is a growing interest in outsourcing as a potential source of competitiveness and 
value creation (Grimshaw and Miozzo, 2006; Huber, 1993; Leavy, 2004; Sveiby, 1997). 
Areas outsourced have burgeoned from information technology (Cross, 1995; Lacity et al., 
1995) and non-core activities like administration, security, product marketing, cleaning, 
catering and payroll (Davis, 2004, IPD, 1998, Rock, 1999; Quinn et al., 1990), to skilled 
personnel (Peisch, 1995), logistics (Lewis and Suchan, 2003), funeral service (Grossberg, 
2004), capital projects and total facilities management (Alexander et al., 2004). 
One of the most exciting trends in organisation and management studies has been the 
sustained interest in resources for enduring competitive advantage. A stream of studies 
(reviewed in chapter three) show how organisations attempt to meet their internal resource 
needs through inter-organisational relationship such as strategic alliances and outsourcing 
that enable some to refocus on core activities and develop them as sources of sustainable 
1 Capability refers to a firm-specific attribute "to perform coordinated set of tasks utilising organisational resources 
(assets or input to production) for the purpose of achieving a particular end result" (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003: 999). 
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advantage. Studies in alliances and outsourcing stress the importance of business 
relationships but few are focused specifically on hotel services in public organisations like 
the NHS. The notable ones are studies in hospital accounting in New Zealand (Lawrence, 
et al., 1997), a collaborative research in Palestine (Hardy et al., 2003) and a study in the 
effectiveness of Transfer of Undertakings (TUPE) in employment relations of those being 
transferred from public sector employment to the commercial sector (Cooke et al., 2004). 
The Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Group (IMP) have studied and advanced our 
knowledge on buyer-seller dyadic relationships and networks (Ford, 2002; H6kansson and 
Snehota, 1995). However their focus has been on providing a framework for safeguarding 
specific investments and reducing total transaction costs through long-term relationships. 
This thesis does not involve itself with the myriads of relationship networks on either side 
of the contractual relationship between services providers and their clients but the thesis 
validates the work of the IMP group in the context of outsourcing and advances their 
interaction model to adding value to services offering through innovation and learning. 
Through outsourcing interaction between purchasing managers and services providers 
there is a perception of mutual learning and the transfer of knowledge and skills that 
enable managers and workers, as agents, make a difference. Ancillary workers have been 
trained and developed, equipped with knowledge, skills, competence and improved self- 
image to liberate themselves from manual workers to professionals in support services. 
Some purchasing managers have used provider investments to liberate themselves from 
the dungeons of the basement to better facilities, which some of them manage, control and 
maintain. Many have transformed their roles, position, departments and ultimately their 
organisations. Consequently, managers and the workforce have been enabled to enhance 
their roles, jobs and departments through support services outsourcing relationships. 
Structuration theory (reviewed in chapter four), accords such managers and workers the 
capability of knowledgeable agents, able to use resources like outsourcing and contractor 
investments as opportunities to make a difference in pre-existing state of affairs (Giddens, 
1979,1984). The perceived changes in the roles, jobs and positions of managers and 
workers documented here are testaments to such a difference. Agents are knowledgeable 
by virtue of what they can do (know-how) and not what they know, hence shifting the 
emphasis from theory or mechanisms alone to practice (Pleasants, 1999; Stones, 2005). 
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Thus, this thesis extends our knowledge of structuration theory from a theory of action and 
a sensitising device to a theory of liberation through the capacity for action (power) of 
agents to use resources to make changes that transform them. 
My choice of structuration theory (Giddens, 1979,1984) as a philosophical underpinning 
for this thesis stems from the episodic nature of changes occurring in the health service 
which suggests that structuration theory may be a suitable interpretive tool. The ability of 
structuration theory to bridge the philosophical divide of subjectivity and objectivity (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979) and other dualisms identified in social research, eliminates the 
restriction placed on social research by a purely Positivist or Contructionist study. 
Structuration theory (Giddens, 1979,1984) charts an epistemological middle ground by 
combining concepts from other disciplines and schools of thought. Human activity, to my 
mind, cannot be seen as purely pre-determined or voluntaristic. The actions of human 
agents are not programmed by structural forces to produce predictive outcomes but are 
the interplay between agency and structure 2, hence Giddens' notion of "duality of 
structure", which constitute social structures that are the very medium of this constitution. 
For example, support services managers and the workforce have access to organisational 
rules and have been equipped with resources they can draw upon at interaction with 
services providers to enable them make a difference to their roles, jobs, departments and 
transform their professional image. However, because human knowledgeability is always 
bounded (Giddens, 1984), the action of these agents produces unintended consequences. 
These unintended consequences create the foundation for new action that enables agents 
to make changes (Kaspersen, 2000). Thus, this thesis uses structuration theory (Giddens, 
1979,1984) as a flexible philosophical lens to identify and explain the underlying 
generative mechaniSMS3 that produce social structures, which are both the medium and 
the outcome of interaction. These structures are rules and resources- knowledge, skill, 
expertise and experience services managers routinely draw upon during interaction with 
contractors to enable them apply the rules of conduct in deploying organisational 
resources to transform hotel services, the workforce and in some cases, their institutions. 
2 Structure is regarded as rules and resources (tacit knowledge) agents draw upon at interaction. Structure and agency 
are not two individual phenomena as in dualism but a duality that is both enabling and constraining (Giddens, 1984) 3 Generative mechanisms are stocks of mutual knowledge drawn upon by actors in their daily interaction to enable them 
to go on (Giddens, 1984) 
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Structuration theory links human knowledge with a process of action in specific contexts. 
Action here depends on the capability of individuals, as knowledgeable agents, with 
access to resources to intervene or refrain from intervening in a specific process like 
outsourcing and make a difference to change and transform their contexts of operation. 
Structuration theory deals with concepts of power and control in novel ways. It considers 
the "dialectic of control" as built into agency and the reciprocal autonomy and dependence 
agents reproduce in the context of their daily interaction. Domination is produced through 
conflicts and contradiction in resource deployment, which is one basis of power comprising 
structures of control and domination drawn upon by the parties to interaction. Hence 
control or domination in complex institutions is never total, negative or punitive as 
subordinates, agents and stakeholders are adept at circumventing oppressive situations 
and directives through distancing, absenteeism or exit. 
Outsourcing in the NHS involves internal power relations in the deployment of resources 
and external power plays in relationship management with services providers. The level of 
outsourcing and the resultant consequences reflect the choices, competence and power of 
agency on the part of support services managers, their workforce and services providers in 
overcoming organisational and departmental constraining politics and the status quo to 
manage their departments and outsourcing relationships for mutual benefits. Thus 
structuration theory is suitable as a flexible philosophical lens or interpretative tool for 
understanding, analysing and explaining services outsourcing outcomes in this thesis. 
Structuration theory has been adopted in management and organisation studies involving 
change (AkgUn et al., 2007; Lawrence et al., 1997) through innovation (Chanal, 2004) and 
information technology in logistics (Lewis and Suchan, 2003) and knowledge transfer 
(Pleasants, 1999). Other areas include the concepts of structure (Ranson, et al., 1980) 
and its relatedness to and dependence on agents (Stones, 2005; Whittington, 1992), 
organisational culture (Riley, 1983) and structure as a source of domination and control 
(Reed, 1996; Xavier, 1996), where workers struggle for liberation. Thus, the structured 
perceptions of those directly involved in hotel services outsourcing and the perceived 
changes to their jobs, roles and departments can be studied, analysed and explained 
using the analytical tools offered by structuration theory. 
The main objective of hotel services outsourcing in 1983 was threefold. Firstly, to refocus 
the health service on its core activity of providing free healthcare for the nation, secondly 
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to improve the performance effectiveness and operational efficiency of the service through 
managerial association with private commercial services providers and thirdly to improve 
managerial accountability in the deployment of public scarce human and financial 
resources and hence reduce the dependence of the health service on Government funding 
alone. Successive Governments since then have attempted to reform and restructure the 
health service through the internal market mechanism and collaborative arrangements in 
search of cost containment and efficiency in deploying resources to achieve organisational 
goals. 
The findings of this thesis suggest that the contractual partnership between commercial 
services providers and their clients has been mutually beneficial. For example, one of the 
perceived results of outsourcing has been the transfer of commercial ethos through 
learning that has enabled some NHS trusts to gain financial independence and autonomy 
as foundation trusts through the Private Finance Initiative (PFI). Many more are poised to 
go the same way. Foundation status liberates an NHS trust from budgetary constraints 
and enables some managers to regard and operate healthcare as a business, releasing 
the trust from Government control through financial bailouts and handouts while the 
services providers increase their remit. Consequently one of the aims of hotel services 
outsourcing is perceived as realised by those directly involved. 
Services outsourcing continues to generate extensive debate, which can be healthy for 
those involved. Observers divide outsourcing into three parts-motivation or strategic 
reasons for outsourcing, the process and benefits of outsourcing. Most studies are on 
outsourcing process resulting in un-quantified benefits or impact (Jiang and Qureshi, 2006; 
Lin et al., 2007; Linder et al., 2002; Nordin, 2006). Researchers note that there is little 
research in the motivation for outsourcing and in mixed model studies comparing both in- 
house and outsourced services (rather than purely outsourced or in-house operations). 
The notable exceptions are studies in strategic reasons or motivation for outsourcing with 
the attendant risks and rewards (Harland, Knight and Lamming, 2005; Zhu et al., 2001) 
and an attempt at quantifying the economic impact of outsourcing (Jiang et al., 2006). But 
none of these studies are in support services. This thesis combines and compares both in- 
house and outsourced support services, deals with and documents the motivation, process 
and benefits or impact of support services outsourcing. Thus the results of this thesis can 
help to fill some of the gaps left by the scarcity of similar studies in the literature. 
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Many studies agree that there are reasons for outsourcing other than cost saving benefits 
whose impact are difficult to quantify. Consequently, most studies, including this thesis, 
focus on the perceptions of the key people involved in services outsourcing. Furthermore, 
the results of services outsourcing are contextual and reflect the work content, experience 
and perceptions of those interviewed. For example, Harland, Kinght and Lamming (2005) 
studied the strategic motivation, risks and benefits of outsourcing information technology 
from a senior management, policy decision-making point of view. Consequently, their 
results reflect the views of senior management with regards to policy and strategic impact. 
This thesis is based on the perceptions of the key people involved in support services 
outsourcing (middle managers, workers and stakeholders) and hence reflect their day-to- 
day lived experience with the work context and content they find themselves in. Other 
researchers proffer the same reasons for the variety and diversity of outsourcing findings 
in different contexts. For example, Jiang and Qureshi (2006) comment that middle 
managers talk about their field of work or departments and their daily struggle to manage 
their departments and not about the whole organisation or financial impact on the firm. 
Harland, Kinght and Lamming (2005) also comment that while proponents of outsourcing 
focus on economic arguments, opponents major on the social (unintended) consequences 
of outsourcing making it difficult to compare results. Consequently, result findings reflect 
the different levels of people interviewed, the context of operation, management fashion 
and ideology. Thus services outsourcing findings are diverse and different but healthy as 
the extensive debate helps to broaden and enrich the phenomenon under study. 
There is also a scarcity of studies aimed at theoretical model building within services 
markets, - especially in the health service (Fishbacker and Francis, 1999; Robinson and Le 
Grand, 1994). This study provides an alternative view of outsourcing outside patient care 
that can increase the stock of knowledge towards a more comprehensive model of inter- 
organisational relationships and may help to fill the gaps left by these scarcities. 
1.2 Contribution of this thesis to the stock of knowledge 
What is knowledge? 
Knowledge is a critical resource of individuals and collectives like healthcare organisations 
and a source of power, livelihood and competitive advantage (Lam, 2000; Starbuck, 1992). 
Human knowledge exists in different forms. It can be articulated explicitly or manifested 
implicitly as tacit knowledge. While explicit knowledge is easily communicated and can be 
transferred without the knowing subject, tacit knowledge is intuitive, cannot be articulated, 
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used or understood without the knowing subject (Popper, 1972; Lam 2000). However both 
tacit and explicit knowledge, are exhaustible but through sharing can dynamically interact 
to create new knowledge (Polanyi; 1962) that is transformative and renewable in nature 
and can contribute to a firm's competitive advantage through innovation and technology 
(Akbar, 2003; Huber, 1999). Thus, knowledge can be transformed and expanded into a 
renewable resource for individuals, groups and organisations for competitive advantage. 
Explicit knowledge is gained through formal study and is exemplified as the ontology or 
locus of knowledge in the know-what, which is objective, embrained in individuals or 
formalised and codified in organisational routines, procedures and practices (Lam, 2000). 
On the other hand, the epistemological expression of tacit knowledge as know-how is 
subjective, experience-based and accumulated through observation and practice. It is 
internalised through active involvement in contexts and embodied in individual's skill and 
expertise or embedded in organisational members'work, roles, authority, structures of 
coordination and communication mechanisms that enable them mobilise and integrate 
different forms of knowledge to meet organisational objectives (Lam, 2000; Starbuck, 
1992). Thus both forms of knowledge can interact and combine to create new knowledge 
in the know-why of understanding cause and effect relationships and the sense-making of 
perceptions of agents expressed through the application of their cognitive and behavioural 
knowledge and transferred through mutual learning and apprenticeship and communicated 
as in this thesis (Akbar, 2003; Huff, 1997; Polanyi, 1962,1983; Quinn et al., 1996). 
Therefore, new knowledge is created, to my mind, through my interaction with agents in 
the context of this research to aid understanding and explanation of events observed and 
data collected. Consequently, healthcare practitioners and researchers can creatively use 
insights and views expressed in this thesis from both the secondary (literature review) and 
primary research as a stock of knowledge to transform their units, jobs or craft competitive 
advantage for their services to liberate themselves or to engage in future research. 
From knowledge acquired through familiarity with previous relevant research my prolonged 
participant observation in the context of NHS trusts' support services investigated over five 
years and the variety of personal experience of the research context combine to create a 
new understanding in applying knowledge to current issues. These experiences enable me 
to contribute to stock of knowledge here and to continue contributing to knowledge through 
information sharing in future research endeavours. 
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1.3 Original contribution of this thesis to knowledge 
This thesis provides a timely study of hotel services outsourcing in the UK health service. 
The study documents and provides useful information on the perceptions of the personnel 
directly involved in hotel services outsourcing and has attempted to shed more light on the 
progressive role of health services outsourcing, its impact on the changing roles of 
purchasing managers, contractors, support services workforce and patients' experience. It 
is hoped that it will encourage further research in the expanding area of health services 
outsourcing and facilities management. 
The literature indicates a need for more qualitative research in the growing area of 
exchange business relationships to improve understanding and theory generation in this 
important area of successful business operations (Bradley, 2005; Eriksson and Laan, 
2007; Maxwell, 1996; Osarenkhoe and Bennani, 2007; Wilding and Humphries, 2006). 
Business relationship is defined as a mutually oriented interaction between reciprocally 
committed parties, based on resource exchange for economic benefit (Ford, 2002: 162). 
The Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Group (IMP) have extensively studied to extend 
our knowledge and understanding on business networks based on successful dyadic 
relationships (Ford, 2002,2003; HAkansson and Snehota, 1995,2000). However their 
studies are mainly focused on relationship as a complementary governance framework for 
reducing total transaction cost and safeguarding specific investments for competitive 
advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kleinaltenkamp and Ehret, 2006). These studies tend 
to neglect the value adding benefit of such business relationships through innovation, 
mutual learning and knowledge transfer (Bradley, 2005; Huber, 1999; Khong, 2005). 
This thesis documents the beliefs of those involved that a bundle of value-adding benefits 
emerged from successfully managing their contractual business relationships for enduring 
personal, economic and mutual organisational benefits resulting in the expansion of health 
services outsourcing to other areas like clinical imaging, patient appliances, information 
technology and sterile supplies. Thus this thesis validates and extends the interaction 
model to a value-adding framework in the context of contractual services outsourcing. 
This thesis builds on other work using structuration theory in organisational analysis. By 
identifying and explaining the structures that emerge from the perceptions of those directly 
involved in outsourced hotel services. The thesis adds weight to the central point of 
structuration theory that knowledgeable agents with access to resources like finance, skill, 
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training, managerial expertise and experience can make a difference by changing their 
status, image, position, power differential and employability. The ancillary workers have 
been trained and developed from manual workers to professionals. Some procurement 
managers have been liberated from the dungeons of the basement (while the procurement 
managers in in-house operations are still in the basements) to own, manage and control 
creative facilities where NHS trusts are tenants and the image of support services has 
been enhanced by the professionalism of services providers. Thus workers and managers 
have liberated themselves to reproduce their institutions and the social world in which they 
are situated. The thesis further advances the concept of structuration theory from a theory 
of action and a sensitising device to a theory of liberation for individuals and collectives. 
An interesting aspect of this thesis is the contribution of facilities management (FM) as a 
catalyst in the evolving change process of the health service. Facilities management is a 
new profession and discipline with few theories (Alexander, 2003). There is a challenge to 
secure the future of FM as a credible discipline built on strong theoretical foundation and 
dedicated to understanding and developing the discipline (Jones, 2000; Ventovuori et al., 
2007). By documenting the creativity in workplace design, organisational transformation 
and community renewal made possible by new facilities (chapter 2) in totally outsourced 
services in NHS trusts like Theresa and County hospitals and the cost effective use of 
healthcare real estate occupancy elsewhere, this thesis provides evidence for the 
establishment of healthcare corporate real estate as a valuable resource to generate 
revenue, enhance NHS public image, motivate workers and benefit patients. 
The thesis enlarges to enrich our knowledge on the problems of achieving organisational 
change and transformation prompted by economic uncertainty. The perceived changes 
documented here occurred through the public partnership relationships with the private 
commercial sector and their willingness to invest in human capital development in the 
context of Private Public Partnerships (PPP) through support services outsourcing. 
This thesis adds something to the substantial body of work on perceived power balance in 
institutional change this time within the health service but outside patient care. Outsourcing 
is a major shift in the organisational structure of the NHS and brings with it significant shifts 
in institutional power. The perception of this shift clearly emerges from this thesis. Through 
the ownership and total facilities management, the professionalism and the self-perception 
of purchasing managers and services providers, a low-status ancillary services function 
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like support services, has been transformed into a competitive services provider and its 
workers into resourceful professionals. This study indicates that outsourcing is having a 
real impact on the working lives of those engaged in the NHS trusts' support services. 
1.4 The thesis is laid out as follows: 
Chapter two is a review of the NHS as an institution, with its historical and economic 
background leading to outsourcing and subsequent developments, reflecting the episodic 
nature of changes from internal collaboration to partnerships with the private sector. A 
limited profile of facilities management is presented to complete the research context. 
Chapter three is a literature review on outsourcing, resource-based view of organisations 
and strategic alliances as routes to attaining comparative advantage with other trusts 
and explanations from relevant theories and schools of thought intrinsic to this thesis. 
Chapter four deals with methodology and methods used in this research with some critique 
of structuration theory, as a sensitising device and its use in social studies. 
Chapter five presents the data analysis of the four categories of outsourcing identified 
namely: completely outsourced, two partially outsourced and in-house operations. Since 
my unit of analysis is the relationship of the purchasing managers and their services 
providers within the context of "hotel services" rather than whole individual NHS trusts, the 
four categories of outsourcing provide a better way of comparing and contrasting to elicit 
structural mechanisms impacting those involved with respect to hotel service outsourcing. 
The perceptions and resultant structuring of the experiences of those directly involved in 
hotel services outsourcing is presented in each of the eight NHS trusts investigated and 
then compared and discussed with reference to extant theories. 
Chapter six summarises and concludes the thesis with managerial applications and 
identifies areas for future research. References, appendices of those interviewed, 
summaries of foundation hospitals and the Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) are included. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2. The UK National Health Service (NHS) 
2.1 Introduction 
The UK National Health Service (NHS), was founded by the Labour Government on 5 July 
1948 (figure 2.1), to provide all citizens with healthcare, free at the point of use, according 
to need and not ability to pay (Klein, 2001: 1; NHS Plan, 2000: 2). The aims of the founding 
fathers were firstly, the provision of a comprehensive health service of universal coverage 
for the population with equity of access. Secondly, the system was to be financed mainly 
from taxation and thirdly, both doctors and patients were to have freedom of choice. 
Doctors could choose how to treat and patients could change doctors without proffering 
reasons (Klein, 2001; Leathard, 1990). But private medicine should remain on the margins. 
However, from inception the cost of running the system from taxation alone has burgeoned 
beyond the expectation of the founders (Klein, 2001; Lawrence, 1988; Leathard, 1990; 
Powell, 1966). By 1950, the system was stereotyped as a "spendthrift organisation" (Klein, 
2001: 31). Margaret Thatcher called it a "bottomless financial pit" (Holliday, 1995). Indeed, 
Leathard (1990: 141) and Levitt et al., (1995: 25) commented that the organisation made 
"insatiable demands" for state funding to meet the "relentless growth for costs" due to the 
inexorable demands for more and better medical care for an aging population that is living 
longer, which the founding fathers could not have envisaged (Le Grand, 2006; Portillo, 
1998: 33). 
Consequently successive Governments have restructured and reformed the health service 
in an effort to reconfigure appropriate administrative, managerial and market frameworks 
to contain costs and improve accountability, efficiency and organisational effectiveness in 
meeting healthcare objectives. Organisational effectiveness refers to the "ability to produce 
an acceptable outcome" (Collins, 2003), or meet the demands of the varied stakeholders. 
Similarly, the complex dynamic influences of policy makers, academia, stakeholders and 
NHS management have also centred on improving performance and operational efficiency 
of the system (Klein, 2001; Laing et al., 2002). Healthcare efficiency is here defined as 
&I squeezing the greatest possible output out of an inevitably limited input of resources" 
(Klein, 2001: 49). With limited national income and other competing sectors like education, 
transport and social services, this "efficiency squeeze", to date, has been elusive but 
remains a constant objective (section 2.5 below). 
11 
2.2 NHS Reorganisation 1974-1997 
Against this backdrop of escalating running costs for the NHS, the Ministries of Health and 
National Insurance were amalgamated in 1968 into the Department of Health and Social 
Security (DHSS), mandated to administer all health and social matters (Klein 2001: 51). 
Subsequently, the biting inflation and recession of the 1970's led to a reorganisation of the 
system (figure 2.2) in 1974, in line with DHSS (1972) management arrangements. This 
was an administrative reform to unify the hitherto fragmented services especially the 
community services run by local authorities and to facilitate the equitable allocation of 
scarce resources (Leathard, 1990; Levitt et al., 1995: 16). The 1974 reform was also aimed 
at managing the external pressure of scarce resources with the internal demands of 
healthcare provision through managerial efficiency (Klein 2001; Leathard, 1990). Thus, a 
consensus administration of medical, nursing and administrative multidisciplinary team 
was set up to improve efficiency through decentralised hierarchical tiers of bureaucracy 
(Klein 2001: 76). This arrangement may have introduced weakness into the health service 
through the "hegemony (political domination) of civil servants" with what Klein (2001: 75) 
calls "bureaucratic complexity in every tier" to effectively implement national policies. 
Figure 2.1. Structure of the National Health Service (NHS) 
for England and Wales 1948-1974 
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Figure 2.2. The Structure of the NHS in 1974 
(Adapted from Leathard (1990: 54) 
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Subsequent to the "winter of discontent", the new Conservative Government of 1979, 
(Klein, 2001; Leathard, 1990) began an urgent review of Government institutions such as 
the NHS, culminating in Sir Ron Griffith's report of 1983, which was highly critical of how 
the NHS was operated and managed where no one seemed to be in-charge or indeed 
accountable (Klein, 2001; Leathard, 1990; Laing et al., 2002; Webster, 1988). Following 
this report, the Government set out a strategy of minimal state intervention and an avid 
commitment to reduce public spending, return the depressed economy to market forces 
and defeat ravaging inflation. Thus, financial cuts were imposed across the public sector 
and Government instituted a general management framework to increase decision-making 
responsibility, improve efficiency and performance effectiveness by eliminating pockets of 
inefficiency, wastage, wasteful and ineffective or inappropriate practices from the system 
(Levitt et al., 1995; West, 1988). 
It was this policy that led to hospitals and Health Authorities being allowed to outsource 
their cleaning, laundry and catering services to private contractors through competitive 
tendering (The Health Services, 1983). The objective was to secure cheaper and more 
efficient service than direct labour (DHSS, 1983; Thornton, 1999). Outside contractor 
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managers were deemed more efficient and productive due to their better incentive 
structures, which in-house ancillary workers lacked (West, 1988). Special Health 
Authorities, NHS Logistics and a purchasing agency, Purchasing and Supply Agency 
(PASA), were also created to help hospitals coordinate services contracting across the 
NHS (Leathard, 1990; Levitt, et al., 1999; PASA, 1998). At the same time, private 
hospitals, voluntary health organisations and "informal carers" who care for their 
chronically ill relatives and family members were forced to share in caring for the sick 
(Leathard, 1990: 58). Thus, a system of welfare pluralism emerged between the private 
sector, voluntary organisations, family members and the NHS. 
The involvement of the private sector in healthcare was not without opposition. Robinson 
(1984) called it 69 privatisation of the welfare state". Ray Whitney, (1988: 79), from the 
Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS), said it was a "flawed report" that failed 
to deal with the main issue of relationship between managers and Health Authorities. 
Opposition was also rife in the sub-contracting of in-house services to outside contractors. 
Labour unions demonstrated with strikes and labour unrest arguing that competitive 
tendering challenged the monopoly of in-house services and that cleaning standards were 
declining (Thomas, 1985). Subsequently, the Audit Commission investigated the union 
claims (Audit Commission, 1987). The commission reported that standards had declined 
but contractors have also lost interest in tendering for contracts (West, 1988: 55). 
Despite all opposition, the Government plans went ahead. Thus, contract arrangements for 
non-core activities like hotel services (initially cleaning and catering) began in the NHS. 
To help civil service managers and doctors improve performance effectiveness (Levitt et 
al., 1995: 26; Carter et al., 1992), Fulton's Report (1982) was used to usher in the use of 
performance indicators across the civil service (Klein, 2001: 117). Annual reviews were 
also introduced (Allen, 1982) as were cost improvement programmes in 1985. But as 
Whitney (1988) observed, the lack of in-built cost containment mechanisms with the 
imposition of resource restraint alone, left the system with slack and inefficiencies. The 
Social Services Committee reports (1988) confirmed these findings. 
In 1985, the American health economist, Professor Alain Enthoven, visited Britain and 
noted that the NHS lacked market discipline and managerial incentives for performance 
effectiveness and financial efficiency that could reduce recurrent Government intervention 
in the health services (Levitt et al., 1995: 25). Based on this observation and Griffith's 
14 
(1988) recommendations for community care, which was not implemented, the 
Government set out a White Paper (1989), Working for Patients. This paper introduced 
competition into healthcare and resulted in major changes. The aim was to stimulate 
efficiency, enhance consumer choice and promote quality of care by separating health 
demand from healthcare provision (Robinson, 1989; Levitt et al., 1995). The providers of 
healthcare were to be the local and teaching hospitals, District Health Authorities and 
private hospitals. The purchasers were fund-holding general practitioners (GP's) and Local 
Authorities. It was thought that competition, or an "internal market" mechanism which was 
a purchaser-led rather than provider-led service would provide the incentive for efficiency 
improvements and a high quality cost effective health service (Laing and Cotton, 1996; 
Laing et al., 2002). 
However, the result was the "internal market" which elicited diverse comments from 
observers. Best (1989: 167) called it "an exciting journey into the unknown". He questioned 
the overall management and how service quality would be rated since there was no 
precedent. Ham and Judge (1989) said the exercise was a "managed competition" since 
hospitals could not be allowed to go bankrupt. Klein and Day (1989) argued that it was 
"competition with conflicting objectives" since the advocate of the exercise, (American 
economist, Enthoven) has failed to achieve the same comprehensive healthcare provision 
at low cost in America. 
From the medical viewpoint, an NHS physician said that healthcare was a service and not 
a business to be driven by profits (Elkeles, 1989). He further contended that, "the cash 
register may drown out the sound of the ambulance" if competition for profit became the 
norm. The Lancet (1989) said it was an attempt to dispense with unproductive health 
services. The chairman of the Commons Social Services Committee, Frank Field (1989), 
called it'a time bomb set to blow the NHS apart'. Opposition ministers saw the white paper 
as a step towards privatisation and commercialisation of the NHS (Cook, 1989; Owen, 
1989). 
Meanwhile the health secretary, Kenneth Clarke, announced that the next step was to 
allow individual hospitals to become self-governing trusts while remaining in the NHS 
(Clarke, 1989; DoH, 1989). The Health Service Journal (1989a) called it a 'flawed'step 
and commented that self-governing trusts 'flew in the face of unity'. The incentive for 
hospitals to reduce cost and the ability of the NHS and local general practitioners (GPS), to 
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provide quality care at stable prices were questioned (Maynard, 1989). But some thought 
that it was a step in the right direction (Green, 1989), since trust status would be optional 
(Willett, 1989). However, the introduction of medical audit (Lancet, 1989) in what Theodore 
Porter (1995) called 'control through quantification' was well received by some doctors. 
Medical audits are used to assess cost of patient treatment, which are then compared 
across the NHS. It is an aid to justify autonomy and accountability (Klein, 2001: 50). But 
some NHS trusts may have used such audits to benchmark their performance against 
under-performers and take comfort from their mediocre achievement and so have become 
complacent and resistant to change (Fraser, 2002; Hailey et al., 2005; Purcell, 1999). 
Meanwhile some trusts used such audits to demand more funding from the Government 
and become dependent on state funding for projects, training and refurbishment of 
decaying buildings (Enthoven, 2000; Moore, 1992). Meanwhile some medical consultants 
continue to flex their hegemonic muscles as controllers of the health service by refusing to 
engage in such medical audits, which they regard as hidden surveillance (Maynard, 2005). 
The internal market, proposed in 1989, became operational in 1991, with a framework for 
competition. In the same year, the purchasing agency and NHS Logistics, hitherto created 
as special Health Authorities, were renamed NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency (PASA) 
and NHS Logistics respectively (Cabinet Office, 1998: 26). They were to help the newly 
formed hospital trusts manage contractual purchasing and supplies. The agencies were 
mandated to standardise, coordinate and improve all purchasing and supplies across the 
NHS and help the internal market function seamlessly (NHS Procurement Review, 1998). 
Furthermore NHS Logistics was to help NHS trusts with bulk purchasing, warehousing, 
transportation and goods delivery to reduce total costs of using multiple contractors for 
purchasing, warehousing and logistics (Arminas, 2001; NHS Procurement Review, 1998). 
2.3 NHS trusts 
The internal market arrangement, outlined in the white paper-'Working for Patients'(DoH, 
1989a), became an act of parliament the following year. The provider/purchaser split was 
an implementation instrument of the internal market. NHS trusts came into being in 1991 
and by 1995 all hospitals in England have become part of an NHS trust (Thornton, 1999). 
NHS trusts provide a range of health services to patients. A trust may be a single acute 
hospital or a group of hospitals or indeed community services provided in health centres, 
clinics and homes or ambulance service. 
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Types of trusts 
e Acute trusts providing acute or specialist medical care 
9 Integrated service trusts, provide acute community services and in some instances, 
mental health services 
9 Community trusts in some areas incorporate mental health services and elderly 
care with learning disability 
4, Mental health trusts can include services for the elderly with learning disability 
A trust is a self-governing public organisation with its own board of directors. These 
executive and non-executive directors are charged with making decisions on local policies 
and setting the strategic direction of trusts. A trust has a financial duty to break even, 
realise a 6% return on capital and live within its budget limit set by the Secretary of State 
for Health. A trust is mandated to work in partnership with local Health Authorities as well 
as with its network of services providers (Levitt et al., 1995: 82; Thornton, 1999). 
Commenting on the creation of NHS trusts, Harrison (1995) noted that trust status brought 
hospitals freedom to innovate at the local level. However Robinson (1996) observed that 
trusts lacked financial independence since they could not go bankrupt but were always 
subject to soft budget constraints. Others confirmed this and noted the constraining effect 
of state ownership on NHS trusts (Moore, 1992; Portillo, 1998). Such constraints range 
from subordinating health services' interest to political will and timetable, interfering with 
internal workforce arrangements through policies that observers say result in resentment 
and human misery of redeployment and may inadvertently contribute to inefficiency and 
poor performance of some NHS trusts (Enthoven, 2000: 1329; Moore, 1992: 117). 
However, NHS trusts have since been allowed to seek and achieve autonomy through 
Foundation status of self-determination and observers watch to see how this newly found 
freedom and determination play out in the highly competitive commercial arena. 
The Health Service Journal (HSJ, 1989: 135) noted that hospital trusts were empowered by 
statute to enter into contracts to provide services and were able to form alliances with the 
private health sector in order to share facilities, running costs and risk for mutual benefit. 
Thus, competitive tendering was extended from non-clinical support services to clinical 
care. By this move, the health minister, Kenneth Clarke, observers say, gave notice to the 
two powerful groups, the treasury and the hospital consultants who hitherto controlled the 
budget and what happened within it respectively (Leathard, 1990: 176; Klein, 2001: 64; 
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Strong and Robinson, 1990). It was the turn of managers and competitive market forces to 
shape the NHS through the internal market mechanism. 
During this internal market era, the health service was fragmented to aid competition and 
hence improve the efficient use of resource allocation through market exchange (Laing 
and Cotton, 1996). Through the fragmentation of the bigger hospitals, many hospitals 
gained trusts' status as healthcare providers having local accountability and a budget to 
engage contractors for services (Laing et al., 2002). But soon after, in 1992, problems 
arose with the competitive framework and led to a commission of inquiry into London 
health services (Thornton, 1999). However, these problems continued until the Labour 
Government came into office in 1997. Subsequently, the New Labour Government 
replaced the internal market mechanism with integrated care, based on partnership, driven 
by performance, with emphasis on value creation through collaborative cooperation (The 
New NHS, 1997; The NHS Plan, 2000). Thus, a fragmented, hierarchical bureaucracy 
deemed wasteful, inefficient and ineffective and unable to contain costs was replaced with 
a "third way" (Giddens, 2000) administrative framework. The tenets of this arrangement 
being increased investment for reforms, incentives and sanctions for improved efficiency, 
better performance and high quality care (The New NHS 1997). 
These reforms of investment and private sector partnerships are aimed at restoring fragile 
public confidence in the health sector but may have impacted healthcare services in other 
ways as seen in this study (The NHS Plan, 2000). The impact is the willingness of services 
providers to invest in developing ancillary staff into more resourceful professionals and in 
the design, build and maintain creative hospital facilities that transform the public image of 
hospitals, motivate workers and renew some community landscapes. 
2.4 Impact of the internal market 
The internal market exercise may also have made the health service less provider-led as 
purchasers were allowed to have a voice in where, when and how they were treated. It 
also helped purchasers and providers negotiate, share and collaborate over contract 
arrangements and commissioning (Shapiro, 1994). 
The internal market, argues Ham (1994), gave NHS staff, not managers, the opportunity 
and freedom to shape the service. NFIS staff was able to negotiate improvements to 
services secondary to their purchasing power to back up any threats of withdrawing their 
custom. This improved prescribing habits by using generic names of drugs to save money. 
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In studying the NHS, Robinson and Le Grand (1994) note that the major problem of trusts 
is the lack of appropriate models of behaviour and organisational models. This lack of 
appropriate models and the diversity of relationships and power coalitions engendered in 
healthcare delivery makes it more difficult to study trusts as organisations (Fischbacher 
and Francis, 1999). For example, there are as many professional bodies, medical, non- 
medical or ancillary support staff within NHS trusts as there are outside them. All of them 
work in delivering healthcare and hence compete for their departments from the same 
state budget. This multiple, complex and dynamic nature of interactions at many different 
levels in healthcare derailed the internal market arrangement due to the difficulty of gaining 
consensus for action (Laing and Cotton, 1996; Ovretveit, 1995). 
Ovretveit, (1995: 113), noted the lack of clear purpose or objectives and usefulness in 
measuring performance outcomes (effectiveness) and how other competing services and 
factors (waiting lists, costs, information asymmetry, personnel) may overlap and impinge 
on results making performance difficult to measure. 
Outcome refers to the 'effect attributable to an intervention' (Ovretveit, (11995: 114). But he 
saw contractual arrangements in healthcare as a means of improving healthcare delivery 
and preventing disease. However, the success of healthcare contracts depends on 
effective collaboration and partnerships within and outside their administrative boundaries. 
The internal market also gave general practitioners, the opportunity to be innovative and 
drive change in healthcare provision (Holliday, 1995; Ovretveit, 1995). These general 
practitioners, hitherto ignored by their district Health Authorities and disdained by their 
consultant colleagues were now being sought out for their patronage (Levitt et al., 1995)l 
Healthcare contracting allows an NHS trust to concentrate on its core competence, namely 
providing healthcare for all at the point of need, where it is capable of adding value to 
patients' offering (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) not managing hospitals (White, 1993). 
These partnerships (relationships) can develop into a network of relationships and help 
manage conflicts through mutual orientation and long-term cost savings (Ovretveit, (1995). 
The internal market helped in building a cooperative ethos in healthcare, by allowing 
erstwhile adversarial attitudes to give way to a more supportive and negotiating 
environment (Deffenbaugh, 1998). It also provided clinicians with what Llewellyn (2001) 
calls alternative 'windows' to become managers thus learn the economic consequences of 
their preferred treatment and healthcare decisions. 
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However some comment that the internal market competition had a "perverse" effect on 
the NHS. They argue that while the benefits of market competition may be clear in certain 
markets, in the NHS competition reinforced the desire to protect or expand services 
without justification or staff expertise (Beddow and Cohen, 2001). This, they also argue, 
encouraged secrecy about financial performance (Craft, 1994; Jones, 2000a) and the 
intentional manipulation and distortion of performance figures (Manning, 1982: 122) and 
the needless duplication of specialist services. 
In her study of the provider/purchaser relationship, Zolkiewski (1999) concluded that the 
internal market led to many changes in healthcare provision. There is more willingness for 
collaboration between different providers whether private or public. For example, services 
outsourcing and partnership with providers now give patients better choices of menus and 
treatment centres. On the contractual front, she contends that many lessons were learnt 
and negotiations are less adversarial and more cooperative through partnerships. 
Although opinions are divided on the overall impact of the internal market, it led to at least 
three long-term effects on the NHS. Firstly, it forced NHS trusts to identify their core 
competence or business as providing healthcare and enabled them to select, bundle and 
package elements of that business as resources to market for survival if not financial gain. 
Secondly, it provided a major shift in ideology for managers hitherto charged with providing 
healthcare for the nation at public expense to engage in identifying their internal resources 
and operating like commercial organisations in meeting their resource needs through 
efficiency drives, effective marketing, outsourcing, alliances or collaborative partnerships. 
Thirdly, it allowed the mistakes and fragmentation of the health service to come to the fore. 
At least six hundred different types of contract arrangements were identified in the entire 
service (PASA, 1998). NHS Logistics and PASA have since helped to coordinate 
economic activities more effectively and efficiently within the available resources for the 
entire health service (DoH, 1997; Laing et al., 2002). 
The function of NHS Logistics is mainly to act as a warehouse and delivery to the health 
service to enable them purchase goods in bulk at reduced prices and be a centre for just- 
in-time delivery of those goods. Thus it helps NHS trusts' internal supply channels realise 
efficiency, speed and cost savings in warehousing and delivery. Indeed NHS Logistics 
saved and redistributed E5million to NHS trusts in its first nine months of operation 
(Arminas, 2001). 
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PASA on the other hand was charged with streamlining the purchasing of goods and 
services contracts to comply with European Union, environmental considerations and to 
produce a template for outsourcing contracts. It has since vetted suppliers and services 
providers, produced standard procedure for tendering and an approved list of services 
providers. Consequently, purchasing managers are enabled by the activities of PASA in 
negotiating best contract terms, engage services providers that add value with their 
offerings, have better relationships with suppliers and are saved time, effort and money as 
PASA helps them eliminate needless waste through uniformity of information, training and 
better purchasing practices. Thus PASA acts as a knowledge repository for NHS trusts. 
In total, the internal market was unpopular like most change initiatives that force people to 
work differently but it laid the foundation for a marketing concept in the health service. 
There is now internal generation of revenue through creativity or provider innovation, 
uniformity of contract tendering and better purchasing practices standardised and encoded 
in procedures, training of purchasing managers in contract negotiations and persuasion, 
team-working and relationship management that has equipped some of them to deal more 
effectively (Reeve and Warren, 2004) with the current Private Finance Initiatives (PFI). 
In summary, the NHS was created as the greatest post-war reform liberating the citizens 
from fear of ill health and the inability to pay (DoH, 2002). It was to provide comprehensive 
healthcare for all citizens, free at the point of use and not ability to pay. Thus it will relieve 
suffering and improve the health of the nation. But the service has gone from consensus 
administration through general management framework to a market mechanism during 
three major reforms in 1974,1982 and 1997 (figure 2.4), which are episodic in nature 
being sequential, with a beginning and an end. The introduction of market competition 
(1991) was a major cultural shift as was the collaborative partnership with the private 
commercial sector in 1997. But, despite its financial constraints, mammoth changes and 
deficits (Chapman et al., 2006; Lloyd, 2006), the NHS remains operational. NHS trusts 
created in 1991, have fully become autonomous and accountable with budgets to engage 
in contracting services from outside specialists. This contractual arrangement introduced in 
1983 for support services now extends to clinical services with varied outcomes. 
2.5 Financial allocation to NHS trusts: (Annual plan 2003 - (VH) figure 2.3) 
Since the introduction of managed competition in 1997 trusts receive allocation (regarded 
as investment) directly from the Treasury (trusts opted out of Health Authority control). 
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This accounts for 77% of its revenue as cash limited (discretionary) allocation. Part of this 
is 'earmarked'for specific 'NHS Plan' activities like reducing waiting times and elderly care. 
A trust has an external financial limit (EFL) of 8% set by the Treasury for capital 
development. This money must be used or returned to the Treasury. A trust must therefore 
raise 12% of its revenue through private patient care and the sale of equipment or land 
(through local facilities management). Trusts must also make 3% efficiency gains and a 
6% return on the 77% revenue allocation (treated as an investment). Thus, a trust must 
generate 15% of its revenue and make a 6% return on the 77% discretionary allocation 
annually to be viable. 
Figure 2.3 
2% El cost savings 
0 capital funds 
0 trust 
contribution 
0 discretionary 
allocation 
Key: 
Discretionary allocation 77% 
Trust contribution 12% 
Cost savings 3% 
Capital funds 8% 
Example of a typical NHS trust would be: 
Operations: Gained trust status in'1999 through the amalgamation of three hospitals. 
Employs: 4,500 staff (excluding contract workers numbering over 600) 
Total revenue: E213million (15% = E31.95million) 
Bed capacity: 800 beds. Annual admissions. 20,000 patients 
Therefore this trust must find the sum of E31.95 million and a 6% on its 77% allocation. 
Financing NHS trusts 
-Y) 
3% 8% 
Income is mainly from clinical services offered to Health Authorities, General Practitioner 
referred patients, private patient care and numerous Government bailouts from 
unbalanced budgets and financial deficits experienced by some NHS trusts. 
Cost savings can come from the sharing of facilities with private medical centres, savings 
through outsourced services like support services, reducing bureaucratic waste and using 
generic drug prescriptions (Ovretveit, 1995). For major capital projects like new hospitals, 
some trusts engage in Private Finance Initiatives (PFI), with all the attendant relationship 
management issues and organisational constraints engendered in external funding (Health 
Emergency, 2004a; Ovretveit, 1995). Consequently many trusts are under constant cost 
pressures and some run into financial difficulties in balancing their budgets (Beattie, 2005; 
Health Emergency, 2004a; Wilson, 2005). From April 2004 trusts received discretionary 
allocations as "payment by results" (Health Emergency, 2004a). This further increased the 
cost pressure and need for savings to reduce dependence on state bailouts and handouts. 
Discretionary allocations are made to NHS trust for meeting certain performance targets 
set by the Government. These include hospital cleaning standards, in-patient satisfaction 
with services received including choice of meals and waiting period of less than four hours 
in Accident and Emergency before patients are seen by a doctor and either discharged or 
admitted. However many support services managers complain that they spend so much 
time chasing some of the 472 targets that they have less time doing their work. Because 
the targets are aligned to star-ratings of the entire NHS trust, the allowance NHS trusts 
receive is dependent on maintaining their star-rating or being deemed an under-performing 
NHS trust with all the attendant economic loss, media attention and budgetary deficit 
necessitating Government bailout with funds to meet their budgetary need. Thus payment 
by results necessitate cost savings or revenue generation to reduce pressure on NHS 
trusts to meet targets and get the extra allowance to balance their annual budgets. 
Since dismantling the internal market, the new market framework focused on collaborative 
mechanisms based on partnership driven by competition and performance, have their 
critics. They have noted the "toxic incentives" and unrealistic "performance targets" 
(Appleby, 2002; Demos, 2002; Harding, 2005a; Lloyd, 2005a; Walker, 2005). 
Nevertheless, on the positive side, some NHS trusts have achieved these same targets 
and gained the requisite incentives to enable them attain autonomy and self-determination 
as foundation trusts (Goldman, 2005; Timmins, 2007). 
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To the relief of some managers, performance targets were withdrawn by the Department 
of Health in March 2006 due to "miscalculations" that resulted in financial problems, 
massive deficits and notable staff resignations (Harding, 2006; HSJ, 2006; Martin, 2006). 
Figure 2.4. Structure of the NHS in 1997 
(Adapted from The New NHS (1997: 8) 
Department of Health [DoH] 
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(Social Services) 
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Primary Care trusts 
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Key: Represents lines of managerial authority 
Represents lines of consultative/coordinating relationships 
2.6 Changes since dismantling the internal market 1997-2006 
The fundamental change and reforms in the NHS since 1997 has been a quest for 
performance effectiveness and operative efficiency in deploying financial and human 
resources to meet healthcare needs. During his revisit to Britain, in 2000 the American 
economist, Alain Enthoven revisited the subject of efficiency in the NHS and commented 
that Britain lacked needed resources and competition to achieve her healthcare objective 
of operational efficiency and performance effectiveness fit for the 21 st Century (Enthoven, 
2000). This is largely due to chronic under-funding (Portillo, 1998) resulting in observable 
decay in the buildings and shortage of staff and equipment, the inefficient use of available 
resources, wastage and the variations in performance across the health service. 
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Subsequently, health service funding has increased to unprecedented levels (20% of total 
public service spending or 8.9% of 2006 GDP) as shown in figure 2.5 below (Appleby and 
Boyle, 2000; Eaton, 2007; Fernman, 2000; Kaletsky, 2008; Watson, 2006), causing fears 
and worries among commentators (Crook and Blitz, 2004; Parris, 2004; Wilson, 2005). 
The Government has also produced a plan of action for reform with a coherent strategy, 
mechanisms for monitoring with incentives for better performance and sanctions for under- 
performing trusts (Appleby and Thomas, 2000; Dixon, 2000a). Thus the Government has 
taken a somewhat clecentralised approach, preferring to set standards, allocate resources 
to ensure equity and transfer power to local frontline staff to meet local need (DoH, 2002). 
But there is state reliance on incentives and monitoring of effectiveness by regulators to 
energise NHS trusts' managers to be accountable and more efficient in resource use 
while private contractors continue to be used in support services (Arie, 2005, Blair, 2005). 
Figure 2.5 Public Spending on the NHS1997-2008 (Watson, 2006: 60) 
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The present collaborative framework allows access to sharing of information, knowledge, 
learning and cost reduction from external others. The concept of partnerships developing 
into network of valuable relationships has been suggested (Levitt et al., 1995: 82; Thornton, 
1999). The advantages of negotiated agreement between collaborating partners in 
reducing conflict and cost of monitoring in long-term partnerships (Ovretveit, 1995) and 
the difficulties of studying the NHS as an organisation have also been highlighted 
(Fischbacher and Francis, 1999; Robinson and Le Grand, 1994; Ovretveit, 1995). The 
sequential and episodic nature of changes in the health service is well documented. 
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1997 2001 2003 2006 2008 
This thesis now explores the aims, objectives and activities of hotel services providers 
through their collective function in facilities management (FM) to provide a rounded picture 
of the agents involved in support services interaction. 
2.7 Facilities Management (FM) 
Facilities management originated in the United States of America (USA) in the 1960s, with 
banks outsourcing the processing of credit cards transactions to a central pool to focus on 
their main function of serving banking customers (Alexander et al., 2004; Nelson, 2004). 
From the 1980s it progressed to coordinating, developing and controlling of non-core 
specialist services like hotel services. By the 1990s facilities management has become a 
process by which an organisation ensures that its buildings, systems and services support 
its core operations and processes and contribute by enabling it to achieve its strategic 
vision or direction in a changing dynamic business environment (Alexander 1996). 
Facilities management can entail total outsourcing in the design, build, operate, manage or 
maintain hospital facilities to facilitate optimal use of premises (hard FM) with non-core 
"soft FW services to enable healthcare providers to focus solely on healthcare. The "soft 
FW services are hotel services-laundry, cleaning catering, housekeeping, security, 
interior decoration of buildings and information systems. However organisations can chose 
to outsource either the hard FM or soft FM or both as in total outsourcing. Indeed some 
NHS trusts investigated, like Theresa hospital has gone for total outsourcing while others 
like Victoria hospital has totally rebuilt County hospital while retaining the outsourced soft 
FM services at Victoria hospital. Thus, there is flexibility in outsourcing as seen in the 
range of services providers' involvement within NHS trusts (see figure 2.6 below). 
Facilities management is a new discipline and profession with few theories, academic 
research and publishing of its own (Alexander, 1996,2003). There is a growing need to 
secure the future of FM as a credible discipline built on strong theoretical foundation and 
dedicated to understanding and developing the discipline in areas of total outsourcing, risk 
assessment and management or facilities management and maintenance (Lai and Yik, 
2007; Okoroh et al., 2002; Rodney and Gallimore, 2002; Salonen, 2004; Walton, 2007). 
When facilities management is provided in the context of Private Finance Initiative (PFI), 
its risk assessment and management provide value for money in the efficient use of public 
resources and accountability from those involved (11ozor et al., 2002; Jones, 2000). Thus 
through total facilities management, the problems of combining resources, sharing control 
26 
and adding value to contractual relationships through creative designs and innovative 
buildings that transform local landscapes can be addressed (House of Commons, 2003). 
In the UK, the outsourcing of hotel services to commercial providers in 1983, invited the 
operators of facilities management, who are also multinational corporations (multinationals 
or MNC) into the health service as services providers (Gallagher, 1998; The Health 
Service, 1983; Thornton, 1999). Hotel service was a point of access for multinationals into 
the health service. Since then outsourcing has progressed to total outsourcing of both hard 
and soft FM, outsourcing of clinical imaging or information technology and major project 
funding through the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) and Private Finance Initiatives (PFI). 
Facilities management operators aim to deliver faster, better and cheaper services more 
efficiently and effectively than their competitors (Alexander, 1996; Gallagher, 1998). They 
also pride themselves with innovative ability to optimise the performance of their clients' 
business while adding value to business operations (Alexander et al., 2004; Vondle, 1989). 
By their activities, FM operators claim to enhance the public image of organisations they 
serve, develop a more productive work environment through better workplace design, help 
organisations attract higher calibre or more motivated employees and improve their ability 
to accommodate workplace changes now and in the future (McGregor and Then, 1999). 
2.7.1 The Advantage of FM Operators 
There is a large and varied literature on FIVI provision, ranging from contemporary 
journalism to academic studies. The multinational corporations that provide FM services 
are renown for possessing large resources, namely, finance, human capital of educated, 
experienced and skilled managers and personnel. Some of these are critical resources 
others organisations like NHS trusts need to provide them with uninterrupted support 
services for organisational survival or building capabilities like routines and processes for 
comparative advantage with other NHS trusts (Child, et al., 2000; Venables, 2005). 
Many of the old and dilapidated buildings crying out for funds have been replaced with 
creative design and workplaces improved for better working conditions (Ilozor et al., 2002). 
But NHS trusts have the option to outsource all or parts of the FM services on offer. 
They also possess expensive technology and information systems that aid management 
forecasting, decision-making and comprehensive record-keeping repository. 
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Figure 2.6 Scope of Facilities Management (FM) in the NHS 
(Adapted from Williams, 2002: 1.6) 
NHS Trust 
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-Machinery 
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Land & 
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desk 
Capital projects and 
General maintenance 
Lifts and electrics 
Notes: 
Estates And Facilities 
Department 
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Services 
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Business 
support 
Domestic or 
Ancillary Staff 
Support 
Non-medical and 
Surgical departments 
Information 
and 
Communication 
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Support 
Software 
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Support 
Systems, Asset 
and Projects 
Integration 
Facilities Management (total FM): -University College and Central Middlesex hospitals 
A. Estates department deals with buildings, hard assets and machinery maintenance 
B. Support or hotel services deals with catering, cleaning, laundry, portering and 
domestic staff. Most hospitals combine estates and hotel services as one unit 
C. Information systems dealing with all systems data generation and storage, 
information dissemination and systems maintenance 
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Most multinationals, especially the United States of America based ones, have an 
aggressive entrepreneurial attitude to investments and the flexibility to adapt quickly in 
response to environmental change (Ferner et al., 2004; Venables, 2005). Hence they can 
combine resources to greater efficiency of resource allocation or mobilise them to where 
needed to effectively improve the productivity and performance of client organisations like 
NHS trusts. The multinationals have also become unparalleled positive instruments or 
catalysts for social change by helping organisations with diverse professionals, like the 
health service; to cooperate and weather economic downturns and cost pressures to 
achieve consensus on cost reduction plans and revenue generation methods. Thus, they 
have enabled outsourced NHS trusts to reduce their dependence on Government funding 
alone and removed the uncertainty of funding in these NHS trusts through investments. 
Financial resources 
All FM providers in this study, as multinational corporations, are involved in or associated 
with global banking,, insurance houses and communication systems. They enjoy monopoly 
market position by setting up barriers to free trade and pooling risk capital away from other 
competitors (Child et al., 2000; Venables, 2005). For example, to form a consortium that 
can provide the total FM services needed by Theresa Hospital, Amek bought out Douglas 
to form Kingsland in order to combine support services with construction operations 
(Ralph, 2003: 44). This is because traditional building construction alone is fraught with 
cost overruns and low margins while total FM with support services can generate revenues 
with interest over longer peri 
' 
ods of thirty years, as is the case with the new facilities at 
Theresa Hospital. By their associations with international banks and Governments, and 
their competitive power in global economy, multinationals can easily obtain maximum tax 
breaks, circumvent local regulations and muster bargaining power in the policy-making 
arena (Venables, 2005). Because multinationals bring in scarce resources like technology, 
skilled personnel and investment funds in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
many Governments condone their activities to benefit from their wealth creative ability 
(Venables, 2005). For example, Multinationals gain entry into foreign nations through 
acquisitions of local firms (Child et al, 2000; Venables, 2005), licensing or agency 
contracts and alliance as the Japanese did in USA, Europe and Mexico (Ferner et al., 
2004). Thus their deep financial pockets allow them to undertake total FM provision in 
design, build, manage and maintain facilities for NHS trusts and wait out the long service 
contracts of thirty-five years before they recover investments. They have reduced the 
dependence of NHS trusts like Theresa and County Hospitals, others on Government 
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funding for capital projects but may also have transferred the dependency of these trusts 
on themselves. 
However their market dominance and financial resources deprive local and national FM 
providers the ability to meaningfully compete in the market place and so threaten their 
ability to contribute to national wealth creation (Salonen, 2004; Venables, 2005). 
For example there are no local or national FM providers in this study dominated by 
multinational corporations. Perhaps this is a case for further studies to unravel whyl 
Cost management 
Organisations gain competitive advantage through lower cost structure or differentiation in 
products or services (Haberberg and Rieple, 2001). Multinationals can access information 
on the cost structure of every element of equipment, product or service they use, buy or 
supply. They also understand details of their cost drivers and can utilise scale economies 
to reduce costs in energy utilisation, facilities repairs or maintenance (McGregor and Then, 
1999; Lai and Yik, 2007). Thus, they can make more meaningful cost analysis and work to 
reduce total costs, generate revenue by avoiding surplus capacity or utilizing redundant 
spaces, hence provide support services at a lower cost or add value to customer offering 
as best value providers in order to increase profits or return on investments. 
Furthermore through their global operations, distributions channels and integrated services 
multinationals enjoy lower inventory carrying costs by operating a just-in-time delivery, can 
reduce material cost by bulk buying or competitive procurement and through efficient fleet 
management, work order tracking and strict budgetary controls can gain cost advantage. 
Their materials and project management can reduce total costs through value engineering 
that eliminates all needless tasks and clients' demands that add no value to performance 
of primary function and so provide the required service at least cost (Williams, 2002). Thus 
multinationals as FM providers are able to compete favourably on cost advantage. 
Human resource 
Observers have long noted the relationship between development of human capital and 
firm profitability for competitive edge (Becker, 1993; Hope-Hailey, 2005; Ulrich, 1997). 
Facilities management work is said to be labour intensive and not too rewarding in terms 
of job satisfaction (Gallagher, 1998). 
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However the multinational FM providers have the resources to make the most of the 
theoretical advantages of work-force motivation. This is done through intensive on the job 
training, regular appraisals to determine personnel needs and a commitment to staff 
development. This raises the enthusiasm of a loyal workforce, who then use standardised, 
operating procedures and flexible working to achieve productivity and performance gains. 
The availability of equipment and automation also enhance workflow and reduces the time 
spent waiting for repairs or replacement equipments. Thus multinationals like other large 
conglomerates, understand the relationship between concern for the well-being of the 
workforce, development of human capital and the resultant higher productivity (Ferner et 
al., 2004; llozor et al., 2002; Venables, 2005). Through staff development and training, 
they unleash the commitment, loyalty and enthusiasm of the workforce to do and produce 
more even at lower wages than competitors. This was the case at Karena and Reinhard 
hospitals, where the services providers, paying lower wages than the health service, are 
still able to attract and retain ancillary staff better than the NHS did. 
But multinational FM providers also engage in brain drain by enticing the competent and 
best personnel away from local entrepreneurs by offering them better jobs and choice of 
work abroad without strings attached. They also have better incentive schemes like 
employee of the month and year, visible management with less blame culture and a more 
cohesive workforce as seen in this study. Hence they can deplete national reserve of 
knowledge and manual or ancillary workers whom they train or educate to become 
valuable resources in their own rights. Perhaps this is why there are no local FM providers. 
When organisations develop their personnel through intensive training, education and skill 
acquisition, they build human resource as valuable assets, by enriching other motivators of 
work apart from pay for better staff retention (Cappelli, 2000; Jolly, 2003; Savery, 1996). 
These dedicated personnel then deliver innovative, quality customer service, competitors 
cannot easily imitate as seen in some Japanese firms (Dyer, 1994; May and Suckley, 
ý005; Pfeffer, 1994a; Setlzer and Bentley, 1999). Consequently, by developing their 
human capital, multinational FM providers increase their resource base for competitive 
advantage. Even when staff members are retrenched, or reassigned, their training and 
skills acquired equip to liberate them for alternative employment or upward job mobility, as 
was the case in this study. 
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Physical resource 
Physical buildings can enhance business profiles and proclaim organisational and worker 
identity to the outside world (Alexander et al., 2004; Hosking and Haggard, 1999). Office 
layouts and facilities control social contacts and relationships of those who work in them 
and define the nature of their daily contact (Becker and Steele, 1995; Walton, 2007). 
Furthermore, business buildings give a symbolic quality to an organisation to reflect 
business vision and reinforce the power structure within the organisation through status 
symbols, space and location (Alexander, 2003; Hatch, 1997). It provides workers with a 
symbol of permanence, a haven of security and allows them to give of their best to their 
organisations (Alexander, 2003; Ilozor et al., 2002). The aesthetic and functional quality of 
the building and surroundings help improve ease or convenience, and the psychological or 
spiritual well-being of patients in a hospital setting (Hosking and Haggard, 1999; Rodney 
and Gallimore, 2002). FM providers can assist this "cultural landscaping" helping to 
improve local ownership of the hospitals as residents culturally identify with their local or 
community hospitals as seen at County hospital with local cultural prints, murals and 
landscaping. Innovative designs are built for looks, form, functionality or fitness for purpose 
and flexibility for future use (Eriksson, et al., 2007; Jones, 2000c; Walton, 2007). Thus, 
"hard FM" providers have the resources to build hospital facilities with imagination, 
creativity, innovation and engineering efficiency to provide an environmentally friendly and 
sustainable facility fit for purpose now and in the future without the need for relocation. 
This enhances the work environment and increases workflow for greater productivity from 
a less-stressed workforce (Munck, 2001; Okoroh et al., 2002). For example the facilities 
provided at Theresa and County hospitals are testaments to the ingenuity of facility design 
and aesthetic beauty that help project community spirit and aid regeneration. The open 
plan design aids workflow and working relationships. Those interviewed in both hospitals 
attest to their new environment being a source of motivation to get up in the morning for 
work and a centre of attraction in the commlinity. Such innovative designs that optimise 
available space are associated with change improvements, and organisational profitability 
(Alexander, 2003; Jones, 2000c). For example, University College London Hospital sold a 
redundant real estate in central London to turn its deficit into surplus (Gainsbury, 2008). 
Thus optimising the use of a redundant space and making profit for the NHS trust. 
The culture of preventive maintenance of buildings and machinery and the innovative use 
of land and vacant spaces can reduce the cost of managing buildings and increase 
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revenue generation or cost savings for NHS trusts served by these providers (Jones, 
2000c; Lai and Yik, 2007; Rodney and Gallimore, 2002; Williams, 2002). 
Any revenue generated is used to offset and reduce their total costs hence dependence on 
discretionary allowances to mitigate their cost pressures. Thus the FM providers, enable 
outsourced NHS trusts reduce cost pressures through preventive facilities maintenance 
and management and change their workings relationships and work environments. 
2.7.2 Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was introduced in 1992 and hailed as a far-reaching and 
radical change in capital investment in public service (HM Treasury, 1995; Payne, 2000). 
It was originally meant to help Local Governments finance the provision of social services 
and repair roads in their borough through private funding (DoH, 2003; HM Treasury, 1995). 
Their remit was expanded by the Labour Government to include a radical innovation in 
financing new facilities and support services in the NHS through partnerships (DoH, 2003). 
This dynamic change in the environment accorded the private sector the opportunity to 
finance, build and manage healthcare facilities and the attendant risks for the working life 
of such facilities (Rodney and Gallimore, 2002; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003). The FM 
providers already have resources for investment and the trained personnel to carry out the 
projects, thus PFI afforded them the window of opportunity for growth and to maximize 
profits and return on investments as well as become change agents in NHS trusts served. 
From these private investments, the public sector benefits through non-committal of their 
own capital, no risk to bear and the payment of one agreed set leasing price (Nutt and 
McLennan, 2000; Payne, 2000). Thus, physical property is no longer viewed as financial 
asset but a business service, hence helping to free up capital while reducing the total cost 
of building through partnerships and longer term investments (Harland et al., 2005; House 
of Commons, 2003). The freed up capital can be used to improve the quality of support 
services or healthcare business performance. 
PFI arrangements have allowed multinationals extend their services offerings to include 
major project funding and hence the flexibility of total FM service provision for NHS trusts. 
There is also an opportunity for those involved in the NHS trusts served to learn from their 
vendors in areas of resource combination, sharing ideas and knowledge to produce new 
knowledge that influence the innovative work place designs (Rodney and Gallimore, 2002; 
Salonen, 2005). There is learning in contract management and sharing of control through 
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interdependence for mutual benefits (Jones, 2000c). However the commercial operators 
have been in business much longer than their public sector counterparts. Consequently 
the learning curve may be steeper for services managers than originally envisaged (House 
of Commons, 2003). There are many areas of commercial interest to learn. For example, 
public sector managers must be knowledgeable and conversant with risk assessment and 
management and be able to negotiate fallback positions and contingency plans into future 
contract bids against non-performance or failure of contractors to secure equity capital. 
There are negotiations in sharing refinancing profits and securing bid prices that do not 
remove the incentive to perform or tie up future options in renegotiating contract prices to 
meet changing needs of their trusts. Managers need to understand contract arrangements 
and project management through effective relationship management in order to continue 
realising value for money from creative designs. But they are learning and PFI schemes 
offer them the opportunity to learn commercial discipline within appropriate governance 
mechanisms. Thus, the public sector benefits from PFI schemes as services managers 
continue to learn through knowledge transfer from their commercial counterparts. 
Information systems (IS) 
Information systems and the accompanying telecommunication technology are important 
sources of power in global competition (Eccles, 1991; Starbuck, 1992; Quinn et al., 1996). 
They can also improve electronic monitoring and security of facilities like hospitals. 
They are used by organisations like FM providers to integrate all systems, store data from 
financial and non-financial performance measurements to market share, human resource 
and innovative project details (Eccles, 1991). They are also used to monitor or track client 
needs and objectives, technology in use and service delivery in order to improve customer 
satisfaction through total cost reduction or added value (Nelson, 2004; Williams, 2002). 
Consequently, information systems are the intelligence of the organisation, a repository of 
information and monitoring device that helps FM providers add value to client offerings or 
be a least cost provider and improve their own profitability for competitive advantage. 
At County and Theresa hospitals, the information systems have improved the central 
monitoring of systems and reduced the time taken for security staff to deal with bogus fire 
alarms and hence improve patient and staff safety especially at night. Furthermore, 
information systems aid management decision-making through scenario planning to 
generate alternative options for better forecasting in any situation or challenge and for 
tracking the performance of the workforce whose incentives are aligned to performance 
measures (Eccles, 1991: 133). 
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For FM providers in particular, information systems help them maintain strict budgetary 
controls over projects like healthcare facilities, by cutting out unnecessary and wasteful 
duplication of practices and eliminating needless tasks that add no value to the 
performance of client operations (Atkin and Brooks, 2000; Williams, 2002; Payne, 2000). 
Information systems also aid competitive procurement of goods for services delivery. They 
help monitor supply chain, supplier movements (Nelson, 2004), benchmarked least price 
payable for goods and the efficient use of the workforce for effective service delivery 
(Williams, 2002). Consequently, information systems and technology are vital resources 
for FM providers and indeed form part of the total FM as shown in figure 2.6 above. 
The main benefits of information systems to FM providers is in storing, analysing and 
tracking information or data on their operations, record keeping, integrating all projects and 
systems in order to maximize profits through a more cost effective and efficient operation 
that avoids wastage or duplication (Alexander et al., 2004; Williams, 2002). However the 
centralisation of such vital information and records of any organisation in the possession of 
their services providers can become a source of power and control over the client, making 
NHS trusts involved in total FM dependent on their services providers. For example, the 
FM providers in total FM like Theresa and County hospitals, will own, manage and 
maintain their healthcare facilities for the next thirty-five years. They have the power to 
allocate status symbols like office location and parking spaces. They can lock or unlock 
doors at will and impose security checks on all members of staff, as is the case in this 
study. All the information on staff movement and all the systems in the facilities are 
centrally monitored and records kept and owned by the FM providers. This gives the 
erstwhile "underdogs of support services" power and control over NHS trust workers, their 
movements and security for thirty-five years hence (Zukin, 1991)l 
These are broadly the perceived advantages and unintended consequences of FM 
services provision from multinationals to outsourced NHS trusts. 
This thesis now explores how NHS trusts can efficiently and effectively deploy financial 
and human resources to improve organisational outcomes and realise their outsourcing 
objectives. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review: Resource acquisition through 
outsourcing and relationship management 
3.1 Introduction 
Increasing global competition and changing technology including information technology 
combined have shifted organisational goal from simply economising to adding value 
(Pettigrew and Fenton, 2000; Power et al., 2004). Multicultural customers now demand 
added value in products and services not just cheaper prices while organisations struggle 
to achieve or maintain competitive advantage (Campbell, 1995; Khong, 2005; Power et al., 
2007). Outsourcing can enable firms tap into new ideas, knowledge and creativity through 
access to services' providers resources like skills, experience, specialised equipment and 
investments to provide services of better quality, at lower costs than in-house departments 
(Campbell, 1995i Sveiby, 1997; Power et al., 2007). Outsourcing can also enable workers 
seize the opportunity for career development and advancement to sharpen and upgrade 
their skills to professional standards and so liberate themselves from manual workers to 
professionals (Leavy, 2004; Sveiby, 1997). Consequently, organisations outsource 
peripheral functions to benefit from its cost reduction or value for money and added value. 
The business interaction between hotel services managers and their services providers, 
Government agencies, charitable organisations and the private healthcare sector involves 
relationships. The decision to outsource services was made for them. Adding value to firm 
activities underlies the literature on outsourcing, the resource-based view of the firm and 
strategic alliances, centred on inter-firm relationships or partnerships (Pettigrew and 
Fenton, 2000; Eriksson and Laan, 2007). Observers note that business is about 
relationships that provide the context of interaction, cooperation and collaboration for the 
successful coordination of economic activity (Webb and Laborde, 2005). Others comment 
that businesses can be transformed through relationships that enable firms gain access to 
more efficient specialist skills, best practice and investments to respond to business needs 
(Linder et al., 2002). Such businesses can become profitable and effective through better 
focus on core functions, social support and input of new ideas (Elmuti and Kathawala, 
2000). Thus business relationships are at the core of successful resource acquisition and 
utilisation for creating value through innovation and learning for competitive advantage. 
The literature on inter-firm relationships is reviewed below. Also reviewed are resource 
dependence theory, transaction cost economics and interaction model, concerned with 
resource acquisition, governance frameworks and contractual relationship management. 
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3.2 Outsourcing: Accessing resources through contracts 
Some organisations choose contractual arrangements like outsourcing to access scarce 
resources in order to reduce costs or build capabilities and competence for competitive 
advantage (Das and Teng, 2000; Leavy, 2004). The literature treats outsourcing differently 
from strategic alliances probably because outsourcing of non-critical functions is usually 
concerned with enhancing specialisation and organisational focus on core activities to 
build capabilities for competitive advantage (Gadde and Snehota, 2000; Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990). The motives for strategic alliances (section 3.6) on the other hand, range 
from co-option of potential competitors and learning to internalisation of knowledge for 
creating value (Doz and Hamel, 1998). However, both are contractual in nature, involve 
hybrid structures and are concerned with collaborative arrangements with external others. 
Researchers proffer many reasons why organisations choose to outsource semi-critical or 
non-critical functions (Cross, 1995; Fill and Visser, 2000; Jennings, 2002; Lacity et al., 
1995; Peisch, 1995). Outsourcing refers to "subcontracting custom-made articles, products 
or services, construction components or sub-assemblies to another company" (Fill and 
Visser, 2000). Outsourcing is essentially 'contracting for results' not collegiate obligations 
or assets (Peisch, 1995: 32). For services, outsourcing is seen as a solution to the quest 
for a continuous, reliable and uninterrupted service (Cross, 1995; Fill and Visser, 2000). 
Outsourcing may be total, as in design, build and deliver arrangements, or selective as in 
payroll and information technology or in-betweens (Davis, 2004; Fill and Visser, 2000). 
Why study outsourcing in line with other studies? 
Many studies used participants' perceptions to document the benefits of outsourcing. But 
none of them specifically involved support services outsourcing in the NHS., For example, 
some studies analysed the effects, advantages and impact of outsourcing (Elmuti and 
Kathawala, 2000; Heide and John, 1990; Khong, 2005; Webb and Laborde, 2005). Others 
investigated public sector organisations (Lacity and Willcocks, 1997; Lim et al., 2007) and 
facilities management in the health service (Okoroh et al., 2002; Rodney and Gallimore, 
2002). Others studied customer services (Khong, 2005) and logistics (Power et al., 2007), 
to document the benefits of outsourcing as in this study. From these studies, the perceived 
benefits of outsourcing range from access to provider resources, cost reduction to value 
for money. To these benefits, this study adds learning, innovation, career development 
and advancement for the liberation of workers as added value. Thus the value-adding 
benefits of outsourcing are worth examining. 
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3.2.1 Cost reduction 
Organisations outsource non-critical functions or services in order to reduce in-house cost 
of production (Jennings, 2002) or acquire skilled personnel (Joshua-Amadi, 2002,2003; 
Lacity et al., 1995; Peisch, 1995). Some firms outsource troublesome functions to focus on 
core competence or enhance resources (Cross, 1995; Dyer, 1997; Peters and Waterman, 
1982), while others maximize flexibility and control for competition (Fill and Visser, 2000; 
Lacity et al., 1995). For example, Cross (1995: 102), noted that British Petroleum (BP) 
outsourced their information technology to effectively focus on 'finding and producing 
hydrocarbons' while Microsoft and Intel both concentrate on research and development, 
outsourcing al'I other functions like administration, security, production and marketing of 
their products (Davis, 2004). Similarly, Apple computer focused on creating a user-friendly 
design and appearance of its hardware and software while outsourcing the rest of its 
functions (Quinn et al., 1990), while Honda used its exclusive engineering skills to become 
a world leader in small engine production, outsourcing the production of other motor parts 
(Dyer, 1997). Peisch (1995) posited that the hospital he studied outsourced all its surgical 
services for skilled personnel to leverage surgical competence from experts. Consequently 
researchers believe that some organisations can become more productive and competent 
using managerial time and effort to deliver added value to customers by concentrating on 
their core competence and outsourcing peripheral functions to external experts. 
3.2.2 Access to skill and knowledge for adding value 
Organisations can access skills, experience and expertise through outsourcing to build 
capabilities (Grimshaw and Miozzo, 2006; Rock, 1999) or add value to customer offerings 
(Grossberg, 2004; Huber, 1993; Leavy, 2004; Linder et al., 2002). For example: services 
outsourcing enabled ServiceMaster to build its unique capability in maintenance services 
to become an important market innovator and repository of market knowledge and 
expertise (Quinn et al., 1990). Continental bank caused a stir in 1991 by being the first 
bank to outsource its "crown jewels" of information technology in order to concentrate on 
customer relationships that form the core of the bank's business (Huber, 1993). Similarly, 
supermarkets now offer mortgages and loans through banks and building societies, to 
process these services and share in their risks and rewards while adding value to their 
customer offerings (Rock, 1999). Building contractors have become more versatile in their 
service offerings through outsourcing to become industry giants in facilities management 
and so earn higher streams of revenues and profits (Jones, 2000c; Ralph, 2003). 
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Some organisations have used outsourcing to enter new markets (Grinshaw and Miozzo, 
2006; Grossberg, 2004) while others used it to enable them reap rewards of innovation 
using the resources of their vendors (Leavy, 2004; Linder et al., 2002; Quinn, 2000). 
Other organisations have become more flexible and in control of their operations freed 
from distractions and troublesome functions thereby cutting investments in these areas to 
build unique capabilities in other areas (Davis, 2004; Huber, 1993; Quinn et al., 1990). 
Some have transformed their organisations through resource acquisition and overcome 
the resistance to change (Linder et al., 2002) or become a learning organisation through 
outsourcing (Jamali et al., 2006; Senge, 1990; Quinn, 1999). Some workers used the 
outsourcing opportunity to upgrade their skills, improve their image, employability and self- 
esteem and liberated themselves from manual workers to professionals (Sveiby, 1997; 
Khong, 2005). Others saved on the cost of risky investments till such services became 
established and successful or outsourced manual tasks to save costs through the scale 
economies of external experts (Huber, 1993; Rock, 1999). For example: Barclays Bank 
teamed up with British Telecom to establish Internet banking while outsourcing its help 
desk telephone service involving manual repetitive tasks, to improve service quality to 
users and save costs. Thus outsourcing can benefit organisations in different ways. 
But for many organisations, efficiency gains are the main reasons for outsourcing (Cross, 
1995; Elmuti, 2003; Fill and Visser, 2000; Knight, 2004), or mimicking the Shamroch 
organisation (Handy, 1996) by outsourcing peripheral activities such as payroll, legal, 
information technology, hotel services and peripheral personnel to contractors to reduce 
total costs (Elmuti and Kathawala, 2000). Some firms streamlined or reduced staffing 
levels to save on salaries, pensions and benefits (Cross, 1995; IPD, 1995; Peisch, 1995). 
Outsourcing can also provide cost efficiency for capital projects, through outsourcing 
dormant or non-critical functions to outside specialist who have access to superior cost 
drivers like low cost locations, expertise, learning and scale economies to reduce unit 
costs (Davis, 2004; Jennings, 2002; Peisch, 1995). Similarly, dormant resources like office 
space can be redeployed to earn revenue streams for other projects or increase corporate 
profitability (Lacity et al., 1995; Khong, 2005; Peisch, 1995). Some firms used outsourcing 
to reduce inventory and possibility of obsolescence or restructured their budgets thereby 
turning fixed into variable costs (Huber, 1993; Lacity and Hirscheim, 1999). 
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3.2.3 Un-materiallsed cost savings 
While many organisations (68%) enjoy savings in time and money (Labour Research, 
2005a; Rock, 1999), for others, the perception of cost savings may not always materialise 
leaving them disappointed and frustrated (Currie et al., 1999; Fill and Visser, 2000; 
Lacity et al., 1995; Labour Research, 2005d; Peisch, 1995; Rock, 1999; ). Reasons for this 
range from hidden costs such as irrecoverable value-added tax (VAT), start up costs that 
can only be recovered through the lifetime of the contract and different assessment of cost 
drivers, to changes in need and expectations (Lacity and Hirchheim, 1999; Rock, 1999). 
For example, clients assume vendors' costs must be lower due to scale economies and 
specialisation but vendors must generate fair profit for shareholders while in-house 
operations only need to recover cost (Lacity and Hirchheim, 1999; Power et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, according to traditional Transaction Cost Economics, in-house operations 
can minimize their total transaction cost due to efficient system of reward And punishment 
that can discourage employee opportunism while outsourcing involves initial search and 
contract negotiation costs and later, coordinating, performance monitoring and contract 
enforcement costs to mitigate opportunism of vendors (Williamson, 1975,1981,1991). 
Also when there are few vendors with enough financial backup facilities to engage in total 
outsourcing, they can take advantage of their captive customers through hidden costs 
(Barth6lemy, 2001; Barth6lemy and QuNin, 2006). Thus, contracts without built-in cost 
flexibility to accommodate changes in client expectation and need, (internal uncertainty), 
will always be froth with disappointment, frustrations and unrealised expectations. 
But the initial assessment of potential cost savings is problematic (Power et al., 2004). 
Proponents of cost-efficiency note that such expectations may be illusionary due to what 
Lacity et al., (1995), call 'hidden agendas and divergent interests'. Thus, total costs may 
escalate beyond expectations. For example, misunderstood contract details, reduced 
performance standards or expected quality unrealised, may all reduce the total anticipated 
cost savings (Cross, 1995; Davis, 2004; Peisch, 1995). Williamson (1975) admits that 
costs are difficult to assess. He notes that costs depend on the frequency of transactions 
and the threat of opportunism or Williamson's (1996: 215) "self-interest seeking with 
guile". Thus, Williamson (1996) advises buyers, to assess monitoring and coordination 
costs against in-house production. Consequently, observers have advised outsourcers to 
decompose their cost drivers (table 3.1) and evaluate where outsourcing can save them 
money (Davis, 2004; Leavy, 2004; Power et al., 2004). Total transaction costs can be 
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controlled and reduced by reducing excessive and frivolous demands and tying service 
usage to costs (Huber, 1993; Lacity and Hirchheim, 1999; Rock, 1999). Furthermore 
clients should weigh other intangible benefits that accrue from outsourcing to compensate 
them. These are the elimination of troublesome functions, saving in management time and 
effort, turning fixed into variable costs, reduced uncertainty in services provision, the 
improvements in service delivery and innovation (Anderson and Goodman, 2002; Davis, 
2004; Currie and Galliers, 1999; Labour Research, 2005d; Storey and Salaman, 2005). 
Table 3.1 Suggested areas to outsource (Davis 2004) 
KEEP IN-HOUSE OUTSOURCE 
All core functions All peripheral functions 
All profitable functions All overused functions seen as internal cost 
Troublesome functions seen as headache, 
distraction or frustrations 
Non-transferable Critical resource 
L 
Functions that maximise flexibility (staffing) 
I 
3.2.4 Political imperative 
Organisations are political entities (Hall, 1991; Handy, 2000; Hatch, 1997). Outsourcing 
decisions may be more influenced by organisational politics and needs of the dominant 
coalition than economic or stakeholder considerations. Thus there are many reasons why 
organisations outsource within the political imperative. These range from credibility 
enhancement, where directors outsource their kingdoms to show that they are corporate 
players. Many jump on the bandwagon of others' success and media reports without 
detailed analysis of their cost drivers or with hazy expectations only to be disappointed and 
be forced to rebuild their in-house operations at extra costs (Lacity and Hirchheim, 1999; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; IPD, 1998). Others may outsource their services to prove that 
in-house team need more funding to provide the same level of services as outside 
contractors (Bruce, 1998; Power et al., 2004; Rodney and Gallimore, 2002; Teisberg et al., 
1994). Some are constrained by the efficiency drives to streamline staffing levels or dump 
the efficiency initiatives on services contractors whom they blame for failure to make their 
outsourced operations more efficient (Rock, 1999; IPD, 1998). But observers note that 
managerial practices like consolidating data centres, centralisation of information for 
common usage and the tightening of controls can aid efficiency gains more than vendorst 
scale economies or specialisation (Lacity and Hirchheim, 1999; IPD, 1998). 
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3.2.5 Outsourcing process (IPD manual, 1998; Table 3.2 below) 
Outsourcing involves a complex process of coordinating activities between networks of 
other organisations for maximum effectiveness (Bruce, 1998; Davis, 2004; Rock, 1999). 
The process begins with a decision to solve an organisational problem followed by an 
analysis of organisational strengths and weakness in terms of resources and capabilities 
to be matched with external opportunities and threats from competitors (Coulter, 2005). In 
the case of public sector organisations, there are regulators, political policies and diverse 
stakeholders' interests to consider (Jones, 2000; Lin et al., 2007). Outsourcing of services 
ends with managing the contractual relationships with providers to achieve the expected 
outcomes (Davis, 2004; Huber, 1993). The inability to properly manage this relationship is 
a source of most outsourcing failures (Elmuti and Kathawala, 2000; Webb and Laborde, 
2005). Observers note that top management involvement and commitment in outsourcing 
is needed for a successful outcome (Linder et al., 2002; Khong, 2005; Power et al., 2004). 
Executives must take the lead in assessing what is to be outsourced, redirect resources 
needed, overcome obstacles and resistance to change and help to minimize the effects of 
outsourcing such as job losses, redeployment and loss of morale in those who are left. 
Where chief executives took the lead, outsourcing enabled the organisation to transform 
itself, as seen in Sainsbury supermarket (Linder et al., 2002). The reverse is also true. 
3.2.6 Situation analysis 
Fundamental to the belief of outsourcing is that organisations focus their time and effort on 
their core, profitable and unique businesses and outsource the rest (Davis, 2004; Rock, 
1999). Thus, a thorough analysis of the present position must be made (Coulter, 2005). 
This will indicate how outsourcing can help organisations concentrate effort on chosen 
businesses through access to skills, technology and knowledge, eliminate troublesome 
functions and enter new markets or new businesses. 
Situation analysis generates a clear reason to outsource for which a strategy is crafted 
based on internal resources and capabilities against external opportunities and threats 
(Coulter, 2005; IPD, 1998). Strategy is defined as a goal-directed decision and action in 
which a firm's capabilities and resources are matched with opportunities and threats in its 
environment (Coulter, 2005: 5). It is the duty of management to build consensus through 
open, honest and credible communication to prepare those concerned with envisaged 
major changes and obtain ownership of the strategy crafted (Huber, 1993; Leavy, 2004). 
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The failure of some organisations to adequately analyse their situation, craft a suitable 
strategy, communicate meaningfully and timely with affected staff to gain ownership of 
changes that affect their lives may result in outsourcing failure. 
3.2.7 Implementing the plan 
A detailed study of the feasibility of outsourcing is needed not only to analyse the risks 
involved but plans to minimize them and avoid later dissatisfaction and frustrations (Huber, 
1993; IPD, 1998; Rock 1999). Vendor selection is simplified by the array of experienced 
consultants who now undertake helping organisations analyse, screen and negotiate 
contract agreements that work over the long term (Davis, 2004, Huber, 1993; IPD, 1998; 
Rock, 1999). Vendors are selected based on their skill, experience, expertise, reputation, 
performance record, financial viability and ability to provide backup or disaster recovery for 
un-interrupted service (IPD, 1998; Linder et al., 2002; Rock, 1999). Outsourcing firms are 
advised to always balance vendors' experience, ability, reputation and quality or value they 
can add to organisational effectiveness with their contract price to avoid the choice of 
cheapest supplier that may result in unrealised objectives (Khong, 2005; Moore, 2007). 
Having selected an appropriate vendor, contract details are hammered out through due 
diligence in important areas of legal, specifications, personnel, service levels, security and 
joint working agreements to avoid later disagreements, conflict and penalties or arbitration. 
Thus time spent under due diligence in working out details will save disappointments later. 
For the health service, NHS Procurement acts as their outsourcing consultant to ensure 
uniformity of properly structured contracts that meet with European Union policies (Cabinet 
Office, 1998). However, senior management are advised to pay particular attention to 
personnel and union issues that conform to European Union (EU) regulations (IPD, 1998; 
Rock, 1999) or face legal consequences of non-conformity with European Acquired Rights 
Directives of Transfer Undertakings Protection of Employees Regulation (TUPE, 1981). 
3.2.8 Transfer of Undertakings for the Protection of Employees Regulation (1981) 
The growing interdependence of economies and job mobility of workers resulting from 
globalisation and outsourcing prompted a need for the uniformity and harmonisation of 
Human Resource practices in the European Union (Ohmae, 1995; Lansbury and Baird, 
2004; Sumetzberger, 2004). This is known as Transfer of Undertakings for the Protection 
of Employees (TUPE) Regulation. The aim of the regulation is to protect workers' rights in 
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employment relations as they are transferred from one employer to another across 
boarders within the European Union (EU) and to ensure the continuity of employment. 
However TUPE provides only limited protection for such workers due to many reasons. 
Firstly, the regulation is complex and contains legal loopholes open to alternative 
interpretations and local meaning. Secondly, the regulation does not and cannot cover all 
aspects of employment relations and work reorganisations. Thirdly, most employment 
contracts are incomplete and workers lose track of their original contract details over time. 
Table 3.2 Outsourcing process (IPD, 1998) 
Make or buy Senior management to decide after situation analysis 
decision 
Reasons for Be clear of objective, scope and focus of main goal to attain 
outsourcing 
What to All peripheral functions, non core, non-profitable or unique 
outsource 
Gain consensus Communicate strategy to all concerned, union and staff, to maintain 
and ownership productivity, staff morale and alley fears fed by gossip. Compromise 
Get specialist consultants' help to analyse, screen vendors and 
Vendor selection negotiate binding contracts based on measurable service parameters 
or engage skilled and experienced contract managers to hammer out 
mutually beneficial but flexible terms. Know limits of contractor remit. 
Allow due diligence procedure to verify or change data/specifications 
Draft in arbitration, termination clauses and controls for change 
Relationship Senior management involvement, support and commitment needed. 
management Partnership of mutual respect, open communication and problem 
solving more successful than adversarial confrontation and blame 
Transition period Reality dawns. Culture clashes, redundancies, teething problems. 
(90 days) Define roles and authorize responsibilities. Reduce resistance to 
changing roles. Post implementation and quality reviews needed. 
Open dialogue and counsel for concerned staff to find new jobs 
Progress Regular reviews of whole service to identify and solve problems. 
Search for service improvements. Regular reporting for corrections. 
Manage relationship with mutual respect and cultural awareness. 
Communicate. Manage change, uncertainties and share benefits 
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Fourthly, most workers base their relationship with employers on the "psychological 
contract" of mutual expectations rather than formal employment contracts (Argyris, 1962; 
Cooke et al., 2004). Lastly although new employers under TUPE assume all powers, 
rights, obligations, duties and liabilities of the transferred workers, they are only obligated 
to consider salaries, holidays and sickness pay but not pensions. Furthermore, new 
employers can streamline their workforce under the guidelines offered by TUPE for 
economic, technical or organisational (ETO) reasons. Thus, employers can repackage and 
offer revised employment relations that are either favourable or detrimental to transferred 
workers. The UK Government offered guidelines to those involved in outsourcing (market 
testing), where workers are transferred in 1993 and ratified it in 1996 (Cabinet Office, 
1996). But the legal loopholes can still favour new employers hence the different research 
findings between the intended and implemented policies (Khilji and Wang, 2006). 
Researchers who studied the effectiveness of TUPE reported a diversity of findings even 
within the same organisation employing workers at different locations (Cooke at al., 2004; 
Lansbury and Baird, 2004; Sumetzberger, 2004). For example in their case studies of 
hotel services and estates facilities under PFI, Cooke et al., (2004) found that the reasons 
for the transfer of workers from public sector employment to a commercial one were 
essentially to reduce costs and improve the efficiency of the services. They also found a 
high level of worker resistance to changes being made by the new commercial employer 
such as team-working and multi-skilling or generic working. These findings are consistent 
with the problems found during the transition or due diligence stage of change, as workers 
transfer from the public to the private sector. In contrast to their study, all the outsourced 
services in this study have been in place from four to twenty years. Thus the commercial 
services providers have already streamlined the workforce and found alternative work for 
those unwilling to accept changes or work in the commercial sector. 
3.2.9 Outsourcing relationship management 
Senior management must be involved and fully committed to managing the resultant 
relationship for without their support, observers say that outsourcing goes awry (Blumberg. 
2001; House of Commons, 2003; Linder et al., 2002; May and Suckley, 2005; Power et al., 
2004). They have the unenviable task of overcoming obstacles and resistance to change, 
communicating the risks and rewards to be shared and dealing with people issues. They 
also need to redirect resources and encourage the acquisition of skills (Sheu et al., 2006). 
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Relationship can be through partnership with suppliers, where partnership is defined as "a 
collaborative and interactive business relationship between a company and its supplier" 
(Bruce, 1998: 1). In such a relationship, both parties are mutually dependent in terms of 
inputs, co-production and resultant rewards. Such partnerships entail the management of 
sensitive relationships on personal, social and business levels, as suppliers help clients 
meet their business needs while retaining control, and avoid the difficulty of adversarial 
confrontations some outsourcers experience (Bruce, 1998; Kanter, 1994, Teisberg et al., 
1994; Webb and Laborde, 2005). Such long-term relationships are built on teamwork, 
trust, mutual respect, constant communication and cooperation (Blumberg, 2001) to iron 
out possible misunderstandings or cultural clashes and so improve service quality through 
innovation and reduce costs (Barney and Hansen, 1994; Elmuti and Kathawala, 2000). For 
example, while Ford Motors used to rely on adversarial supplier contracts with resultant 
bad relationships (Campbell, 1995; Key et al., 1994: 28), Marks and Spencer and Benetton 
worked closely with suppliers to influence their product quality and encourage flexibility to 
adjust to changes and maintain continuous innovation that helped build capability into 
routines and reduced total costs (Bruce, 1998; Jennings, 2002). But despite all care 
outsourcing can still fail due to the reasons listed in table 3.2 above. 
Customer relationship management (CRM) 
However to reduce the incidence of outsourcing failures, Osarenkhoe and Bennani (2007), 
list the core requisites of effective customer relationship management (CRM) as follows: 
(a) emphasis on quality of products or services provided 
(b) effective management of the gap between customer expectation and 
performance in order to satisfy the needs of customers 
(C) investment in the workers (training) and giving them incentives to enable and 
motivate them to give professional services to customers and increase profits 
(d) communication and meaningful dialogue with customers in order to listen and 
adapt to their individual preferences and so retain their custom and loyalty. 
(e) setting realistic targets to monitor and assess performance in order to better 
understand the elements of customer services offering to expand and meet 
other needs of the customer for prolonged mutual benefits 
In this study, customer relationship management is brought to the fore to enable services 
providers expand their offerings to meet customer needs beyond outsourcing expectation 
and so retain their custom and loyalty and increase their profits over longer periods. 
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3.2.10 Outsourcing controversy 
Outsourcing in general is said to have hit a plateau (Caulkin, 2007; Preston, 2004). This is 
probably because of dissatisfaction with the impact of sourcing decisions on the business, 
uncompetitive costs, and unrealised objectives. Other reasons range from lock-in effects 
that preclude flexibility for other business relationships (Preston, 2004; Power et al., 2004) 
to changing needs and expectation or loss of in-house competence (Power et al., 2007). 
Outsourcing in the NHS has not been without controversy (Labour Research, 2004,2005c, 
2005d). Some called outsourcing an emotional process (Webb and Laborde, 2005). For 
example: support services were outsourced in 1983 to involve the private sector in the 
NHS but to date it has not been accepted and still arouses fierce passions (Carlise, 2007). 
The unions call for a freeze in services outsourcing because it means loss of jobs for their 
members due to the central Government's plan known as "Peter Gershon's efficiency 
drive" to streamline personnel and save revenue. It also claimed that support services 
outsourcing meant low wages for union members, paid by contractors who must acquire 
all support services workers as part of the contract deal (Labour Research, 2005b). Many 
complain that cost containment promised has not materialised probably due to changing 
expectation, lack of flexibility in their contracts or lack of focus in services improvements 
(Key et al., 1994; Labour Research, 2005d; Moore, 2007). Some unions regard services 
outsourcing as part of "the Government's obsession with market-driven Tory policies" and 
have cut their. Labour party contributions to make their point (Labour Research, 2005a). 
Some NHS trusts regard services outsourcing and extended choice for patients as 
needless expansion of capacity when their own facilities lie idle and unutilised (Johnson, 
2005). Others complain about hospital cleanliness and link it to outsourcing (Moore, 2007). 
Furthermore, the issues of leaking confidentiality to vendors and external others, ethical 
consideration and lack of real benefits has continued to plague the outsourced national 
healthcare information technology to date (Anderson and Goodman, 2002; Foster, 2005). 
But despite the controversies, services outsourcing will continue in the NHS, alongside a 
strong central control and domination and may even increase by 25% to increase capacity 
and capability of the whole system (Arie, 2005; Bellamy, 2002; Blair, 2005; Crisp, 2005). 
Outsourcing is generally plagued by controversies due to the changes it brings (Linder et 
al., 2002; Webb and Laborde, 2005). People dislike the resultant disruption, loss of job 
security and uncertainty of outsourcing outcome (Power et al., 2004). Others fear the loss 
of control over services, the inevitable dependence on vendors, the risk of transferring 
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people, production and services to outside vendors, hidden cost and the cost of rebuilding 
services should outsourcing fail (Khong, 2005; Leavy, 2004). There is the risk of losing in- 
house skill when learning opportunity is ceded to a vendor. For example: General Motors 
outsourced the production of microwaves to Samsung of Korea only to become involved in 
a dependency spiral that culminated in the loss of a learning opportunity and dominance of 
the microwave market by Samsung (Leavy, 2004). 
These controversial issues are reflected in this study and are discussed in chapter 5 
3.2.11 Public sector organisations 
Outsourcing in the public sector is generally regarded as a complex, politically sensitive 
process involving many stakeholders often with different views, conflicting objectives and 
agendas (Lin et al., 2007; Harland, Knight and Lamming, 2005). There is pressure on them 
to function like private commercial firms deemed to be more efficient, even though public 
sector organisations are not designed to be efficient but to be fair and accountable as 
constrained by the political timetable for the public good (Lin et al., 2007). Furthermore, 
public sector organisations are plagued with inefficient and ineffective management 
practices, that build slack into the system and increase total costs while the commercial 
sector are motivated by economic considerations (Lin et al., 2007). Public organisations 
are often required to provide better social services like healthcare but often with reduced 
budgets although the funding for the NHS has been increased during the present 
administration (Eaton, 2007). Consequently, some public sector organisations are forced 
to determine what it means to achieve best value for money locally in place of efficiency. 
3.2.12 Why outsourcing falls 
Observers note that 30-50% of all outsourcing ventures fail due to lack of well-defined 
focus or contract management (Davis, 2004; Labour Research, 2005d). Other reasons for 
failure are said to be the inability of suppliers to deliver projects on time and within costs, 
failure of purchasers to realise the level of expected savings or dissatisfaction with 
outcomes (Currie and Galliers, 1999; Labour Research, 2005d; Moore, 2007; Rock, 1999). 
Outsourcing ventures also fail because parties to interaction may fail to address potential 
problems early to save time, effort and misunderstanding while some make pre-contractual 
mistakes and fail to clearly define the scope, objective and focus of outsourcing (IPD, 
1998; Lacity and Hirschheim, 1999; Rock, 1999). There may be loss of shared vision and 
ownership of the whole venture or lack of compromise between parties to interaction 
(Lacity and Hirschheim, 1999). For some there may be lack of senior management support 
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and commitment to see it through. For others when expected efficiency and cost savings 
fail to materialise due to hidden costs, inexperience in contract bidding and process 
management, lack of understanding of scope of operations and changes in expectation, 
they lose interest due to unmet expectations (House of Commons, 2003; IPD, 1998; Rock, 
1999). People problems can present as cultures or personality clashes, lack of mutual 
respect or cultural awareness (IPD, 1998; Rock, 1999). Also because most people dislike 
change and uncertainty that produce a sense of loss, instability and anger from disruption 
of routines and relationships, they resist outsourcing initiatives and do not make the 
commitment needed to engage in managing the relationship for mutual benefits (Rock, 
1999). Thus managers are advised to carefully weigh the cost of services outsourcing 
against its benefit before embarking on such ventures. 
Other organisations that outsource to weather seasonal downturns or reduce competitive 
pressures may lose the capacity and competence to take advantage of market changes 
when there is an upturn in demand (Lacity et al., 1995). Similarly, lean, flexible and core 
competence focused firms may lose the ability to build tomorrow's capability due to lack of 
relevant resources or narrow vision. Indeed, such firms may be stuck with obsolete 
functions or lose competitive advantage due to lack of flexibility (Cross, 1995). Jennings 
(2002) cites the case of Boeing operating lean supply that resulted in their inability to meet 
cyclical increase in demands and so lost market position and profitability. Thus outsourcing 
like alliance formation, to access resources for competitive advantage, can become 
double-edged (Leonard-Baton, 1992). They shield firms from competitive pressures but 
when conditions change, they can block the ability of firms to respond due to dulled 
motivation and competence and distorted perceptions from the inertia of either focusing on 
core competence or inflexibility of in-house integration to reduce transaction costs. 
But despite these failure rates, many organisations report improvements to their services 
offering due to outsourcing. For example, Citi group claimed to have saved $75m in one 
year while Prudential Insurance made a 30% saving on total transaction cost and 
American Express made 50%. Similarly, British Petroleum reduced its staffing from 1400 
to 150, a 65% reduction in salaries, pensions and contributions due to outsourcing of its 
information technology alone (Cross, 1995; Davis, 2004; Lacity and Hirschheim, 1999). 
Writers agree that the success of outsourcing depends on the degree of coordination and 
relationship management. They note that mutual cooperation becomes less costly in 
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monitoring terms, when suppliers gain expected revenue streams for providing agreed 
reliable and uninterrupted services (Fill and Visser, 2000; Lacity et al., 1995; Peisch, 
1995). Thus, outsourcing benefits depend on good internal assessment of resource need 
against the potential problems of divergent expectations, contract haggling, performance 
monitoring and relationship management to meet agreed objectives for mutual benefits. 
To reduce the dissatisfaction with outsourcing results, and increase their benefits, 
organisations are advised to first assess internal needs, clarify purpose, objectives, scope 
of outsourcing and contextual issues and weigh them against the problems of outsourcing 
(Cross, 1995; Davis, 2004; Jennings, 2002; Power et al., 2004). Hence, the reputation, 
integrity, capacity to meet demand and the financial foundation that determines stability, 
attractiveness and reliability, of the supplier firm are of paramount importance to buying 
firms (Caulkin, 2007; Leavy, 2004). Then parties to interaction must manage the resultant 
relationship with trust, mutual respect and consideration of future benefits to reduce the 
costs of contracts renegotiations, haggling and monitoring (Barth6lemy and Qu6lin, 2006). 
Thus, outsourcing skills are needed to evaluate providers, establish a clear performance 
criteria and contingency sanctions against non-performance with monitoring provisions in 
contracts (House of Commons, 2003). Outsourcing and strategic alliances can be classed 
as hybrid forms due to their strong incentives to reduce costs, adapt processes efficiently 
and the inter-dependency created by mutual resource needs (Williamson, 1996). 
So what relationship skills do the managers investigated in this study have to make their 
services outsourcing venture successful and mutually beneficial? 
3.3 Resource-based view of organisations 
The Resource-based view (RBV) was founded by Edith Penrose in her seminal (1959) 
book, "The Theory of the Growth of the Firm" and later expanded in Penrose (1996). The 
framework was built up by Nelson and Winter (1982), re-ignited by Wernerfelt (1984), 
Barney (1986,1991), Dierickx and Cool (1989) and Peteraf (1993) and subsequently 
permeated into general management thinking by ideas from Prahalad and Hamel (1990). 
The central premise of Resource-based view of organisations is that, "sustained superior 
performance is a firm-specific phenomenon deriving from resources and capabilities that 
produce economic rents by virtue of their value, scarcity, imperfect imitability and rent 
appropriability" (Powell, 2001: 881). The heterogeneity of resources and capabilities is the 
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cornerstone of resource-based approach (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Peteraf and Bergen, 
2003; Teece et al., 1997). Valuable resources help organisations attain strategic position 
through cost reduction or product differentiation (Haberberg and Rieple, 2001). These 
valuable resources include organisational competences and capabilities, incorporated in 
learned skills and routines, built over time through tacit knowledge (Dierickx and Cool, 
1989; Henry and Mayle, 2002; Knight, 2004; Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 2003: 991). 
Organisations are large complex social systems consisting of assortments of resources 
(Anderson et al., 1994), capabilities and competence (Kanter, 1983; Teece et al., 1997). 
These capabilities and competence built over time, become firm specific assets difficult if 
not impossible to imitate that can help organisations create wealth and value through more 
efficient production process or new products and services. Thus, organisations can attain 
competitive advantage through control and access to resources that enable them develop 
and build competence and capabilities over time (Collis and Montgomery, 1995; Dierickx 
and Cool, 1989; Powell, 2001: 881; Teece et al., 1997; Williamson, 1991: 76; Winter, 2003). 
Resource-based view assumes that organisations have different resources or capabilities 
because of their different histories, experience, culture, competence, assets and skills 
base (Collis and Montgomery, 1995; Knight 2004; Teece et al., 1997). Thus, competitive 
advantage lies in how organisations deploy and use their stock of valuable or strategic 
resources (that must be scarce, inimitable, durable and non-substitutable) to achieve 
superior performance in a dynamic competitive environment (Barney, 1991,1997; Hamel 
et al., 1989; Porter, 1980,1996; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Teece et al., 1997). 
Organisational resources, competences and capabilities may be embedded in routines, 
processes, culture or tacit knowledge that cannot be easily bought or controlled (Argyres, 
1996; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004; Powell, 2001; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Hamel, et 
al., 1989; Teece et al., 1997). Furthermore no one organisation controls or has access to 
all the resources for building competence and capabilities (Douglas and Ryman, 2003). 
Thus, organisations may engage in alliances to access valuable resources and build 
capabilities for competitive advantage. Indeed, alliances are said to be ways of extending 
resources to build capabilities in order to develop sustainable competitive advantage 
(Grant, 1991). Alliances formations and management are dealt with below in (section 3.6). 
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For example, NHS trusts partners with private financial and charitable organisations to 
share facilities to save costs or access funds for capital improvement and some are in 
partnership with other NHS and private hospitals to share facilities and so reduce costs. 
The resource-based view of organisations has emerged as a complementary approach to 
understanding organisational competitive strategy (Das and Teng, 2000; Grant, 1996). 
Its inward looking approach, contrasts with Porter's (1980) competitive forces model and 
Carl Shapiro's (1989) strategic conflict approach. Both are said to be outward looking and 
based on strategy of limiting competition through raised rival costs and entry barriers 
(Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). 
Teece et al., (1997: 516) regard the term "resources" as misleading and prefer to call them 
"firm-specific assets", because resources they say, include trade secrets, specialised 
engineering and production facilities that also contain tacit knowledge. Trade secrets here 
refer to "secret formulas or techniques or processes known and used to advantage by a 
single manufacturer or operator" (Collins, 2003). For example, McDonald's spices are 
secret formulas used to advantage and can be regarded as trade secrets. 
Again focusing on the NHS trusts, their specialised medical knowledge may be regarded 
as "trade secret" while the experienced personnel of their services providers have tacit 
knowledge as proposed by (Teece et al., 1997), these can enable their combined forces 
improve efficiency and effectiveness of their operations, thus gaining competitive 
advantage to remain viable in the face of financial constraints and cost pressures. 
However, the resource-based view has been accused of not explaining the heterogeneity 
of resources and failing to use a conceptual model to explain how competitive advantage 
is created'(Helfat and Petraf, 2003: 997; Makadok, 2001: 388). Others point to its inability to 
explain how organisations meet their resource needs (Barringer and Harrison, 2000). 
Douglas and Ryman (2003), argue that the resource-based approach fails to combine it 
with alliance formations that allow the leveraging of resources across organisational 
boundaries for competitive advantage. However, Williamson (1996: 309) comments that 
"business strategy has a broad mandate" hence a single lens like the resource-based view 
cannot be expected to inform all the relevant strategy issues. Instead the resource-based 
view offers a general framework stating that firms can use their resources and capabilities 
to appropriate economic rent. This idea provides insights to which other theories can add 
needed structures. For example, the resource-based view, as founded by Edith Penrose 
(1959), was built up by Nelson and Winter (1982), and Barney (1986,1991,1999) but 
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Permeated into management thinking by ideas of collaboration and core competence for 
competitive advantage by Prahalad and Hamel (1990). 
Porter (1991: 108) argues that successful organisations are successful because they have 
unique resources and calls the reasoning of the resource-based view rather circular, 
inward looking and troubling. This is probably because Porter's (1980) competitive forces 
are focused more on what Teece et al., (1997) call "strategising" to gain privileged product 
market position rather than emphasising the "efficiency and effectiveness inherent in 
developing, accumulating, combining and protecting unique skills and capabilities" that can 
enable some firms gain enduring competitive advantage (Teece et al., 1997: 513). 
Again, yes NHS trusts and their services providers have unique resources. Medical 
expertise is unique and patients travel across the world to be treated by such experts. 
The international reputation, knowledge and experience of services providers as hoteliers 
are unique resources. When these firms combine their unique skills and resources they 
can improve efficiency and effectiveness hence competitive edge of their organisations. 
3.4 Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) 
While resource-based view is inward looking, the Resource Dependence Theory is more 
outward looking and recognises that organisations may be resource-deficient hence must 
interact with the external environment to access and meet their resource needs. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), identify the motivation for alliance formation or outsourcing as 
a response to environmental uncertainty and vulnerability. They note that problems arise 
not because organisations are dependent on the environment but that the environment is 
not dependable. This is due to problems of environmental changes and resource scarcity 
that demand organisational adaptation to change for survival. The theory proposes that the 
key to organisational survival stems from the ability to acquire resources from external 
sources. This is because firms may be resource-deficient, therefore organisations interface 
With their environment (be they other organisations, Governments, suppliers or indeed 
competitors) in order to acquire, share or access the resources needed to survive. 
As a result of organisational resource needs firms become inescapably bound up with the 
conditions of their environment that constrains them but provides the social context that 
shapes their activities, structural framework and behaviour (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Consequently, organisations enter into relationships or alliances to achieve a "negotiated" 
and more predictive environment in which to survive (Nichols, 1993; Thompson, 1967). 
53 
The negotiated environment buffets organisations that interact through the process of 
attention and interpretation of information gathered. Thus, collected and recorded 
information help to shape organisational decision-making (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 13). 
Furthermore, it is not merely organisational efficiency but the capacity to mobilise scarce 
resources and effectiveness in preserving itself through local legitimacy that determines 
competitive survival in the market place (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Schoemaker, 1993). 
Organisational effectiveness is defined as the "ability to manage demands of stakeholders 
who provide the needed resources and support" while efficiency refers to "how well an 
organisation is doing" or a ratio of resources consumed to output produced (Hill and 
Jones, 1992; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 11). Thus, external pressure on organisations 
demands greater efficiency while organisational effectiveness provides acceptability. 
The diversity of stakeholder interests and demands present organisations with problem of 
alignment and manipulation through organisational politics in order to retain support (Hill 
and Jones, 1992; Schoemaker, 1993). The need for valued resources (hence vulnerability) 
and stakeholder support (uncertainty), leads firms to build coalitions that may result in 
network formations (Barringer and Harrison, 2000). Coalition linkages help stabilise the 
exchange between organisations and the external environment through negotiation and 
agreement for mutual assurance and predictability of outcome (Zajac and Olsen, 1993). 
Thus, coalitions help reduce uncertainty and can ensure firm survival, growth and success. 
Resource scarcity can create dependence that precipitates power advantage for less 
dependent organisations and a relative loss of autonomy for dependent firms (Hill and 
Jones, 1992; Schoemaker, 1993). Pfeffer and Salancik, (1978: 51) define dependence as 
of a product of the importance an organisation attaches to an input or resource and the 
extent to which that resource is controlled by relatively few organisations". However, 
management can manipulate the interface between organisations and the environment, by 
avoiding conditions that demand compliance and so maintain autonomy. When avoidance 
is not possible, organisations must manage the resultant interdependence to enable them 
gain mutual benefit to survive and grow (Hill and Jones, 1992; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
The main thrust of Resource Dependence Theory is that because organisations may be 
resource-deficient, they must interact with the environment to obtain or access resources. 
This interaction with undependable environment precipitates dependence and formation of 
coalitions for support. To manage diverse interest of coalition members who may also be 
stakeholders, firms are involved in organisational politics, negotiations and agreements to 
find consensus and so reduce environmental uncertainty and complexity. Consequently, 
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organisational decisions become "other directed" or a result of stakeholder consensus 
(Bergen et al., 1992; Hill and Jones, 1992; Schoemaker, 1993; Zajac and Olsen, 1993). 
However, Resource Dependence Theory has been criticised for focusing exclusively on 
resources that must be obtained from external sources for organisational survival, growth 
and prosperity (Barringer and Harrison, 2002). It is said to lack specifics on how to obtain, 
access or share resource or how to develop and build competence and capability for 
enduring competitive advantage. These issues are left for other theories like Institutional 
Economics to decide. However, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 132) note that, "power 
organises around critical and scarce resources" and whoever controls these resources, 
controls the organisationl The result of resource dependence, namely effects of power and 
influence and network formations are dealt with in relationship management (section 3.6). 
3.5 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) notably of Williamson (1975,1996) provides a 
predictive framework for reducing the total cost of resource exchange between 
organisations and hence is intrinsic to the resource-based view of organisations. 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) framework argues that an organisation's make-or-buy 
decision centres on minimizing transaction and production costs (Williamson, 1975,1996). 
Transaction costs refer to cost of activities associated with resource exchange such as: 
"bargaining, negotiating, monitoring and enforcement costs necessary to ensure the 
delivery of contracted goods and services (Hunt and Morgan, 1995: 5; Williamson, 1975). 
Production costs include learning, organising and managing production (Das and Teng, 
2000). TCE advices organisations to internalise production through mergers, acquisitions 
and in-house production when transaction costs are high but utilise market exchange 
when production costs are high (Williamson, 1975,1996; Das and Teng, 2000). This 
predictive advice serves economizing purposes in a world of incomplete contracting, 
bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 1975,1996; Zajac and Olsen, 1993). 
However, the TCE framework "has been copiously critiqued, built on and in some cases 
muddied" (Gander and Rieple, 2004: 62) for providing firms with predictive guidance on 
structure and governance decisions in their relationships with other firms, based purely on 
transaction costs. Williamson, (1996: 11) defines governance as "an institutional framework 
in which the integrity of a transaction or related set of transactions is decided". Integrity is 
further expounded as "a means in which orcler is accomplished in a relation in which 
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potential conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities to realise mutual gains" (italics in 
the original). Thus, governance can be stated as 'a framework in which transactions are 
decided in an orderly fashion, avoiding potential conflict to achieve mutual gains'. 
Other writers decry TCE's central focus on efficiency and 'economising on transaction 
costs' (Hunt and Morgan, 1995) while neglecting the value creating aspects of transaction 
(Barth6lemy and Qu6lin, 2006; Zajac and Olsen, 1993). This can result in missed 
opportunities or varied and sub-optimal performance for organisations (Dyer, 1997). 
Barringer and Harrison (2000) comment thatpeople' issues such as culture, trust, 
reputation and learning are assumed away by TCE. Indeed, Faulkner (1995: 187) posits 
that many managers interviewed about the motivation for alliance formation and choice of 
alliance partners considered survival in a turbulent and uncertain environment more 
important than governance structures and the transaction costs involved. Hence flexibility 
in the face of constant change was more important to them. Hence organisations are 
advised to "try markets, try hybrids (long-term contractual relations into which security 
features have been crafted), and resort to firms when all else comparatively fails" 
(Williamson, 1999: 1091). 
In this study, of the resource exchange between the NHS and its hotel services providers, 
the choice was made for them. They have tried hierarchy, market competition (Internal 
market) and are now forced to try a hybrid arrangement (section 3.6.3 below) with private 
commercial services providers in search of efficiency in human and financial resource use. 
3.5.1 Operational efficiency 
Operational efficiency is an umbrella term for reduction in total transaction costs, more 
efficient and effective use of human and financial resources and the attainment of client 
satisfaction with services supplied against the prices paid (HMSO, 1970; Klein, 2001: 50). 
Cost reduction is also one of the main reasons for services outsourcing as organisations 
aim to turn their fixed into variable costs. Thus this study confirms previous outsourcing 
data that rates cost reduction through automation or more efficient use of resources as a 
major reason for services outsourcing (Fill and Visser, 2000; Harland, Knight and 
Lamming, 2005; Jennings, 2002; Jiang et al., 2006; Lacity and Hirscheim, 1999). 
In a competitive free market economy the idea of operating more efficiently in order to 
reduce total costs can help to shape problem definition and colour the arena for debate in 
order to find solutions to the constant cost pressure to reduce inefficiencies and increase 
the efficient use of financial and human resources for comparative advantage. Hence 
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through the engagement of commercial providers of support services by some NHS 
trusts, operational efficiency can become an attainable objective. 
To aid its achievement ancillary workers were sold to services providers, streamlined and 
staffing levels reduced, machines were automated to standardise products and services 
offered with the incentive of payment by results (PbR) to boost morale in reducing service 
inefficiencies. But how does the literature analyse operational efficiency? 
3.5.2 Components of efficliency (Figure 3.1) 
Efficiency consideration can be a strategic or operational issue (Karl6f, 1993: 21). Strategic 
efficiency focuses on products or services, pricing them to retain long-term competitive 
advantage in a chosen market while gaining profitability in order to grow. Conversely, 
operational efficiency is concerned with short-term production costs, effective functionality 
of machines (hence automation) or personnel and productivity. Thus, NHS trusts, being 
political organisations in perpetual budget crisis as evidenced by the news media, they 
seem to focus more on short-term operational efficiency. This re-enforces the choice of 
this theme to encompass costs savings through automation and streamlining of ancillary 
personnel to reduce total costs or turn fixed into variable cost by using temporary staff. 
From figure 3.1 below, organisations that emphasize efficiency can either focus on 
productivity and production costs hence doing the right thing or refocus on adding value to 
their customer offerings through creativity and innovation and so being more effective. 
Figure 3.1 
Value to customer High 
-Utility in relation to price 
-Doing things right 
(Effectiveness) Low 
Efficiency Matrix (Karl6f, 1993: 11 
low Productivity High 
-units of output per unit of input 
Doing the right thing (efficiency) 
Boyne (2002), paints a grim picture of bureaucratic organisations like NHS trusts. He 
catalogues the complexity faced by managers in having a diversity of stakeholders with 
conflicting demands that constrain them. Others also note the short-time horizon based on 
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political stance and state ownership that leads to instability and confusion (Moore, 1992; 
Turrill, 1993). The absence of managerial incentives to deal with unprecedented rate and 
volume of change or to search for alternative sources of funding, the lack of competitive 
Pressures and fear of failure or bankruptcy lead to reduced organisational efficiency and 
effectiveness. The bureaucratic red tape, low managerial autonomy and policy ambiguities 
that favour inertia, inflexibility, non-decision making also translate as the inefficient use of 
scare resources (Boyne, 2002; Enthoven, 2000; Hill and Jones, 1992; Moore, 1992). Thus, 
it can be assumed that many organisations within the NHS choose alliances to avoid the 
problems of markets and hierarchies (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Barth6lemy and 
Qu6lin, 2006; Blumberg, 2001; Das and Teng, 2000; Tsang, 2000). Authors note that 
alliances can limit opportunistic behaviour through the development of reciprocal trust over 
time, commitment to continued association, long-term benefits and expected mutual gains 
(Dyer, 1996; Faulkner, 1995; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). 
3.5.3 Impact of Human Resource Management (HRM) on efficiency drives 
For some public sector organisations where Human Resource (HR) departments rule the 
roost, alliance formations may be frowned upon. The scars of previous change efforts and 
the enormity of the resultant anxiety, frustration and agitation can force these "custodians 
of employment contract and protector of workers" to clamour in the opposite direction to 
outsourcing and change (Pettigrew et al., 1992; Schuler and Huber, 1990; Torrington and 
Hall, 2002). This avoids repeating painful experiences and erases memory traces as 
members search for stability, familiar routines and independence (Czarniawska, 1992; 
Weick, 1995) in what Giddens (1984) calls "ontological security". 
Consequently, HR managers provide organisational policies, procedures and practices 
that guide daily routines, lines of reporting and expected behaviour that reflects the cultural 
Valuesof the organisation and limits uncertainty, complexity and disruption of daily 
routines. This can result in fear of outsourcing, risk aversion or bureaucratic control. 
Changes in the workplace like technology (automation) and the current ambiguity in the 
social contract affect the loyalty, motivation and demands of workers (ancillary) based on 
the perceived job insecurity and inappropriate compensation for time and effort expended. 
Automation also dictates that less staff is required to do the same work (Sherwell, 2005) 
while demanding initial investment in machines for the expected increase in productivity 
(Purcell, 1999). Organisational response to increased competition may be cost pressure 
that forces some FIR managers, to indiscriminately reduce total costs by reducing staffing 
headcount (Ames and Hlavacek, 1990; Hailey et al., 2004). Furthermore, in times of 
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unemployment, organisations can pick and choose staffers at very low wages while full 
employment makes it harder for organisations to recruit skilled and trained staff, already 
employed by others (Torrington and Hall, 2002). 
Thus, the role and focus of HR policies will vary according to these factors. For example, 
where there is a culture of respect and care for workers, with job security, there will be 
reduced staff turnover and commitment to organisational goals (Biggs and Swailes, 2006; 
Dyer, 1994; Gallie et al., 2001; Forde and Slater, 2006). The reverse is also true. 
This variety in the role and focus of HR policies in different contexts explains the diversity 
of research findings between intended and implemented policies (Khilji and Wang, 2006). 
3.5.4 Parallels between TCE and Resource-based theories 
Parallels can be drown between resource-based theories and Williamson's TCE (1996). 
Transaction Cost Economics is similar to Resource Dependence Theory in that it views 
non-market governance as a response to environmental uncertainty (see 3.3.2 above). 
Uncertainty, in TCE terms, arises due to the behavioural assumptions that pair bounded 
rationality with opportunistic self-interest (Williamson, 1996: 56). Self-interest seeking refers 
specifically to economic agents being permitted to disclose information in selective or 
distorted manner, calculated to mislead, disguise or confuse. This is termed moral hazard 
or agency cost, the mitigation of which can be mutually beneficial in exchange transactions 
(Williamson, 1996: 56). Opportunism also refers to "deceit-oriented violation of implicit or 
explicit promises about one's appropriate or required role behaviour" (Hunt and Morgan, 
1995: 5). These hazards (uncertainties) arise, says Williamson (1996), when incomplete 
contracting is joined with asset specificity. Asset specificity refers to the degree with which 
resources (assets) can if required, be redeployed to alternative use without the loss or 
sacrifice of productive value. Williamson (1996: 60) lists the types of assets engendered as 
site (prime location), human asset (skills and learned competence), physical asset such as 
dyes for materials, brand names and assets dedicated to specific contract relationships. 
3.5.5 Asset specificity 
Asset specificity plays an important role in TCE. Williamson, (1996: 106) asserts that it 
increases the total transaction cost in all governance forms. This is probably because 
transactions costs are made up of the frequency of transactions, the uncertainty of future 
transactions and the degree of asset specificity involved. Williamson (1996) argues that 
asset specificity creates bilateral dependency between transacting actors and thus poses 
added contractual hazards. For example, Williamson (1996: 110) asserts that asset 
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specificity tends to shift the adaptive behaviour of actors in a business relationship towards 
Cooperativeness. Consequently, when disagreements or self-interest bargaining in 
contract negotiations arise, mal-adaptation costs are incurred raising total transaction 
costs. Had such assets not been involved, business partners would be free to seek 
alternatives (if they exist) or adapt more efficiently to reduce costs. Others regard close 
business relationships involving asset specificity as a disadvantage because it reduces 
their freedom of choice in developing alternative relationships, alters the power balance 
Within the relationship and involves opportunity costs of foregoing other good partnering 
Opportunities (Brennan and Turnbull, 1999; Schoemaker, 1993; Moschandreas, 2000). 
Thus, the importance of asset specificity, or sunk costs (irrecoverable costs that cannot be 
easily transferred to alternative contexts without loss), also lies in its ability to introduce 
significant asymmetry into future contract bids. The incumbent may gain unfair advantage 
through investment in such assets to exclude other parties (Gander and Rieple, 2004: 64). 
3.5.6 Comparison between TCE and Resource-based theories 
Both TCE and Resource Dependence Theory deal with uncertainty and dependence. But 
While TCE bases uncertainty on behavioural integrity of interacting parties namely, self- 
interest seeking and opportunism and uncertainty of transactions, Resource Dependence 
Theory bases uncertainty on a non-dependable environment. Such uncertainty stems from 
the scarcity of resources, lack of knowledge as to how the environment will fluctuate, the 
availability of exchange partners and the cost of transaction (Faulkner, 1995; Heide, 1994). 
Secondly, both theories also deal with dependence. Again while Resource-based theories 
deal with the organisational dependence. While Resource-based theories deal with the 
organisational dependence on the environment due to resource deficiency, TCE regards 
dependence as a consequence of asset specificity involved in business transactions that 
introduce bilateral dependence and maybe mal-adaptive costs. Thirdly, while TCE 
attempts to identify, explicate and mitigate possible contractual hazards through the 
Prediction of efficient governance structures, Resource Dependence Theory identifies the 
Motivation for inter-firm relationships as performance effectiveness and power influence. 
Thus, both TCE and Resource-based theories deal with similar problems facing resource- 
deficient organisations namely dependence and uncertainty but address them in different 
ways. However, organisations attempt to reduce these uncertainties and dependence 
While maintaining the autonomy for independent action. Consequently, the Resource- 
based theories and Transaction Cost Economics are complementary and intrinsic to the 
Present study of NHS resource exchange with its hotel services providers. 
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Drawing the similarities further to NHS trusts, the TCE view on asset specificity obtains in 
their cooperative arrangements. Services providers make trust-specific investments like 
refurbished kitchens and new canteens. These investments make the parties dependent 
on each other to the extent of increasing their contractual duration to ten years instead of 
the mandatory five years. This increase may both involve opportunity costs of best 
alternatives foregone or mal-adaptive costs should the services provider renege on their 
contractual commitments. Similarly the Resource-based theories are relevant to some 
trusts in that they chose (or were forced) to outsource non-critical functions to focus on 
core activity, thus build up competence and capability in order to compete favourably with 
other trusts. Trusts form coalitions for dealing with environmental uncertainty through 
business relationships, which may prove to be valuable bridges to as well as buffers from 
hostile environments and cost pressures. Thus outsourcing and current competitive mode 
of some trusts may have reduced bureaucratic red tape, made them more cooperative, 
trusting and outward-looking (Barney and Hansen, 1994; Moore, 1992; Zolkiewski, 1999). 
3.6 Advantages of accessing valuable resources through alliances 
As stated above, organisations may collaborate to access, share or leverage resources for 
developing and building competence and capabilities. Such collaborative arrangements 
can be in contractual forms like strategic alliances, buyer-supplier partnerships, joint 
ventures or outsourcing agreements (Faulkner, 1995; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). 
Strategic alliance is defined as "a particular mode of inter-organisational relationship in 
which the partners make substantial investment in developing a long-term collaborative 
effort and common orientation" (Mattsson, 1988). Alliances may involve the commitment of 
two or more autonomous inter-dependent organisations to exchange, share or co-develop 
products, services and technologies (Gulati, 1998; Williamson, 1991: 271). Indeed joint 
ventures involve the pooling of resources to create a new business entity (Faulkner, 1995). 
Alliances have been described as "hybrid" structures between markets and hierarchies 
(Williamson, 1996). Hierarchy refers to the willingness of participants to submit to control 
through legitimate authority (Williamson, 1975). Alliances are complex arrangements in 
which trust, collaboration, cooperation and negotiated roles of responsibility are major 
features (Bleeke and Ernst, 1991; Faulkner, 1995; Zajac and Olsen, 1993). 
Organisations can enter into alliances with mixed motives and objectives. Such mo lves 
include internal vulnerability due to resource deficiency or external constraint (Faulkner, 
1995; Grant and Baden-Fuller, ý 2004). Resource deficiency may be in capital, employees, 
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specialised skills or managerial experience. External constraints range from need for 
capacity, market turbulence, globalisation, fast technology changes or short product life- 
cycle among others (Bleeke and Ernst, 1991; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004; Makadok, 
2001; Stuart, 2000; Zajac and Olsen, 1993). Thus, organisations can access resources to 
remedy their internal vulnerability or perceived external constraints (uncertainty) through 
alliance formation and collaborative partnerships. 
3.6.1 Wealth and value creation' 
Accessing resources through alliances can create wealth and result in more efficient 
production (Zajac and Olsen, 1993). Makadok, (2001) cites the case of Microsoft, who 
through superior information regarding IBM's resource need (Barney, 1986), enabled him 
purchase QDOS operating systems for $50.000 in 1980 and sold it to IBM to be used as 
standard in personal computers (PC). Microsoft has continued to reap the rewards of his 
alliance with the makers of QDOS while IBM efficiently produced MDOS system for 
windows. Capability building can also create value through enhancing other resources. 
Wal-Mart's unique internal "cross-docking logistic system" enhances the productivity of 
their trucking fleet, workforce and information to create wealth for them (Makadok, 2001). 
Other studies confirm similar claims (Khong, 2005; Leavy, 2004; Power et al., 2007). 
3.6.2 Cost reduction 
While alliance formation can help organisations share high fixed costs through expanding 
Production volume, others may share both risk and cost of particular ventures (Dyer, 1996; 
Okoroh et al., 2002; Rodney and Gallimore, 2002). Indeed Dyer, (1996) found that some 
Japanese automakers; in cooperative arrangements achieved low transaction costs despite 
their high asset-specific investments. This contrasts with the argument that "asset-specific 
investments" increase transaction costs of all governance forms (Williamson, 1991: 282; 
1996: 106). Others regard these asset-specific or relationship-specific investments or sunk 
costs as part of the adaptive behaviour associated with the concepts of power balance and 
levels of commitment and trust in exchange relationships (Barth6lemy and Qu6lin, 2006; 
Blumberg, 2001; Brennan and Turnbull, 1999; Morgan and Hunt, 1994). 
Indeed, an explanation is offered as to why the Japanese are able to achieve such lower 
transaction costs in cooperative arrangements. The Japanese Williamson (1996: 315) 
argues, are distinguished by a 'syndrome of attributes'. The life-long employment relations, 
long-term planning view with their unique cultural, legal and banking systems give them an 
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edge in contractual relationships. The cultural openness they demand and get from most 
partners and suppliers helps to build trust and commitment that reduce contract haggling, 
monitoring and coordination costs and hence total transaction cost and limits opportunistic 
behaviour (Dyer, 1994; Hundley and Jacobson, 1998; Morita, 1992). 
Heide and John (1992: 34) contend that the expectation of continuity in supplier-customer 
relationships for long-term profitability was more important for channel members. Other 
channel writers view alliances versus in-house production as a trade-off between cost and 
control (Anderson and Weitz, 1983; Heide, 1994). Indeed Heide (1994: 72) comments that 
while in-house production provide employment opportunities and control advantages, the 
cost-efficiency of contracting out to specialists may be more advantageous in the long run. 
This may be because external specialists are able to realise economies of scale and 
scope by pooling multiple demand curves to reduce unit costs of production (Heide, 1994). 
3.6.3 Evolution 
Alliance success depends on its ability to evolve over time. But evolution may engender 
tension and changes from initial objectives, which is the essence of alliance formation 
(Bleeke and Ernst, 1991). For example, evolution can lead to expansion of both scale and 
scope of products and services from the initial aims of the partners or lead to new product 
production, entry into new markets or indeed lead corporations from complacency to 
competitiveness (Chandler, 1990; Nichols, 1993). Bleeke and Ernst (1991: 131) cite two 
examples from their study of the alliance between General Motors (GM) and Snecma to 
develop jet engines, which evolved into producing a wider range of engines for other 
organisations. Similarly, GM-Fanuc alliance to develop robotics for the auto industry 
evolved into producing robotics for non-automotives users. Similarly, the relationships 
between services and provider managers have evolved into new products and services. 
3.6.4 Learning and knowledge transfer 
Inter-organisational alliances often provide learning opportunities for alliance partners (Doz 
and Hamel, 1998, Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004; Tsang, 2000). Even competitors can 
collaborate with each other and win in the market place (Hamel, 1991; Hamel et al., 1989). 
Through learning, partners can develop more efficient production system, improve skills or 
find new ways of producing products and services and so create value through alliance 
formation (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Doz and Hamel, 1998). Such knowledge-based 
alliances feature in high-tech, semiconductor and pharmaceutical industries, where speed 
to market and first-mover advantage is critical (Teece et al., 1997). Indeed, Barringer and 
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Harrison (2000) cite an example of alliances between biotech and pharmaceutical firms. 
The biotech industries benefit from investment, distribution channels and reputation while 
sharing their cutting-edge research and knowledge with the pharmaceutical industry. Such 
arrangements realised value through innovation and speed to market for their products as 
well as market position through reputation enhanced by association (Stuart, 2000). 
In contrast, (House of Commons, 2003) report comment about the problems of skills and 
knowledge transfer from the private to public sector managers in the areas of contract and 
project management. This has led to non-realisation of value from some contracted PFI 
projects and dissatisfaction with the contract arrangements. However things are improving. 
3.6.5 Creating wealth through Innovation 
Innovation means different things to different people and different things at different times 
(Innovation, 2002: 42). In short it is difficult to define but seen as the ability to turn creative 
ideas into commercial reality to meet changing need (Christensen et al., 2004; Innovation, 
2002; Seltzer and Bentley, 1999). Innovation is the life blood of development or upgrades 
(Jolly, 2003: 27; Morita, 1992), central to wealth creation, driven by challenges to widen 
business scope, increase customer choices, meet latent demands or add value to market 
offerings (Innovation, 2002). Innovation is about profitability, economic growth, gaining 
competitive advantage and success in the market place (Jolly, 2003; Osborne and Brown, 
2005). It is productive change that is discontinuous with the past, said to be 10% 
inspiration and 90% acquisition, changing values or creating employment (Kanter, 1983). 
It is also about creating surprise by doing something different or in a different way through 
the interaction between material, technology and the organisation (Harding, 2005). Thus, 
organisations are driven differently, to innovate or improve through continuous adaptation. 
Innovation, as Joseph Schumpeter noted, creates monopolistic positions and monopoly 
opens the path to above-average and protected profit margins. But the path to monopoly 
rent is strewn with other drivers of innovation like unexpected occurrences changes in 
market, industry, technology or demography, changes in customer perceptions, new 
knowledge and process needs of organisations (Drucker, 1998). Hence organisations 
constantly strive to innovate to stay ahead of the competition. Multi-cultural societies now 
demand new ways of doing business to produce new products and services that meet 
their needs (Osborne and Brown, 2005). Thus the need to upgrade products and services 
and sustain competitive advantage or meet changing customer perceptions and lifestyle 
are forces to continuously innovate and stay ahead to avoid obsolescence, economically 
64 
grow to create wealth and profitability (Jolly, 2003; Innovation, 2002; Von Hippel, 1998; 
Storey and Salaman, 2005). Finally innovative manufacturing is said to be the engine that 
powers national economy as organisations innovate, grow and become profitable they 
create wealth that translates into national wealth (Morita, 1992). 
Drivers for innovation 
Successful innovation depends on tackling opportunities when they arise, having the 
requisite resources, processes and facilities to innovate and the value system that allows 
Organisations to prioritise the opportunity against other projects competing for resources 
(Christensen et al., 2005). Kanter (1983: 213) states, that the power to innovate is the 
capacity to mobilise people and resources to get things done. Furthermore the willingness 
for teamwork that draws on organisational stock of knowledge, recognising and absorbing 
the same while contributing to integrate new knowledge so created is a pre-requisite for 
innovation (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Huber, 1999). Services providers come with 
requisite skills, knowledge and resources (Huber, 1999). Consequently, outsourcing and 
alliances as valuable relationships can facilitate innovation through access to resources 
like sharing knowledge, learning, co-opting alliance members or provider investments. 
Obstacles to innovation 
Strict contract specifications without the flexibility for changing needs are obstacles to 
innovation since they give services providers no incentive for improvement (Eriksson et 
al., 2007). Bureaucratic division of labour with its fragmentation of specialists, detachment 
from common goals and blame culture hinder innovation. The lack of knowledge and 
creativity or the ability to combine them in a conducive environment may encourage 
continuous improvement but hinder innovation (Huber, 1999). An environment of mistrust 
and conflict will hamper innovation (Eriksson et al., 2007). Consequently innovation 
thrives in conducive environments that encourage creativity and change without blame. 
3.6.6 Legitimacy 
Alliances can improve organisational visibility, image, cross-border or local legitimacy and 
reputation. These may be doors to accessing or sharing resources and expertise to create 
unique products (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Tsang, 2000). 
Indeed, Barringer and Harrison, (2000: 374) cite the case of Wal-Mart alliance with Cifra of 
Mexico that led to Wal-Mart legitimacy in Mexico and the creation of unique products for 
the Mexican market. Others consider alliances as aid to building critical mass (Hamel, et 
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al., 1989; Kanter, 1989; Senge, 1990). Firms may also have other reasons for alliances 
such as building market power through alliances to neutralise that of competitors or plug a 
skills' gap (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Ohmae, 1995) or indeed imitate successful firms 
in alliances (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Others like Mexico's Vitro can transform their 
organisations from complacent local firms to competitive and aggressive international 
concerns through alliance formations (Nichols, 1993). Others firms like Sainsbury realised 
organisational renewal and transformation through change (Linder et al., 2002). 
3.6.7 The disadvantages of inter-organisational alliances 
Observers agree that about 50% of alliances fail due to difficulties in managing them. 
These difficulties arise from complexities of managing mixed cultures, divergent motives 
and objectives, loss of autonomy and resultant dependence, or non-performance 
(Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Das and Teng, 2000; Jennings, 2002; Tsang, 2000). 
Besides the objective of cost reduction being elusive and not realised, some writers 
contend that organisations may lose know-how to alliance partners who use the learned 
knowledge to compete against them as rivals (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Faulkner, 1995; 
Hamel 1991; Hamel et al., 1989; Khanna, 1995; Khanna et al., 1998; Teece et al., 1997; 
Stuart, 2000; Zajac and Olsen, 1993). 
Indeed, Khanna et al., (1998) comments that organisations fail to consider the dynamics of 
alliances especially with regards to learning. Khanna et al., (1998) see alliances as quest 
for learning for innovative purposes. This race to learn from alliance partners provides a 
forum for both competition and cooperation. For example, partners cooperate and share 
learning and information for mutual benefit. However, parties may also unilaterally race to 
learn each other's tacit knowledge for private gain. Thus, alliance partners are advised to 
learn while the alliance endures to gain future benefits. The ability to learn faster than 
competitors may become a sustainable competitive edge of the future (Senge, 1990: 4). 
Although alliances enable firms to access resources and knowledge (as in research and 
development), or to reduce costs and share risks, alliances may lack the authority-based 
relationship of a hierarchy needed to embed resources into capabilities (Grant and Baden- 
Fuller, 2004: 68; Gulati, 1998; Stuart, 2000). Alliances can also limit the global future of 
organisations involved as they may be "locked into" relationships without the flexibility to 
develop or build their own competence and capabilities for enduring competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1999; Faulkner, 1995; Gulati, 1998; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). 
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Furthermore, alliances can lead to loss of proprietary information and autonomy as parties 
become dependent and may ultimately lead to acquisition (Bleeke and Ernst, 1991). 
Also, being in one alliance precludes an organisation from partnering with other more 
beneficial organisations thus alliances can hinder organisational flexibility (Doz and Hamel, 
1998; Tsang, 2000). Thus, these seemingly negative aspects of alliances make them 
complex and rather difficult to manage and maintain for enduring advantages. 
However, others note that not all organisations wish to have long-term close collaborative 
alliances (Ford, 2002; Ganesan, 1994). This is because alliance relationships are costly in 
terms of managerial time, skills and effort (Reeve and Warren, 2004). Such relationships 
are complex in the range of services supplied and people involved (Gadde and Snehota, 
2000). Alliance relationships are interactive, time-consuming and dynamic engendering 
levels of complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity, power influence and shifting coalitions 
organisations would rather avoid (Brennan and Turnbull, 2000; Harland et al., 2005). 
But, depending on the nature of the business, many organisations use provider/supplier 
relationships differently for their cost-benefit effects or value creation (Ford, 2002,2003; 
Gadde and Snehota, 2000). Hence providers and purchasers may work with a mixture of 
inter-organisational frameworks from simple marketing to cooperative alliances to reduce 
their perceived resource deficient vulnerability or external environmental constraints. 
3.6.8 Network formations . 
Networks refer to "constellations of autonomous businesses, loosely connected in 
collaborative arrangements by the need to exchange, share or access resources 11 
(Barringer and Harrison, 2000: 376; Ford et al., 2006). Connected refers to the extent to 
Which "exchange in one relationship is contingent upon exchange or (non-exchange) in 
another" (Cook and Emerson, 1978). For example, NHS trusts services providers do not 
make raw materials for food or beverages but purchase these from a network of suppliers. 
Thus NHS trusts become connected to these external others through their relationships 
With respective services providers. Furthermore, as firms "seek to avoid dependence and 
external control in order to shape their own context and retain autonomy for independent 
action" (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) they may form networks. Control refers to'the ability 
to initiate or terminate action at one's discretion' (Pugh, 1997: 131). The control of critical 
resources leads to the control of organisations. Hence organisations so controlled, may 
lose the ability to initiate or terminate action without recourse to their "controllers 
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3.6.9 Network context and environment 
The network context, is structured by bonds between social actors, the activities they 
perform in the network and the resources used (Anderson et al., 1994). The position of 
organisations within the network gives them their network identity, defined as a "perception 
of how organisations see themselves and how they are seen in the network" (Anderson et 
al., 1994; Hgkansson and Snehota, 1995). Thus, firms become embedded in a business 
network context that is enveloped by the environment (Anderson et al., 1994) [Figure 3.2]. 
This 'envelope' formed by a network of firms also limits the administrative and managerial 
control of the firm thus forming its boundary. This boundary may be arbitrary, or real but it 
does exist due to the firm/market dichotomy in economic thinking (Penrose, 1996: xvi). 
Jarillo, (1988) uses the "hub and wheel" example to describe strategic networks, where the 
'hub firm' initiates and maintains the network. Networks can be powerful in aligning 
stakeholder interests and reducing environmental uncertainty through cooperation and 
consensus (Barringer and Harrison, 2000). Network members concentrate on their area of 
business competence while all benefit from specialisation which can reduce transaction 
Costs and curtail opportunistic behaviour through building mutual trust, commitment and 
Willingness to remain in the network (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Ring and Van De Ven, 
1994; Tsang, 2000). Transactions costs are reduced through high volume and repeated 
transaction over time and the expectation of a long-term exchange relationship (Dyer, 
1997; Morita, 1992). Thus, networks are purposeful but voluntary association of social 
actors driven by the need to access resource, reduce transaction costs and environmental 
Uncertainty. There are many motives for network formations but network contacts help 
organisations realise objective by acting as a bridge to scarce resources, accessing and 
sharing of capabilities, knowledge, information or reputation and buffer from a hash, 
faceless and competitive environment (Araujo et al., 2003; Gulati, 1998; Thompson, 1967). 
Network members may belong to trade associations to share valuable and timely advice 
and information, form a platform for collective lobbying or build market power to neutralise 
competition (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Ohnae, 1989). Indeed networks in the auto- 
industry allow firms to remain small, nimble and flexible, focus on competence while using 
network of stable component suppliers to accomplish objectives (Dyer and Singh, 1998). 
Similarly, Benetton uses network of franchises to manage its operations in 110 countries. 
Other firms in the apparel industry, where timely information is vital depend on network of 
suppliers to avoid cost of integration and unreliable market transactions (Jennings, 2002). 
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Organisations in highly specialised knowledge-based fields like oil refinery, high-tech and 
aircraft use networks of multiple contacts to meet time pressures to accomplish project or 
to gain first-mover advantage in the market place (Axelsson and Easton, 1992; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). Others use them to maximize efficiency of learning, knowledge transfer, 
and innovation to gain advantage (Hagedoom and Duysters, 2002; Kleiner and Roth, 
1997). Organisations can use their networks as "brain pool" as in aerospace industry to 
produce unique innovative products thus gaining competitive advantage and creating 
value through interdependence (Blois, 2002; Das and Teng, 2000). 
3.6.10 Disadvantages of networks 
Though network members use self-enforcing norms like reciprocal trust to stabilise 
relationships, networks are difficult to organise and manage as number of participating 
firms increase (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Doz and Hamel, 1998). The large power 
imbalance and the problems of aligning divergent stakeholder interest may cause attrition 
between members. Finally, learning and competence of members may wane over time as 
those of the hub firm and competitors wax (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Doz and Hamel, 
1998). This is probably because the hub firm controls the finished product while all others 
contribute components. The case of 'Airbus' final assemble in Germany is a case in point. 
Thus, networks can help firms collaborate to realise business objectives through cost 
reduction, knowledge sharing or transfer, market power, innovation, flexibility and lean 
Production but can also restrict their flexibility to take advantage of other relationships. 
However, to understand networks is to understand the dyadic relationships that comprise 
them (Ford, 2002; Easton, 1992; Gulati, 1998). These dyadic relationships provide the 
medium of interaction and resource exchange between actors. They are the context of 
cooperation and collaboration for the coordination of economic activity (Sheu et al., 2006). 
This study does not involve the diverse networks of services suppliers and hotel services 
managers' relationships. But it takes its point of departure here to include Interaction 
Model as a relationship management framework for successfully using the resources 
acquired through outsourcing to create value for clients and profits for services suppliers. 
3.7 Relationship Management 
3.7.1 Medium of resource exchange 
The previous section established the fact that organisations require resources that may 
reside outside their control for survival and success in a dynamic market place. 
69 
Resource exchange is the "basis for business relationships" (Moller and Wilson, 1995). 
Exchange is defined as "the act of obtaining a desired object from someone by offering 
something in return" (Kotler, 1980), while a business relationship refers to "a mutually 
oriented interaction between two reciprocally committed parties" (Ford, 2002: 162). 
Hence business exchange may involve a party offering resources like management skills, 
experience and investments in return for reputation, cash flow and externalities. A firm's 
competitive edge lies in its ability to add value to services and product offerings. As many 
firms add value through relationships, the successful management of dyadic relationships 
becomes a primary activity for competitive advantage (Pettigrew and Fenton, 2000). 
Social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) suggests that personal relationships based on long- 
term orientation can foster trust, commitment and loyalty that can promote cooperation and 
discourage opportunism (Pasamaa and Hair, 2007). Similarly, business relationships are 
often based on personal relationships of people cooperating within and between firms. 
They engender friendship, loyalty, trust and commitment that limit opportunism, choice of 
partners and the overt use of power but are beneficial to parties concerned (Gulati, 1995; 
Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Uzzi, 1997). Thus investing in such relationships and successfully 
managing them (as customer relationships) become antecedents to benefits like reduced 
risks and monitoring costs and creating value for clients or profits for providers. 
The Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Group (IMP) studies are centred on relational 
exchange between businesses. The concepts of trust and commitment to mutually agreed 
rules of conduct, the sharing of risks and rewards are central to their studies, aimed at 
reducing total transaction costs and safeguarding relationship investments (Ford, 2002; 
2003; HAkansson, 1982). Furthermore other studies cited value creation in relational 
exchanges. For example: in relationship marketing (Grcinroos, 1997; Dwyer et al., 1987), 
working partnerships (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Heide, 1994), contracts (MacNeil, 1980) 
and business-to-business relationship (Morgan and Huntj 994; Webb and Laborde, 2005). 
However neither of these studies was involved in support services or aimed at combining 
total cost reduction and safeguarding of relationship investment with value creation. 
Consequently, this study goes beyond the confines of studies on simply creating value 
through relationships and the focus of IMP Group on safeguarding investments while 
reducing total transaction costs to advance the interaction model of relational exchange. 
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The advancement of knowledge for this thesis involves relational exchange that includes 
learning and knowledge transfer for value creation through innovation in the context of 
hotel services outsourcing and outside industrial business marketing. 
3.7.2 How business relationships relate to Resource-based theories and TCE 
Resource-based view established that valuable resources give organisations the edge 
they need to compete successfully in the market place. Since many organisations are 
resource-deficient, they may access resources from the environment to develop valuable 
resources for competitive advantage. This access to needed resources creates inter- 
dependence, hence organisations form relationships and coalitions through alliances or 
outsourcing to potentially stabilise supply of resources and reduce their vulnerability. 
It has been established that valuable resource cannot be bought in the open markets but 
must be built as capabilities or competence over time. Thus, dyadic business relationships 
provide the forum or context of interaction and resource exchange and are intrinsic to the 
resource-based theories. Similarly, TCE notes the benefits of hybrid mode of exchange as 
being free from the burden of hierarchy, namely bureaucratic costs, and ability to deal with 
decreased market efficiency as bilateral dependency increases (Williamson, 1996: 110). 
TCE further notes the benefits of network formations, where information is rapidly and 
accurately communicated to members thus attenuating the incentive for opportunistic 
behaviour, integrity and reputation being valuable resources (Williamson, 1996: 115). 
Hence, both Transaction Cost Economics and resource-based theories are involved with 
relationships through business interaction and organisational collaborations. 
3.7.3 The interaction approach 
HAkansson (1982), outlined the motivation for developing the interaction approach. Firstly, 
the realisation that business-marketing literature seemed inadequate for business markets. 
For example, most business purchases were processes of interaction between companies 
in the context of a relationship. Secondly, that these business relationships evolve over 
time, are often long-term, close, complex and enduring. Finally, they realised a need for 
emphasis on analysing and understanding these complex relationships in order to provide 
an understanding of their management. The interaction model is presented (figure 3.2). 
3.7.4 The Interaction Model (IM) 
HAkansson (1982) noted the factors needing careful consideration when investigating 
industrial markets. These are the fact that both buyers and sellers are active participants in 
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the market exchange (not active sellers and passive buyers). Secondly, that buyer-seller 
relationship can become institutionalised. Finally that close links can exist between 
companies who buy and sell infrequently. Using these factors and the interaction process 
of industrial markets, M611er and Wilson (1995: 112), list elements of the Model as: 
1. The interaction process, which contains the actual exchange of business, 
(economic, technical and social), but which also includes a long-range component 
in terms of adaptation, contact patterns, etc. 
2. The participating actors' resources, e. g., technological and organisational resources 
available to them. These create both possibilities and limitations and place specific 
requirements on the information processes 
3. The environment in which the interaction takes place, which includes the structure 
of the actors in the firm's environment. This affects the actual business exchange. 
4. The atmosphere in which certain cooperation takes place. This deals with power 
dependence relations, conflict, cooperation, overlapping proximity or distance and 
the trust and expectations created on both sides. 
3.7.5 Development of business relationships 
Ford (1980), states that industrial firms establish buyer-seller relationships, which are often 
close, complex and frequently long-term. These relationships are motivated by economic 
benefit and characterised by buyer-seller interdependence. in the establishment and 
development of relationships over time, Ford (1980), records a five-stage evolutionary 
Process comprising a pre-relationship stage, an early stage, a development stage, a long- 
term stage and a final stage. As business relationships develop and evolve, Ford (1980) 
reports changes to a number of variables. For example, the social bonds between the 
actors become strengthened as they socialise more and come to develop reciprocal trust, 
which decreases their cultural distance as they interact and learn more about each other's 
Way of 'doing things' and the technology involved in their activities. Senior management 
decisions may favour a relational posture and commitment towards long-term partnership, 
which further strengthens their relationship bonds (Mansson, 1982). In time the relating 
Partners may adapt their procedures, routines and accounting systems as their levels of 
trust and commitment increase (Hallen et al., 1991). The inherent power in-balance (RDT) 
can be attenuated by their long-term view of relationship benefits far above costs involved. 
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Figure. 3.2 The IMP Interaction Model: [adapted from Ford, (2003: 29)] 
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3.7.6 The Interacting parties 
As firms access and exchange resources, they become interdependent, develop activity 
links, resources ties and actors bonds (HAkansson and Snehota, 1995) (see figure 3-3). 
This interdependence between exchange partners is in line with the resource-based 
theories. However, these business relationships so formed have liabilities in terms of 
irretrievable relationship investments or sunk cost (1-16kansson and Snehota, 2000). The 
limiting nature of these investments (resource ties), have already been noted as asset 
specific investments that burden cooperating partners with opportunity costs. Activity links 
are mainly the adaptations to routines, processes, planning and procedures as levels of 
trust and commitment increase. Hallen et al., (1991) found in their study that the failure to 
make these adaptations resulted in loss of good will and future business. Adaptation can 
also result from coercion whether explicit or implicit in "if you don't adapt, we will take our 
business elsewhere". However, most partners did adapt their procedures as a sign of 
commitment to long-term partnership and expectation of enduring benefits. Thus, 
collaborative parties are advised (as in TCE) to weigh relationship benefits against the 
economic cost of relationship development and management (in managerial time, energy, 
effort and emotional resources). 
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These relationships are similar to collaborative alliances that precipitate behavioural or 
social content in terms of commitment, trust and the use of power to influence dependent 
actors when uncertainty of resources prevails. The resultant interdependence and social 
factors, prompted Ford (2002: 90), to call relationship a "golden cage or an ugly prison". 
However the successful management of business exchange relationships whether 
contract or alliance based, can be beneficial to the parties concerned (Halinen, 1997; 
Tyler, 1996: Tyler and Stanley, 2002). Thus business exchange relationships need not be 
ugly prisons but can be managed to become golden tunnels to bundles of benefits. 
Figure 3.3. Scheme of Analysis of Resource Exchange in a Dyadic Relationship 
Reproduced from: Relationship as a dvad [Ford, 2002: 177] 
Organisation A Organisation B 
Activity links 
(adaptatjons) 
Resource ties 
(asset specific or sunk costs) 
Actor bbnds 
(personal links) 
Key: 
3.7.7 Interdependence 
delineates medium of resource exchange 
As relationships evolve over time, actors learn to cooperate with each other for individual 
or mutual benefits (Anderson et al., 1994; Svensson, 2002). But such cooperation is 
tainted by the power imbalance resulting from resource interdependence. Managing this 
power asymmetry is a "balancing act" organisations must deal with as they interact and 
exchange resources (HAkansson and Gadde, 1992). This is probably because of the 
importance of provider relationship, which can account for about 70% of a firm's turnover. 
The importance of provider relationships may lie in knowledge transfer or sharing, for 
building capabilities and for innovation (1-16kansson and Gadde, 1992; Jolly, 2003). These 
relationships are dynamic, complex and may involve major investments hence firms that 
choose to interact with others must manage interdependence as all relationships become 
74 
inter-related and inter-dependent hence the network effects (Blumberg, 2001; Gadde and 
Snehota, 2000; H6kansson and Gadde, 1992; Jolly, 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
3.7.8 Social norms 
Fortunately, the exchange parties may belong to the same business network or trade 
association, where 'social norms' help curb opportunistic tendencies (Heide and John, 
1992; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 147). Social norms refer to common expectations of 
behaviour that are shared by decision makers, to which social actors are socialised to 
behave as prescribed (Heide and John, 1992; Krackhardt and Hanson, 1993; Maitlis, 
2004; Ouchi, 1979; Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Westphal and Khanna, 2003). 
Norms are developed under conditions of uncertainty to increase relationship predictability 
hence the stability of organisations for mutual benefits (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
If violated, actors are subject to sanctions through constraints, loss of face or business 
reputation (Reagans and McEvily, 2003). There are implicit norms of business relationship 
such as reciprocal trust and commitment to meet expectations and obligations. Here, the 
expectation of future business interactions makes business norns effective. This reduces 
total transaction costs through cooperative, self-enforcing arrangements that minimize the 
cost of searching, bargaining and haggling over legal contracts in what Araujo et al., 
(2003: 1256) call "a world of incomplete contracting and divergent interests". Thus business 
relationships become what Ford (2002: 167) calls "valuable bridges to access resources as 
well as resources" in connecting organisations and reducing transaction costs. 
Organisational interdependence can thrive on interpersonal linkages and social networks 
that help reduce uncertainty and increase predictability (Blumberg, 2001; Granovefter, 
1985; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Social networks and personal linkages provide means 
of communicating information about each other's activities, costs and pricing, a forum for 
negotiation and persuasion to obtain needed commitment and support for predictable 
planning and hence a means of stabilising interdependent relationships (Gadde and 
Snehota, 2000; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Social networks can also provide legitimacy 
for organisations. For example, a prestigious stakeholder sifting on the board of a local 
firm, can provide confirmation of value and worth for the organisation. Similarly, a banker 
on the board of an ailing firm can become committed to its financial need and mount a 
timely rescue bid to save the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Thus, interdependence 
involved in resource exchange presents organisations with a balancing act of power and 
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dependence to be managed through interpersonal linkages, social networks and norms 
that promote trust, cooperativeness and commitment to mutual benefits (Ford, 2003). 
3.7.9 Trust and commitment 
Trust is essentially reciprocal in nature, trust and control being different sides of the same 
analytical coin in as much as they are both functionally necessary for the generation and 
maintenance of social order through instituted power relations in legitimate authority 
structures (Reed, 2001). Thus, trust and power form a communicative medium through 
which dominant and subordinate groups can coordinate and control their social interaction. 
Consequently, exchange partners are bound by what Reed (2001) calls 'rule-based trust' 
and sanction-based power' relations in situations of risk and uncertainty such as resource 
sharing, acquisition or economic exchange to reduce complexities and achieve stability 
(Bleeke and Ernst, 1991; Doz and Hamel, 1998; Lane and Bachmann, 1996; Tsang, 2000). 
Trust and control are linked to the risk and uncertainty of cooperation between exchange 
partners, for without the uncertainty engendered in exchange relationships trust has no 
role to play (Das and Teng, 2001; Grey and Garsten, 2001; Reed, 2001) (see figure 3.4). 
Risk may be relational or performance risk. Relational risk is defined as 'the probability of a 
partner not cooperating in good faith and performance risk as 'the probability and 
consequence that alliance objectives are not realised' (Das and Teng, 2001). Furthermore, 
trust can be goodwill trust or competence trust. Goodwill trust denotes integrity and is 
defined as "the expectation that some others in the social relationship have the moral 
obligations and responsibility to demonstrate a special concern for other's interest above 
their own (Barber, 1983: 14). Competence trust refers to the expectation of a technically 
competent role performance and expertise expected from, say a reputable expert or 
professional (Das and Teng, 2001). For example, one trusts an airline pilot employed by a 
reputable organisation to fly safely to a given destination. 
Trust can be regarded as a state of mind, which has the capacity to lower perceived risk 
(Giddens, 1994; Layder, 1997), or a1eap of faith'tied to risk management mediated 
through expert power and knowledge (Giddens, 1994). Thus, there is an element of 
power-dependence or control in all trust-based relationships due to what Layder (1997: 64) 
calls the 'lack of viable alternatives for those who have to trust them'. This trust in expert 
systems such as justice, law, trade associations, doctors and banking may become 
institution alised into 'system trust' that has the ability to moderate the behaviour of 
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economic actors where goodwill trust and threat of sanctions alone may be inadequate 
(Bachmann, 2001; Barth6lemy and QuMin, 2006; Sheu et al., 2006). Thus, organisations 
in alliance relationships can use membership to trade associations or network reputations 
to align the behaviour of exchange partners to meet contractual obligations and reduce 
total transaction or monitoring and contract enforcement costs. 
Inter-firm trust, between actors can also be a source of competitive advantage through the 
suggestion of good intentions that ameliorate the problems of cooperation and reduce the 
relational risk of opportunism, thus reducing monitoring costs (Barney and Hanson, 1994). 
Relational exchange are said to be more effective and productive due to the goodwill of 
parties to interaction striving to resist short-term attractive alternatives in favour of long 
term benefits, commitment to preserve investments and shared values that ameliorate 
decision-making uncertainty and the propensity to exit (Eisingerich and Bell, 2007; 
Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Wilding and Humphries, 2006). 
Consequently, trust can reduce the risk of opportunism, facilitate the coordination of 
economic activities and become a source of competitive edge through cost reduction. 
The need to maximize organisational acceptability to stakeholders and increase resource 
and capability base for long-term survival can be the driving force for some forms of trust- 
building relationships (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). In such relationships, trust building 
and commitment to common goals can affect the effectiveness of one actor's control over 
another and reduce the overt use of power (Das and Teng, 1998; Eriksson and Laan, 
2007; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Wilding and Humphries, 2006). Control can also be'a 
process of regulation and monitoring for the achievement of organisational goals'. 
This is achieved through governance structures, contractual specifications, informal 
mechanisms and managerial arrangements (Das and Teng, 2001; Maitlis, 2004; Westphal 
and Khanna, 2003). Thus, trusting relationships and commitment to common goals can 
minimize the use of control measures and save total transaction costs. 
Because commitment of time, energy and resources entails vulnerability for parties to 
interaction, they will seek trustworthy and competent partners (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). 
Unfortunately, goodwill and competence trust can be misplaced, but the consequences of 
misplaced goodwill trust are less dire than that of competence trust (Bachmann, 2001). 
Lack of trust can result in constant monitoring of preset objectives. This can further erode 
Competence trust and create anxiety (Das and Teng, 2001; Grey and Garsten, 2001). 
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Figure 3.4 Framework of Trust, Control and Risk In Strategic Alliances 
(Das and Teng, 2001: 257) 
TRUST 
Goodwill Trust 
V- RISK PERCEPTION 
Competence Trust 
CONTROL 
Relational Risk 
Perfonnance Risk 
Behavioural control 
Output Control 
Social Control 
Some have questioned the role of managerial orientation towards long-term business 
relationships in promoting adaptive behaviour hence trust and commitment that can 
reduce transaction costs through reduced monitoring (Hallen et al., 1991; Morgan and 
Hunt, 1994). Others found that both managerial posture towards durable relationships and 
the power asymmetry due to interdependence, led to adaptive behaviour that increased 
the levels of trust and commitment for mutual benefits (Brennan and Turnbull, 1999). 
Overall researchers found that trust and commitment over time lead to loyalty and make 
total customer relationship management mutually beneficial to interacting parties (Eriksson 
and Laan, 2007; Osarenkhoe and Bennani, 2007; Wilding and Humphries, 2006). 
3.7.10 Power and control 
Other mechanisms for reducing uncertainty and complexity in the exchange environment 
are power and direct control. Resource exchange creates interdependence characterised 
by power asymmetry. It has been stated that the control of critical resources, means 
controlling the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Power refers to 'the ability to influence 
others successfully' while authority is regarded as officially recognised power (Hodge and 
Anthony, 1991). Both power and authority can enable managers to take action on behalf of 
organisations and achieve goals. For example, financial allocation negotiations during 
resource scarcity may be won more on the exercise of power than on need, discretion or 
consensus (Pfeffer, 1994: 41). 
However, organisations are said to be social instruments of power and energy where 
people vie for position and control (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Effective power derives 
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firstly from access to resources, information and support needed to carry out tasks and 
secondly from the ability to get cooperation in the performance of economic activities 
(Kanter, 1979). Effective power, notes Kanter (1979) is essentially position power derived 
from the formal and informal systems in organisations, which help those in authority, 
coordinate activities. But such authority granted to others through relationships or 
dependence, can also be withdrawn by those with power (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Therefore, organisations may prefer to share power through social agreements and 
consensus in order to manage the interdependence involved in exchange relationships. 
Major sources of power in organisations include ownership, access to, use of, or ability to 
regulate the allocation of critical resources (Pfeffer, 1981,1994; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). This discretionary power increases with resource scarcity. In ownership situations 
power influence is exercised through authority position while in cooperative arrangements 
like alliances, compliance is gained through voluntary behaviour. Hence, organisations use 
negotiated agreement, persuasion and consensus to align behaviour of business partners 
and coalition members to stabilise desired outcomes and avoid control (Wrong, 1979). 
Furthermore, control of discretionary resource allocation can be used to manage an array 
of organisations (Pfeffer, 1981,1994). For example, the 450 NHS trusts in England are 
managed by this means through the Department of Health (to set the standards) and the 
Treasury (to allocate allowable funds). Consequently, effective management of alliance 
relationships that reduces NHS trusts' need for discretionary allocation of funds, can 
reduce the control of these organisations over the NHS trust involved. 
In decisions under uncertainty and complexity, social networks are said to be invaluable 
(Pfeffer, 1981). These network linkages provide information, experience and knowledge 
through learning to aid the decision process. Such linkages may be board members drawn 
from the community who then become committed to organisational goals and help stabilise 
the organisation with respect to its hostile environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Consequently, information can be a source of power in organisations, the manipulation or 
distortion and withholding of which can affect effectiveness through reduced politicking. 
Organisations are like Governments and hence fundamentally political entities (Pfeffer, 
1994). The interdependence between organisations creates incentives to work together 
and forge common goals. Consequently, success depends on the ability to coordinate 
activities through teamwork or mobilise support through trade associations and coalitions 
to exert political influence on behalf of members (Westphal and Khanna, 2003). 
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Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), argue that successful organisations engage in minimal power 
politics, which consumes time, distorts or restricts information and hence may distort 
perceptions of the state of the environment. However, change in organisations is often a 
consequence of political processes, using power politics to align organisations with the 
environment. Thus, power politics and interdependence become "balancing acts" actors 
must manage in exchange relationships (Ford, 2002,2003; Hkansson and Gadde, 1992). 
Organisational politics is the arena for struggles for power (Boulding, 1990; Wrong, 1979). 
Members must mobilise power to access resources for innovation and to improve services 
or struggle to countervail the power of others to impose institutionalised routines and 
policies. Hence those reluctant or unwilling to engage in power politics and conflicts must 
resign and confine their organisation to gradual developmental change over long period 
rather than radical change or innovation (Linder et al., 2002; Wrong, 1979: 63). 
In organisational structures and procedures are located patterns of power and influence in 
action that recur to establish the 'rules of the game' for effective control (Clegg, 1979; 
Ronchetto et al., 1989). But such control is never total (Giddens, 1979,1984) partly due to 
undercutting and erosion by agency or labour force (Clegg, 1989; Ezzamel et al., 2001; 
Marx, 1990; Mechanic, 1962) hence negotiation and bargaining power become necessary 
instruments in successful exchange relationship management (Das and Teng, 2001; 
Flack, 2002; Lorpch, 1995). This can be achieved through cooptation, which is a less direct 
method of resisting control through socialisation of hostile elements. The aim is to involve 
them as participants in board membership, or as advisers to the vulnerable organisation, 
where they may become committed to the focal organisation's cause and provide needed 
assistance rather than complaints (Frankforter et al., 2000; Lorsch, 1995; Maitlis, 2004). 
Indeed one NHS hospital studied used cooptation to invite a complaining community elite 
as a board member. Through the help and lobbying power of the board, changes were 
made to the satisfaction of all concerned. 
3.7.11 Communication 
In relational exchange, of interdependence and commitment to goals, timely, reliable and 
relevant communication can foster trust through early conflict resolution and the sharing of 
information to reduce misunderstandings and align perceptions or clarify issues (Anderson 
and Narus, 1990). Communications refers to the formal or informal sharing of meaningful, 
timely and relevant information, while conflict is determined by the frequency, intensity and 
duration of disagreements (Anderson and Narus, 1990). For example the timely receipt of 
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meaningful, clear information about pricing, competitors activity or resource need to be 
met allows organisations time to use and benefit from that information. Microsoft sale of 
QDOS operating systems to IBM is a case in point (see 3.6.1). With long-term view in mind 
conflicts become functional, most are resolved early and amicably as they provide 
valuable medium for problem solving rather than disagreements or disputes (Ganesan, 
1994). Thus, clarity of communication, loyalty, trust and commitment become important 
social capital for creating value in business interactions. 
Influence patterns can be used to induce desired actions to shape exchange relationships. 
This may lessen conflict and improve cooperation, communication, trust and commitment 
that facilitate outcomes for mutual satisfaction (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Maitlis, 2004). 
Blumberg (2001) argues that communication leads to the development of trust. However, 
Anderson and Narus (1990) regard the relationship between trust and communication as 
an iterative process and comment that meaningful communication makes conflict 
functional as a means of 'clearing the air'. Though their study is predictive and static, it can 
be adapted for dynamic alliance relationships. Consequently, exchange partners can use 
communication to reduce conflict, build trust and cooperation as they commit to achieving 
their set goals for mutual benefits. 
In summary, the management of relationship interdependence involves commitment to 
common goals and building trust over time to reduce the risk and uncertainty of a hostile, 
undependable environment in the quest for resources. This can reduce cost of monitoring 
and ultimately transaction costs while building stronger relationship bonds that become 
valuable resources. Power and politics are essential features of organisations. They can 
be used to align divergent stakeholder interests and behaviour to achieve organisational 
goals. Cooptation can make hostile outsiders allies while communication make conflicts 
functional. Negotiated agreements and consensus work better, than power plays. 
Common orientation and expectation between exchange partners help regulate their 
behaviour to prescribed norms, which then maintains the relationship as valuable. 
3.8 Where now for NHS trusts studied: Market Mechanism or Hybrid structure? 
Having reviewed the literature on some of the theoretical schools of thought that underpin 
this study, what does it suggest about the NHS trusts investigated? 
Are they operating a market mechanism? 
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Clearly the trusts are not operating in a classical free market, where buyers and sellers are 
able to judge the real transaction costs and value of exchanges. The NHS has no buyers 
and sellers. There are consumers (users), services purchasers and providers under the 
over-arching control of central Government and designated agencies (Ovretveit, 1995). 
The information about prices, capacity and quality is not freely available so users cannot 
judge what services they get (Laing et al., 2002; Levitt, et al., 1995). Furthermore, users 
do not purchase a service rather it is purchased for them by a third party from the funds 
they paid (taxation) which acts as an insurance for services when needed. The central 
Government administers funds and ensures services will be there when needed (DoH, 
2002; Ovretveit, 1995). Demand and supply are not price mediated as in markets but are 
highly regulated by purchasers and the Government. Thus, the NHS cannot be deemed to 
operate a market mechanism based on price, perfect information, with free entry and exit. 
Under the present system, trusts have been mandated to engage in long-term services 
contracts, retain local autonomy and accountability and are encouraged to become more 
efficient and reduce total costs and waste (Health Emergency, 2004a; Ovretveit, 1995; 
Williamson, 1975). But there is always the assurance of a bailout and the fact that trusts 
cannot go bankrupt may encourage slack in the system and reduce incentive for efficiency 
(Ovretveit, 1995). NHS trusts can only contract with vetted providers whose capacity, 
prices and quality of service are known (Government agencies vet and approve service 
providers that trusts can engage) (PASA, 1998). Furthermore, the bilateral dependency 
created by services outsourcing demands that contracts include contractual safeguards 
like information disclosure, methods of dispute settlement and equitable sharing of risks 
and benefits, thus avoiding the type of moral hazard envisaged by economic governance 
frameworks (Williamson, 1975). Contract details are pre-worded by Government agencies 
and local trusts can choose between a standard few for their need (PASA, 1998). 
Perhaps the closest organisational model is, as Williamson suggests, the franchise. NHS 
trusts appear to act like franchises, having quasi-local autonomy but under greater 
surveillance, added rules and are highly regulated (Williamson, 1996: 107). 
Although Williamson (1996) states that the local autonomy of franchises may impede 
global (or national) adjustments, the Government already uses agencies to impose 
national adjustments on NHS trusts in spite of their quasi-autonomy (PASA, 1998). 
Similarly, TCE argues that the added restraint on franchises to use only franchisor 
materials, to prevent abuse may prohibit utilising local opportunity for cost effective 
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procurement. This is similar to what obtains in the NHS where trusts must use agency- 
Vetted suppliers for products above E300.000 (PASA, 1998). Thus, the NHS seems to 
approximate to TCE views based on commercial organisations while modifying some 
aspects of the framework. 
Furthermore, the Government acts as a holding firm, absorbing all cash flow variance to 
shore up ailing parts, shielding trusts from the effects of financial adversity through bailouts 
and handouts and policing internal efficiency matters through numerous agencies 
(Ovretveit, 1995; Williamson, 1975). The Government also exposes trusts to competition 
by assigning cash flows to high yield users (via payment by results), which is deemed a 
fundamental attribute of a holding firm or Williamson's M-form (1975: 148). The Centre for 
Research in Strategic Purchasing and Supply (CRiSPS) at the University of Bath, United 
Kingdom came to the same conclusion (Harland, Knight and Lamming, 2005: 835). Thus, 
the whole system becomes synergistically more efficient as the Government favours local 
goal pursuit and least cost behaviour similar to profit maximization while retaining the 
concepts of divisionalisation with centralised internal control and strategic decision-making 
(Williamson, 1975). Thus the Central Government is shielded from local partisan politics 
while planning, appraising, controlling and allocating funds to its divisions (NHS trusts). 
Based on the foregoing analysis, these trusts, with respect to their resource exchange, 
appear to be oscillating between a market mode and a hybrid mode with an over-arching 
Government constraint that makes it a special hybrid type or Williamson's M-form of 
hybrid, a product of Chandler's (1962) multi-divisional universal form. 
NHS trusts do not operate purely on a market mechanism but are subject to political 
constraints and financial bailouts. However the present trajectory of NHS trusts for 
autonomy and self-determination as foundation trusts, calls for them to embrace the 
competitive ethos in order to survive in a competitive market. But some see no profit to be 
gained as reward, hence no incentive to be motivated to strive for more. Thus some NHS 
trusts focus on efficiency (value for money) and economising on total transaction costs by 
in-house production and perhaps to limit the ubiquitous opportunism of economic agents 
(Williamson, 1981: 1550). 
Observers note that organisations are unique and different in time and space (Barney, 
1991; Giddens, 1984). This is due to their varied history, location, processes, competence, 
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skill base, attitude to risk, power political orientations, people, culture and capabilities that 
support their strategic choices (Child, 1997; Hunt and Morgan, 1995; Weick, 1995). 
Based on these factors, organisations make decisions or non-decisions (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1962) and take varied actions to deploy their human and financial resources, skills 
and competences into uncertain future (Porter, 1991; Powell, 2001: 886; Weick, 1979). 
What most researchers then observe and catalogue are the consequences of past 
performance and creation struggles, which are the outcomes of where organisations, have 
been. Thus many factors determine the variety of organisations like NHS trusts, their 
choices as outsourced or in-house concerns and their present state as either autonomous 
or state dependent or indeed successful or still struggling to survive and compete. 
Coase (1937) notes that firms will avoid contract negotiation costs by producing their own 
inputs till the marginal cost of in-house production equals the market price of the input. But 
if NHS trusts have no obligation or legal mandate to market-test prices, how will they know 
when the price of input produced in-house equals that of the market? Thus the fear of 
opportunistic behaviour of economic agents, deemed guilty by axiom, may prevent some 
NHS trusts from outsourcing or engaging in competitive market endeavour preferring to 
cooperate with other in-house low cost operators for stability, predictability or mediocrity. 
Besides managers are reluctant to abolish their own jobs by outsourcing to contractors 
(Williamson, 1975). Consequently they retain in-house supply even when external supply 
by commercial contractors may be lower than viable cost of internal production or supply. 
What is more, by favouring procurement managers, with in-house operations, other 
departmental managers make room for trade-offs and reciprocity between departments for 
future use. Thus procurement decisions are distorted in favour of internal supply and 
benchmarked against other in-house operators. 
Secondly, internal arrangements economise on informative communication devoid of 
meaningless symbols, using instead their unique occupational and cultural jargons for 
efficiency. Outsourcing involves external others and a cost in relationship management. 
Consequently, NHS trusts economise on total transaction costs through favourable internal 
arrangements (Williamson, 1975). 
Thirdly, internal arrangements promote convergent expectations and attenuate uncertainty 
of interdependent parties making independent decisions with respect to private motives 
and agendas or changing market conditions, contract details or prices (Williamson, 1975). 
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Fourthly, internal arrangements and cooperation with similar NHS trusts permit parties to 
deal with uncertainty in adaptive sequential manner without the same hazards that market 
contracting can pose. Consequently, in-house managers economise on their bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1991; March and Simon, 1958) by working on approximations rather 
than on certainty and by waiting till events unfold to deal with them. Sixthly the sunk cost of 
existing processes and facilities insulate them against replacement with new or preferred 
projects, hence favouring in-house continuance. 
Furthermore, by abandoning their present facilities to choose alternatives like outsourcing, 
current committed administration will have to admit failure of internal procurement and 
management hence the persistence of in-house persists and it becomes rather difficult to 
separate the inappropriate and inefficient from meritorious performance in such NHS trusts 
(Moore, 1992; Williamson, 1975). Thus in large complex organisations, where cross 
subsidisation glosses over inefficiency, market testing is rarely undertaken (no legal 
reason to do so), so managers focus on cost containment and cooperation while avoiding 
market mechanisms that will bring accountability, relationship management and more 
open communication to the fore. 
But the NHS trusts that embrace the competitive ethos to aim for foundation status can 
struggle and strive now to learn and make the financial stability grade that will enable them 
to attain self-determination and the ability to define or configure their own services with a 
more efficient and cost effective view in mind. Some have already gained comparative 
advantage from medical research and expertise and with competition to spur them on 
many more will attain the foundation status and be freed from Government dictates and 
domination (Timmins, 2007a), to add value to healthcare services that meet the needs of 
local community. Thus the variety of NHS trusts will enable patients have more hospital 
choices with a diversity of hotel support services, while workers and some managers will 
liberate themselves from the mundane to the professionals, able to hold their own in 
organisations of diverse professionals. 
Clearly the third way (Giddens, 2000), presents NHS trusts with different options and 
choices for the future. The purpose of this study is to understand and document the 
Perceptions and interpretations put upon these choices by those directly involved in 
support services outsourcing with private commercial services providers. 
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Chapter 4 Methodology and Methods 
4.1 Introduction 
The choice of structuration theory, reflects the nature of the research question, the data 
gathered from a somewhat unique context and my intention to understand and explain the 
Outcome of complex and dynamic interactive process like hotel services outsourcing on a 
group of people directly involved in the process. It is difficult to position this study in either 
of the prevailing polar ends of the philosophical divide of determinism or voluntarism. 
Determinism deals with the reproduction of social relations as causal mechanical 
Outcomes devoid of any active process involving human agency. Similarly, voluntarism is 
said to treat only problems of "production", where agency produces reality through 
Meaning (Bryant and Jary, 1991: 7). But structuration theory seems to offer another way of 
examining the situation by suggesting social structures as both the medium and outcome 
of social interaction. It incorporates the action of knowledgeable human agents with 
Meaning, subjectivity, reflexivity and power, facilitating and constraining agents through 
the dialectic of control. The support services workers and their managers have been 
trained and developed from ancillary workers to professionals through services provider 
investments. This accords them the privilege of knowledgeable and skilled agents able to 
Use available resources to make a difference to their roles, departments and NHS trusts. 
Similarly, the contractual relationship between services providers and their clients in the 
outsourced support services engenders autonomy/dependence power positions hence a 
constant balancing act for their relationship to continue for mutual benefit. Structuration 
theory deals with the concept of power in social interaction like contractual relationships. 
Consequently, structuration theory (Giddens, 1979,1984) provides a powerful but flexible 
Philosophical framework with which to study and explain the evolving social and economic 
changes resulting from hotel services outsourcing in the National Health Service (NHS). 
4.2 Structuration theory 
Structuration theory (Giddens, 1979,1984) is deemed a metatheory of action, relevant to 
all social sciences and suitable for the study of patterns of change through interaction or 
economic consequences (Bryant and Jary, 1991: 14,102). It is an ontological framework for 
studying human social activities (interaction) in social institutions like the health service in 
advanced or capitalist societies (Giddens, 1984). Structuration theory is dedicated to 
examining how knowledgeable actors as agents, differentially 611dowed with access to' 
needed resources like finance, knowledge, managerial experience and a loyal workforce 
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can make a difference in pre-existing state of affairs that affects their roles, and attain 
organisational transformation, community renewal and social change. By giving weight to 
the actors' meanings and actions, the theory helps to show how social structures like 
Culture or reputation are both constituted by human agency and yet are the medium of this 
Constitution. 
Structuration theory focuses on understanding of human agency and social institutions, 
where institutions, like the health service and the monarchy, are regarded as the more 
enduring features of social life (Giddens, 1984: 24). Structuration theory regards all social 
life as generated in and through praxis; where social praxis includes the nature, conditions 
and consequences of historical activities and interactions produced through the agency of 
social actors in time and space (Cohen, 1989: 2). Because the rationality of agents is 
bounded the activities they perform have intended and unintended consequences 
(Cassell, 1993; Giddens, 1979: 215). Thus, actors (by intention) are creators of social life 
but the resultant social life created is not of their creation due to unacknowledged or 
unintended conditions of action (unforeseen outcome). For example, diverse intentional 
acts aimed at improving urban sprawl through housing policies and the need of ethnic 
groups to maintain cohesion via common language, customs and social events, may result 
in ethnic segregation as an unintended consequence (Giddens, 1984). 
The theory of structuration (Giddens, 1979,1984) skilfully straddles the great philosophical 
chasm of objectivism and subjectivism in what is called ontology of social life in sociology 
While claiming an epistemological middle ground (Bryant and Jary, 1991; Cassell, 1993; 
Cohen, 1989). Structuration theory is not alone in rejecting this philosophical polarisation 
described by Burrell and Morgan (1979). Critical theory of Bhaskar (1978) also abandons 
this restrictive dichotomy for a different focused framework for investigating complex 
Organisations. Both structuration and critical theories deal with concepts of power, control, 
domination and change in novel ways that transcend description and attempt to explain 
what is observed in complex dynamic relationships like support services outsourcing in the 
NHS (Reed, 1996,1997; Riley, 1983; Stones, 2005; Whittington, 1992; Willmott, 1987). 
Structuration theory is eclectic in supporting the synthesis of assumptions and favouring 
Pluralism. This is expressed through its ability to borrow concepts from other disciplines as 
well as divergent schools of thought (Bryant and Jary, 1991; Cassell, 1993; Cohen, 1989). 
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For example, from the objective world of structuralism (Levi Strauss) and functionalism 
(Comte) the ideas of constraining quality is emphasised in the duality of structure where 
structures are rules and resources that both enable and constrain actors in their daily 
activities and interaction. Similarly, the social whole is given pre-eminence over individuals 
although individual agents are acknowledged to be knowledgeable and able to intervene in 
events to make a difference when they have access to resources (Bryant and Jary, 1991; 
Cassell, 1993). From the subjective world, the concepts of subjectivity, action, meaning 
and communication are related to notions of structure and constraint used to explain 
human conduct. For example, human agency is rooted in the capability of doing things. 
The motive for action is prompted by want while the reason provides the ground for action 
(Giddens, 1984). The knowledgeability and subjective experience of human agents entails 
the ability to meaningfully communicate, explain and elaborate on the reasons for actions 
engaged in. The rules of social conduct provide a mutual platform for understanding and 
Monitoring the resources (hence structure) drawn upon during interaction in co-presence. 
Thus human agents can be held accountable and responsible for their actions. 
The production and reproduction of social systems' involve the communication of meaning 
through language, exercise of power and the evaluation of conduct through reflexive 
Monitoring of action by actors (Bryant and Jary, 1991: 8). For example, the informal use of 
language as humour, irony or sarcasm to communicate hidden meaning can display the 
basis for actions or coping mechanisms for those in subordinate positions more than 
Structured interviews. Structured interview formats fail to incorporate local ironies or hidden 
cultural meanings of those interviewed. Furthermore, the perception and exercise of power 
and control by providers of vital scarce resources and how they reflexively monitor and 
evaluate their conduct to maintain custom, reputation and legitimacy can be studied using 
the framework offered by structuration theory. Thus, structuration theory (Giddens, 1979, 
1984) is an appropriate tool for studying the role and consequences of hotel services 
Outsourcing to commercial services providers, who are also investors in capital projects 
and stakeholders in some NHS trusts. 
Structuration theory also rejects the dualism of agency and structure in favour of duality of 
structure; where structures are rules and resources used in interaction. These rules and 
resources are both the medium and the outcome of interaction. As a medium, rules and 
resources provide the structures individuals draw upon to interact meaningfully and as 
I Social systems relate to the patterning of social relations across space and time (Giddens, 1984: 376) 
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outcome, they exist only through being applied and acknowledged in interaction. Rules 
and resources do not exist in time and space except in the constitution of social systems, 
Where systems are regularized relations in interaction (Giddens, 1979: 65). Thus, 
structuration theory can be used to study ways in which social systems are produced and 
reproduced in interaction via the application of generative rules and resources in the 
context of intended or unintended outcomes (Cassell, 1993; Cohen, 1989; Stones, 2005). 
Basically, the ontology of structuration theory, emphasises the self-direction of the 
individuals as agents and focuses on which conditions of action will maximize the capacity 
of knowledgeable actors to make a difference in society when they are differentially and 
Socially endowed with access to vital resources (Bryant and Jary, 1991: 19). Hence it is 
concerned with the uniqueness of historical views or perceptions of human action and 
human societies and the reproduction of social systems (figure 4.1 below). it limits the role 
of causal laws, defies generalisation (Bryant and Jary, 1991: 18) and excludes all universal 
laws, which according to Giddens (1990: 310), do not exist in human social activities. 
Structuration theory regards social science as neither natural science nor non-science but 
science with a different character. Hence the open-ended guidelines for investigating 
social institutions like the health services. There are three stipulations for using 
structuration theory (Giddens, 1976: 6). These are firstly researchers must be sensitive to 
the complex skills of agents in day-to-day activities. Secondly, they must be aware of the 
critical discipline in sociology, which seems to undermine ideology or capabilities by 
making the sectional interests of dominant groups appear as universal ones. Thirdly, 
research must be in a specific context, with findings communicated in appropriate literary 
style, having ethnographic or anthropological aspects to them (Bryant and Jary, 1991: 24). 
The main issues in structuration theory are: Social praXiS2, power as transformative 
capacity of agents to make a difference, the fact that all historical practices (healthcare 
delivery) and circumstances (support services) are subject to change, the duality of 
structure, the broad use of language to communicate meaning, the time-space 
distanciation, the dialectic of control, where autonomy and dependence are reciprocally 
related and control is never absolute and de-centring of individual in favour of society. 
2 Social praxis are the nature, conditions and consequences of historical activities (Giddens, 1984) 
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Figure 4.1 Reproduction of social systems through interaction 
(adapted from Giddens, 1979: 27-28: Bryant and Jary, 1991: 123) 
SOCIAL INTEGRATION: in physical co-prcscnce 
(Reciprocity 
between actors) immediate nexus of interaction 
t Unacknowledged 
Conditions of action 
Unintended 
Conseq r nces of action 
SYSTEM INTEGRATION: in physical absence 
(Reciprocity between Reproduction of institutions 
Groups or collectives) and institutional practices 
4.3 The nature of reality 
In framing his ontology of social life, Anthony Giddens claims that he was inspired by post- 
empiricist doctrines associated with positivist ideas but chose a middle ground from which 
to "fire critical salvos (guns, applause or questions) into reality" (Giddens, 1982: 72). Hence 
he regards his world-view as lying between two houses-a factual house and a moral or 
critical one, neither of which is safe (Giddens, 1982: 74). Consequently structuration theory 
can also be critiqued from any theoretical angle or established schools of thought, as 
many have done, and Giddens accepts that there is room for other world-views, even in 
capitalist societies. However, Giddens (1981: 184), has been reticent in rebutting his critics 
and regards such areas of endeavour as contested terrain to be avoided. He maintains 
that no single theory can be expected to provide the frameworks needed in conducting 
social research as evidenced in the multiple theories intrinsic to this thesis. 
Williamson 0 996: 309) adopts the same view and favours; multiple intrinsic theories. 
Some writers have been critical of structuration theory. For example, Bhaskar (1986: 84) 
considers structuration theory as too voluntaristic. Stones (2005), makes the same 
Comment arguing that structuration theory overestimates the knowledgeability and power 
of agents. Others complain that agency may dominate the stage in structuration theory but 
the issue of dualism has only been refocused not resolved (De Cork and Rickards, 1995). 
Others argue that such criticisms are epistemological issues on which Giddens has been 
silent and is reluctant to specify (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Bryant and Jary, 1991: 25). 
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4.4 Knowledge-ability of agents 
Barbalet, (1987: 11) argues that there is little credible evidence that the knowledgeable 
agents of structuration theory know about their institutions as much as they are supposed 
to. Giddens (1979: 255) replies that to be a competent member of society, every individual 
Must know a great deal about the workings of that society. Besides agents are not "cultural 
dopes" but highly skilled and knowledgeable with both unconscious cognition and stocks of 
tacit knowledge (experience) on which to draw in the constitution of social activity. Agents 
also reproduce structures (expertise through learning) as medium and outcome of their 
interaction and in so doing can reproduce, renew, change or transform their institutions 
and subsequently society (Giddens, 1979: 71). However, Pleasants (1999: 55), comments 
that agents are knowledgeable by virtue of what they can do not what they can theorise. 
Hence their stock of know-how is more important than their theoretical knowledge. For 
example in problem-solving, where action not knowledge is needed to avoid conflict. 
Whittington (1992: 704), also Posits that it is by the active exploitation of tensions between 
divergent structural principles (as principles of organisations or institutional alignment) that 
Managers gain their agency. For example the internal ambiguity and plurality of rules and 
their subsequent interpretations give agents the leverage to reduce such rules to local 
contexts, apply them creatively or dispense with them altogether as inappropriate for them. 
Similarly alien rules introduced through relationships or external control mechanisms are 
also subject to contestation or interpretation to suit local contexts as seen in the rules 
governing corporate subsidiaries which agents interpret to suit them and thus avoid central 
control (Child et al., 2000; Ferner et al., 2004; Grimshaw and Miozzo, 2006). Others argue 
that change is made through the struggles for autonomy (Craib, 1992; Kaspersen, 2000). 
On resources, structuration theory credits knowledgeable agents with the capacity to make 
a difference when they have access to resources. However, others argue that perhaps 
access or indeed possession of scarce but vital resources alone does not guarantee their 
effective usage without requisite skills (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Pettigrew, 1973). Thus 
the skills agents bring to bear on using resources and their ability to mobilise support for 
their claims or sectional interest may be more important than access or possession alone. 
Stones (2005), had the last word by commenting that structuration theory is meant to be 
used as a sensitising device and not a detailed guideline for research procedures. Other 
theories should provide the frame of reference or context for research while structuration 
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theory deals with the interplay and interdependence between agency and structure. For 
example, family structure is tied to the job market but Government structures and 
employment policies provide the context of employment for family members. Thus through 
the interplay of employment policies and structures, family members maintain their roles. 
Despite these arguments, observers contend that structuration theory remains a most 
Promising analytical and explanatory framework, than multiple paradigms, for conducting 
in-depth analysis of the interplay between structure and agency as they shape and 
reproduce organisational forms (Bryant and Jary, 1991; De Cork and Rickards, 1995; 
Reed, 1997; Stones, 2005; Weaver and Gioia, 1994; Whittington, 1992; Willmott, 1981). 
4.5 Users of structuration theory 
Many researchers have used structuration theory to study aspects of organisations and 
society. For example: 
Whittington (1992) used it to investigate how class structuration and the capitalist division 
of labour can be influenced by gender, ethnicity, knowledge and state and how conflicts 
and contradiction between private appropriation of surplus value and socialised production 
can open up space for agency to transform their organisations through the dialectic of 
control. The active exploitation of these tensions enables workers to exercise the privilege 
of defiance in contradiction to capitalist rules of obedience, loyalty, compliance and 
commitment aimed at employee control and domination at the workplace. Consequently, 
Using structuration theory extends managerial agency beyond the confines of corporate 
buildings into the communities where managers and workers (employees) are parents, 
leaders and members of ethnic groups whose rules of conduct and engagement differ from 
those of the capitalists. Thus employees have a plethora of choices within diverse systems 
from which to draw on rules and resources in order to make a difference without recourse 
to capitalist or institutional structures alone. 
Willmott (1987) argues that managerial work in social institutions in capitalist societies like 
support services in the NHS can be influenced and conditioned by the requirements of 
capitalist labour process because the rules and resources agents draw upon to perform 
Managerial work in these institutions are already accepted, legitimised and sustained by 
the politico-economic relations of power in capitalists society. Hence managers draw on 
capitalist structures (rules and resources) within and outside institutions as the medium 
and outcome of their interaction to enable them accomplish their tasks. Agency is 
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therefore through the imperfect and multiple confusing roles which managers play, as 
career managers, agents of capitalist system and employees of corporations with powers 
to allocate rewards or apportion sanction to which they are also subject. Thus in 
institutional analysis, managerial work becomes a continuous search for consensus in the 
conflict of personal and sectional self-interest between power holders and non-clique 
Members within the "dialectic of control' . 
In the realm of change, Pettigrew (1985), documents how external economic recession 
triggered change and was used by corporate leaders, as agents of change, to mobilise 
Managerial action in the context of Imperial Chemical Industry (ICI) to transform that 
organisation. This study resonates with the consequences of hotel services outsourcing in 
the health services. The trigger for services outsourcing was the inflation or economic 
recession of the time needing a reduction in Government healthcare expenditure in order 
to fund competing areas like education. The subsequent mobilisation of forces by 
Managers, as agents in their trusts, has seen trusts like Theresa hospital attain foundation 
status and become liberated from central control. Others trusts studied are poised to gain 
the same through the enabling action of services providers as capital projects investors 
and major stakeholders that streamlined activities, instituted innovation, commercial 
ventures and ancillary staff training in many trusts with outsourced services. 
Still on change, Chanal (2004), used structuration theory to study how project teams in an 
industrial setting can draw on organisational rules and resources (structures) and through 
interaction produce new knowledge that resulted in change through innovation in design. 
Huber (1999) also used structuration theory to study how an organisation outsourced its 
design features to access skill, knowledge and expertise. The in-house team and their 
vendor, through interaction and drawing on organisational rules and resources were able 
to produce new knowledge to redesign features that effectively impacted the client firm. 
Similarly, Ranson et al., (1980) used structuration theory in the context of organisational 
structure as informal patterned regularity of interaction combined with structure as 
framework of the organisation to show how organisations change over time through 
interaction. Here Ranson et al., (1980), acknowledged the separate notions of structure 
as a medium of control and domination through hierarchical positions or social 
93 
relationships (interaction). Both involve political processes to enable agents to access, 
allocate and to administer scarce resources or mobilise forces to achieve desired 
outcomes for change or renewal. 
AkgU'n et al., (2007), used structuration theory to understand organisational intelligence as 
an interplay between individual and corporate intelligence, which through interaction of 
Workers as agents, is combined into a comprehensive form of organisational intelligence. 
Others used structuration theory to study the interaction between information systems and 
agents who receive, interpret and use or resist using them to improve the effectiveness of 
their delivery services in logistics (Lewis and Suchan, 2003). 
On cultural issues, Patricia Riley (1983) used structuration theory to investigate culture as 
organisational politics rife with patterns of symbolic discourses and subcultures (as what 
an organisation is and not what organisations have). In her institutional analysis, she 
compared political symbols from two professional bodies, which were subsidiaries of the 
same organisation to elicit features of control, power play and domination. One sample 
Was routinised (public) and the other non-routinised (private). Her aim was to identify 
Structures that govern the political nature of organisational culture and to elicit structures of 
domination through resource allocation and budgetary decisions. 
Although her data collection was hampered by the refusal of some people to be 
interviewed, the transfer of employees, resignations, vague responses to interview 
questions and attrition, she achieved 20/50 scheduled interviews in the end. Such data 
collection problems were also seen and experienced in this study (so I am not alone). In 
her analysis, using structuration theory schema, (figure 4.2), she also found it difficult to 
discern actions generated through domination and hence relied on respondents' views at 
interviews on what was important to them through repetition or voice modulation. However 
she managed to arrive at a plausible conclusion that organisations are rife with informal 
cultures or subcultures not officially espoused by all members but through the dialectic of 
Control, the official culture predominates. This is the same conclusion arrived at in this 
study. 
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Figure 4.2 Analytical elements using the process of structuration 
(adapted from Giddens, 1984: 29) 
STRUCTURE SIGNIFICATION DOMINATION LEGITIMATION 
(semantic rules) (resources) (moral rules to 
evaluate conduct) 
MODALITY Interpretative Facility Norm 
(mediation of scheme 
interaction in (stocks of 
process of production knowledge and 
and reproduction) capabilities) 
(Accountability) 
INTERACTION Communication Power Morality /sanction 
Although structuration theory has been criticised as a meta-theory of action, many 
researchers have successfully used aspects of it (as intended by Giddens) in social 
Studies involving change, power through culture, organisational intelligence, innovation in 
design and logistics, but none of these studies involved a large public organisation like the 
NHS or support services outsourcing. 
However, Lawrence et al., (1997), used structuration theory to investigate the ability of 
agents to mobilise forces during crisis situation prompted by economic recession to effect 
change, survival and transformation of their organisation. Although the context of the study 
Was a large public hospital in New Zealand, the research was in the accounting section. 
There are similarities with the research presented here. For example, the context of study 
and the stimulus for change through operational efficiency are the same but again it does 
not deal with either support services or services outsourcing as in this study. 
4.6 Research Methods 
Introduction 
This section defines the data collection methods, ethical, validity and reliability issues. The 
decision to use a resource-based approach for this study, evolved during the pilot study of 
NHS trusts. The relevant theoretical frameworks that underpin the study namely Resource 
Dependence Theory (RDT), Resource-based View (RBV), Institutional Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) and Interaction Model (IM) emerged as "lenses" to guide the study, 
select people interviewed and raise important questions and issues to examine (Cresswell, 
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2003: 131). Subsequently, structuration theory (Giddens, 1979,1984) also emerged as a 
Unifying lens with which to understand the perceptions of particular individuals in specific 
contexts of NHS trusts and how these people create meaning in their roles as procurement 
Managers, services provider (FIVI) managers, stakeholders or members of the workforce. 
These theoretical underpinnings have been reviewed and discussed. Their combined 
assumptions provide a rich broad framework amenable to the study of complex and 
dynamic phenomena like the perceptions of key personnel involved in hotel services 
Outsourcing and the consequences of their business relationships with commercial 
services providers in the eight NHS trusts studied. 
Others have used multiple theories to investigate business relationships. For example, 
Heide and John (1988) used TCE and power theory to study inter-firm relationships while 
Anderson and Narus (1984 and 1990) combined intimate relations theory and power 
theory in their study of working partnership relationships. Furthermore, Transaction Cost 
Economics and Resource Dependence Theory have also been used to provide models 
that were empirically tested (Anderson and Narus, 1984,1990; Weitz, 1981). Recently, 
Chanal (2004), used structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), communities of practice theory 
and the discursive view of organisations to investigate how innovation in a firm contributes 
to organisational learning. Also Grimshaw and Miozzo (2006), used contract law (Barley 
and Kunda, 2001) and varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001) in their comparative 
studies of institutional effects (context) on IT outsourcing. These multiple theories aid 
better understanding and explanation of the subject under study by moderating their 
individual distinctiveness (Easton, 1995). Consequently, the five intrinsic theories used in 
this study also complement and moderate each other for similar effects. 
Because so much is new, complex and interwoven in these outsourcing relationships, 
coupled with the evolving process of interaction exchange, the research is based on the 
subjective views (perceptions) of managers on both sides of the relationships. These 
views embody the constructed meanings of these actors or agents from their experiences, 
jobs, routines and the paradoxical political climate and diverse stakeholder interests that 
govern, influence and constrain their work and exchange relationships. Hence an inductive 
stance allows for a richer understanding of the evolving change processes, the dynamic 
nature of these relationships and their outcomes (Easton, 1995). Induction may also play a 
Powerful role in knowledge development through the discovery of theories in use and their 
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applicability in the design, management and structural outcomes of inter-firm outsourcing 
relationships (Berger and Luckman, 1966; Dwyer et al., 1987; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). 
Qualitative research is referred to as "an umbrella term covering an array of interpretative 
techniques that seek to describe, decode, translate and come to terms with the meaning, 
not frequency, of certain naturally occurring phenomena in the social world" (Van Maanen, 
1983: 9). Flick (2002: 9), further defines qualitative research as "a process of constructing 
versions of reality in time and place". However he bounded it by stating its relevance to 
social relations, not the formulation of general laws or measuring to quantify phenomena 
(Flick, 2002: 2). This may be because a hypo-deductive approach is deemed static and 
Unable to capture the complexity and dynamism of inter-firm exchange process. 
Qualitative methodology lends itself to the study of complex inter-organisational functions 
such as business relationships through outsourcing and provides powerful tools in 
management studies (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Flick, 2002; Gurnmesson, 1991; Miles 
and Huberman, 1994; Mintzberg, 1973,1990). Hence, this study has a descriptive and 
explanatory purpose. 
This thesis endeavours to add to the body of knowledge by aiding the understanding of the 
Process of hotel services outsourcing in the unique context of the health service and the 
hopeful production of knowledge for managers and stakeholders to better understand their 
resources and how others have creatively used theirs for comparative advantage through 
hotel services outsourcing in the healthcare arena. 
4.6.1 Research aim 
The aim of this thesis is two fold. Firstly it should contribute to and develop knowledge of 
Outsourcing process in the NHS context. Secondly it should allow academics and both 
NHS and FM managers to gain understanding of the structural outcome and impact of 
hotel services outsourcing in these eight selected NHS trusts, in order to perhaps apply it 
to improve their outsourcing outcome or gain advantage in the competition for healthcare. 
4.6.2 Research objectives 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the perceptions of managers, workers and 
stakeholders most closely involved in the contractual business relationships between eight 
Selected NHS trusts and their providers of hotel services. It does not seek to quantify the 
resultant benefits or extend these benefits to third party network interests. Rather the study 
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seeks to explain the commonalities, differences and contradictions between perceptions of 
these respondents directly involved in hotel services outsourcing in their different trusts. 
4.6.3 Research focus 
This research focuses mainly on the contractual relationships between hotel services 
providers and their clients with reference to the resources involved and the structural 
outcome of these relationships. Many previous studies (as shown in the literature review) 
have used the Resourced-based approach to study the benefits of business relationships. 
For example in using inter-organisational relationships (alliances) to create value through 
resource combination or knowledge sharing (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Das and Teng, 
2001) or to transform their organisation (Jamali and Sahyoun, 2006). Some used alliances 
to gain access to foreign markets, increase the speed to market as in high-tech firms (Doz 
and Hamel, 1998; Faulkner, 1995), while others, through alliances, built capabilities for 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1999; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004; Powell, 2001). 
Other researchers used outsourcing of Information Technology to enable them focus on 
finding and producing hydrocarbons (Cross, 1995), to improve manpower needs (Peisch, 
1995) or to investigate its impact in the public sector (Jiang and Qureshi, 2006; Lin et al., 
2007). But none of them investigated support services outsourcing in the NHS. However, 
the focus of this study is on how trusts use outsourcing of their non-core activities namely, 
hotel services to access skills and know-how that enable them focus on their core activity 
of medical research and practice and so compete with other NHS trusts. Resources 
acquired, as investments, also enable some trusts to build capabilities or facilities to 
improve working environments and human capital to enhance their performance. Some 
services managers used such investments to upgrade their skills to professional standards 
and so liberated themselves and their workforce from manual workers to professionals. 
4.6.4 Access 
Access is referred to as the researcher's main problem (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; 
Gurnmesson, 1991; Phillips and Pugh, 2002). This problem is magnified in management 
and business studies, where managers are unwilling to be interviewed (Mintzberg, 1973). 
This may be because research is deemed a disturbance that disrupts business routines 
and has no immediate pay off for the managers or institutions involved (Flick, 2002: 56). 
Besides busy managers count the cost of their time and decline to give interviews that may 
become prolonged and interfere with paid business schedules (Easterby-Smith et al., 
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2002). Hence some managers may have genuine reasons to avoid being interviewed. 
Thus, access becomes an exercise in securing their willingness to be involved. Many well- 
conceived studies are aborted for lack of access to organisations and to people with 
relevant information (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002: 72; Faulkner, 1995). Indeed restricted 
access to research environment in management research leads to superficial knowledge 
that is misleading at best or worthless (Gummesson, 1991). 
Many managers feel threatened by disclosing information. They fear that such information 
Might be of use to competitors, or used out of context to threaten their jobs or position. 
Without an open working relationship based on trust, experience or knowledge of issues 
involved in organisations, researchers fail to gain insight into organisational dynamics. 
Thus access involves the credibility of researchers, gaining the trust and cooperation of 
informants with useful information, their transparency and the willingness of managers to 
give up their paid or free time for lengthy interviews. 
However, after decades of my working in and managing hospitals, access was obtained to 
Many NHS health centres. The mental access of understanding what is going on in NHS 
trusts was also accessible to me. But my knowledge and experience should neither block 
innovative thinking nor prevent collected data speaking to be heard (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967). My naivety in research terms is hopefully balanced by my knowledge and familiarity 
With NHS trusts and the ability to confirm issues with others within trusts. The problems of 
Politics and power in organisations are inherent in organizational research. Acknowledging 
and dealing with these issues without the loss or distortion of data is the essence of social 
or management studies. Avoidable problems of bias were identified and avoided. 
4.6.5 Bias in management studies 
I am aware of the problems of bias arising from researching an organisation in which one 
also works. Indeed Dalton (1959), investigated an organisation in which he also worked, 
While Faulkner, (I 995: ix) investigated organisations that were also his clients. 
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Forms of bias identified are: 
1- Observer bias due to prolonged association with the organisations. 
2. Participant bias due to participating in a different area of the organisations, that 
is being researched-the problems of "going native" in an NHS context 
3. Semantic bias as different respondents may use words differently. 
4. Power and political bias inherent in researching support services sections of 
large complex NHS organisations 
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5. Behavioural bias in interpreting non-verbal behaviour (body language). 
6. Bias in interpretation during interviews and also in transcription. 
7. The interpretation of silences during interviews and on transcription tapes. 
8. Cultural and professional bias between researcher and respondents. 
9. My personal beliefs and values may intrude into the research process. 
10. Personal experience of NHS trusts may influence interpretation of data. 
However, it should be noted that my work is in the medical and clinical areas of NHS 
trusts, which are entirely different from the areas of study. This study is on managerial, 
purchasing and support services areas. However there were occasions of participant 
observation when worked and shadowed frontline nurses in their daily routines and helped 
out hotel services workers in order to gain first hand knowledge of what their work entails. 
4.6.6 Validity 
This thesis makes no claim to universal validity. However the thesis presents a plausible 
account of the outsourcing process in the NHS context and their structural outcomes 
through multiple access to the perceptions and experiences of those directly involved to 
aid understanding for academics, procurement and support services (FM) managers and 
NHS stakeholders. Validity in qualitative research is mired in the problems of researchers 
" accurately interpreting respondents' perceptions and presenting them" (Flick, 2002: 222). 
However, Hammersley (1992: 50-52) asserts that firstly, the validity of knowledge cannot 
be assessed with certainty but assumptions can only be judged by their plausibility and 
credibility. Secondly, that phenomena exists independent of our claims concerning them 
hence our assumptions can only approximate to them. Thirdly, that research should aim at 
Presenting reality not reproducing it. 
The use of structuration theory in analysing data in this study also precludes justification. 
Discussions are based on participantis viewpoints and perceptions with those of others to 
generate the essence of reality in these business relationships. These coupled with my 
Prolonged engagement in the trusts and persistent observation throughout the period of 
five years should validate this study. Awareness and avoidance of avoidable research bias 
identified above will also aid validity. 
4.6.7 Reliability 
Reliability involves showing that the operations of the study such as data collection and 
analysis can be repeated and the same results obtained (Stake, 1998; Yin, 1994). 
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Working alone in the chosen hospitals, which are typical of NHS trusts, I have retained the 
same Interview Protocol (Appendix 1), while allowing for in-depth interview variations 
between interviewees. These should increase the reliability of response to the same 
questions. Furthermore the data analysis has been done with due regard to transparency 
but within the limitations of the study. 
4.6.8 Limitations of this Research 
It was not possible to catalogue and record all exchanges made by the managers and 
others interviewed due to time pressures and the unwillingness of some informants to be 
interviewed on tape or beyond certain limits. Hence it will not be prudent to extrapolate 
direct research results to hospitals in different economic, geographical or cultural locations. 
Besides respondents were not chosen at random hence some caution in generalising 
interview data to other organisations is called for. Also structuration theory posits that 
knowledge of practices in most organisations is never completely shared by groups, 
organisations or collectivities. Thus, any information gathered from respondents at each 
NHS trust support services, their stakeholders and workforce, must only be recognised as 
Containing and attributed to the individuals who create or recreate these structural patterns 
out of their own lived experiences though they are also members of the larger society. 
The research is further limited to understanding the vital processes and driving forces for 
hotel services outsourcing relationships within the support services of the eight NHS trusts. 
Although outsourcing outcomes have a knock-on effect on the other clinical and non- 
clinical departments of some of the hospitals investigated it is hoped that this research will 
contribute to a deeper understanding of hotel services outsourcing and elicit possible 
benefits as structural outcomes from these complex dynamic exchange relationships. 
4.6.9 Ethical Issues 
The confidentiality and anonymity of participants is maintained. All the names of people, 
Places, hospitals and organisations in this study are fictitious. Any relationship or similarity 
to known places or organisations is purely coincidental and non-attributable to anyone. 
The choice of neutral venues for interviews in some cases did enhance privacy. I am 
aware of the possibilities of participants either deliberately or unintentionally providing 
Misleading information. These are parts and parcel of social interaction as researchers 
and participants exchange views to discover meanings and build a holistic picture of 
emerging experiences, perceptions and choices in all their complexity and contradictions. 
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But the use of triangulation and my long immersion in the research context have hopefully 
limited such misleading information. 
4.6.10 Triangulation 
Triangulation here refers to the use of multiple but independent sources in the study of the 
same object. The term was borrowed from navigation and surveying where a minimum of 
three reference points are taken to check an object's location (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002: 146). It can also refer to using multiple methods to study the same subject (Denzin, 
1989: 236). Indeed scholars regard triangulation as an essential part of methodology. Four 
types of triangulation are described here (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002: 146) 
a. Data triangulation covering time, space and people involved in the study by 
using multiple data sources from multiple informants in the same organisation or 
data collected over different time frames 
b. Investigator triangulation, using multiple observers for the same object to collect 
data which is then compared thus providing different perspectives of the same 
situation in order to compare, develop and refine studies 
C. Theoretical triangulation involves borrowing models from one discipline and 
using them to explain situations in another discipline. This can reveal insights 
previously ignored from data. 
d. Methodological triangulation involves using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods of data collection or interviews and questionnaires. 
However triangulation should not be an end in itself but premised to balance out individual 
weaknesses with the strength of others and so maximize the totality of data collected. 
Consequently, both data and theoretical triangulation were used in this thesis to clarify 
agents' perceptions in each NHS trust and multiple theories applied in the discussion. 
The uses of triangulation 
Although the standard use of triangulation is in using different methods to provide different 
Perspectives on what is being studied, that was not the case in this study. For example 
Hofstede (1991) used a combination of quantitative data processed through qualitative 
narrative in his classic study of national cultures. Others have used qualitative narrative in 
attempting to quantify the economic impact of outsourcing. They also used both interviews 
and questionnaires and gathered quantitative data for their study (Jiang et al., 2006). Thus 
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these researchers have used methodological triangulation to validate the accuracy of their 
findings. However in this thesis data triangulation was used. 
4.6.11 The use of data triangulation in this thesis 
Gathering qualitative data involves actively listening to respondents at interviews, trying to 
decipher their voice modulation, body language and facial expression and later reading 
interview transcripts to understand respondents' perceptions as they create their realities 
and make sense of their lived experiences through narratives. This active listening and the 
perception of respondents are intangible attributes. Consequently, as Stengel et al., (2003) 
suggested, the issues involved in such narratives should be looked at from a number of 
different angles. Hence the same interview questions should be asked in different ways to 
different people in the same organisation. By so doing the most pressing issues to those 
interviewed and their relatedness can be identified. Thus by asking different people the 
same questions in different ways, lapses in organisational memory can be jogged to 
enable researchers obtain more accurate and holistic information from respondents. 
However, my over-arching reason for using data triangulation in this study was to 
determine the accuracy and authenticity of the evidence gathered. Therefore different 
Members of staff in the same hospital were questioned to check the accuracy of 
information gathered through interviews and to explore and confirm my own observations 
in order to eliminate needless observer bias from the findings. Data triangulation also 
enabled me to understand diverse, multiple realities of those directly involved in support 
services. Consequently by comparing and contrasting different conversations and varied 
Perspectives of respondents and stakeholders as they tried to make sense of their daily 
Working lives in support services, I was able to seek the underlying meaning of their 
narratives in order to focus on the main issues or over-arching structures. 
To accomplish this, I worked as a part-time agency or bank nurse on night duty at most of 
the hospitals investigated to enable me observe things for myself and also to dialogue with 
nurses. In the hospital environment, nurses are the linchpins between the medical and 
non-medical support staff, of which hotel service is a part. Nurses are at the fulcrum of 
activity and at the centre of the interaction between patients and other hospital personnel. 
However agency nurses are always out in the cold, never accepted as members of the 
team no matter their length of service. This accorded me the emotional detachment and 
distance needed to maintain my objectivity as a researcher. 
103 
Therefore by working as a nurse on numerous occasions over the entire period of this 
thesis, I was privileged to observe, first hand, how support services workers function in 
both the outsourced and the in-house operations. During the night shift, it was possible to 
have quiet conversations with nurses and support services workers be they cleaners or 
caterers. Issues raised by respondents at interviews were constantly clarified with nurses 
and cleaners, unaware of my research interest, so had no reason to give me misleading 
information. Thus through data triangulation and reflection in my journal, I gained a deeper 
understanding of the working lives of some of the support services workers and was able 
to appreciate their perspectives and iron out discrepancies and personal bias. For 
example, at Theresa hospital, where only two people were willing to be interviewed due to 
the management ban on workers talking to outsiders or giving interviews to reporters, I 
resorted to getting a job there to enable me talk to other stakeholders. In the process of my 
Working the night shift as a nurse, I encountered and talked with two other managers, 
(agents C and D) herein called Joanna and Sue. Their valuable contribution enriched the 
narrative from the two respondents interviewed and enabled me gain a richer perspective 
Of issues like the motives and benefits of services outsourcing at this hospital. 
Similarly at Victoria and County hospitals NHS trust, I also worked as a night nurse in 
Order to make first hand observations there. Although three people were interviewed at this 
hospital, some people who would have contributed to the narrative, declined interviews. 
Consequently, I talked with nurses, porters, cleaners and caterers, again unaware of my 
research interest, while working the night shift. Agents P and Q (on the respondents 
Profile) made more meaningful contributions by sharing their experiences as cleaners with 
Me. Their narratives are included as excerpts in the data analysis. Thus my conversation 
With porters, cleaners, caterers and security men at work and observation gave me a more 
holistic perspective to augment the interview data and enrich my analysis of this hospital. 
Furthermore, I had previously worked at Helina, Karena and Reinhard hospitals as a night 
nurse during the pilot and preliminary studies and formed relationships with some workers. 
Subsequently it was not difficult to return and talk to these workers to clarify issues raised 
at interviews or to observe support services workers at work. Indeed I trained as a nurse at 
Dickson Memorial hospital before attending medical school at Charlston memorial hospital. 
Consequently, I was conversant with the layout of both hospitals and remember too well 
the set up of the kitchens and dining areas. I was most surprised that they have remained 
the same dull and dingy places I remember despite attempts at refurbishment. Thus, my 
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knowledge of the different hospitals and work opportunities gave me unlimited access to 
the people working there either to clarify issues raised at interviews or to observe workers. 
The use of data triangulation in this thesis may seem to differ cross-case due to the need 
to clarify, confirm or verify issues. Because different NHS trusts investigated have different 
history, operate in different locales and are somewhat unique in their modes of operation, 
the use of data triangulation was also different or cross-case. Thus data triangulation was 
used in this thesis as needed to understand the multiple realities of different respondents 
from different perspectives and so gain a more holistic view of the emergent structures. 
4.7 Research Method proper 
My interest in NHS hotel services outsourcing started during my IVIBA project. I noticed 
that catering, laundry, portering and cleaning services (called hotel or support services) 
Were being outsourced in several NHS trusts. I wondered why and reflected on the 
benefits thereof. When the decision to engage in doctoral research was made, I was glad 
to try and find out why and how outsourcing benefited these trusts that engaged in it. 
Thus a preliminary study was carried out in three NHS trusts in the London area. 
4.7.1 Preliminary study 
This was firstly to ascertain the do-ability of such research, secondly to gain access to the 
People involved (the procurement managers and their services provider managers), thirdly 
to determine the suitability of such a study for a PhD and finally to generate a suitable 
research proposal. Three London trusts were selected on the strength of previous visits 
during my MBA project. Three procurement managers of these trusts and their services 
Provider managers were interviewed using a semi-structured interview format to unearth 
the motives and benefits if any, of their trusts outsourcing hotel services. The study was 
focused on the NHS networks of suppliers from a services marketing perspective. The 
results were revealing. 
The results of this preliminary study revealed that the research was doable and would be 
suitable for a PhD. A suitable research proposal was generated but most importantly, that 
the motive for hotel services outsourcing was mostly due to resource scarcity and not 
services marketing per se. These motives ranged from lack of space for laundry facilities 
through lack of managerial experience, knowledge and skills to inability to recruit and 
retain ancillary (support services) workers. This resource scarcity seemed to hinder and 
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distract these trusts from competing favourably with other trusts either for Government 
allocation of funds or in the effective, smooth running of their organisations. Some of these 
trusts, procurement managers also reported the benefits of outsourcing as value for money 
and a chance to refocus on medical services on which their reputation and expertise lay. 
Outsourcing helped some avoid the ugly scenes of ancillary staff demonstrations for more 
Pay since by outsourcing, the ancillary staff were sold to the contractors who then became 
responsible for their pay, benefits and contributions. Thus this preliminary study helped to 
redefine my area of interest and research focus and also enabled me to build relationships 
With services managers and their provider managers for future use. 
Further literature search in areas of services outsourcing (Cross, 1995; Huber, 1993) 
alliance formations (Faulkner, 1995) resources for competitive advantage (Penrose, 1959, 
1996; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) services business 
relationship management (Ford, 2002,2003) and services marketing in the NHS (Laing et 
al., 2002) revealed gaps between what obtained in the commercial business sector and 
the experiences of some managers. For example the NHS is a public sector organisation 
Providing a social service in healthcare. Consequently, trusts are not profit oriented and 
cannot compete with commercial organisations yet can outsource hotel services to these 
Commercial operators and report benefits, cost savings and more reliable services. Thus 
the stage was set for a pilot study. 
4.7.2 Pilot study 
This paradox of the health service in partnership with the commercial sector, helped 
deepen my interest to find out the real motives and benefits of hotel services outsourcing. 
Subsequently, a pilot study was carried out. The aim of this study was to explore in greater 
depth, the motives and benefits of hotel services outsourcing in three trusts in the London 
area and to better understand the management of the dyadic business relationship 
between the procurement managers and their services providers managers that enable 
them benefit from hotel services outsourcing. To further buttress the reports of the 
Managers involved, the interviews were extended to stakeholders and support services 
workforce. Again a semi-structured interview format was used in order to enable the 
Managers, stakeholders and workforce tell their stories from their lived experiences and 
not just tick sections of a questionnaire without explanations, motives or reasons. 
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The results of this pilot study confirmed those of the preliminary study. The motives for 
outsourcing were mainly due to scarcity of resources in personnel experience. skills and 
knowledge, finance for improvement of support services like kitchens, canteens and caf6s 
and the nurturing of new ventures as reported in some trusts. New venture like the Diners' 
Den at Victoria hospital, was later taken out as commercial a business for the services 
Provider. Thus the pilot study revealed economic benefits for the trusts involved, nurturing 
- of new ventures, infusion of funds by services providers into the refurbishing of kitchen, 
CaMs and canteens and improving cleaning and portering to aid the smooth running of 
Some trusts and patients' jo u mey through them. Outsourcing was also seen to extend to 
Medical supplies, payroll and theatre equipment due to the benefits generated from hotel 
services. This pilot study also established the uniqueness of each trust investigated and 
the accomplishment of my transfer from MPhil to PhD. 
The pilot study helped me redefine areas for the main study and the subsequent research 
design. Again further literature search revealed the need to focus on both the motives for 
Outsourcing and the outcomes both intended and unintended. Thus the main research 
question became the consequences of hotel (support) services outsourcing in selected 
NHS trusts in the Greater London area. This was changed to the present one following my 
Mock viva to reflect the dominant perceptions of those directly involved in the study. 
Twelve NHS trusts were initially chosen for the main study. These were, Dickson memorial 
hospital, Charlston memorial hospital, both of which engaged in limited outsourcing (10%). 
Others were Featherstone, Karena, Victoria, Reinhard, Theresa and Helina hospitals. The 
rest were Blummer, Chapter and Davison hospitals and Freedman mental hospital. These 
last four hospitals were not included in the final study due to their location, outside the 
Greater London area, the long distance involved in getting to them for interviews, the lack 
Of willingness of the managers to be further involved in the research process and mainly 
because the same services provider, Assured, was also the provider in each of the four 
hospitals. Hence it was felt that including them in the study would not add more in the final 
analysis but then I could be wrong and should have included them for variety sake. Finally, 
eight hospitals were chosen on the strength of their location, unlimited access, the variety 
Of hospitals involved and the willingness of the managers, stakeholders and hotel services 
Workforce to engage in a prolonged research endeavour. 
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4.7.3 Research method used 
A total of twenty-six managers and directors of eight NHS trust hospitals (some hospitals 
like Theresa and Featherstone are based on more than one site as shown below) and their 
hotel services providers, together with members of the workforce and other stakeholders 
were interviewed using a semi-structured interview format in a case study inquiry. This 
enabled the agents tell their stories and generate insight into how these trusts' managers 
have managed their complex relationships with outsourced services providers in the face 
Of constant cost pressures and the structural consequences of their interaction. 
Interviews were chosen over questionnaires to enable me explore, clarify and elicit the 
Perceptions of agents and the multiple meaning of their experiences (Silverman, 2000: 35). 
Interview data provides access to attitudes, perceptions and beliefs, which reveal multiple 
Meaning in such complex phenomena as inter-firm contractual exchange relationships. 
The explanatory nature of the study and complexity of the social phenomena, called for the 
flexibility offered by unstructured and later semi-structured interviews that allow the "views 
Of agents to be known" (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002: 86). Moreover, health service workers 
and especially busy managers dislike questionnaires. Questionnaires fail to capture non- 
Verbal communication and personal contact, which may be present in facial expressions 
and inflection of the voice that help researchers gain valuable clues to meaning (Easterby- 
Smith et al., 2002: 86). Observers suggest that managers comply with what they think 
Some researchers should know about their organisations when completing questionnaires 
and may avoid extreme responses in either direction creating a discrepancy between the 
data sought and that obtained from questionnaires (Cresswell, 2003; Eastherby-Smith et 
al., 2002: 41; Gurnmesson, 1991; Punch, 2002). This may be because managers are 
unsure of what use the questionnaires will be put to and the possibility of their competitors 
Making use of the information contained. But face-to-face interviews can overcome these 
Problems through trust building and sensitivity towards, what agents deem confidential. 
Furthermore case study uses a narrative medium crucial to understanding complex 
Organisational behaviour and attitude in natural settings (Van Maanen, 1988) while 
Multiple case studies "provide multiple views of the evidence sought" (Yin, 1989: 23). Other 
observers agree that case study inquiry in management studies can provide varied and 
Comprehensive views of the project (Cresswell, 2003; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). 
FUrthermore case study may aid in practical applications managers can identify with and 
Probably modify to apply in their situations (Gummesson, 1991; Stake, 1998; Yin, 1994). 
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In total twenty-six interviews, out of the thirty-one conducted from May 2005 to April 2006, 
were recorded. The managers interviewed are responsible for hotel services in their 
respective NHS trusts. Hotel services comprises of catering, cleaning, portering, laundry 
and in some cases, housekeeping. These seemingly non-critical functions outsourced to 
contractors by some trusts form part of the total facilities management remit of support 
services. The perceptions and experiences of these hands-on agents are vital in eliciting 
What they perceive as the reasons and consequences of outsourcing hotel services under 
their care. 
Some interviews were held at neutral venues within the hospitals to increase confidentiality 
and ease of agents' disclosures. Overt and covert observations were made (as I already 
work in the hospitals) to confirm issues raised at interviews or to improve later discussions. 
The same interview questions were put to each person interviewed but they were allowed 
to tell their story as they saw fit. This method helped to unearth some information that 
respondents would not have volunteered and also aided consistency in agents' responses. 
Some agents were asked follow-up questions to clarify issues while stakeholders and 
Members of the workforce were later questioned formally and informally to collaborate and 
triangulate most of the stories until June 2007. Consent was sought through internal 
Means, where necessary and sensitivity towards personal or confidential issues was 
maintained. All data collected are treated as confidential and non-attributable. 
Eight NHS trusts were chosen as my sample on the strength of an earlier pilot study, 
to refine interview questions as well as gain access to people with useful information for 
the study. These trusts were chosen on the strength of unlimited access, location in the 
Greater London area, the participants' willingness to be involved in the study and to be 
interviewed as the need arose and the variety of hospitals (from teaching to general) to 
Provide sustainable intrinsic interest for me as researcher and their level of outsourcing 
from 10% to 100% as indicated in (table 4.1 a and 4.1 b) below. Those interviewed in each 
Outsourced category are listed in (Appendix 2). The potential for learning from their 
differences, similarity and uniqueness increased my interest with a view to generalising 
Modified forms of the results to similar hospitals (Cresswell, 2003; Stake, 1998). 
Most managers were willing to be interviewed. But in places like Charlston memorial 
hospital with six catering managers, one of them was interviewed at her convenience 
during shift work and in other places some managers volunteered more useful information 
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than others. However, some managers were reluctant to discuss some "sensitive issues" 
despite several attempts and different ways of asking the same questions, while others 
fearing for their jobs, sanctions or just being uninformed about their contexts chose not to 
contribute (Dyne et al., 2003; Milliken et al., 2003). Perhaps these are the ones sworn to 
secrecy by management using "gagging clauses" to ensure that they don't give interviews 
critical of the NHS to anyone (Craft, 1994; Jones, 2000a; Sheard, 1994). Indeed this was 
confirmed at Theresa hospital, where the managers were vocal but stressed that they had 
been reprimanded by management for giving interviews of any kind. Consequently, some 
interviews are shorter than others where agents were willing to talk but felt constrained. 
However, a point of data saturation was reached when agents' responses were repeated 
on several occasions in different hospital contexts. 
Interviews lasted from sixty to ninety minutes, were taped, transcribed (available for 
scrutiny on demand), analysed and coded according to the main issues of concern to the 
Managers interviewed (Flick, 2002) and displayed for comparative analysis and discussion 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). Relevant documents and Annual Reports of each hospital 
and those of the services providers were collected and information contained noted. 
The underpinning assumption is that different views are found in different social worlds 
(context) hence their uniqueness. This method of coding for comparison makes for a 
deeper understanding, flags up negative cases and helps one explain contextual issues. 
However the coding procedure remains sensitive and open to specific case contexts by 
Preserving their uniqueness while allowing group comparison. Hence the focus is on the 
analysis of both uniqueness and variety in the distribution (Flick, 2002: 189), while the 
display allows for inferences to be drawn on emergent themes or patterns (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). But the procedure is limited by being time consuming. 
4.7.4.1 Self critical awareness in conducting qualitative interviews 
Qualitative research is said to be specific to the study of social relations, which are replete 
With inequalities in knowledge, experience, skills and balance of power (Flick, 2002). There 
are myriads of differences between researchers and interviewees in their beliefs, values, 
understanding, cultural background and outlook. Furthermore, because these studies 
involve the subjective meaning that respondents attach to their lived experience and daily 
job routines and practices the researcher lacks familiarity and knowledge of the field and 
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subject under study. Consequently, researchers are always negotiating and managing the 
interview interface with sensitivity and skill to gain insight into the subject of study. 
Unlike in quantitative studies where researchers are armed with research questions and 
hypotheses from theoretical models and go into the field of study to test such hypotheses 
against empirical evidence, the qualitative researcher is dependent on the information 
gathered from the field through interviews, narratives, personal observations and reflection 
on the data and evidence gathered. Thus patience, understanding and perseverance are 
Virtues that can enable researchers, in pursuit of information, to gain insight from interview 
narratives while mindful of the difficulties and problems of conducting them. 
Why I kept a reflection journal 
To help me deal with my initial inexperience and lack of much needed skill and sensitivity 
in conducting face-to-face interviews and gathering data through observation and dialogue 
With stakeholders, I kept a reflection journal. Even after I thought that I had gained some 
knowledge, skill and experience in these areas, I continued to reflect in my journal to help 
Me catalogue and analyse difficult or contradictory situations and dialogue I encountered 
during this study. Through these reflections I was able to unravel some of the underlying 
Meaning between and within data gathered and come to what I perceive to be a plausible 
Meaning of the issues and situations in their varied context. For example I have included 
in Appendix 1 b, a full interview transcript conducted in March 2004 during the early part of 
this study. I chose to include this particular transcript because it was the most difficult and 
Yet least informative of all the interviews I conducted but it was also the most productive 
because I learnt a lot from it to help me make future interviews more informative. 
In the said interview transcript I used the analogy of pulling out teeth to reflect on my 
inability to gain the information sought. I was inexperienced at the time and so was the 
interviewee. It was a case of two inexperienced people trying to accomplish a highly skilled 
and sensitive feat of managing and conducting a qualitative interview. So how does the 
dental analogy of tooth extraction fit in with this interview as I reflected on it? 
1 Did the tooth need to be extracted? 
In other words did I need to gain the information sought from the interviewee? The 
answer was yes 
ill 
2. Did I anaesthetise the area adequately to lessen the pain and make the extraction 
pain free? The answer was no. This was mainly due to lack of the right equipment 
in the form of skills, sensitivity and experience in conducting such interviews. 
To adequately anaesthetise the area is analogous to first building rapport with the 
interviewee, which would have put him at ease, enabled him to trust me more and 
would have given him the confidence to be more open and to readily cooperate with 
me by telling me his story. Instead what transpired was a dry and bland interview 
with an apprehensive respondent that became laborious for both of us and in the 
end elicited only superficial data. 
However, a tooth (information) was extracted and the experience enabled me to reflect on 
what went wrong in order to improve on the skills needed for future qualitative interviews. 
For example after my reflection on this interview, I decided to give future interviewees, 
where possible, an outline of the questions to be asked, to give them an idea of what to 
expect. I also learnt to listen beyond what was being said or what interviewees tended to 
couch in verbosity. Consequently future interviews were more in-depth and revealed more 
Of the meaning behind the issues and situations discussed when applied to their context. 
For example by November 2004,1 conducted other interviews at Charlston memorial 
hospital NHS trust with the previous encounter still ringing in my ears. An extract of this 
second interview went thus: 
MJ: some people say they outsource services to reduce cost and wastage. How do 
you manage to contain both cost and wastage doing things in-house? 
Florence: it all depends on how you manage it. If you have a very good in-house 
manager, wastage in catering should not be a problem. Basically you bear all the 
risk. You are not passing it on to outside contractors. With contractors there could 
be a lot of problems like quality of service and control of the level of service. 
Every time you want to make a change, it will cost you a lot of money with outside 
contractors whereas we could be more flexible with in-house services. 
In my reflection journal I analysed the answer to the question of wastage and cost 
containment in this in-house concern as follows: 
1. Having very good in-house catering managers will reduce wastage 
2. The fact that you bear all the risk whether services are outsourced or in-house 
3. Outside contractors could pose a problem with their fixed prices 
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4. There is more flexibility in making changes with fellow in-house managers than 
with contractors. Such changes can result in cost savings when made between 
in-house managers than with contractors. 
Explaining my reflection In context of this hospital 
Charlston memorial hospital NHS trust has six catering managers poached from the 
commercial sector. Florence herself, who was the director of operations at the time, has 
over twenty years experience in support services both within the NHS and the commercial 
sector. Furthermore, one of the catering managers interviewed claimed to know how 
contractors cut corners to reduce their costs and so make profits. Consequently when 
Florence talked about having very good catering managers, who are able to reduce 
Wastage, I was sensitive to her underlying meaning and understood what she meant. 
Good catering managers meant experienced managers who would know how to cut out 
Wastage, if not for profit, to become more efficient in resource use and so reduce costs. 
Secondly the fact that the support services managers still bear all the risk whether services 
are outsourced or in-house makes outsourcing redundant. To this in-house concern with 
Previous experience of a contractor that went into liquidation, forcing them to rebuild their 
transport services, there seemed no point in outsourcing services. If they outsource, they 
Still bear all the risk and are forced to deal with possible problems with contractors and 
Manage the resultant relationship they find inflexible and costly in time, energy and money. 
Consequently, support services have remained in-house, allowing managers to make 
needed changes while shifting their budgets around to contain costs or save money. 
The services managers have'also become risk averse in order to preserve in-house jobs, 
maintain control over services and reduce any interference from contractors, all of which 
Manifest as their fear of services outsourcing. Thus the sensitivity and skills that were 
lacking during my interview with Roland are less evident during later interviews. My skills 
were augmented and sensitivity to insights on issues discussed heightened by journaling 
to understand the underlying meaning of respondents' narratives. 
Value of reflection journal 
By reflecting in this journal I was able to critically analyse the words respondents used 
Within the context of their operations, my own observations and experience of the NHS 
trust concerned and my dialogue with other stakeholders on the same issues. This critical 
analysis enabled me to compare and contrast the catalogue of issues, thoughts, ideas, 
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feelings, impressions, hunches, contradictions and my own prejudices in order to clarify 
them and find the underlying meaning hidden in respondents narratives and conversations 
as they endeavoured to create their own realities and make sense of the situations around 
them. There is always a potential problem of misinterpreting what respondents mean or 
say at interviews due to the differences in language, culture, values and beliefs but far 
from the interview sites, issues can be dissected in the reflection journal to elicit problems 
or indeed find solutions to problems that arose during interviews. Thus by journaling in my 
reflection book, as part of the research process, I became more critically aware of the 
emotional problems faced by both researchers and respondents during interviews and the 
difficulties encountered by researchers who conduct qualitative interviews in social studies. 
This self-awareness helped to heighten my sensitivity to non-verbal communication be 
they voice modulations, facial expression or silence during interviews. Consequently, the 
Work done in the journal enabled me to handle future interviews with more confidence and 
sensitivity and hence probe deeper into issues under discussion. For example at another 
interview, this time with the domestic manager, Linda, at the same hospital, the dialogue 
Went thus: 
MJ: Can you tell me what you do here and why you choose to do it in-house? 
Linda: In this department we employ all the cleaners that clean the whole hospital. 
As an in-house concern, I have mixed views about whether it is a good or a bad 
thing having worked for a contractor before I came here. I think being an in-house 
concern has benefits to the service and to the trust but not necessarily to the staff. 
But a hospital served by contractors has more benefits than one cleaned in-house. 
In my experience, having been on both sides, when domestic staff and I worked for 
contractors, they (staff) were more flexible and more manageable. Most of the staff 
did expect to do what was a reasonable day's work whereas here I have staff, who 
tell me that they have been here for thirty years and they don't work on the wards 
because they don't like sick people. I mean this is a hospitalll 
Background to the analysis in my journal 
This hospital was under pressure to reduce costs and wastage. As a teaching research 
hospital, with all the government allowances it collected, it should have been preparing for 
foundation status. Instead the hospital seemed to be under-performing having gained only 
two stars instead of three. Most of the managers were under pressure and felt it. The staff 
were said to be "dead wood pillars" of the establishment whom no one could shift because 
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the Human Resources managers (HR), as custodians of the workers, shielded them from 
discipline. Consequently, they worked to rule, avoided work as they pleased and voted 
with their feet through constant absenteeism or sick leave. Thus the domestic manager felt 
pressure from her superiors and from her own staff whom she found difficult to manage. 
Furthermore her experience with contract work was being stifled. In a contract job where 
contractors must perform to earn their fees, anyone will do what is needed to get the job 
done. That was her idea of flexible and manageable staff. For example, if a ward has an 
emergency where a sink or toilet was overflowing with water, any cleaner available will get 
there quickly to get it cleaned up to prevent business failure or ward closure. But in the in- 
house services, the domestic staff may not be available to do the cleaning. Even those 
available will first ascertain whose duty it is to clean that area and why the nurses cannot 
deal with it. The in-house staff members have no incentive to do more. They have tenure 
and see no reason to do more than their basic duty. Consequently, this commercially 
experienced domestic manager finds her in-house staff inflexible and difficult to manage. 
But for personal reasons, she prefers to work in the NHS for now and so must endure the 
inflexible and difficult to manage staff and the pressure transferred from her superiors. 
The main issue again is flexibility in services, this time with domestic staff but the reasons 
are different due to the context in which the word is used and by whom. Thus journaling 
enabled me to jot down all the relevant facts around the words respondents used and play 
around with them to find their underlying meaning in their entire context and usage. I hope 
journaling will enable me to conduct future interviews with more confidence and skill as a 
researched 
4.7.4 Interview transcripts (A full interview transcript is attached -Appendix 1b) 
Selection of sections from interview transcripts was based on their recurrence during 
interviews and their perceived importance to the agents interviewed due to either the 
emphasis laid on them or the ways they discussed other issues around them. Hence the 
Presented excerpts represent the perceptions of interviewees, borne out of their jobs or 
lived experiences in the different context of operation or locales. Obviously there is a lot of 
Overlap between examples in different categories of outsourcing and structures but in the 
Main all respondents' answers remain relevant (chapter five). From outsourcing outcomes 
evolved structures that are grouped as structural categories and discussed in chapter five. 
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This study fits in with previous research on the NHS "internal market" operations where 
qualitative methods were used (Klein, 2001; Zolkiewski, 1999). Healthcare trusts and 
support services managers will now have a comprehensive research evidence to better 
Manage their scarce resources through cooperative arrangements and look inwards to find 
and utilise their respective valuable resources for enduring comparative advantage. 
The profile of NHS trusts investigated is depicted below in (figures 4.1 a, 4.1 b). 
4.7.5 Data analysis method 
It may have been possible to use one of the current software in the market for my data 
analysis as tools to facilitate and aid the management of large volumes of data generated. 
There is a non-numerical unstructured data indexing, searching and theorizing software 
(NUDIST) and its in-vivo counterpart, Nvivo (Fisher, 1997; Gibbs 2002). However, some 
researchers who have used them admit that they can be technically demanding and 
intellectually arduous especially if one comes to use them after data collection to help keep 
afloat from drowning in mountains of data (Fisher, 1997; Gibbs 2002). These researchers 
also comment that some universities and computing facilities do not generally support the 
Use of these software. Consequently, researchers are not exposed to them, cannot test- 
drive the different types to assess their suitability before or after data collection. Hence 
some software may be incompatible with generated data files or incomprehensible when 
original codes are re-entered between software. However, computer assisted qualitative 
data analysis software are said to be easier, more accurate, reliable and transparent in 
Managing, coding and retrieving bulk of data than manual cutting and pasting chunks of 
text (Cassell and Symon, 1994; Fisher, 1997; Gibbs 2002). They also have perfect 
Memory to facilitate data storage and retrieval. 
Discourse analysis was also considered. This focuses on language as used by 
respondents in the social context of their daily work. Others have used it to analyse 
organisational processes and outcomes in attempts to understand the meaning of 
Workers' experiences at work (Cassell and Symon, 1994). Although language is a 
Medium with which we express ideas and understand the world, discourse analysis, is 
Mainly used to classify and categorize individuals and groups. For example, it is used in 
Psychology to classify personality traits into extroverts and introverts. Also it can be used 
to examine individual differences to see how and why variations occur and what purposes 
they serve as in job satisfaction or insecurity over time (Cassell and Symon, 1994). 
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Consequently, it was not deemed entirely appropriate to my analysis of the perceptions of 
individuals involved in the complex and dynamic consequences of support services 
outsourcing in eight unique NHS trusts with all the attendant political imperatives involved. 
Content analysis was ruled out for similar reasons although Riley (1983) used it 
successfully in combination with structuration theory to analyse organisational culture 
Using political symbols and language that embody political intent. 
However using software can reduce creativity and sensitivity bordering on loss of control 
With collected data or inability to understand and interpret respondents' perception and 
experience beyond data because software cannot understand the meaning of texts like 
humans (Cassell and Symon, 1994; Fisher, 1997; Gibbs 2002). Consequently, it was 
decided not to attempt to use either of the available software in my data analysis. 
My choice of data analysis method was somewhat limited by the decision to use a case 
study inquiry method since all the trusts studied were unique in their outsourcing needs, 
Motives, history, clientele and location. The flexibility offered by structuration theory 
enabled me to accord stakeholders, hotel services managers and their workforce the 
Status of knowledgeable agents, able to mobilise resources needed for action to shape 
the internal environment of their departments or liberate themselves and their workers 
from manual work to professionals. The aim of this study is to understand and explain the 
Particular, unique features of hotel services outsourcing relationships and their outcomes 
and use their unique differences to fashion commonalities applicable on a wider basis. 
For example, where the motive for services outsourcing was to access resources like 
Managerial experience or ancillary workforce they lacked and resulted in a favourable 
Outcome, other NHS trusts can use the information presented here to craft their own 
Outsourcing need and expect similar outcomes. 
Consequently, to unravel the uniqueness of the trusts' outsourcing relationships, it was 
necessary to explore unfolding processes against their contextual backgrounds and allow 
the agents or participants to introduce terms and concepts unique to their situation. 
Through a dialectic process, important themes emerged from key issues that were 
iMportant to the respondents. These were collected into patterns of relationships. These 
are then discussed in the light of extant theories and relevant studies in order to explain 
their particular meanings, problems, situations or contradictions and in some cases find 
common themes like innovation, organisational change or efficiency (value for money). 
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Thus my understanding of the conditions for action in unique NHS trusts' contexts can 
enable others specify conditions under which such actions can be expected to recur. 
Others have used similar data analysis methods to unravel mountains of data and elicit 
Participants' meaning by allowing data speak and letting simple themes evolve from key 
issues (Eisenhardt, 1989; Lawrence et al., 1997; Nordin, 2006). 
Table 4.1 (a) Profile of NHS trust's (Hotel services) investigated 
Helina Hospital Theresa Hospital Karena Hospital Victoria 
Hospitals (HH) NHS trust (TH) NHS trust (KH) NHS trust Hospital (VH) 
NHS trust 
[8 locations] [2 locations] [2 locations] 
% Outsourced 100 100 75 75 
Speciality General and Specialist Specialist General and 
Blood Teaching Teaching Blood 
disorders Transplant Renal disorders 
Reputation Reputation 
beds 12tal R t i ý 500 820 550 800 
- O- t-a l staff 2000 6000 3500 4500 
Ancillary staff 200 400 500 440 
% Ancillary to 10 6.6 14.3 9.7 
ý total staff 
M-eals served 800 1900-2000 1200-1500 1500-2000 
-Ppr 
day 
Star-rating 
- 
2,2,2 3,3,3 3,3,3 2,2,2 
VF ýI Yes Yes Yes Yes 
[Access to capital] [Access to capital] [Accessto [Accessto 
capitall capital] 
Foundation Not yet qualified Yes and Applied for Not yet 
status operational qualified [ 
Hotel Service Assured Mediserve Areno 
(Premier Group) Kingsland International 
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Key to profile of hospitals Investigated (Table 4.1 a and 4.1 b) 
-Speciality: represents areas of interest or global renown 
-% outsourcing: shows the level of hotel services outsourced 
Total beds: is the hospital capacity 
Ancillary staff is the total number of hotel services staff employed 
% Ancillary to total staff: is the percentage of hotel services staff to total staff 
(in most cases also represents the level of investment into hotel services) 
-Star-rating (1-3): represents level of government allocation secondary to performance 
-PFI: represents Private Finance Initiative or private sector capital project investment 
Table 4.1 (b) Profile of NHS trust's (Hotel services) investigated 
Hospitals Featherstone Reinhard Charlston Dickson 
Hospital (FH) Hospital (RH) Memorial Memorial 
NHS trust NHS trust Hospital (CMH) Hospital (DMH) 
NHS trust NHS trust 
[4 locations] [3 locations] [3 locations] 
Specialist Specialist Specialist General 
Speciality Teaching Teaching Teaching Blood 
Research Orthopaedics Transplant Disorders and 
Reputation Reputation Reputation Diabetes 
% Outsourcing 
- - 
-50 50 10 10 
Total beds 
- 
560 245 1100 575 
total staff 6034 906 4727 2068 
; ýnýcýilla ýstaffý 400 170 500 133 
% ancillary to 6.6 18.7 10.5 6.4 
t2tal staff 
Meals served 800-1200 450-500 2600 800-1000 
Perday 
Star-rating 3,3,3 3,3,3 2,2,0 2,2,2 [PFI 
Will not rule out Yes Not preferred Yes [as access 
route to capital to capi all 
Foundation Applied for Not sought Not yet Not yet qualified 
status 
_ ualified RZ efS§e -rVic; e7s- Assured Assured In-house In-house 
-Erovider (Premier Group) (Premier Group) 
I 
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Chapter 5 Data Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
From the central Government's point of view the reasons for outsourcing hotel services to 
Private commercial contractors were to reduce bureaucratic waste (Williamson, 1996: 311) 
deemed prevalent in the health service, contain the escalating cost of providing healthcare 
from taxation alone and eliminate labour unrest that has plagued many public sector 
Organisations (Klein, 2001; NHS Plan, 2000; Thornton, 1999). The services providers were 
Motivated by "making money" through "doing business together" (Kay et al., 1994) and as 
commercial firms, increasing their area of interest with time (Jacoby and Rodriguez, 2007). 
It was hoped that through collaborative contractual arrangements and interdependence, 
With commercial service providers, hotel services managers would become commercially 
oriented to see and operate services as a business. They would save on operating costs, 
generate revenue, improve their performance effectiveness and become more efficient in 
their use of human and financial resources (Laing et al., 2002; Levitt et al., 1995). 
My own interest for this study was stimulated by the scarcity of studies in support services 
outsourcing in healthcare in particular and a dearth of literature on outsourcing in general 
(Cross, 1995; Fill and Visser, 2000; Jennings, 2002; Lacity and Hirscheim, 1999; Nordin, 
2006). 1 wanted to discover the views of those directly involved in the process as to why 
they thought their in-house services were outsourced to private firms and what benefits, if 
any accrue to them as a result of outsourcing. The perceptions of those interviewed are 
quite revealing. Many have used the opportunity accorded by outsourcing to improve their 
roles and positions and the image of their departments, profession and NHS trusts. 
Table 5.10 below shows the combined motives for outsourcing and their outcomes. 
Furthermore, the results of this study suggest that some NHS trusts (Featherstone and 
Theresa hospitals) seem to have strongly imbibed the commercial ethos. Through their 
cooperation with commercial services providers, they have both strengthened and 
Stabilised their financial standing enough to attain Foundation status (Theresa hospital or 
are poised to do so (Featherstone hospital). Thus the political imperative to outsource 
support services, the internal need of the NHS trusts to access resources they lacked and 
the external environment (services providers), have combined to shape hotel services 
towards perceptions of favourable outcomes. 
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5.2 Data analysis method 
In this study, I did not have optimum control over the interview questions due to the 
Political nature of the NHS trusts and some respondents' wish to steer clear of political 
issues and stay out of media attention. Consequently most of them were reluctant to 
discuss certain issues like their budgets, economic impact of outsourcing or private 
finance of their department except by asking other leading questions in some lateral ways 
to elicit some of the required response. Thus respondents were allowed to talk freely and 
in their own colloquial ways and to tell their stories as they saw fit and in the process, 
Many questions were answered and issues inadvertently raised were discussed. 
Final choice of analytical method 
Basically I have adapted structuration theory 3X3 analytical schema (Giddens 1984) to 
Miles and Huberman's (1994) data analysis method to come up with a simple method of 
data reduction and selection of relevant texts based on key issues respondents were 
concerned with in their respective departments or trusts. This method, to my mind, allows 
Me to incorporate the perceptions of respondents in their particular context with my 
Prolonged observation and knowledge of the areas discussed in an attempt to understand 
the meaning beyond their expressed views, opinions and language in use. It can be 
argued that what is presented is my understanding of participants' perceptions, views and 
Opinions. However one of the tenets of qualitative study is to represent constructed 
Meaning from the diversity of respondents' perceptions, ideas or opinions as accurately 
as possible in order to reflect a holistic view of their particular departments like support 
services in the wider NHS trusts' overall context and the researcher's observations and 
reflections (Cassell and Symon, 1994; Creswell, 1998). Thus, I have endeavoured to 
Present relevant verbatim transcripts to enable readers to make their own assessment 
regarding the fit of key themes as elicited and discussed with the theories in use. 
Structuration theory analytical schema 
Structuration theory provides a 3X3 analytical schema as shown on figure 5.1 below. 
'Structuration theory is concerned with the conditions that govern the transformation or 
reproduction of structures. These structures are the rules and resources agents draw 
upon at interaction. They are also the medium and outcome of interaction. From the 
schema below the main institutional structuring mechanisms of signification, domination 
and legitimation are depicted against modality for interaction. All these structures are 
inter-related and have transformative capacity. Their analytical value lies in eliciting how 
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these structures come into being from the perceptions of respondents, how they are 
sustained, the conditions that allow them to continue despite alternatives and how they 
become reproduced or facilitate change and alter power relations over time. 
Figure 5.1 Analytical elements using the process of structuration 
(adapted from Giddens, 1984: 29) 
STRUCTURE SIGNIFICATION DOMINATION LEGITIMATION 
(semantic rules) (resources) (moral rules to 
evaluate conduct) 
MODALITY Interpretative Facility Norm 
(mediation of scheme 
interaction in (stocks of 
process of production knowledge and 
and reproduction) capabilities) (Accountability) 
INTERA TION Communication Power Morality /sanction 
Signification 
This is language in use, important codes or verbal themes of how respondents as agents 
Perceive their roles or departments as a whole, trappings of power, prestige and status 
like office locations and the stories they tell about working conditions or the tedium of 
daily work. 
Domination 
Structures of domination depict the ability to mobilise, authorize and control resources for 
administrative or economic decision-making and allocation, as in budgets. Controllers of 
resources (budgetary allocations, project funding or expertise) can dominate others. 
Legitimation 
This depicts the interplay between value standards and sectional interest that favour 
dominant groups. For example legitimate decision to outsource services must embody 
rights and obligation that favour dominant groups to have a binding force to be actualised. 
Hence legitimation involves rights and obligations as well as sanctions both overt and 
covert. Hence deeper structures may not be overt as themes but can be inferred. 
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5.3 Presentation of this analysis 
Since each NHS trust studied had a different motive for outsourcing hotel services based 
on local needs, first a short history of each NHS trust is presented to provide readers with 
background to judge respondents' perceptions and opinions based on their transcription 
excerpts. These are presented and findings discussed. One NHS trust in each category is 
analysed using structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) analytical framework to elicit 
resultant themes. These common themes are discussed in the light of extant theories. 
The motive and outcomes for outsourcing from each outsourced category (10%-100%) is 
tabulated in (Tables 5.1-5.8 below). A comparative summary of all outsourcing motives is 
shown in Table 5.10. The research question of how respondents directly involved in hotel 
services outsourcing structure their experiences is answered. Thus the consequences of 
support services outsourcing are presented as themes and discussed and compared with 
regards to my prolonged observation, knowledge and triangulation with stakeholders 
aiming to iron out discrepancies or lapses in organisational memory. Respondents' profile 
is tabled (inserted at the end) for easy identification of the speakers of selected excerpts. 
5.3.1 Theresa hospital (TH) 100% outsourced 
This is the nations flagship hospital. Located in the centre of town and of world renown. 
Presently, it is the only hospital in my study that has attained the foundation status of 
alltonomy and self-determination as an NHS trust. There are eight specialist teaching 
hospitals that form the trust. These focus on dental, obstetrics, heart, tropical diseases, 
children and adolescent, neurology, homeopathic and bone marrow transplant. Therefore 
it is well funded as a specialist, teaching and research institution. The hospital started as 
a charitable organisation in 1826 and had medical students attached to it in 1834. Another 
nearby hospital founded in 1755 also applied for teaching hospital status and got it about 
the same time. Theresa hospital is credited with a lot of firsts. For example, Robert Liston 
Performed the first surgical operation under anaesthesia at here on 21 December 1846. 
Betty Anderson opened the first hospital for women in Harrington place near Theresa 
hospital in 1890 and when she died in 1917, the hospital was renamed after her. This 
association with Betty Anderson hospital is of historical importance because she was the 
first female British medical doctor but was trained in France. 
Theresa hospital merged with the School of Hygiene in Gordon Street in 1924. Following 
the reorganisations of the NHS in 1974 and 1982, six of the eight hospitals that make up 
the group were joined together under the Bloomingdale Health Authority. The hospitals 
became a trust in 1994 and were joined by other hospitals in 1996. Theresa hospital 
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boasts of sponsorship from fifty pharmaceutical firms, medical devices and research 
organisations that have enabled it reach the present enviable position of autonomy and 
self-determination. 
The trust employs six thousand staff, four hundred of which are ancillary staff (6.6%), 
placing it on the lower end of ancillary/staff ratio in this study. The trust has retained three 
stars for three consecutive years, which is an achievement in itself hence the foundation 
status that it has enjoyed since July 2004. Kingsland is the services and project provider. 
Kingsland specialises in design, build, refurbish and operate global investments that set it 
apart as a leader in centralised facilities management processes. The contractor believes 
in driving change through continuous productivity improvements that enable clients 
businesses run more effectively, while adding value to their operations. For example, 
Kingsland is the sole provider of capital investment and facilities management at this 
trust. The contractor has contracted with the trust to pay one fixed price for all services 
and loans over a 38 years period. Thus the trust can plan ahead focused on improving its 
medical and research expertise without threats of any seasonal of inflationary variations. 
Kingsland is noted for innovation in operational efficiency saving clients time and money 
and enhancing the quality of the services they provide to clients. Thus the partnership of 
this trust with Kingsland, as a complete services provider and financier of capital project 
has enabled the trust evolve and is now able to determine its own capacity, areas of 
Operation, how to manage its performance and choice of NHS clientele. 
The trust moved into its state of the art E422 million building in central London on 19 April 
2005. This new fourteen-story building (seven below and seven above ground level) is the 
Most prestigious of any NHS trust hospital. The aim was to bring services together for a 
More pleasant patient journey (patient-focused), operational efficiency and effective team 
Working. The trust covers a diverse community from the deprived and homeless in the 
Centre of town to those in affluent areas of London with its migrant population as well as 
the surrounding areas. Consequently, the trust faces and deals with diverse inner city 
health problems. The trust attracts and commands the services of eminent doctors and 
influential non-executive board member like an editor-in-chief of a medical journal, a local 
councillor, a director of Chinese community and members of commerce, industry and 
international banking, who help maintain its legitimacy with the local community and 
Worldwide renown. 
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Theresa Hospital (TH) outsourcing-excerpts 
Four people were interviewed at this trust (Agents A, B, C and D) and their views 
- triangulated and collaboration with those of other workers for accuracy and consistency. 
5.3.1.1 Motives for outsourcing: 
We outsourced our support services under the PFI. It was not tendered, as is the case these days. We 
chose the contractor (Kingsland), on the strength of previous services, their reputation and financial 
standing and of course recommendation. There are eight different specialist hospitals in this hospital group 
and our aim was to bring them under one roof and so reduce our expenses in transporting patients from 
one hospital to another either for tests or treatment (Agent C). 
We outsourced our support services and hospital project to our contractors because we think that they have 
enough clout to help us achieve our aim of housing all our services in one place. This will reduce the chaos 
of running eight hospitals. You cannot imagine the confusion that creates sometimes. There is also the cost 
of conveying patients and staff from one hospital to another. It can be a nightmare (Agent D) 
We believe that contract services provide the trust with value for money. Cost savings are imperative. We 
contractors can do a better job with the same if not more resources than in-house services (Agent B) 
Staff training: 
In this trust you have trained staff. Before services outsourcing the commitment of the trust for training 
ancillary staff was very low. But now we have more trained staff and we (contractors) give more training 
than the trust ever did. We train them especially in food and personal hygiene, which have direct effects not 
only for the members of staff who eat here but also for the patients (Agent A). 
Yes we were sold to the contractors. There was no freedom. If we did not wish to join the private company 
We would have made ourselves unemployed. I did not want to become an employee of the company but we 
had no choice. All our pensions and contributions were frozen because under the pension scheme, they 
said they could not transfer a pension so we lost out (Agent A). 
But we have a happy and committed workforce, we give the trust continuity of service and because the staff 
are happy, they work better and the performance level of the trust has increased (Agent A) 
Our staff members eat free here, it is their duty deal and there is also a staff discount of 20% for all those 
_ 
Who eat here (Agent A) 
, Investments: 
We run the vending machines and canteens for the trust to generate funds for them. The trust owns all the 
machines and all the proceeds from the canteens. We don't provide money to the trust, our investments are 
in providing the services they want and at the higher standards they demand (Agent A) 
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There are eighty different service level agreements (SLA) the trust wants us to meet. Everything they want 
is done at a different standard than before. The trust blames the Government for the new higher standards 
Of Performance and the extra work put on services providers to meet these new levels of performance. We 
have no choice we meet all the standards. We serve the trust well. They source nothing for us (Agent A). 
The hospital trust is broken into three different contract caterers. When they move into the new building, we 
Will be in charge of all catering, maintenance and management. We will be the major contractor, in control 
Of the whole project. It is a brand new building for a foundation trust and we are helping the (consortium of) 
builders to build it. We give our time and experience to the trust (Agent A). 
We are international and on the Stock Exchange. We have financial backing from banks and building 
societies. Our shareholders are our stakeholders. The company is so diversified, we can be working on 
building projects in Malta or oil rigs in China. We also work for the ministry of defence (MoD) and do school 
and hospital catering and support services (Agent A). 
While we are running the new hospital, we will do all the maintenance work-plumbing, carpentry, the lot 
but if the trust people damage anything, they will get a bill for it and if we do the damage, we pay for it, it 
Works both ways (Agent B). 
Contractor investment in facilities prompted stakeholders to say: 
This is what a hospital should look like, clean, airy, roomy and with much needed privacy for patients and 
staff, we can now work better and not step on each other's toe all the time. The changing rooms are the 
best in the bargain, no more having to change into uniforms in cars, toilets, linen cupboards, broom 
Cupboards and patient's bathrooms, we have our own place to change in and you can let your hair down 
without disturbing anyone, very good and very thoughtful of the trust, but it must have cost a lot (Agent C). 
Relationship and Communication: 
We use PASA approved suppliers to ensure that our products are of the highest quality. We have good 
relations with all our suppliers but they also know that there is more than one greengrocer approved by 
PASA that we can use. For catering alone there are twenty suppliers on this section of the trust (about a 
third). But when we move all the suppliers will be amalgamated too so they will be fewer (Agent A) 
We belong to the same social club with the trust members and we meet everyday to discuss operational 
Matters. The official catering meetings happen every two weeks but we also meet every month with 
dieticians, facilities people, nursing staff and all the rest of them. We communicate daily (Agent B) 
IMPact of outsourcing: 
The biggest impact of this new arrangement (outsourcing) is this magnificent building. Now I can come to 
work with a spring in my step, not the former "Oh Lord not that horrible place again", all day long (Agent D). 
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Because of the investment we (contractors) made, the trust has more freedom. They don't have to employ 
accountants to pay wages and salaries to 400 ancillary staff (sold to contractors). They have no worries on 
pensions or contributions. They don't have to deal with personnel disputes, discipline, conflict or people 
Management. They can concentrate on their prime business of healthcare while we concentrate on our 
expertise of providing them with superior support services and value for money (Agents A). 
They would not have extended our level of service if they were not satisfied with our services (Agent B). 
We have been in this basement for thirty-one years and with the contractors for four. But when we move 
into the new building, fit for the 21$t Century, things will be different. There will be new changes and 
challenges. As the changes evolve we have to motivate workers and support them through the change 
Process. A cook cannot be told on the first day that he cannot cook because the trust has decided to use 
Cook-chill meals so he must go and become a cleaner. It Is not possible. He was contracted to cook and not 
to clean so we have to support him till he gets sorted out. The challenges will be in finding our way round 
the new place and all the expansion of duties-there will be duty managers, patient services managers and 
facilities managers, the lot and working in a brand new place where everything is a challenge (Agent A) 
think the trust is running more smoothly and efficiently than before (the staff are trained to be more 
efficient and they have more support), the whole place operates in a more user-friendly way with less 
Conflict than before and the place is cleaner. The new building will be a brand new place with everything 
under one roof. It is a flagship for the trust and the Government. What is the point of having such a brand 
new hospital if you are not going to call it a flagship? (Agent A) 
Furthermore, it was observed that the facilities managers here, through their relationship with commercial 
Contractors gained advice or insight into disposing a property on p "me site previously left to weeds and ri 
squirrels. This was the property in Edgware road that previously housed few elderly psychiatric patients. 
Thus they raised funds to augment their bank balance in preparation for foundation status. Without the aid 
of their contractor, those patients will still be there rather than at Chertsey with other inmates and no new 
flats will be built on that site. Consequently, this trust has become adept at disposing dormant functions to 
raise funds and reduce its total costs. 
Innovation: 
There is no innovation here because we are moving into a brand new building but under the interim service 
level agreements (ISLA) we continue to operate services from these old buildings till the trust decides to 
Move into the new one. The length of time we will stay open depends on the trust because once they move 
in, they start paying so they will delay moving until they are ready (Agent B). 
6.3.1.2 Discussion (TH) 
The contractors at this trust have been there for four years, during which the trust gained 
foundation status, built its new state of the art facility and moved in. The motive for 
Outsourcing was realised (eight specialist hospitals moved to one site). The contractors 
are perceived to have added value to client offerings. The added value is in the form of a 
127 
new facility liberating workers from eight different aging hospital facilities and managers 
from life in the basement (for 31 years) into better work environment and changing rooms, 
training of the ancillary staff to professional standards with incentives to give professional 
service to make the hospital environment more user-friendly and so attract more clients. 
The support services managers here chose a relational exchange with the contractors as 
opposed to market mechanism or in-house authority control. Although managers can use 
authoritative orders to control and coordinate activities, in exchanges with high investment 
or asset specificity, as in this case, authority control becomes an ineffective governance 
Mechanism due to power struggles and the inability of authority to control professionals 
involved in such exchanges (Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Williamson, 1996). This power 
imbalance distorts information exchange, limits knowledge sharing and transfer through 
learning thus limiting value adding through investments and innovation (Eriksson, 2006). 
Consequently authority becomes an efficient but ineffective governance mechanism. 
Similarly, market mechanism of supply and demand based on prices encourages multiple 
Sourcing with resultant competition and conflicting goals. These restrict the sharing of 
Confidential information and investments hence learning and innovation that can add value 
to offering (Wilding and Humphries, 2006). Consequently, in relational exchanges, 
involving high levels of asset specificity, parties to interaction, as seen here, believe that 
Without the exercise of authority, or markets they can get what they want without fearing 
Opportunism or divergent goals (Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Wilding and Humphries, 2006). 
Specific investments generate mutual dependence that forces interacting parties to commit 
to long-term collaboration and cooperation to achieve common goals for mutual benefits 
(Wilding and Humphries, 2006; Williamson, 1996). The problem of incomplete contracts 
and expert professionals involved in relational exchange, as in support services, makes 
Control through soft parameters more effective and efficient as a governance mechanism. 
These soft parameters are social norms, professional ethics and membership to common 
business networks that impose self control to limit self-interest seeking and provides the 
incentive to perform and add more value (Das and Teng, 2001; Williamson, 1996). Thus 
the emphasis on professional self-control, reputation and informal communication that can 
foster trust and commitment to common goals is enhanced in relational exchange. The 
'Outcome is seen here as satisfied client, cost reduction through reduced personnel issues, 
reduced costly contract haggling, monitoring, and coordination costs, revenue generation 
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through disposing dormant functions in prime sites and long-term valuable relationship as 
bridge or buffer to the external environment to reduce the uncertainty of services provision. 
This confirms the findings of the interaction model framework (IMP) on the effectiveness of 
relational exchange to safeguard specific investments. Furthermore the results of services 
outsourcing by this trust goes beyond this framework to impact the services managers and 
Workers by liberating them from the dungeons of the basement and unsuitable work 
environment into more suitable facilities that has also transformed the local community. 
5.3.2 Helina Hospital (HH), 100 % outsourced 
This is a community general hospital in Barnley with buildings dating from 1906 and 
crumbling. The hospital evolved from the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 when the 
Local Union became guardians of the poor who could not afford medical treatment. The 
hospital continued to house both the sick and the poor till 25 July 1906 when those with 
small pox, typhus and cholera were housed separately from the poor. It served as a 
Military hospital from 1915 and became Helina Hospital after the first World War in 1920. 
The workhouse for the poor was closed in 1938, inmates transferred to Chaseville and 
the whole institution used as a hospital. Thus the hospital has several buildings, built at 
different stages hence crumbling at different rates or needing attention. For example, the 
accident and emergency was built in 1955, the out patients department in 1960, the 
Pathology department in 1982, theatres in 1991 and walk-in centre in 2000. 
The trusts' catchment's area is a mobile community of "doubtful ethnic mix" mainly in 
Samley, Chaseville and surrounding areas. The hospital became a trust in December 
1990 and was named a university training hospital in July 2001. Its main focus is on HIV 
and blood diseases but has a thriving and active children and youth health centre 
affiliated with other children's hospital in keeping with a university status. There are local 
Community centres like a dental access centre and a Learn-Direct. The trust has pooled 
together a lot of managerial experience and commercial know-how through World Agents 
to build a "commercially aggressive team" to help it save money and provide commercial 
support to the facilities manager in tendering and revenue generation. 
HH outsourcing-excerpts 
Four people were interviewed at this trust (Agents E, F, G and H) and their views 
collaborated and triangulated with those of their workers for accuracy and clarity. 
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5.3.2.1 Motives for outsourcing: 
We are a commercially aggressive team and we are here to save the trust money, that's the bottom line. 
We have also pooled together, a lot of experience as a team of very experienced purchasing managers 
from different walks of life. So the trust benefits from our experience and world-wide contacts (Agent G) 
When we tendered for the business, we looked at costs and expertise and other areas that can benefit the 
trust in a competitive way so that the hospital gets value for money. The trust is currently looking into a PFI 
scheme and having one primary contractor as a part of the consortium to maintain all our existing contracts. 
That will help the contractor to tailor our services and to provide a more personal service (Agent F) 
Companies are in business to make money so they have to be as efficient as possible to make profit. But 
one of the reasons for choosing the present contractor is their management structure. It is to the advantage 
Of the trust to get better value for money, when contractors invest in senior management personnel. A team 
of qualified and experienced managers who care for their customers are able to project a better company 
image to make the business more successful. So firms that invest in management personnel invest for the 
long-term benefits not short-term profits. It is important to see that people are properly trained to serve the 
needs of the customers and so make the company more effective and successful (Agent F). 
World agents provide commercial support to the facilities manager in tendering and other areas of 
contracting. Our patient turnover is very high with all the day cases we treat. That increases our overall 
expenditure. We also have old buildings from 1906 that are very difficult to keep clean. So we hope the PFI 
Will enable the trust to maintain and improve standards in newer facilities (Agent F) 
The trust would outsource services if there are operational and economic advantages. For example if we 
need to recruit more staff on the NHS scale (as in support services) it will be better for the trust to outsource 
the service. That way we save the trust the problems of personnel and their management costs (Agent F) 
It does not really matter whether services are outsourced or in-house, as long as the services are provided. 
What is important is the management of these services so we get what we tendered for. We went for quality 
not the cheapest supplier but the best services provider and we are satisfied 90% of the time (Agent E) 
Services outsourcing takes away the strain and risk and all the extra work involved in catering and providing 
the services in-house (Agent H) 
Risk assessment: 
For example, when cleaning contractors bid for the contract, they looked at the square footage of the wards 
and what needs to be done and decided "what do we need to get this hospital clean". That will decide how 
Many people are needed to run the services-how many supervisors, cleaners and managers are needed 
to get the job done as specified (by the trust) and then they bid accordingly (Agent G) 
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Investments in developing managers: 
I am aware that a lot of investment has gone Into developing purchasing teams of other organisations as 
professionals to make them more responsive and effective to the needs of their clients (Agent F) 
Investment in staff training: 
The ancillary staff are better trained by the contractors. The NHS did not train ancillary staff. They were the 
bottom of the pile and there was no point in training them. Now they are better trained and get better 
uniforms, look more professional and even their salaries are improved at par with the rest of the NHS. They 
have better recognition for what they are and the work they do. Sometimes people just blame cleaners, 
cleaning and contractors as an easy target because they cannot answer back (Agent E) 
We (contractors) train some of the staff in food and personal hygiene when they start here and they have 
refresher courses. They can work anywhere we have contracts if they request for it (Agent H) 
We have 10% discount for all the staff that eat here. We have social get-together for the staff to enjoy 
themselves and forget about the world. No we don't solve problems there but it helps them to relax (Agent H) 
My staff are well motivated. They don't need me to control them. Someone else has been doing my job for 
the four weeks while I have been away. We all need to try and empower ourselves to perform. Everyone is 
empowered to use initiatives. There are rules and regulations we all have to abide by. We don't need any 
other formal thing to empower people to do their job. We all need to be alert and work together (Agent E) 
Things are done more professionally now. They (ancillary staff) now realise that you cannot have loads of 
staff hanging around doing nothing while you are paying them for it (Agent E) 
Relationships and support 
It is not a bad relationship with the trust members but it could be better. We are always regarded as the 
contractors. Well they are satisfied with our services or they would not have renewed the contract if they 
Were not. We have been here for twenty years now (Agent H) 
We use Premier nominated suppliers, vetted for hygiene purposes to ensure that the products we use are 
safe. We have a good relationship (network relationship) with them (Agent H) 
We (contractors) network with other trusts and dialogue with them to learn best practice and get to know what 
others are actually doing and who is who in purchasing (Agent F) 
We serve hundreds of other hospitals around and we support each other. Premier is the biggest catering 
company in the world and Assured is the hospital branch of it. We've been here for twenty years (Agent H) 
We (NHS managers) have no support from neighbouring hospitals. There are no NHS formal support 
networks to my knowledge. But I have informal contacts if I need them (Agent E) 
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Communication: 
We meet often with the trust on commercial matters especially best practice and tell the trust when matters 
of commercial interest arise (Agent F). 
Things are done more professionally now and that may have added a layer of communication (Agent E) 
We meet every day informally but fortnightly we have formal meetings with managers from catering, 
cleaning, security, health and safety and things like that to discuss things. It is important to maintain the 
same standard of output (Agent E) 
Externalities: 
If the contractors do well, they can use this contract as a springboard to provide other services here or 
elsewhere. It is also an incentive for contractors to continue performing well (Agent F). 
Learning: 
There is a lot of learning between the trust and the contractors. When a new contractor is engaged, it is 
important for the contractor to quickly understand what is required. For example anew pest control 
contractor needs to know the layout and sites where pests can become involved. They need to learn quickly 
to prevent any misunderstandings and avoid under-performing. The trust also learns from them (Agent F). 
innovation: 
Assured has its own branded cappuccino and all the rest of them and we have Nevitto, as a commercial 
venture in most petrol stations all over the country (Agent H). 
Power and control (Reciprocity) 
YOU manage individual relationships. I don't control the contractors I deal with them on personal basis and 
expect them to do the same. There is no difference whether they are contractors or on the NHS (Agent E). 
Trust plays an essential role in our relationship with contractors, without trust, there is no contract (Agent F). 
Sitting contractors may have advantages at contract renewal but can also have disadvantages. You get to 
know their faults and weaknesses as well as their strengths and on balance it can work against them, 
resulting in a change of contractors. The important thing is having an open and fair competition at tendering. 
Using the same contractor time and time again may be anti-competitive and may result in having a "cosy 
relationship", where personal interests may become more important than business ones (Agent F). 
These excerpts from Helina Hospital (HH) are analysed below in Table 5.1 
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Table 5.1 (HH) Using structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) analytical methods 
Structures 
i - _ 
Signification Domination Legitimation 
f Tfi ý i7e rZ y -Commercially aggressive World agents provide -Avoid budget team here to save the Commercial support to deficits and 
trust money facilities manager for overspend 
-We looked at costs when economic advantages -Maintain 
we tendered so trust gets standard of 
better value for money output 
nvestments -World agents give -Contractors enable -Avoid service 
commercial support and the trust obtain disruptions or 
advice to benefit the trust operational contract 
-Services risk capped and advantages through termination 
transferred to contractors commercial support -Give 
-Old buildings difficult to -Investment in personalised 
keep clean hence PFI management structure service 
Staff training Ancillary staff better Contractors own and Give better 
trained by contractors to train all ancillary staff professional 
professional standards service 
-Purchasing teams now -incentive to train 
developed to be more . other purchasing 
responsive and effective to teams 
client needs 
Managerial -We have pooled a lot of The trust benefits from -Avoid conflicts 
experience experienced managers our experience and -Improve skills of 
from different walks of life network connections managers for 
better services 
Relationships 
-Network with other trusts -There is a lot of Client is satisfied 
to learn best practice learning between the with services so 
-Contractors have other trust and contractors renews contract 
networks for support or -We manage 
help with equipments individual relationships 
_ _ _ _ not control managers i n n _0_vafion -Branded Nevitto We work with all our Avoid problems 
-Improved food and contractors as a and complaints 
services team in partnership from patients 
6.3-2.2 Discussion of 100% outsourced services at HH 
The contractors at Helina hospital (HH) have been there for twenty years, during which the 
hospital has become a university training centre. However the motive for outsourcing was 
for operational and economic reasons. The operational reason was the lack of experienced 
and skilled managerial resource with the professional knowledge to give personalised 
support service to the trust, to improve its image and effectiveness. With their commercial 
aggression and extended networks, World agents provide the trust with value for money 
and claim to have enabled it become more economical, in efficiency savings. This is 
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achieved through effective client relationship management and investment in their 
management structure that enables them to provide personalised hotel services. 
Customer relationship management (CRM) emerged in the 1990's aimed at obtaining and 
storing customer preference data in order to secure a one-to-one relationship and create 
long term relationships with loyal customers (Osarenkhoe and Bennani, 2007). This was a 
shift from transaction-based marketing. The aim was to lower the cost of acquiring new 
customers by keeping the old ones as seen at HH for twenty years. Serving a smaller 
number (or segment) of customers individually also attracts premium prices as those 
customers become loyal and indifferent to other competitive offers (Eriksson and Laan, 
2007). These satisfied customers help to promote the products and services of their 
Providers by word of mouth as seen in the externalities reported at HH. Over time the 
services provider build a trusting relationship with their clients and both become confident 
that their relationship will not be harmed or put at risk by either party's action (Das and 
Teng, 2001; Morgan and Hunt, 1994). This confident trust generates commitment to long- 
term relationship of mutual benefit that further reduces cost of formal monitoring and threat 
of opportunism, thus promoting the concepts of relational exchange to reduce total costs. 
Furthermore trust and commitment in relationships here allow for confidential information 
exchange, meaningful communication and'learning. Through learning and knowledge 
sharing, ideas for innovation are realised to build capabilities or nurture new products like 
Nevitto. Thus the effective customer relationships management at HH seems to have 
enabled the parties to interaction realise long-term benefits as profits for services providers 
and added value for clients. This is shown in the training and equipping of ancillary staff 
With skills to liberate them from manual workers to professionals and the proposed PFI 
Project to improve facility, work environment and image of the hospital as a result of client 
satisfaction with the services providers, thus extending the remit of services providers. 
The moderating influence of trust and commitment to mutual goals in their relationship is 
shown in the lack of control and exercise of power. Rather personal ties come to the fore 
in their association to push their commitment and loyalty further towards a common goal. 
Their professional ethics promote informal social control to guard their reputation and 
frown at having cosy relationships that can tarnish their image. Thus trust and commitment 
reduce the exercise of power or authority in interdependent relationships of mutual benefit. 
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Finally the requirements of customer relationship management (CRM) of Osarenkhoe and 
Bennani (2007) were met at HH. They went for quality services, not the cheapest. The 
skill, expertise, experience and professionalism of the managers guaranteed personalised 
service and customer satisfaction. The services providers invested in training the staff to 
equip them with skills and knowledge and turn them into professionals with incentives in 
the form of free meals, to motivate them to give professional service. There is investment 
in management structure to equip them with skills and knowledge to give personalised 
Professional services to the trust and liberate it from a community hospital to a university 
training centre over time. Constant communication and meaningful dialogue enabled the 
Provider and client to avoid misunderstandings and resolve issues before they turn into 
conflicts. Thus the services providers at this hospital engaged in effective customer 
relationship management to retain their clients over time and increase their profitability 
While adding value to support services offering. 
The combined summary of 100% outsourcing results is shown in table 5.2 below 
Table 5.2 Summary of outsourcing in the 100% outsourced NHS trusts 
NHS trust Motives for outsourcing Excerpt themes 
elicited 
Theories in use 
Theresa Jo concentrate effort and Value for money- RBV (acquire resource) 
Hospital resources on one site I nvestment TCE (economise costs) 
(TH) -Gain value for money Staff training IM (safeguard 
investment) 
from best hotel services Relationships 
provider Learning 
Heliný 
-Lack experienced and Best provider RBV (acquire resource) 
I Hospital skilled services managers I nvestments TCE (economise costs) 
(HH) Nalue for money (through Staff training IM (safeguard investment) 
competitive tendering and Relationships CRM (manage client for 
providers' relationship Learning profit and add value) 
5.3.3 Karena Hospital (KH) 75% outsourced 
This trust is a specialist, teaching hospital in central London. it is associated with royalty 
and renowned for being the birthplace of penicillin, in the days of Alexander Fleming 
(1928). It specialises in kidney, liver and bone transplants for which it has become world 
famous. The trust took over the management of the charitable and eye hospitals both in 
Queensland road. This trust is 75% outsourced with Mediserve as its services provider. 
The trust has also applied for foundation status and has a contentious PFI scheme in 
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progress, all during this research period. The trust has a mixture of very old and new 
buildings and was thinking about merging with other nationally renowned hospitals to 
become a consortium of clinical excellence, hence the contentious PFI arrangement. 
This arrangement has now been shelved in favour of a more viable relationship with 
Featherstone hospital. The trust also maintains good relationships with Colleges of 
research, and local universities for training nurses and doctors. 
The trust gets donations from pharmaceutical and commercial organisations with whom it 
collaborates in research. Furthermore, the trust boasts of eminent non-executive board 
Members chosen for their community standing and the work they did in the past or are 
currently doing. For example, the chairman of the board is a peer and former conservative 
member of a London borough. Other board members are currently serving as a global 
investment banker, a chartered accountant, an experienced commerce and industry 
member, a managing director of a financial institution, a private personnel recruitment 
consultant and a professor of medicine well versed in research, development and 
treatment of HIV disease. Consequently, these eminent board members help the trust 
smoothen out its environmental threats while seizing commercial and business 
Opportunities as they arise to help the trust to evolve. 
Karena Hospital outsourcing-excerpts 
Four people were interviewed at this hospital (agent 1, J, K and L) and their views 
collaborated and triangulated with those of their workforce for clarity and accuracy. 
6.3.3.1 Motives for outsourcing 
We outsourced our support services for two reasons-cost savings and staff retention. Even though 
contractors pay their staff at lower rates than in the NHS, they always manage to hold onto them probably 
because their staff can work anywhere within their organisation and also in any of their other contracts 
around 
_the 
world but NHS staff employed in this trust will be confined to this trust alone or work in different 
departments. I think that their staff value the variety contract work gives them (Agent 1) 
We transferred a lot of risks to the contractors and capped all our support services and they met all the 
needs of the trust. They procure all our services within one contract price and we pay a set price (Agent 1) 
First it was a Government directive that all hospitals outsource catering, cleaning and laundry but since then 
there is a marked difference in price, we know. Also they (contractors) relieve us of the cost in time and 
money of recruiting and managing people. Managing people is costly because it consumes time. Now they 
recruit and manage their own staff. That's a huge load off my back (Agent K) 
We give the hospital a good service so that they get the right food in a good clean environment (Agent 
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Staff training: 
The contractors recruit and train their own staff. They operate services all over the country and can get staff 
- and retain them. Our staff vacancy rates and turnover are greatly reduced (Agent 1) 
They (contractors) provide employment for their staff. They took over all the ancillary staff here and now 
train and manage them better if you will and so relieve us of the burden of personnel management and all 
- 
that goes with it (Agent 1) 
The contractors recruit and train their own staff and some of them have trained to do other jobs in the trust. 
One of the catering staff is now a nurse in the private wing (Agent J) 
Investment 
We are always short of money but as an organisation we cannot borrow money. The contractors are private 
Organisations with wider networks and they can borrow money. With new buildings, they can get money 
from the Government but we cannot, that's just the ways things are, (we are a public organisation so we 
cannot). But we need money to maintain these old buildings and to finance the work we do here. The 
contractors have access to national resources and they can borrow money and make it available to the 
trust. This last time they invested so much money and we are paying back gradually over time. They invest 
for interest. There is nothing wrong with making interest. We don't get the money for nothing. We pay for 
the privilege of having the money we need to function so we pay back with interest over time (Agent 1) 
ý They (contractors) bring a lot of skills, knowledge and experience and they are professionals in their chosen 
fields. We learn a lot from them (Agent 1) 
The contractors have invested lots of money here in equipment and personnel (Agent K and J) 
We built this trust a new restaurant, because they needed one and refurbished the kitchen (because it 
needed refurbishing) and we run the canteens and caf6s to raise money for them to reduce costs (Agent L) 
They (contractors) refurbished the kitchen and changed it completely from conventional cooking to cook- 
chill because we could never get staff to work in the kitchens. The fast food houses and restaurants around 
here are the reasons. The chefs prefer to work in those places with better pay and conditions than what the 
NHS could offer to attract them to provide continuous services. Because we cannot retain them we changed 
Our kitchen services to cook-chill and the contractors enabled us to achieve that (Agent 1). 
- 
Relationship and communication 
The key to a good contract is a good contract manager. If you have a good contract manager, you will work 
Well and quickly with them otherwise you will have conflicts and problems and things become difficult. 
80 We work with the contractors in a relationship as a team. If you work with them as a team you will 
achieve goals and if you don't, you won't achieve your goals. It is that simple (Agent 1) 
We Work in partnership with the trust. We don't have different views we have the same objectives (Agent L) 
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Good teamwork is all about relationship and how you work well with people not discipline (Agent 1) 
The domestics and hostesses who help to service the meals are part of the ward teams. The ward 
Managers use them as they see fit (Agent 1). 
We maintain a good business relationship with them (contractors) it is important that we maintain good 
relations with all our contractors, because we depend on them for services to continue. We are satisfied 
With their work. They are professionals and they have their pride so they do a good job (Agent K) 
Contractors have changed in the thirty years I have been in this hole called an office but the present one is 
good. They are doing very well. We are satisfied. I retire soon but someone else will be here (Agent K) 
As a teaching hospital we work in alliance with local research colleges to provide the standards and the flow 
Of patient services (Agent 1) 
We relate with PASA because they save us a lot of money. And with NHS Logistics that help us buy in bulk 
so we save money because they help us with storage, re-distribution and transportation (Agent K) 
We meet regularly, informally say weekly but we communicate daily. We meet formally monthly to review 
imPortant issues and we have annual reviews with their managing directors, executive and non-executive 
board members so they can all be a part of what we are trying to do here (Agent 1) 
We meet regularly. Informally we meet daily with the facilities manager and the contractors but the monthly 
Meetings are with the directors to discuss performance and other issues (Agent K) 
We communicate every day by phone or e-mail or face-to-face and if there is a problem we rectify it 
immediately. We have a set of procedures to follow and we learn from each other everyday (Agent L) 
The contractors know what to do and the consequences of under-performing. There is no conflict we trust 
and interact with them as professionals and they do a professional job (Agent K) 
They are our clients and we trust them. We give them good quality services as they specified (their set 
standard is the quality they require) and they are happy and the patients are happy. What is a dodgy client? 
I have never met one my company will not get involved with what you call a dodgy client (Agent L) 
We use company procedure books to resolve conflicts and disputes so everyone knows it is fair (Agent Q 
Power relationships: 
We have the power to penalise them by taking money away from them. They know all that from the start. 
We don't have penalty clauses in our contracts because they can be fiddled and they get in the way of good 
teamwork but if we can show that the contractor has not done the work as required, we can take money 
away from them provided you are fair and can provide evidence that they have not performed (Agent 1). 
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The contracts are set for a definite period of time, the maximum period Is seven years but we limit it to five 
years with an extension period of two years to see how they are doing. At the end of the contract, we can 
either extend it or revoke it. This gives them the Incentive to perform well (Agent 1) 
We monitor them. We use monthly patient and customer surveys to see how they are doing. We have had 
our traumas with contractors but the present one is doing a good job. We have a good service now (Agent 1) 
The contractors are professional and they do a very good job here but we manage them because sometimes 
We get complaints (Agent K) 
Hospitals depend on contractors for support on patients' services to continue or the hospitals will grind to a 
halt. Support services are crucial for smooth healthcare delivery (Agent K) 
The contractors have managed to let the public know how important the support services are. Hospitals are 
Usually thought of as doctors and nurses, but without the support services, hospitals could not function 
(Agent 1) 
innovation: 
We may know what we need as an organisation but the contractors have visions and views of how they can 
Provide more services and do it better. They also have wider input and more sources of supply so they can 
Procure materials cheaply. They come up with ideas to helpr us achieve our goals and objectives (Agent 1) 
Our staff dining services and new canteens are based on commercial ventures to provide us with income 
which we roll back to offset some of our costs. Our coffee shop for visitors is also a commercial venture to 
Provide income to the trust (Agent 1) 
IMpact of outsourcing: 
The biggest impact of outsourcing here is innovation in food and services. We may know what we need but 
the contractors have visions and views of how they can provide more services and do it better. They also 
have wider input and more sources of supply. They help us with ideas to achieve our goals (Agent 1). 
IMage of support services raised 
The contractors have also managed to let the public know how important the support services are. 
Hospitals are usually thought of as doctors and nurses, but without the support services, hospitals could not 
function. The support services are critical to this trust. Because the support service workers have a better 
Profile, image, work uniforms and improved training than before, they stick with the contractors (Agent 1) 
Other benefits of outsourcing: 
We capped all our services and transferred a lot of risks to them and they met all the needs of the trust. 
They bring a lot of skills, knowledge and experience and they are professionals in their chosen fields. 
They have access to national resources and they can borrow money and make it available to the trust and 
We repay it over time with interest. They have invested so much money here this last time and we are 
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Paying back gradually over time. They have completely changed our kitchen services from conventional 
Cooking to cook-chill and refurbished the kitchen and built new canteens based on commercial ventures to 
Provide us with income. They procure all our services within one contract price so we pay a set price. 
They operate services all over the country and can get staff and retain them. Our staff vacancy rates and 
turnover are greatly reduced. They come up with ideas to help us achieve our goals and objectives (Agent 1) 
There is more patient choice in food, especially on the private wing and the caterers check and monitor 
themselves and the Government agents monitor them too so we don't have to. The rest rooms and the 
Visitor's areas are also cleaner, we know because there is less complaint coming in to me (Agent K) 
They (contractors) provide employment for their staff. They took over all the ancillary staff here and now 
train and manage them better if you will and so relieve us of the burden of personnel management and all 
that goes with it (Agent 1) 
Foundation status and autonomy: 
We will never be autonomous. There will always be an aspect of Government in the shadows telling us 
What we should be doing. But one clear message with foundation status is the ability to borrow money and 
do all the things we want to do now. Instead of depending on the Government, we can go out and double 
What they can give us. Also we can look at services from a money generating point of view. We will look at 
Our bread and butter core element of the community we treat differently, in ways that can generate money 
and not drain the trust of resources. It will enable us see healthcare as a business and give us completely 
different visions of how that business can be run, if not for making profit, then run successfully (Agent 1) 
The present state of affairs is that the Government provides us with funds through the Strategic Health 
Authorities (SHA). They set the direction of all the trusts in their area and decide how much money we can 
have depending on our performance and all sorts of things. So we have a budget and have to work within 
that budget. But if we go down the foundation route, we will be able to change all that and function as a 
business. We will still have and work within our budget but things will be a lot easier and simpler (Agent 1) 
Tabulated analysis of excerpts from Karena Hospital is shown in Table 5.3 below 
-5-3.3.2 Discussion: 
Karena hospital trust outsourced its hotel services to enable it retain ancillary staff and 
reduce total transaction costs. They achieved the aims outsourcing and realised more 
benefits in innovation in food and services and improved image of support services. The 
services managers realised that a partnership arrangement with the contract managers 
Would facilitate a more trusting relationship of mutual commitment and cooperation to help 
them achieve their goals. Consequently, rather than exerting their position power in 
controlling or penalising the contractors, services managers use informal social control. 
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Social control is defined as building a common organisational culture that encourages 
self-control and limits opportunism (Das and Teng, 2001). Social control is a more 
effective form of control in cooperative arrangements where goals to be attained are 
Uncertain and performance monitoring is problematic as in support services outsourcing 
that adds value over time (Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Power et al., 2007). This is achieved 
through trust and commitment in business relationships that impose self-control to reduce 
the fear of opportunism and monitoring costs. Trust and commitment become incentives 
for services providers to invest more and help the client organisation to achieve more. 
Consequently the visible hand of authority to control behaviour is replaced by self-control 
or reciprocal conduct when asset specificity is coupled with inter-dependence. Thus the 
advantages of cooperative relationships of mutual benefit, governed by social control 
outweigh the exercise of power to attain goals. This reinforces the tenets of the interaction 
Model (IMP) that parties, to interaction without the exercise of authority or power, can 
achieve mutual goals through relational means without fearing opportunism, control or 
domination (Ford, 2002,2003; H6kansson and Snehota, 1995). 
Having secured a working partnership based on trust and commitment, the services 
Provider sets about optimising the client's business processes as seen in the investments 
Made to refurbish the kitchens and build canteens to generate funds because the kitchen 
needed refurbishing and the trust needed to generate funds to offset their costs. Further 
investment in equipment, workforce training and motivational incentives equip the staff 
With skills and knowledge to become professionals and to provide professional services 
with enhanced commitment and loyalty to the services provider despite lower wages and 
loss of entitlements like sickness benefits. Consequently, providers' investments enable 
the staff to make a difference and transform the erstwhile run down image of support 
Services. Thus the outsourcing objectives of this trust were achieved and value added by 
liberating the workforce from a rundown image of manual workers always waving 
Placards and agitating for a better living wage and improved working conditions. 
This reinforces the tenets of structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) with regards to the 
Ontological security perceived by agents. When workers feel cared for by managers they 
are more committed to daily chores, reduce absenteeism and exit. This is evidenced here 
as better staff retention and reduction in staff vacancy rate and turnover. Thus the 
Professionalism of the workforce helps to improve the image and profile of support 
services as added value to the outsourcing goals of cost reduction and staff retention. 
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Finances invested for profit benefits the services provider and enables the trust function 
better without budget deficits. Through the investment in managerial time for learning and 
knowledge sharing, innovation in food and services is realised, commercial ventures are 
nurtured and run by the services provider to generate funds to offset costs. Learning has 
also equipped the services managers with knowledge to see healthcare as a business 
and poised them to qualify for foundation status that would further liberate them from the 
dictates of the Strategic Health Authority commissioners and perennial budget deficits. 
Consequently the impact of hotel services outsourcing here goes beyond cost reduction 
and staff retention to include commercial skills acquisition by services managers through 
learning and teamwork to liberate the trust from budget deficits and the dictates of 
commissioners, giving them the freedom of charting their own course as foundation trust. 
Issues of power 
Although the services managers possess the authoritative power to take money away 
from non-performing providers, they also realise that these services providers possess 
allocative power of investing funds to enable them function better by upgrading their 
Processes like kitchens and canteens, to generate funds through vending and coming up 
With ideas to help them achieve their goals. Consequently the services managers chose 
not to exercise their punitive power (Foucault, 1977) but to work with services providers 
through the dialectic of control (Giddens, 1984) to achieve a more favourable outcome. 
Power is a great motivator that facilitates interaction by constraining or enabling agents to 
achieve outcomes both intended and unintended (Giddens, 1984). Secondly, the services 
Providers possess the scarce resources the services managers require to function. These 
are finance for investment, ideas to help them achieve goals, ancillary staff to do the work 
and professional expertise to supply hotel services. Thus the expert power of services 
Providers enables them to manage and reduce the uncertainty of resource acquisition. 
This is in keeping with the tenets of IMP relational exchange where the interdependent 
sharing of knowledge for building capabilities and innovation far outweigh the momentary 
exercise of authoritative power (HAkansson and Gadde, 1992; Gadde and Snehota, 2000; 
Jolly, 2003). Consequently, both parties chose to communicate and negotiate to achieve 
consensus for mutual benefits. This also reinforces the ontology of structuration theory 
(Giddens, 1984), which emphasises the self-direction of agents in focusing on which 
conditions of action (interdependent teamwork or punitive power) will maximise the 
capacity of agents to make a difference. Thus, allocative and authoritative power, 
Combine in a trusting partnership relationship, to make the overt exercise of power 
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redundant. Cooperative partnerships can reduce misunderstanding, nip conflicts in the 
bud, eliminate the need to find alternative sources of supplying resources (Smith 2000) 
and to facilitate needed change better than punitive exercise of authority to discipline 
erring contractors. Other studies confirm these conclusions (Courpasson, 2000; Eriksson 
and Laan, 2007; Osarenkhoe and Bennani, 2007; Wilding and Humphries, 2006). 
On innovation 
The services managers had operational flexibility to achieve innovation. This was in the 
certainty of investment, through the ability of the providers to mobilise national resources 
and invest it and their diverse inputs that enable them achieve innovation in food and 
services (Harding, 1999 and 2005). The contractors provide a stream of stable and cheaper 
loan to be repaid over time while they generate revenue for the trust to offset such debts 
(Harding, 1995). Consequently, a major obstacle to innovation (investment) was overcome 
Making it possible for managers to realise the benefit of innovation in food and services. 
Innovation is a radical combination or integration of knowledge (Pettigrew and Fenton, 
20oo; Huber, 1999). Successful innovation requires a conducive and trusting environment 
that supports creativity and drives to make it flourish (Christensen, et al., 2004). Services 
Providers, acting as change agents, already come with requisite knowledge (Huber, 1999). 
This'is found in contractor expertise, experience and skills, tacit memory or standard 
Operating procedures (SOP), equipments and routines (Nelson and Winters, 1982). 
Working in a trusting partnership with the client managers, they draw on organisational 
resources (stock of knowledge) as a medium of their interaction and reproduce the same 
as innovation in food and services (Giddens, 1984). The services managers are already 
sensitised with the absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) to regard support 
services in healthcare as a business needing innovation to move beyond its present state. 
Thus, through their inter-dependent and cooperative working relationship based on 
Common goals and mutual benefit they communicate constantly and openly to share 
knowledge across disciplines and apply new knowledge to produce something perceived 
as novel and new in food and services (Okoroh et al., 2002; Osborne and Brown, 2005). 
An environment of mistrust and risk aversion hampers creativity and stifles innovation 
(Eriksson et al., 2007; Jolly, 2003). Agency theory uses the metaphor of contracts to 
describe principal-agent relationships and assumes that agents are risk-averse due to 
their inability to diversify their employment, hence preferring a more secure line of action 
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Table 5.3 (KH) Using structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) analytical methods 
Structures 
_t 
- iL rI S gnification Domination Legitimation 
v Efff Iciency Marked price difference We depend on Avoid overspend 
-PASA and logistics contractors and budget deficits 
save us lots of money for services to 
-Services procured at continue 
one fixed price 
-We roll back income to 
offset some of our costs Innovation -Contractors come up with -We work with Avoid problems ideas to help us achieve contractors as a and conflicts or 
our goals and objectives team in partnership complaints 
-More patient choices -We learn a lot from from patients 
-Creative ways and wider our contractors 
input to do services better 
nvestments -Contractors have invested -Contractors access Avoid service lots of money here national resources disruptions or 
- We capped all service and make them contract termination 
risks and transferred to available to the trust so to retain contract 
them. They met all needs -They invest for they add value to 
-These old buildings interest and we pay client offerings 
crying out for money back over time 
Managerial -Contractors are -It is important that Avoid conflicts experience professionals we maintain good Learn from them 
-Contractors come with lots relations with all our 
of skill and knowledge contractors 
-Key to good contract is a -We work well with 
good contract manager contractors to 
-_ _ _ achieve our goals ýO u nda -fio n -Autonorny has some clear We look to the Avoid dictates of Status messages-Ability to contractors Strategic Health 
borrow money now and do to help us achieve Commissioners 
all the things we want our goals 
-Look at healthcare as a -We learn a lot from business to generate them (commercial 
money not drain us ' ethos) Community 
-Hospital as focal point of We serve the needs Local relevance to concern or local community of our local avoid closure Legitimacy 
-National teaching and community as our 
research centre bread and buffer 
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(Bergen et al., 1992). Contrary to this assumption the services managers (principal) state 
that they transferred a lot of risks to the contractors (agents) and they met all their needs as 
evidence of their ability and competence to perform and achieve specified details of their 
outcome-based contracts. The services managers are committed to improving their lot to 
gain foundation status and liberate themselves from the commissioners, while providers 
have a need to innovate and create wealth, avoid obsolescence, make profits and sustain 
their competitive advantage over other suppliers (Von Hippel, 1998; Morita, 1992; Story 
and Salaman, 2005). Consequently, both engage in meaningful dialogue, having secured 
investment funds and creative ideas, to drive innovation forward and reap mutual benefits. 
Thus in relational exchange of mutual benefit, interacting parties can become risk-neutral. 
5.3.4 Victoria and County Hospitals trust (VH) 75% outsourced 
This is a community hospital group located in two different areas of London that reflect 
the diversity of its population. One is in a depressed inner London with a varied ethnic mix 
While the other has its own ethnic community and suburbs. The trust chose to outsource 
- services up to 75% to focus on core activity, save costs and especially guarantee 
services supply and support. The trust has built a Day Care Surgical Centre (DCSC) and 
an Emergency Diagnostic Centre (EDC) in their local Industrial estate, using PFI funding 
to replace the crumbling old hospital building founded in 1946 on an old railway station. 
The trust is currently undergoing plans to rebuild the Victoria extension, whose land was 
Purchased in 1898 and built in 1970. The two hospitals were amalgamated as the West 
London NHS trust inl 991. It has maintained its two star status for three years and is yet 
to qualify for foundation trust status for which probably its chief executive was recalled to 
the Department of health for bringing the name of the trust into disrepute. The trust 
maintains partnerships with local boroughs, the Olympic committee and its services 
Suppliers, Areno (hotel services) and Builders International (PFI capital projects). Both 
companies are multinational corporations with headquarters in UK and Paris respectively. 
Both are actively in the market place armed with commercial ethos to exploit opportunities 
for profit, market share and growth through innovation and customer satisfaction. Thus, 
their combined association with this trust has enabled the trust evolve meaningfully as 
shown below. The trust receives the largest research and development funding for a non- 
teaching hospital mainly for clinical trials and is associated with specialist hospitals, of 
international repute, an infectious disease hospital, an eye clinic and a research college. It 
also has excellent relationships with private healthcare organisations for which it has a 
centre at its main base at Victoria hospital. 
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Victoria Hospital outsourcing-excerpts 
Five people were interviewed at this trust (Agents M, N, 0, P, and Q) and their views were 
collaborated and triangulated with those of the workforce for accuracy and clarity. 
6.3.4.1 Motives for outsourcing: 
The objective of the trust as we see it is to provide a quality, timely and reliable service which would fit in 
With the needs and policies of the trust. We are big enough to meet that need and guarantee the service by 
Providing all the backup and technical support needed to make it a quality service. In short we are a one- 
stop shop for all their services. At the end of the day it is value for money or perceived as value for money 
for them because we guarantee a quality service at a fixed price through all seasons (Agent M) 
My understanding is that hospitals are in the business of providing healthcare. We are not great at catering or 
cleaning or business so we get people who are very good at these things and can organise them better and 
We pay them to do it for us (Agent N) 
We (contractors) have contacts and personal links all over the world and can buy stuff cheaper than the 
trust can source them so they benefit and we do what we are best at. They will never be able to afford to do 
it themselves because of their enormous overheads (Agent M) 
We are a big organisation and we specialise in support services unlike the health service that mainly treats 
Patients. Anyway, we supply ready cooked meals and a lot of choices for patients so the trust saves on raw 
Material, labour and storage costs and they don't pay consultation fees to source anything so there is a lot 
of savings by letting us provide the services for them. So for my company, the objective was an opportunity 
to provide services here. That's what we are good at and that's what we do world-wide (Agent 0) 
%Staff training: 
We support and train (ancillary) staff in food hygiene, health and safety and infection control. As our own 
initiative because we are a big company, we project the trust and help them move forward (Agent M) 
We recruit and train all ancillary staff in support services. There is staff discount of 25% on purchases 
(which nearly bankrupts us). There are prizes for staff of the month and other sports events for staff with 
Prizes for winners so we try to keep staff motivated and productive (Agent 0) 
When I was with the NHS, they (managers) sat in the office and only sent for you when there is a complaint 
(no visible management). Every time patients complain you go to the office and explain why they complain. 
HOW do you know why patients complain? Some people always complain but the supervisors think you 
make the patients complain which is bad for the hospital. But things are much better now (Agent Q) 
When the NHS sold us to the contractors who won the contract, we lost things like London weighting and 
Sick leave allowance other than that it is okay because there are monthly competitions and if you win you 
get vouchers or paid holidays for two weeks. Also the supervisors and managers are here to help you if YOU 
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get stuck and they don't blame you if wards or patients complain they just come and talk to them and 
afterwards they explain things to you so you work better next time (less blame on contract staft) (Agent Q) 
I worked at a mental hospital before my family moved here and this company allowed me to transfer here. 
Yes they let you transfer if you move house or want to change location. Now I work from 7.30am till 2pm then 
start again at 5pm till 8pm so I can go home and get the children from school and come back (flexible 
Working). But in the NHS if you moved house you have to travel or find another job. I used to spend two hours 
on the bus to and from work and it tired me out. This company (contractors) also let us eat free when we work 
so I save money too and we have better uniforms and equipment to do the work (Agent P) 
We all get training from the company before we start work and monthly we go for refresher courses. It is 
free and we train in work time, which is good for me (Agent Q) 
nvestments: 
In providing support services there is a financial burden to bear. If something happens for whatever reason, 
the client wants to know that the company is big enough to sustain it and continue with un-interrupted 
service. When we took the contract we were able to provide E5 million to build a new kitchen in the private 
Wings because the trust could not afford it. We also provide support and training for staff because we are a 
large company, we help the trust with information and other projects to push the business forward. We have 
Since created two new restaurants at a cost of E4 million over ten years, interest free (Agent M) 
The project contractors are aggressively in the market place so able to access national resources and make 
them available to the trust. There is noway we could have been able to build EDC. The Government was not 
going to fund it and we did not have the funds so the contractors enabled us to build it (Agent N). 
We (contractors) bring a lot of skill, knowledge, experience and expertise to this trust. I am trained, I worked 
in the army as an electrical and mechanical engineer, then I went and trained to be a chef, worked in many 
hotels and restaurants within Britain, Austria, France and Italy came back here and got Into catering 
management and from there to facilities management. I am not alone but all my managers are highly 
trained too. The job demands that we do the best, so we provide quality service. We are experts in what we 
do whether it is for royalty or the NHS trust, we believe we are the best at providing quality service and we 
are in the business for value for money, not the cheapest, but value for money (Agent M) 
We refurbished the main kitchen and canteens with extensions at our own cost interest free (Agent M) 
We also provide support and training for ancillary staff because we are a large company and we keep up 
with all the technology so they don't have to (Agent M). The trust learns a lot from us, (Agent M) 
Innovation: 
We have since created two new restaurants at a cost of E4 million over ten years, interest free. We help the 
trust with information and other projects to push the business forward. And we come up with creative ideas 
to Make them look good so they get better hospital scores and meet their objectives (Agent M) 
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We built two new restaurants as commercial ventures Diners'Den and CaM Locale and run them together 
With the vending machines to collect revenue for the trust to offset their massive costs (Agent M) 
Relationships and communication: 
We have thousands of suppliers in a world-wide (network) who can supply anything anytime from 
anywhere, no problem (Agent 0) 
Our relationship with this trust, I think it is a high profile thing to be serving an organisation like the health 
service, but we do a good job in providing the service they need (Agent 0) 
We work closely with local partnerships, London Coaches, the Lord Mayor's office and other community 
leaders we consult on regular basis. They are all involved and support the schemes here, financially and 
socially, it is their hospital and we serve their community. The Local Government is also involved. They 
gave their blessings and support so we can move on with the work we do here (Agent N) 
I Personally meet daily with my opposite number at her office or mine, along the corridor, on the phone or 
what have you and we discuss any matters of interest from cleaning to catering or patient entertainment, 
Which we provide as extra under due diligence. That way we nip minor issues in the bud before they 
become major concerns. My managers do the same daily. It is a very informal relationship that I have 
constructed. The more formal ones happen on a monthly basis when we meet with people from health and 
Safety, patient forum, infection control and directors (Agent M) 
I (on behalf of the contractors) meet with all the different departmental managers, client managers and we 
talk about innovations, how we are performing, what the scores are, standards we are targeted to meet by 
the trust or by head office, patients' surveys or any downfalls in services we provide. We also keep the trust 
abreast of what is happening in our company through newsletters, leavers and starters and our levels of 
services supply, all that sort of thing. We are constantly talking to everyone who needs to know (Agent M) 
We maintain long-term relationships and work with the client in partnership to meet their goals, we 
communicate often and personally (Agent M) 
We (contractors) use a network of 36 suppliers here so we can supply most things (Agent M) 
We (Contractors) try to promote them (client) socially as our partners (Agent M) 
When there is a problem I can react as professionally and swiftly and competently as possible to rectify it 
because we always make sure that we have something in place to deal with unpredictable emergencies. Yes 
We react but not like the NHS managers do in what we call "knee-jerk reaction". They react and then pass 
the buck to someone else but I have to deal with issues (to prevent conflicts arising) (Agent M) 
If Someone pees on the floor after it has been cleaned, I have to get it cleaned up in minutes, no fuss. That 
_ 
Way we exceed our client's expectations (Agent M). 
We would not supply services to a client who has been in the news in the last two years. Money is not 
everything. Our reputation is more important (Agents F and M). 
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Power relations: 
The trust depends on us (contractors) they will never be able to do all this on their own because of their 
enormous overheads but we have to be subtle about it because they are our clients and we look after them 
(Agent M) 
Before we became Areno, we were associated with a reputable hotel chain that every body knows and 
recognises in all the countries around the world, massive reputation and all that but we look after our clients 
_ 
that's what we do (Agent M) 
Impact of outsourcing: 
The trust saves on labour and personnel costs. We provide quality services as a one-stop shop for labour 
and conflict management and we give them value for money and exceed their expectations (Agent M) 
We are international so we buy in bulk and save them money. They don't source any thing for us and if 
things change and prices go up we bite the bullet. We provide other benefits without asking them for more 
Money and we innovate to push the business forward. So we exceed our client's expectations (Agent M) 
I don't think we came here solely for the profits, we do a good job and get paid for that and if profits come 
along good but that is not our main aim (Agent 0) 
Community care: 
All hospitals aim to provide for the healthcare of its local population but there are areas of interest. Here we 
have a very active blood disease centre (the first in the country) that reflects the ethnic makeup of our 
Community. This is a major centre and looking to expand so in that sense it reflects the area we work in. 
Also this community has a strong history, which is reflected in the hospital building, decorations and 
Paintings along the corridors here. When we move into the new building, all these will be there (Agent N) 
5.3.4.2 Discussion: 
Hotel service was outsourced here to acquire a continuous and uninterrupted quality 
service with guaranteed backup through all seasons. The services providers claim to have 
evolved as a one-stop shop for providing quality support services at a fixed price through all 
Seasons. They are big, reputable and can "bite the bullet" if conditions change. There is a 
Perception of added value through investments in new facilities, locally nurtured innovative 
ventures, Diners' Den and Caf6 Locale and staff training to provide professional services. 
The main advantage of relational exchange here is in the evolution of their relationship. 
First support services were outsourced at Victoria and County hospitals then as the client- 
Provider relationship deepened, asset specific investments increased to include the design, 
build, manage and maintain operations at County hospital, involving a project contractor, 
Builders International, the Mayor's office and London Coaches in partnership. This is an 
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example of a complex, dynamic inter-related and inter-dependent relationship involving 
major investments hence the network effect of alliance relationships (HAkansson and 
Gadde, 1992; Gadde and Snehota, 2000; Jolly, 2003). Thus as relationships evolve and 
asset specificity increases, the focal organisation becomes the locus of a network of 
relationships and all concerned must manage the inter-dependence and balance the power 
asymmetry involved with the benefit of the relationship (Pesamaa and Hair, 2007). Indeed 
relationship networks are plagued by power influences and shifting coalitions. In time they 
become complex and consume managerial time and energy (Brennan and Turnbull, 2000). 
Consequently, observers advise those involved to balance the cost-benefit (enablement 
and constraints) effects of such relationships (Ford, 2003; Gadde and Snehota, 2000). 
There is also a perception of creating value or relational rent in this exchange through 
investments (Dyer and Singh, 1998). It confirms the concept of capital theory (as part of 
Market process theory) that profits and value reside in the modes of capital application 
(Kleinaltenkamp and Ehret, 2006). As relationships deepen services providers as investors 
can detect other options for their resources not already served or services not supplied and 
craft to implement a business solution to provide the client with superior added value and 
extraordinary profits for themselves. Thus relational exchange becomes a fertile context for 
relational rent (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Also capital invested creates resource advantage to 
Maximise value for customer and enduring profits for investors (Hunt and Morgan, 1996). 
The new facility at County Hospital meets all these criteria. The facility is owned, managed 
and maintained by the contractor for the next thirty years providing a stream of rent and 
Profits for investors and an improved work environment for the support services workers as 
Well as transforming the local environment. This hospital facility won the prestigious 
Commission for Architectural and Built Environment (CABE) festive five award as one of 
the foremost new health buildings in the country (Annual Report, 2006/2007). Indeed, FIVI 
built environment continues to win awards, like the (LIFT) award for excellence in building 
healthier communities and replacing old, antiquated NHS buildings (Bradshaw, 2008). 
Most ancillary workers describe the new work environment as "a unique breath of fresh air" 
that benefits them, the patients (through infection control) and the local community as a 
focal point of interest, healing community differences and uplifting the local industrial area. 
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Furthermore, these erstwhile support services workers who hitherto occupied the dark 
dungeons of the basement, regarded by other professionals as the bottom of the skills 
heap (Restell, 2008), now "own" a beautiful, spacious, airy and aesthetics facility. They 
made good their newfound influence by allocating to themselves the vantage point on the 
last floor from which they can observe the picturesque view and walk on top of everyone 
else. What is more the staff canteen, out of bounds to visitor, patients, public and 
relations, is on the same second floor as is the kitchen, offices of the support services 
staff and even the rest room for the domestic staff I 
Some members of the medical staff regard this arrangement as "the ultimate in control". 
No longer could they pick and choose their own office space as before or be able to 
convert any vacant prime site into a medical office, conference or teaching room. 
Although the catering staff, complain of "too much walking about along the long corridors", 
they are satisfied with their lot and can see for miles from their cleaner-air vantage points. 
The domestic managers were also ecstatic about their new location and privilege. 
Thus the support services staff, perceived as the underdogs of the health service have 
been enabled to liberate themselves as owners of facilities they control and others lease. 
There is a no blame culture at this trust, as expressed by workers and visible management 
to encourage and support the workforce. There is flexible working to fit in with life and work 
Patterns and other incentives like free meals and the ability to move from job to job to suit 
the needs of workers. Consequently, the workforce is motivated to work for the contractor 
despite the loss of London Weighting, sickness and pension allowances and lower pay. 
The interacting parties have also created a value system that enables them prioritise 
against other projects to focus on creating commercial venture (Christensen et al., 2005). 
Conducive environment for innovation made it possible to nurture commercial ventures. 
Successful innovation requires a conducive, no blame, trusting culture and a cooperative 
Working relationship between exchange partners (Jolly, 2003; Kanter, 1983). This allows 
creativity to thrive and innovation to flourish. Inter-dependence promotes knowledge 
sharing between specialists across disciplines and encourages risk taking to create 
-something new and novel for commercial gains (Eriksson et al., 2007; Okorok et al., 2002). 
The constant communication and willingness of the contractors to socialise all workers help 
to create a conducive environment for dialogue and taking initiatives without fear of failure. 
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The teamwork, risk sharing and having the same objectives for mutual benefit also create 
collaborating environment to nurture creativity and hence knowledge sharing and transfer 
for innovation. New knowledge is created, (Huber, 1999) and absorbed to create something 
new. The outcome is two commercial ventures, Diners' Den and Caf6 Locale. Also every 
available dormant space in both hospitals has been creatively converted and rented out to 
generate revenue. These augment the management of vending machines, canteens, and 
visitors' caf6s to generate further revenue to offset and reduce total costs. Consequently, 
the impact of services outsourcing here goes beyond the central focus of IMP- reduction 
of total transaction costs and safeguarding specific investments to include the nurturing of 
commercial ventures in a conducive and supportive environment of mutual risk and reward. 
Legitimacy 
Organisational effectiveness depends on the degree of its social support (Elmuti and 
Kathawala, 2000). Stakeholder theory states that a constituency in exchange relationship 
With a firm has legitimate claims on the firm (Hill and Jones, 1992). The contractors 
Provide this trust with investments and innovative ideas in exchange for opportunity to 
supply support services and make profits. The social environment in which the hospitals 
are situated, provide land, local workforce, public image and free promotion or publicity as 
their local health centre. The credibility of the trust can be jeopardised if it fails to maintain 
legitimacy with all its stakeholders especially the special interest groups. Consequently, this 
trust has sought and obtained credible permission from the Local Partnership Associations, 
the Mayor's office, London Coaches and the Local Authority. Most of these groups have 
donated funds and provided network links in other areas. 
For example the social environment provides the non-executive directors, a critical 
resource of local workforce and a critical mass to lobby Government and investors for 
funds, tax breaks on antipollution and ISO trade agreements (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Thus support services managers here have built a bridge and buffer to their social 
environment through valuable social network relationships. This confirms the tenets of 
interaction model (IMP) that for business support, survival and possible success, parties to 
interaction should maintain legitimacy with the social context in which they are situated. 
This would increase their visibility, improve image, plug skills gap and enhance local 
legitimacy and reputation. In time such organisations are enabled by local acceptance, 
Patronage, publicity and recommendations to survive, thrive in a competitive environment 
and maybe become successful. 
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Table 5.4 Summary of outsourcing in the 75% outsourced NHS trusts 
NHS trust 
- - 
Motives for 
outsourcing 
Themes elicited Theories in use 
R arena -Ancillary staff Value for money TCE (economise on costs) Hospital recruitment and Staff training RBV (acquire resources) 
retention problems Investments IM (safeguard investment) 
-Cost savings Relationships 
Power asymmetry ST (dialectic of control) 
- - 
Learning (Innovation) Learning (innovation) Vi ctoria -Need for reliable - -Value for money TCE (economise on costs) And service guaranteed Investments RBV (acquire resources) County -Value for money Relationships IM (safeguard investment) Hospitals -Lack of expertise in Legitimacy Market process (rent) 
le itimacy) r ( 
(I n ovafiZ) n 
5.3.5 Featherstone Hospital (FH) 50% outsourced 
Featherstone hospital is located on four sites in London. It is a specialist, teaching 
hospital renowned nationally and internationally for research in collaboration with other 
research colleges two of which are situated within its grounds. 
It has the largest 200-bedded renal unit in Europe and is a centre of excellence for mother 
and child medicine at its Maternity Hospital in London. Its partnership with research 
colleges, means that medical research findings are quickly translated into healthcare 
benefits for patients hence its worldwide reputation as a centre of excellence. At its 
Orthopaedic unit, close to the maternity unit, elective surgery is undertaken to complement 
the work done by other national orthopaedic centres. Featherstone hospital covers both 
undergraduate medical education and post-graduate medicine at two of its centres in 
London. The four hospital units were amalgamated into a trust with sixty-four specialities 
in 1994. 
The extensive research and teaching facilities at this trust means that it receives rather a 
generous grant for teaching medical and post-graduate doctors as well as for research. 
But it chooses to outsource 50% of its hotel services (where it lacks expertise) to 
commercial operators in order to focus on its core competence of healthcare. Assured 
(Premier Group) is the services provider for the hospitals while other catering firms 
(rzviance) within the Premier Group serves the research colleges and research centres 
Within its grounds. Featherstone hospital group has benefited from services outsourcing. 
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Featherstone, Hospital (FH) outsourcing-excerpts 
Five people were interviewed at this trust (Agents R, S, T, U, and V) and their views were 
triangulated and collaborated with those of the workforce for accuracy and clarity. 
5.3.5.1 Motive for outsourcing: 
You have to recognise what your core business is and what resources are put into non-core business. Our 
business is healthcare not catering, cleaning, building maintenance or anything else (Agent R) 
We outsource hotel services (soft FIVI) because we don't have the expertise in-house to manage and 
maintain it. There is also the degree of training involved. Where other companies have the necessary 
knowledge, equipment and better facilities to do a better job or give better service and have the technical 
knowledge to maintain the equipment, there is no reason not to outsource such services to them. Where we 
cannot afford to have trained personnel to manage a service or equipment, we will outsource that service. 
But it makes no difference whether services are outsourced or done in-house the key to it is really the 
Management (Agent R) 
We outsourced our information technology maintenance and servicing to outside contractors and we also 
Outsource our own expertise in building maintenance to local companies to raise money for the trust. All the 
trust is really interested in is having suitable facilities to carry out its core business of healthcare (Agent R) 
We seem to have created a multicultural environment in this trust, which has many challenges and 
Problems so we work with the contractors, Assured, to make changes that we feel will make a difference 
and improve patients' experience through the trust. Many years ago patients could get by with tea and 
sandwiches for lunch but not any more. The multicultural patients we have here demand certain diets that 
only professionals like Assured can consistently provide so we work with them daily to make that possible 
(Agent V). 
Staff training: 
The trust spends a lot of money training staff and we in estates and facilities (Hard FIVI) also operate an 
apprentice scheme. Not many organisations do that now (Agent R) 
The reason is ownership. We in estates and facilities run a 24/7 operation 365 days a year. It would be 
difficult to obtain this degree of ownership and loyalty we have here with an outsourced company (Agent R). 
At Premier Group (Assured), everyone gets training and it is free. Before you start work you get training in 
food hygiene and safety, personal hygiene and health and safety. Every week we pick out some people and 
send them for training in the areas where they work and we rotate till everyone has done the necessary 
training. We also do training in management and dispute (conflict) management (Agent S) 
I used to be a cleaner but the company helped me to train in night school and now I manage other cleaners 
and I have worked all over the country in our contract places (Agent T) 
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At Premier Group, you can ask to be moved to anywhere in the world where we have contracts and you can 
go. Premier sends out vacancy lists every month and anyone can apply. We also have staff of the month 
prizes and three prizes for employee of the year to motivate and encourage the staff (Agent S) 
We have a great workforce and they are always cheerful. Cleaning job is hard and no one wants to do it but 
here they don't complain. They work hard and we have a great time (Agent T) 
Innovation: 
We look to the soft FIVI (contractors) for innovation in food and services (Agent R) 
We have now implemented the new (Al-plus) special group of cleaning equipment and cleaning practices 
here and the hospital is cleaner and more hygienic. No more wet mops and buckets or chemicals (Agent T) 
Al -plus is a range of equipment created at Premier for better cleaning. There is the linco-machine that is 
driven to clean and polish public areas so no more sweeping, mopping and polishing by hand. There is a 
special vacuum machine that sucks up broken glass or medical waste so cleaning is easier and 
contamination or cross infection by staff is reduced. Then there is the microfibre flat cleaning cloth. It is new, 
not disposable but has disinfectant incorporated in it so no more chemicals and buckets for toilets or dirty 
areas. Cleaning with this cloth, we can kill 99% of the bacteria in those places so it is good for Premier 
Group and the cleaners. It is really good for cleaning and does it in less time so we have less staff to do the 
Work and do it better. It helps with hospital infection (no MRSA here) (Agent T) 
Other areas the agents regarded as innovation but could be classed as improvements: 
We refurbished the new building to make it more work-friendly for all concerned and reduce domestic 
intrusion. When it is finished you will see the difference between there and the rest of the wards in the trust 
The new floor we built are padded and softer so our feet don't ache from walking all day and night, very 
good for nurses and doctors and for cleaners too (Agent T) 
We have this new catering steam simplicity dishes you just microwave and it retains its taste and flavour 
even though it is cook-chilled (Agent T) 
There are new automatic washing machines with computerised correct temperature for all kinds of soiled 
linen and equipment so no more cross infection while cleaning laboratory areas or washing out the rags and 
cleaning cloth we use (Agent T) 
All our cleaning equipment and cloths are electronically marked so they are automatically returned to 
designated areas and not lost or cross used like before. So we are more hygienic and moving with the 
times. We also have the electronic palm pilot for monitoring cleaning areas, which makes it consistent every 
time because it is standardised (Agent T) 
Relationships and Communication: 
We work in partnership with the trust as a team for the patients and we work well together (Agent S) 
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Premier is the biggest food provider in the world with regional and international networks everywhere. We 
only use Premier approved suppliers. Suppliers to Premier are checked weekly by Premier standards for 
food hygiene and quality. We have very good relationships with all our suppliers (Agent S) 
We have the research centre and the research college on our grounds and we work in partnership with 
them. If you are doing medical research you need research material and the cooperation and collaboration 
of organisations that with a flow of patients through them. Because of our partnership, patients probably get 
a higher standard of care due to the highly qualified experts taking care of them (Agent R) 
Our non-executive directors, I would say were probably chosen for who they are, their standing in the 
Community, the work they do now or have done in the past and their standing in other healthcare 
Organisations. Some of them have been influential in many ways, some are still voices to be heard in 
certain areas and many are professionals of international standing so all together they are very beneficial to 
the trust (Agent R) 
We meet every day informally to discuss and agree on issues for the day but formally we meet monthly with 
the board members to discuss operational matters (Agent S) 
At Premier, we have a no-blame culture and team spirit. We show appreciation for hard work (Agents T) 
Community and environmental concern: 
There is a waste and energy management project due to Government commitment to climate change and 
the KOYOTO agreement. We also strive to meet all the ISO standards and our waste disposal is done in an 
environmentally friendly way. All these initiatives save us costs. We have a new waste recycling initiative 
With the local council which was launched by the local Mayor (verified) and a police crime watch with CCTV 
at both our hospitals. There is the snug bus arrangement with London Coaches to enable our staff and the 
locals travel safely outside working hours. The bus changes its routes to take in the housing estates and 
becomes a fare-paying bus for passengers at night (Agent R) 
IMPact of outsourcing: 
We look to the soft FM for innovation in food and services. That has impacted us more (Agent R) 
We (hard FM) also generate revenue for the trust by outsourcing our own services to local companies. 
We benefit from scale economies of the contractors. if you are a smaller organisation, you benefit from 
being part of a larger concern. That way we gain from not having to train and manage our hotel services 
staff. We also benefit from not having to keep up with technology or maintain our equipments (Agent R) 
Outsourcing is good. If the company does well, the hospital will be good and they will say Premier was 
good. We help the trust to maintain cleaning standards and give them good service. We have our reputation 
and we keep to Premier standards. We use the rulebooks (SOP) and everything is fair (Agent S) 
We manage the canteens, restaurant and vending machines for the trust and make money for them so the 
trust benefit from our services. We motivate the staff and they get 10% discount, which is good (Agent S) 
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On the issue of foundation status: 
Our application has been made (verified). It would raise our financial freedom, to be able to look at different 
ways of doing things and get us a bit more independence from the Strategic Health Commissioners. Our 
agreements will then be legally binding and we will be able to operate on a more sound financial footing. 
Presently our service level agreements (SLA) with the commissioners and other health institutions are not 
legally binding. They can decide not to pay for the medical care we give their patients and there is nothing 
we can do about it. With foundation status all that will change. We will have more freedom and better 
financial footing to operate from (Agent R) 
The analysis of Featherstone Hospital is presented in table 5.5. below 
Table 5.5 (FH) Data analysis using structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) 
Structures Siqnification Domination Legitimation 
Efficiency -utilise scale economies 
-Be part of a larger concern Must show value for Avoid budget 
-Outsource own services money in resource use deficits and 
to generate funds overspend 
-No technical/ knowledge 
or equipment update 
nvestment -Revamped kitchen To lengthen contract Avoid services 
-Built canteen disruption or 
-Trained ancillary staff Control ancillary staff contract termination 
Innovation 
-In food and services Contractors help us to Avoid media 
-A-1 plus cleaning kit keep out hospital attention and 
-Steam simplicity infection and meet patients' complaints 
-Better padded floors diverse dietary needs_ 
orkforce -Spent a lot of money -Contract staff are -Better staff development training ancillary staff happy and work hard retention 
-Apprentice schemes -We have a strong -Avoid exit and 
has 
-incentives, job mobility team culture here lower absenteeism Community 
-Environmentally friendly KOYOTO agreement Avoid 
disruptions 
concern waste disposal used and ISO standards from special 
-Snug bus, CCTV security to maintain interest groups 
-Local youth employment TeTitimacy 
-Board members of social Maintain local Avoid possible 
standing, relevance and closure or 
-Local council partnership reputation disruptions 
_ ý 
in energy savings T 
0 undafion -Sound financial footing 
status -Generate revenue Freedom from Autonomy with 
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5.3.5.2 Discussion 
This trust outsourced support services to concentrate on its core function of healthcare. 
The managers here went for efficiency of operation. The outsourcing of both soft and hard 
FM to reduce distraction from core activity is a measured of efficiency (Davis, 2004; 
Hamel, 2000; Peters and Waterman, 1982). As managers focus on their areas of 
expertise, they save time, effort and energy using them to find better ways of working, to 
reduce waste and duplication hence become more efficient. This enables them to realise 
outsourcing aims and to outsource their own hard FM to generate funds to offset costs. 
Thus efficiency gains are made by better focus on core activities and transaction costs. 
Contractor investments help to improve processes and enable the staff work better. There 
is staff training by the contractors with incentives to motivate them. There is also client 
investment in training and apprentice schemes to improve workforce ownership and 
loyalty above their professionalism. Their team spirit, no blame culture and constant 
communication encourage creativity for innovation in food and services and motivates the 
Workforce to work harder despite lower wages and lack of sickness benefits. Thus like 
Other outsourced concerns there is added value as innovation in food and services. 
There is also a concern for the local community and the environment in crime prevention, 
local transportation, waste disposal, community and environmental care for legitimacy. 
The courting of goodwill to improve the social context in which they are situated helps to 
stabilise operations for survival and success and reduce the power asymmetry between 
the focal organisation and its network of social relationships. Thus, the service managers 
here have managed to make their relationships valuable bridges and buffers to the social 
environment for support and local legitimacy while reducing the politics and power-play 
thereof with their social goodwill and community care. 
However the most notable impact here is in community care. The services managers 
Went out of their way to appease the local community by providing snug buses, CCTV 
linked to the police station for crime prevention and waste disposal in environmentally 
friendly way. This trust is very much involved in jobs for local youth and enlisting of the 
Mayor's office and non-executive directors, some of who are still international voices to be 
heard. Consequently the issue of legitimacy for social support comes to the fore here 
together with the quest for freedom and liberation from Strategic Health commissioners. 
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They went out of their way to court relationship with the locals to improve organisational 
visibility, public image, reputation, local goodwill and legitimacy (Barringer and Harrison, 
2000; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Tsang, 2000). The goodwill and social support so 
created will help them in their bid for foundation status to liberate them from the dictates 
of commissioners and enable them function on a more stable financial footing. Hence the 
services managers here realise the benefits of having favourable relationship networks 
with all stakeholders for support, stability, survival and success. Thus, the concepts of 
stakeholder theory are evidenced, where services managers, as agents of the firm, 
exchange local goodwill and investment in apprenticeship schemes with reduced conflict 
from environmental pressure groups. The social support gained enhances their lobbying 
Power to free them from commissioners in their bid for foundation status. It also gives 
them local promotion and publicity from a loyal, motivated and committed workforce. 
The services managers sought to reduce the environmental uncertainty of scarce 
resource (Ajauro et al., 2003; Pffefer and Salancik, 1978) with regards to hotel services. 
They have aligned their processes and procedures by allowing the contractors free reign 
in using their company rule books in the management of daily routines. These help to 
Provide evidence of fairness and equity amongst staff members and reduce conflict. This 
Sense of fairness and equity helps to maintain adequate staffing levels of workers to do 
the work. The supportive social environment they created enables them to co-opt non- 
executive membership from which to build a critical mass of interest groups for collective 
lobbying or favourable resource acquisition. More importantly they can save on total 
transaction costs by using their common membership to trade associations to align the 
Conduct of coalition members and stakeholders to gain much needed local acceptability. 
Thus through goodwill, services managers enhance local acceptability, reduce transaction 
costs and their vulnerability from the uncertainty of resource acquisition. 
There is a tangible quest for freedom and liberation from the dictates of the Strategic 
Health Commissioners. This would be achieved through gaining foundation status for 
Which the NHS trust has applied. The services managers, as agents of the trust, will be 
free to chart their own course and be enabled to make more legally binding contracts, 
keep surplus money and be able to borrow money to do all the things they want to do 
instead of waiting on Government handouts. Consequently, the partnership with services 
Providers has been meaningful in areas of learning and commercial knowledge transfer 
that enable services managers imbibe the idea of commercial ethos for future use. 
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5.3.6 Reinhard Hospital (RH) (50% outsourced)] 
This NHS trust is both a teaching and post-graduate specialist medical centre located in 
Pleasant surroundings outside London. A club-footed medical physician and philanthropist 
named William John Little founded the hospital. He wanted to make the treatment of this 
Victorian condition available to other sufferers. By 1840 the institution has opened in 
Barmsbury in a house, said to be formerly, occupied by Disraeli's father. From there, 
three specialist hospitals merged to form the present one. Now based in a London 
suburb, it is the largest specialist orthopaedic hospital in Britain and has international 
renown as a teaching, post-graduate training and surgical centre. The hospital focuses 
Mainly on correction of deformities and treatment of diseases of the bone and joints. 
There are twelve specialist units treating different aspects in the institute. The hospital 
has a bed capacity of 245 with 906 staff 170 of whom, are ancillary staff (10.5%). This is 
the largest ancillary to total staff ratio in my sample. The reason for this ratio may be 
because of the large expanse of land the hospital occupies. 
This trust focuses on its core competence of healthcare outsourcing 50% of its hotel 
Services like catering, cleaning and portering to Assured, a branch of Premier Group. 
Premier is a leading foodservice company based in Surrey and dedicated to finding 
foodservice solutions and quality services that add value to the client's business. 
The company operates globally in ninety countries through teamwork, lasting business 
relationships and a passion for quality in the hospitality, leisure, travel and healthcare 
industries, providing innovative high quality solutions in food and domestic services. 
In this small study Premier Group was involved in 50% of all those who outsourced 
services as well as in the other far flung hospitals that were investigated but not part of 
the final study because it was thought that they had nothing new to contribute. 
Reinhard Hospital outsourcing-excerpts 
TWo people were interviewed here (Agents W and X) and their views collaborated and 
triangulated with those of the workforce for accuracy and clarity 
-5-3.6.1. Motives for outsourcing: 
The hospital is spread over a large area. It was very hard to get domestic and catering staff to come and 
Work here, reason being the large area we cover. All the wards are separate as you can see and far from 
the residential areas where people live so we could not get staff to stay till we outsourced the services. Also 
We are a specialist hospital not good at cooking and cleaning so we get Assured to help us out (Agent W) 
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We pay one set price, which is helpful, they recruit, train and retain their own staff and they are specialists 
in What they do. I must say they have invested a lot of money in the trust with the restaurant, canteen and 
kitchen, so there must be some savings made. We are not using money from the trust for refurbishment and 
staffing on the soft FM side (Agent W) 
We provide better food for the patients here and a nice clean hospital to work in. Assured, is responsible for 
catering and feeding both for patients and staff in the new restaurant, it is also open to visitors, the public 
and whoever. Patients have more choice of food. Also we do security at the main gate. You see this place 
- is like the country, far from the city so security is important too (Agent X) 
Assured is a very big company and we serve all over the world. We are specialist in food service and we 
buy cheaper from our many suppliers so we must save them money (Agent X) 
The trust does not have the strain and stress of cooking, cleaning and portering, we do all that for them so 
they can treat patients better (Agent X) 
We are quite satisfied with their (contractor) services and they have not reported any problems with staffing. 
They always seem to have loads of them serving and cleaning. The contractors have their sources for 
recruiting staff. We seem to have mainly Filipinos here and they do a great professional job (Agent W) 
Staff training and motivation 
The contractors recruit and train their own staff. No problems of staff shortages has been reported since we 
Outsourced the services (Agent W) 
Premier trains all staff in food hygiene, health and safety and NVQ levels. Many of my staff when they came 
here could not speak English but Premier trained them and now they are good, some have many skills, like 
generic workers (Agent X) 
We pick staff of the month and they get prizes like vouchers then Premier picks staff of the year and they 
get 1't, 2nd and 3"' prizes and it helps to motivate the staff to work well (Agent X) 
InVestments: 
We revamped the kitchen and restaurant when we won the contract. Now the staff, patients and visitors 
have a more pleasant place to meet and eat. There is more opportunity for us as a company to help the 
, ', 
trust. We have more leeway than under the NHS to help the hospital evolve (Agent X) 
I have been on both sides. When I was young, I worked for the NHS, it was just a job for me but now I can 
See the good things my company, Assured, brings here. We have better uniforms and strict standards to 
keep. In the NHS the uniforms were always tafty and never washed properly, it may be a little thing but it is 
important to look clean and good for patients and visitors. Now my company, Assured, makes investments 
here but in the NHS there was no equipment, we were always waiting for things to come and sometimes 
they never came because they said they were short of money (Agent X) 
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Relationships and Communication: 
We have contracts with neighbouring hospitals in Watford, St. Albans, Hemel Hempstead and other places. 
So if we are stuck for something, we can get help or call for advice or whatever and those other units can 
also call on us, it is good (Agent X) 
They (the trust) are our client and we look after them. No we are not in charge, we work in partnership as a 
team for the patients. We meet every day and once a month with the people from health and safety, 
infection control and the rest of them. If they say there is a problem we work quickly to correct it (Agent X) 
We have a total of eight Premier-approved suppliers, vetted by the purchasing department at Premier and 
they supply everything from chilled and frozen food to confectionary that meet Assured standards (Agent X) 
Assured has very strict standards so we don't have problems with suppliers or our clients will complain so 
we use only Assured suppliers and we have very good relations with all of them (Agent X) 
Innovation: 
Premier is basically a food company with a business edge so they know about food. It is not good having 
Medical people to be messing about with food. 
Food wise -1 don't think that there are masses of changes with the NHS but there is more innovation with 
Assured. Ideas come in to help patients get better service through Assured. Also Assured has its own 
People on site teaching others hands-on and as new Ideas come in they try them out and then dissipate 
them to places they have contracts so patients can benefit. On this site we have a green acre garden a kind 
of a la carte for the children to get better choice of menu. There is a housekeeper on site to cook it straight 
away for them no matter what time of day. It helps keep the children happy while in hospital (Agent X) 
IMPact of outsourcing: 
The contractors have greatly improved the services. There are less complaints and the kitchen and 
restaurant function better now. There are no recruitment or retention problems any more. In food and 
services we look to them for innovation. I mean they are professionals in food and hotel business so they 
know their job and we are satisfied with what they do (Agent W) 
We (contractors) save them money. We use our networks of suppliers to buy cheaper than in the market 
and they pay one fixed price so we must save them money and effort (Agent X) 
We help the trust to maintain Government standards and they get good scores so that is good (Agent X) 
Our uniforms are better, we have enough staff to do the work and people are happy in their work so they 
don't call in sick like in the NHS. I don't have to run after the staff to do their work or check them all the time, 
they know what to do and they do it without complaining (Agent X) 
We revamped the kitchen and restaurant when we won the contract. Now the staff, patients and visitors 
have a pleasant place to meet and eat. Hopefully, the community will also think that this is a nice clean 
hospital when they visit and so they continue to use it (Agent X) 
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6.3.6.2 Discussion: 
Hotel services were outsourced to attract and retain ancillary workers. Now there are no 
support services personnel problems. The managers realise innovation in food and 
services with the reliability of a continuous un-interrupted support services at fixed price. 
The contractors are perceived to do a professional job and there are no complaints. 
The contractors use their own network of suppliers and have neighbouring contracts for 
Support and help with staff or equipment as needed. Consequently the services providers 
have met the need of their clients and added value through staff retention and innovation. 
The contractors invested in improving their clients' processes through refurbishment of 
kitchens and canteens to make them better places to work and eat and to safeguard their 
contract for streams of economic rent. Thus by crafting a business solution to add value 
to client processes and profits for themselves, the contractors confirm the concepts of 
capital theory and prolong to retain their contract (Kleinaltenkamp and Ehret, 2006). 
They also invested in training to motivate (with incentives) Filipino workers who could not 
sPeak English when they came and managed to liberate them from manual workers to 
support services professionals, able to give better service. The service improvement, lack 
Of staffing problems, better staff retention and the satisfaction of the client voiced, confirm 
this. These outcomes reaffirm the tenets of interaction model (IMP) that relational 
exchange can develop into valuable relationships that safeguard specific investments and 
reduce total transaction costs through professionalism and reduction in monitoring costs. 
Thus the relational exchange at this trust has added value beyond cost reduction and 
safeguarding of investments to include better staff retention and the liberation of support 
services staff from manual workers to motivated and loyal professionals. 
The contractors use their network of relationships with neighbouring hospitals to maintain 
support, visibility and social presence that enable them provide a reliable uninterrupted 
support service to keep their jobs and maintain reputation. This also confirms the tenets 
of social networks in maintaining legitimacy and offering support to buffer the external 
environment by reducing the complexity and uncertainty of services provision and 
ensuring the availability of scarce resources. These reduce organisational vulnerability to 
enable the organisation survive and succeed (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Nichols, 1993). 
Thus the contractors obtain a negotiated and predictable environment through social 
support and succeed in meeting their contractual obligations to their clients' satisfaction. 
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Furthermore, the services managers and their context organisation (the trust) are enabled 
to focus on their core activity as contractors remove the distraction of support services 
from them, thus improving their efficiency in use of their time and effort (Hamel, 2000). 
With the help of contractors, the demands of all stakeholders, with respect to support 
services (workers, service managers, employing organisation and Assured suppliers), are 
Met, improving the perceived effectiveness of the services suppliers and their clients 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hill and Jones, 1992). Thus their relational exchange goes 
beyond staff retention and cost reduction to improve the efficiency (better focus on core 
activity) and the effectiveness of contractors and clients through stakeholder acceptability. 
Power 
Although the ability of contractors to meet the needs of their clients make the clients 
dependent on them for the scarce resources they possess (workforce retention, 
investments in equipment and staff training, creative ideas for innovation), the contractors 
claim "not to be in charge". But rather they prefer to look after their clients mindful of the 
interdependence of their relational exchange (Ford, 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Consequently services providers manage their power asymmetry through constant 
dialogue to reduce misunderstandings and conflicts (if the client says there is a problem 
we work quickly to rectify it). Indeed they also manage to appease both customers and 
Patients, as was the case on one occasion when I visited the hospital for an interview. 
The resultant interdependent relationship of mutual benefit also requires negotiation and 
consensus to liberate parties to interaction from domination (Clegg, 1989; Machiavelli, 
1958). Thus both parties survive. The providers retain the custom of their client and earn 
streams of profits while the client gains staff retention and innovation in food and services. 
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5.3.7 Charlston Memorial Hospital NHS trust (CMH) 10% outsourced 
Chariston memorial hospital is a teaching, specialist hospital, reputed for its liver and 
kidney transplants and Government funded for its medical research, medical and nursing 
training schools. The hospital was founded by, William Marsden, a philanthropist, in 1828 
to provide care for those who could not afford medical treatment. It gained a royal charter 
from Queen Victoria in 1837 in recognition of its work with victims of the cholera epidemic. 
It was reputed as being the only hospital in London offering facilities for clinical education 
of women hence its association with other Schools of Medicine for women. It later became 
the Charlston Memorial School of Medicine. It moved to its present location from central 
London when it was amalgamated with other local hospitals. The current Queen Elizabeth 
Opened the present hospital building on its 150 years' anniversary on November 1978. In 
April 1991, Charlston memorial hospital became an NHS trust, amidst controversies 
rancorous conflicts and acrimony as one of the first trusts established under the NHS 
community care Act of 1990. This trust status was to aid competition and the efficient use 
Of resources during the internal market era (1991-1997). Charlston memorial has three 
satellite centres at a national ear, nose and throat hospital (added 1996), an elderly 
Psychiatric care centre and an infectious disease hospital, each with its own support 
services staff but all managed as in-house concerns. 
Charlston memorial has 1100 bed capacity and 4727 staff members 500 of whom, are 
Support services workers (10.5%). It serves an affluent and expensive community with a 
high level of HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus) cases and a thriving gay community. It 
also covers an area of London, where some television, media and film people live. This 
closeness to an affluent area may have necessitated the trust keeping a low profile out of 
Media attention or reluctance of the management to outsource more services and hence 
invite or attract outsiders to the hospital. 
Its main focus is on clinical excellence in renal, liver and bone marrow transplants for 
Which it is affiliated with Theresa hospitals to share facilities and contain costs. 
Charlston Memorial Hospital-in-house service 
Four people were interviewed here-Agents Y, Z, AA and BB and their views triangulated 
With those of their workers for accuracy, relevance and clarity. 
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6.3.7.1 Motives for in-house service: 
We are very much tailored to doing things ourselves. With contractors, there could be a lot of problems like 
quality of service and control over the level of service. Every time you want to make a change it will cost you 
a lot of money with outside contractors whereas you could be more flexible with in-house services (Agent Z) 
While in the private sector, I was always delighted to hear trusts say "I would like to change so and so" 
because it always costs them extra to make variations from set specifications and prices. But the variations 
helped me make money for my bosses. Basically it was less flexible than in-house services (Agent Z) 
In-house service just gives us more flexibility to make changes without added costs. We find that having 
Contracted out services, there is no continuity (should contractors fail) and the service is quite expensive to 
Use and the quality of food produced is dubious but it is actually working out more economically to have 
things done as in-house service (Agent AA) 
With private contractors, they are profit-making firms so they try to cut corners to reduce their costs and 
make profit but ultimately it is the patients that lose out. There are six catering managers here and we all 
Come from the private sector so we are aware of the methods they use to save money. Here we have our 
Own overheads but they are specific to us and not to a company and we don't have shareholders to pay 
dividends so any profit we make is ploughed back into the service to benefit patients (Agent AA) 
The in-house team won the first tender in 1986/87. When that tender ended in 1991, the trust was going 
through so much change to become a hospital trust that they decided not to re-tender it. It has been done 
in-house ever since and rolled over every time. I think as long as you can show that you give value for 
money, there is no legal reason to outsource services (so it has been kept in-house) (Agent BB) 
The advantage of in-house services is that you have control over the services so you can be flexible, able to 
contain costs and you don't have the problem of failing contractors (as once happened in our transport 
department when the contractor went into liquidation). There are always risks with contractors who are 
always trying to cut costs and to make profit (Agent Z). 
The advantage with contractors is that you transfer all risks to them but the down side is that you have to 
manage the contract (relationship). If there is a problem with the contract or the contractor goes into 
liquidation, you won't be able to take the service back in-house straight away even though you are still 
responsible for providing the service (fear of failing contractors hence in-house services) (Agent Z) 
It is far more difficult to change things when it has always been in-house but if You go through the change 
once and that change is acknowledged and accepted probably with great difficulty, it is less difficult next 
time whereas if it has never changed, the people don't know any different and some of them have been 
here too long and become set in their ways like "deadwood" (Agent 1313). 
We outsourced linen service to Sunlight due to space issue. We don't have the space here to wash linen 
and we needed the laundry space for other things (Agent AA). 
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Staff training and management: 
We have lots of training schemes and computer skills training available for everyone. There is the NVO for 
Porters and domestic workers. There is basic education sessions available for staff, who want it (Agent Z). 
We get lots of money from the NHS for training so we are able to help our workers. Every domestic worker 
has NVQ training. Anyone who wants it can do literacy, numeracy or computer training, completely free of 
charge. They are very keen and we don't have to force them (Agent BB) 
The training makes them more confident on the wards as an added benefit. Some of them have trained and 
gone onto do other jobs in the trust, which is great (Agent BB) 
We have professional managers who are well trained with both technical and professional qualifications. 
Some are studying to gain full diplomas, others higher-level management or masters degrees (Agent Z). 
The last time we had the Healthcare Commission and patients' representatives in for inspection, they did 
not say that our result was awful but that it could be better if we actually had enough domestic workers to do 
- 
the work, so it was not as bad as it could have been (Agent BB). 
Staff control is not a problem provided you have a good clear strong management structure. That helps 
People in their jobs to stay motivated, knowing that they have the support and it carries them to make 
decisions and to take pride and responsibility in their area of work. It helps flexible working (Agent Z) 
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When I worked in a contract job, I found the staff more flexible with work and more manageable (Agent BB) 
Human Resource: 
We have a very large Human Resources department with policies on everything. They know all the theories 
but not the practical aspect of managing situations like dealing with drunken domestics (Agent BB) 
The HR department has full procedures on most things like training opportunities, performance, changes to 
Contracts, trust policies, infection control, health and safety and procedures on work plans (Agent Z) 
We operate a basic hierarchy system, which works well but it does restrict action and wastes a lot of time. 
For example I cannot discipline my staff without reference to HR policy on the issue, which I first have to get 
frOM the intranet. Then I will have the HR personnel come and tell me how to discipline a drunken domestic 
even though I am trained to manage my staff. It restricts your authority. So discipline is up the spout. 
Staff members know that they can flout the rules and get away with it because they have the HR and the 
unions on their side and this is the NHS (where they have security of tenure). If we ever get outsourced, 
many of the "deadwood staff" here will be retired or found more suitable work to do and the staffing will be 
-streamlined. No contractor can stand for it (Agent BB) 
Besides I am not allowed to spend money from my budget without clearance from HR. I know what my 
department needs and requested for it but when the money comes, I am not allowed to spend it without 
their clearance. For example, I can engage agency staff if we are really short staffed but I have to justify it 
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every time and take action to remedy the situation but I am not allowed to get extra staff on permanent 
basis because they cost too much. So everyone has to muck in to get the job done to save money 
(Agent BB) 
The chief executive wants us to cut costs to meet budget deficits and we are doing all we can. But how far 
can one cut costs? The vacant posts are frozen and staff reduction is an on-going process. This cost cutting 
is driving everyone mad. They say we have a zero-rating, how can such a big teaching hospital be zero-rated 
and still manage to treat our patients well? (Agent Y) 
Investments: 
We have revamped some of the chilling equipment in the kitchen and we are building to provide 
accommodation for the staff (Agent Z) 
We have Government funding for the university and for specific areas of service and healthcare. We are 
looking to charitable organisations to liase with them and share in the provision of services (Agent Z) 
We get lots of money from the NHS for training so we are able to help our workers. Every domestic worker 
has NVQ training and other training sessions are completely free of charge (Agent BB). 
There are lots of things going on here. Our eight years refurbishing programme has been going on forever 
because we start and stop till more money comes in. We just cannot invent a pot of money to enable us do 
things so we look at what we feel is more important like infection control and do those then we do the rest of 
them in small chunks. That is how we manage to do things here (Agent BB) 
In the previous 10-15 years, money was taken away from support services when hospitals had to balance 
their budgets. Perhaps they thought that the support services have grown too fat and needed to be toned 
down a bit but I think that they went too far and we are now cleaning up the problems we created for 
Ourselves in Greater London hospitals. But things have improved in the last 5-6 years. Also the buildings 
were not refurbished as often as was needed. There was no preventative maintenance work in the years 
gone bye that would have stopped some of the rot we see today. Also the expectations of patients and the 
Public have changed and they will not accept anything not working properly, so more investment is needed 
to Put things right than would have been the case (Agent BB) 
Relationships and communication: 
We use PASA approved and vetted suppliers. In this catering department we have sixty suppliers for food, 
and cleaning equipment for the kitchen (Agent AA) 
PASA provides us with basic templates for national contracts. They help to streamline tendering processes 
through PFI or ordinary contracts and they are experts in contract management. They are very valuable to 
us. We also buy things off national contracts that have been vetted for quality by PASA (Agent Z) 
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The NHS to my knowledge does not share staff, equipment or whatever but the nature of domestic services 
Is that you get to know people as you move around and work in different places over time. So when you are 
in trouble you ring up (informally) and get help (Agent BB) 
I think as in-house, we have better communication with the nursing staff. The domestic staff members are 
treated as part of the ward team and they are loyal to the ward staff and they help the patients (Agent BB) 
We use the NHS centralised support for hospital departments. We look at trusts of similar sizes and 
budgets to find out the cost of things and compare like with like in every category of service. We have the 
central agencies for benchmarking and the national networks like Hospital Caterers Association and 
Institutes of Healthcare Management and other professional bodies for support if we need them (Agent Z). 
innovation: 
We get a lot of representatives come here with their cleaning equipment and they let us try them out to see 
if we like them. Sometimes we buy the good ones if we have the funds or the companies give them to us. 
But basically we wait for the representatives to give them to us free or we can forget it (Agent BB). 
IMPact of in-house services: 
The advantage of in-house services is that you have control over the services so you can be flexible, able to 
contain costs and you don't have the problem of failing contractors. There are always risks with contractors 
trying to cut costs and make profit (Agent Z). 
We provide hotel services and meet the changing needs of the trust in a more flexible way. Support 
services provide the trust with a clean hospital environment from which to operate (Agent Z) 
The impact of in-house services I must say is rather constraining and constricting. For example, I have to 
get my line manager's permission to spend some money from my budget. I have to get HR permission to 
discipline my staff. Even though I was trained to manage budgets and people (Agent BB). 
In-house service and outsourcing compared: 
When I worked as a contract manager, I was the manager in that remit answerable to no one in the unit 
0 was in control). I managed the staff, other managers and supervisors. But in this in-house service, we 
have all the hierarchical levels with managers upon managers and they do get in the way (Agent BB) 
When I worked as a contract manager, we were part of a bigger team because the contractor will have a 
nuMber of contracts say in London. We had the opportunity to meet up with people on regular basis 
because we all worked for the same company, using the same manuals and doing the same routines. We 
had the same issues, problems or whatever. I felt a sense of belonging then (Agent BB) 
When I worked as a contract manager, it was easier to borrow staff. For example if I had a particularly good 
floor team and they had a floor problem, I could easily send them my floor team for a few days to help them. 
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Getting equipment then was as easy as pie because every 3-5 years a contract would finish and we could 
90 and pick up equipment we needed and they were mostly the same as ours if not better. There was never 
any shortage of equipment then but here in the in-house service, if we have no money to replace 
equipment, we have to wait until we do. So many things were easier in the contract jobs. I was more In 
control and felt a sense of belonging but here in the NHS you are part of a hierarchical system without a say 
about what goes on (Agent BB) 
Contractors know the life of a contract is limited so they have to perform or be out at the end of the contract. 
When a contractor comes in, it is like a breath of fresh air because a lot of staff that should have retired or 
got something more suitable to their needs years ago will go. A good contractor will make sure that they 
only take on NHS staff that are not set in their ways or have become pillars of the establishment you cannot 
shift, trying to justify spending their days at work finding reasons why they should not be doing what they 
know that they should be doing. So contractors streamline the staff and work to earn their fees (Agent 1313) 
In-house service is rather constraining. For example, I have to get my line manager's permission to spend 
Money from my budget. I have to get HR permission to discipline my staff. Even though I am trained to 
Manage budgets and people. If I feel I have a situation, I can follow the rules but I don't need permission to 
do my work. I cannot even suspend someone for a serious offence if I thought they were seriously out of 
Order and that I could deal with it. You could get your hands chopped off for trying to spend capital on 
Staffing or spend money earmarked for staff. Whereas in a contract job you could move money around as 
needed as long as you justify it. In-house service is very constraining and constricting (Agent 1313). 
When I worked as a contract manager, I had the freedom, autonomy and flexibility to deal with my staff 
according to the procedure books and company policies and everyone knew it was fair because that's what 
the books say and the network was fantastic so we had no problems. It would be a bit of fresh air to 
Outsource this contract. It will bring in experience from the commercial sector especially in senior 
Management and they will have more accessible rulebooks and policy manuals (SOP) (Agent BB) 
8uPPort services are the underdogs of the NHS and every time they needed to cut something to save 
Money or balance their budgets, they cut the service and they may have pruned it so much that now it is 
Very difficult to get it to an adequate level of service again. No one wants to work down here (in the lower 
basement). We are trying today to get a rapid response team to come and deal with all the repair work 
because some people are off sick. Support service has always been a basement job and we are still in the 
basementll (Agent 1313). 
Tabulated analysis of Charlston Memorial Hospital excerpts are shown in Table 5.7 below 
- S-3.7.2 Discussion: 
According to the respondents, the in-house team won the contract for support services 
and it has been rolled over ever since. There is no legal reason to outsource services 
Provided it can be shown to give value for money. Although transport was outsourced, the 
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contractor went into liquidation and the service had to be rebuilt at great cost and brought 
back in house. Consequently, the services managers developed aversion for outsourcing, 
Which they attribute to the possible risk of contractors failing. Thus in-house service is 
justified on the grounds of flexibility with making changes without added costs and control 
over services without the stress and strain of managing contract relationships. 
The impact of in-house service is seen as having control over services, ability to contain 
costs, with the flexibility to meet the changing needs of the trust. But the system is also 
deemed constraining and constricting with regards to discipline and budget spending. 
Table 5.7 (CMH) Data analysis using structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) 
Structures Signification Domination Legitimation 
-It is working out more -Must show value for Avoid budget 
economically as in-house money deficits and 
-Government agencies -Can get hands chopped relegation 
help us to save money off for spending money 
-We have no shareholder on staff Management Good, clear, strong -Managers upon Discipline is up 
resource management structure managers get in the way the spout 
is key to flexible working -Very constraining getting 
their permission on staff 
- 
discipline and budgets 
Ide o 1-0 g _y -Very large HRD with -Must find out what new HR on side of 
policies on everything procedures HR managers deadwood staff 
-Ancillary staff flout rules has dreamt up overnight to avoid their exit 
and regulations -Managers not allowed to 
-1 tend not to have views discipline staff without No sharing of 
on Government policies HR permission ideas-isolation 
Inve-stment 
-No money to replace -Refurbishing project Projects are 
equipment so we wait lasting forever extensively 
-Cannot invent a pot of -We wait till Government delayed 
Even though there are managers upon managers that get in the way, the emphasis is on 
cost control and efficiency through frozen posts and reduced staffing levels, prolonged 
refurbishment that seems to be going on forever, lack of equipment and adequate staff to 
do the job. Consequently, worker absenteeism is rife, discontent and lack of commitment 
to efficiency drives reign with managers resulting in budget deficits. Even the Healthcare 
Commissioners commented on their staff shortage and need for improvement. The lack of 
fresh external input and their risk aversion mean that there is neither visible change nor 
innovation. Thus in-house services remain in what Giddens (1984), calls the status quo. 
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Furthermore, although there is Government funding for staff training and development, 
the staff are still in the basement physically and mentally within their "psychological 
contract". There are no fresh ideas from without to bring in changes in perception or make 
visible ones. Consequently, although the workers are trained, they are not yet liberated 
from manual to professional workers hence they remain in their "basement jobs". 
The main issue here is power for the control of services and staff. This is expressed 
through flexibility to make changes favourable to the dominant coalition, with others find 
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constraining, the restriction on budget spending and the flouting of discipline by staff. 
Power for control and domination has been in bureaucratic organisations since Weber's 
(1904) theory of economic organisation. Organisations are political entities, where power 
struggles for control and domination are rife (Clegg, 1981 and 1989; Perrow, 1986). 
The power of the Human Resources (HR) managers to control services through policies, 
Procedures, efficiency drives and discipline enables them to dominate budget spending 
and the rules of engagement, which in turn constrain managers and workers in their daily 
work. Indeed Clegg (1989: 239) regards such organisational power as "irreducible" in 
Sustaining and reproducing to perpetuate the same power. Thus, the formal authority 
Position of HR managers is both the medium and outcome of their interaction with support 
services managers and their workers (Giddens, 1979; 1984). Because the managers and 
Workers are unable to mobilise countervailing power the outcome is seen as discontent of 
Managers as workers vote with their feet through absenteeism and exit to distance 
themselves from such oppressive working conditions (Goffman, 1969; Fincham, 1992). 
The reliance of the organisation on Government funding and charitable organisations 
Makes them vulnerable with regards to funding and their annual income uncertain 
(Pfeffer, Salancik and Lebleici, 1976) This vulnerability and uncertainty further enhances 
the power of the HR managers to tighten the economic belt in the guise of efficiency drive 
and to restrict budget spending, thus worsening the constraint and discontent produced. 
Consequently, the support services and the organisation struggle for survival. This is 
shown in the removal of the chief executive and the relegation of the trust to two stars. 
The services managers seem unwilling to share power through relational exchange. 
Such relationships would dilute their autonomy, question their quest for stability and the 
Ontological security of tenure they take for granted (Giddens, 1984). They have enacted 
their own environment of control and flexibility to make changes but are mired in budget 
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deficits and incremental change going on forever (Weick, 1995). But relational exchange 
can bring in the needed resources of investment funds, skill, fresh ideas and equipment. 
Consequently there is no external investment (apart from Government funding), no fresh 
ideas to nurture change and some workers have become "inflexible" to manage. There is 
also a lack of support (except private ones), which further alienates managers and 
workers in their daily work. This reinforces the tenets of both the IMP and resource 
dependent theory (RDT) that those unwilling to manage business relationships and avoid 
their ugly prisons, retain autonomy, control, stability and familiar routines but may lack 
access to scarce resource and social support (Ford, 2002; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
On issues of change 
Most changes result from human intervention through new technology, shifts in ideology 
- or struggles for the redistribution of power, which act as triggers for change (Greenwood 
and Hinings, 1996; McNulty and Ferlie, 2004; Pettigrew, 1987). Consequently, change in 
Complex organisations involves power struggles, as change and control seem to be 
inextricably linked together (Bachmann, 2001; Reed, 1996). Since there is no change 
agent or trigger in this trust, the managers plod on in their stable, secure environment. 
They exhibit uniformity of conduct in daily routines and avoid struggles that rock the boat. 
There is no risk to bear, no alien culture to cope with and no failing contractors to manage 
thus the services manager remain constrained, workers absent themselves from work 
and everyone has to muck in to get the job done while the HR managers rule the roost. 
The HR managers have the authority positions to impose rules of conduct as seen in 
budget spending and staff discipline and demand compelling obedience as expressed by 
Weber in his model of bureaucracy (Freund, 1968; Weber, 1962 and'1978). The majority 
accept the imposed rules and work within them while the rest acquiesce to it but may 
have different opinions as exemplified here in the outburst of the support services director 
and the complaints of constraint elicited. Consequently, in closed relationship evidenced 
here, the managers and workforce enjoy their inalienable rights of tenure without the cost 
'Of relating to external others or dealing with interference from anyone. The motivation for 
their exclusivity can spring from the responsibility of the dormant few to protect the jobs of 
the majority, convenience, appropriateness or usefulness of in-house operations. Thus in- 
house service has been allowed to go on despite Government directives to the contrary 
and the abounding evidence of outsourcing around these support services managers. 
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5.3.8 Dickson Memorial Hospital (DMH) 10% outsourced 
Dickson memorial hospital is located in a run down area of London with buildings as old 
as Highgate cemetery and serving a high population of immigrants. The present hospital 
was formed from a leper colony of 1473, a small pox hospital built in 1848 and two 
independent neighbouring hospitals added in 1866 and 1877. All three hospitals were 
amalgamated in 1900 with a total of 2000 beds. However in 1946, the hospital was rebuilt 
on its present site with a reduced bed capacity of 472. The current bed capacity for all 
three sites is 575 with a total staff of 2068,133 of which are ancillary workers (6.4%). 
The hospital focuses mainly on blood disorders like sickle cell and thalasaernias and has 
a thriving women department. Many historic and listed buildings abound in the area. For 
example, a listed Tudor mansion, reputed to be the home of a king's mistress, Gwynette, 
is close by as well as other neo-classical listed building in the surrounding hearths and 
parks. The hospital serves the local communities of about 300,000 residents. It regards 
itself as a community hospital with limited (10%) outsourcing. 
But despite its apparent handicap and location, the services managers here, who act as 
agents for the trust, seem to have gone further than was the case at Charlston memorial 
hospital. For example, they have kept to 10% outsourcing but have market tested 
services to obtain best value for money and have accessed funds for a new hospital 
building through business relationships with a consortium of banks and contractors. 
Dickson Memorial Hospital in-house services-excerpts 
Three people were interviewed here-Agents CC, DID and IRE and their views were 
triangulated with those of their workers for accuracy, clarity and consistency. 
5.3-8.1 Motives for in-house services 
We did actually think about outsourcing but when hotel services was tendered, about five years ago, the 
in-house team won the contract and since then, they have not revisited outsourcing (Agent EE). 
, IVe are an in-house service and we look after the housekeeping needs of the hospital, within housekeeping 
1 
department we are further divided into three parts, doing domestic, portering and hostess chores (Agent EE). 
Our objective is to ensure value for money or best value. If that includes market testing then that is the route 
the trust will go down but the trust does not necessarily see outsourcing as the best way to get best value. 
When we market tested for hotel services, five years ago, the in-house team put in a bid and convinced the 
trust that theirs was a better option. The in-house team, work within the NHS they are not contractors. So the 
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Outsourced elements here are the car parks and the linen services. The contractors provide on-site 
operational management of the car parks and Sunlight does linen services for us (Agent CC). 
The core of our hotel services Includes domestic services, catering, portering, security, accommodation and 
estates. They are all done in-house (Agent CC). 
We have not gone down the route of outsourcing but we continually look at the services in terms of cost and 
quality but we tend to benchmark ourselves against other comparable hospitals, in terms of the work they do 
and the size of beds they have, using database provided by our estates and facilities (Agent CC). 
We tend to be heavily influenced by what is happening in the NHS as opposed to the private sector. We 
develop working relationships with other NHS agencies in terms of initiatives, objectives and targets and how 
we achieve those targets and objectives, rather than going out and looking at the private sector hospitals or 
trying to adopt some of their practices (Agent CC). 
Staff training: 
We have a local initiative here in the housekeeping department. Our staff are multi-tasked generic workers. 
Basically they are trained by the trust up to NVO 1 standards to be able to do both domestic and portering 
chores. There are also hostesses and facilities services assistants (FSA). The ward managers can use them 
Whichever way they like knowing that they can serve both patient needs and do domestic chores (Agent EE). 
The facilities services assistants act as a rapid response team within the hospital. Their responsibility is to 
respond to specific portering duties like getting patients off and on the ambulances and transporting them to 
Other parts of the hospital. They help the pool of other porters to get the job done. The hostesses help to 
Prepare the meal trolleys and trays and assist in serving the meals to the patients. They play an integral part 
on Patients' meal services by advising them on what is available and how to access things (Agent EE) 
Here in estates department we don't have an army of fitters, plumbers and builders. What we have is a small 
core of individuals able to respond to emergency calls. But if say an office needs lighting, we would use 
contractors to buy in what we need as opposed to using the emergency team (Agent CC) 
There used to be three of us (catering managers) but since one left, both of us now share the work. I am 
suPPosed to work part-time but we share alternate weekends so she can get time off. She cannot work 
SeVen days a week (Agent DD). 
When we are short staffed, which is often, I call the agency and they send me staff. Then I train them. I have 
to teach them everything about food and personal hygiene. Now we have eight staff members (five staff and 
three from the agency). The agency people don't stay long because of all the work they have to do. 
In the kitchen we have eight cooks, two from the agency but they stay two weeks and they go (Agent DD). 
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Staff incentive: 
No we don't have staff of the month or things like that. If a staff works well, I just thank them that's all. No 
prizes and nothing else, no appreciation we are all worker/managers, and we work, But the workers are very 
helpful. If I want something done they just do it, nothing is hard for them to do for me (Agent DID) 
Investment through the PFI 
I think it is basically access to capital. We in the NHS don't have the funds to construct buildings so we have 
to go out and seek partners to help us but it is purely a financial partnership (Agent CC). 
The Government was not prepared to fund the building so there was no other option, since we did not have 
the funds. The money has to come from somewhere and if the Government provided it, it would potentially 
mean an increase in taxes. That is why the Government set up the PFI scheme (Agent CC). 
We are using the PFI for the new extension to the hospital. It is very good although the building is 
extensively delayed and late but when it does come on it will be good for us (Agent EE). 
Our contractors, Burgess, will build and maintain but not manage the new building for the duration of about 
thirty years. They have to guarantee the building when they hand it over to us so they keep a tight rein on the 
upkeep throughout the period when they have control of it. But in the mean time as we use the building to 
transport patients, if we damage anything in any way, we will get a bill for it (Agent CC). 
We serve cook-chill because we don't have proper kitchens to cook for the patients only for staff. We have 
vending machines here for drinks and technicians come to fill them up and collect the money (Agent DID) 
All the staff get 10% discount on meals but catering staff they pay for food. No one eats free (Agent DID) 
Relationships and communication 
We have a strong working relationship with all our contractors. Crown Foods, supplies our cook-chill meals. 
There is flexibility within the contracts and we meet regularly to discuss and settle issues (Agent CC) 
We visit Crown Foods' sites and do regular food tasting there. We also monitor them through patients' 
questionnaires. Crown Foods' people also do their own monitoring when they visit monthly. We tend to pool 
data from both our visits and patients surveys to monitor our contractors. We are satisfied with their services 
and regard them as stakeholders (Agent CC). 
We will have an operational working relationship with the staff of Burgess, when they complete the new 
building. Because it is bolted onto an old building, the contractors will maintain but not manage it (Agent CC) 
- 
We have about ten suppliers for the catering. They supply different things. The store (Procurement) manager 
checks them as PASA approved, to make sure they are safe (Agent DID) 
There are no hospitals we share things with. We just cook for the restaurant that's all (Agent DID) 
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innovation: 
No we have not cooked anything new this year but the new menu will be out soon then we will know if there 
are changes to the menu. We cook according to menu, nothing special and no one complains (Agent DID) 
The impact of hotel services: 
In a nutshell we basically contribute to the continued comfort and well-being of the patients in their journey 
through the hospital, starting from when they come in to when they leave. Our department impacts on the 
Patients'journey, transporting them to wards and clinics and helping with the services they receive in terms 
of comfort, cleanliness and dietary needs while they are here. We work towards the Government's directives, 
like every other hospital, on health plans. So our impact is on the environmental influence we have as part of 
the NHS Plan on the patients' experience on the stages of theirjourney through the hospital (Agent EE) 
We basically help to keep the hospital environment clean. Cleaning is one of the main things on the patients' 
views of the National Health Plan that all hospitals must adhere to. When the new building comes on stream, 
We will be doing the day-to-day cleaning. The contractors will be in charge of maintaining it but we will 
manage and help to keep it clean as part of the hospital environment (Agent EE). 
At the moment the ward managers manage the domestics who work on their wards. They are flexible in the 
duties they perform for the wards, doing both domestic and other duties, to help out on the wards and 
improve the patients' experience through the hospital. But hotel services, as a whole is moving on. I think 
that the boundaries between clinical and hotel services will reduce. As time goes on we will see more 
allthority and autonomy devolved to them (as professionals in hotel and clinical services) (Agent CC). 
Last year we had three stars but this year, we are down to two stars because we did not meet some of the 
national criteria, which includes cleaning, housekeeping and patients' views of their experience through the 
hospitals (Agent EE). 
-5.3-8.2 Discussion 
This trust managers said that they thought about outsourcing support services but the in- 
house team won the initial contract tendered and it has been rolled over ever since. Again 
there is no obligation to outsource services as long as the services managers can show 
that they give value for money in the use of human and material resources. The services 
Managers claim that they do not see outsourcing as the route to that. However the main 
eMphasis here is on control over services and flexibility of staff as generic workers to 
Meet the changing needs of patients in their journey through the hospital. There is a 
reaching out for financial partnership through the PFI for contractors to construct a new 
building since the Government was not going to fund it and they did not have the funds. 
The managers also use market exchange to buy in resources needed for maintenance 
work. Consequently, these services managers have limited partnership with the PFI 
177 
contractors while using market exchange, where they control the goods and services 
purchased at prices they are willing to pay, for services they are unable to provide in- 
bouse. Thus, the services managers at this trust economise to minimize total transaction 
Costs by internalising operations when transaction costs are high and using market 
exchange to purchase resources when production cost is high (Williamson, 1975,1996). 
They also enact their own stable environment by doing most of their business in-house 
without external interference, distraction or competition (Weick 1995; Czarniawska, 1992). 
They enjoy autonomy of control and stability with familiar routines and independence from 
external others and so avoid the risk of managing contract relationships. Thus they realise 
their expectation of in-house services and avoid the needless disruption and complexity of 
change. Inter-dependent and collaborative conditions of relational exchange are shunned 
and avoided. Consequently there are no power struggles and no meaningful change seen 
(except the new building, with extensively delayed completion date). 
In-house services conserve jobs for the workers. From Government funding, workers are 
trained to generic workers but are under the control and dictates of ward manager to use 
them as seen fit. The expansion of work through generic duties results in overwork as 
seen in the worker/managers who man the tills, do the chore and manage others in the 
same shift. Consequently, staff members remain overworked and constrained manual 
workers, most of who do not stay long. There is no evidence of their professionalism, 
Motivational incentives or liberation from "manual chores". Thus, these in-house services 
workers retain their jobs and privileges of tenure but are not liberated from manual labour. 
The lack of input form external sources means that there is no investment and projects 
are extensively delayed, there is no exchange or sharing of ideas, no learning and no 
innovation and the bureaucratic culture of blame and risk avoidance seen in complex 
Organisations remains. Consequently, the managers are content to work in their enacted, 
stable and predictable environment, giving value for money, where they attempt to 
achieve maximum efficiency or value for money with minimum resources as seen in the 
Use of agency staff and generic workers. They too have been relegated to two stars. 
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Table 5.8 Summary of key motives for outsourcing in 10% outsourced NHS trusts 
NHS -trust Motives for 
outsourcing 
Themes elicited Theories in use 
Charlston -Flexibility to control Legitimate control Bureaucratic control Memorial services and costs Value for money TCE (search for efficiency) Hospital -Ability to make Relationship (with 
changes without charitable IM (relationships) 
added costs organisations) 
UIckson -inertia (outsourcing Legitimate control Bureaucratic control Memorial not revisited or seen Limited relationship IM (relationship) Hospital as route to value for Value for money TCE (search for efficiency 
mone Inve., th market mechanism) 
5.3.9 Research Question: 
How do the key people involved in the hotel services outsourcing relationships structure 
their experiences? 
Having analysed the motives for services outsourcing from the excerpts of those directly 
involved in outsourcing relationships and elicited the relevant themes from the eight NHS 
trusts investigated, how does this analysis answer the research question posed? 
5.3.10 Research question answered 
From the foregoing analysis, these key people involved in outsourcing relationships and 
in-house services structure their experiences in terms of their context of operation, locales 
or the NHS trusts where they work and the content of their daily work. The content of their 
Work encompasses jobs, work situations and working conditions they find themselves in. 
These structures reflect the significance, essence, meaning or importance they attach to 
their daily interaction with contractors, stakeholders and others. Some structures feature 
as satisfaction, fulfilment or lack of contentment from working relationships that depict a 
sense of belonging, constraint or alienation. 
For example, the respondents framed their responses with reference to their locales or 
hospital trust (context) as in these excerpts: 
We believe that contract services provide the trust with value for money (Agent B) 
In this trust, you have trained staff (Agent A) 
This is what a hospital should look like-clean, airy, roomy and with privacy for patients (Agent C) 
We are an aggressive team of professionals, here to save this NHS trust money (Agent G) 
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Others framed their responses and experiences in terms of the significance, essencel 
meaning, benefits or importance they attach to the content of their work. From these 
responses themes such as relationships and reputation are elicited. For example: 
Relationships 
Good teamwork is all about relationships and how you work well with people not discipline (Agent 1) 
We network with other NHS trusts to learn best practice and know what others are actually doing and to 
know who is who in purchasing (Agent F) 
We use PASA approved suppliers to ensure that our products are of the highest quality (Agent A) 
We have good relationship with all our contractors. It is important that we maintain good relations with them 
because we depend on them for services to continue (Agent K) 
Reputation: 
Before we became Areno, we were associated with reputable hotel chains that everyone knows and 
recOgnises, everywhere, massive reputation. We are in all the countries around the world. We would not 
supply services to clients who have been in the news in the past two years. Money is not everything, our 
reputation is more important (Agents F and M) 
Other themes framed are efficiency (as value for money or relief from distractions allowing 
them to focus on core functions), investments, staff training, innovation, learning, power 
and control, externalities, trust, commitment and loyalty or ownership of duty, community 
care for local relevance or legitimacy and staff retention. These themes are discussed, 
compared and contrasted below with reference to the context of the respondents. 
A third group of respondents structure their experience by comparing their periods in the 
NHS with their lived experiences in commercial contract jobs. For example some said: 
The contractors train the ancillary staff workers better. The NHS did not train ancillary staff because they 
were regarded as the bottom of the pile and there was no point in training them (Agent E) 
When I worked as a contract manager, I was in control, managing staff and supervisors. I felt a sense of 
belonging but in this in-house service there are managers upon managers that get in the way (Agent 1313) 
Assured makes investments here but in the NHS, there was no equipment and we were always waiting for 
things to come and sometimes they never came because they said they were short of money (Agent X) 
A fourth group relate their experiences to a longing for a better future, anticipating the 
freedom to operate as a business making legally binding agreements. For example: 
We will never be autonomous. There will always be an aspect of Government in the shadows telling us what 
we should be doing but with foundation status, we can go out and borrow double the money that 
Government can give us. We will be able to see healthcare as a business and run it successfully (Agent 1). 
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Foundation status would raise our financial freedom to be able to look at different ways of doing things on a 
better financial footing and get a bit more independence from the Strategic Health Commissioners (Agent R) 
Others structure their experience in terms of personal achievement or in terms of future 
expectations. For example: 
I used to be a cleaner but Premier trained me in night school and now I manage other cleaners (Agent T) 
We look to the soft FM contractors for innovation in food and services (Agent R) 
As Wresult of their varied experiences, different history of their locales of operation and the 
varied lengths of their tenure, there is a multiplicity and duplication of structures grouped 
as themes for ease of discussing their differences, commonalities and contradictions. 
In sum the themes elicited arose from context of operation or locales, content of working 
relationships and interactions, comparison between private and public sector jobs, a 
longing for a better future freed from constraints and liberated from domination, personal 
achievement since outsourcing or future expectations. 
The discussion now turns to comparing and contrasting themes in their contradictions. 
A Comparative analysis of the motives for outsourcing with outcomes for each of the eight 
categories investigated is presented in (Table 5.10). The combined analysis of elicited 
themes is tabulated in (Tables 16a-1 6c) at the end of the chapter. 
5.3.11 Comparative discussion on motives for outsourcing 
The comparative motives for outsourcing elicited were diverse and varied ranging from 
the flexibility to control costs, show value for money as in-house or outsourced operations 
through to the need to focus on healthcare, outsourcing burdensome non-core functions. 
The need for a continuous, reliable, uninterrupted guaranteed services and ancillary staff 
recruitment and retention were also major motives for outsourcing support services. Thus 
these motives for outsourcings are the needs services providers must meet to earn their 
contract price (Ford, 2002: 55). Some observers note that services outsourcing is 
essentially contracting for results be they reliable, continuous and uninterrupted service, a 
More efficient way of cost containment or indeed value for money spent (Cross, 1995; Fill 
and Visser, 2000; Peisch, 1995: 32). Hence where the opportunity or means for obtaining 
Such results are lacking internally, organisations will outsource to access resources they 
need. From (Table 5.10 below), all the support services managers perceived that their 
NHS trusts achieved their outsourcing objectives and more. This confirms the essence of 
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Table5.10 Combined comparative motives for services outsourcing with outcomes 
NHS Motives for Outsourcing outcomes through agency 
Trust Outsourcing 
Theresa To concentrate all -Now operates as a business on one site, using Hospital services on one site services contractor investments 
100% (ultimately) -Enabled to make legally binding agreements 
-Patients' choice in food and services is enhanced 
-Ancillary workers liberated into new facilities 
Helina Lack of managerial skill -Contractors advice managers on matters of Hospital expertise and experience commercial interest such as current PFI plans 
100% -Help facilities manager gain value for money 
Karena Ancillary personnel -Achieved aim of outsourcing and raises funds Hospital recruitment and retention from innovative new canteen and cafd. 
75% problems -Contractor's ideas and investments help support 
services managers achieve their goals. 
-Professionalism of ancillary staff has improved 
the image and status of support services 
Victoria To a gain reliable -Achieved aim plus gets funds from innovative And un-interrupted support new caf6s. Contractor investments and staff 
County services, guaranteed training are perceived as value for money 
Hospitals -Ancillary staff liberated into professionals and 75% managers into new facilities they own and 
manage 
Featherstone Relieve a troublesome -Able to concentrate on healthcare Hospital non-core function to -Enhanced patients choices in food and services 50% concentrate on -Innovation in cleaning and new floors to relieve 
healthcare aching feet. Legitimacy enhanced 
-Freed from special interest groups Reinhard Ancillary staff -Achieved outsourcing aim with innovation in Hospital recruitment and retention food and services -Contractor investments make 50% problems better dinning facility possible for staff, patients 
and guests. 
-Liberation of manual workers to professionals 
Charlston -Need to retain control -Previous unsuccessful outsourcing, now cautious Memorial of service quality and -Fear of losing control and having to rebuild 10% costs services from scratch hence risk averse 
Jo make changes -Capital projects (refurbishments) are delayed 
without added costs 
Dickson Inertia (outsourcing not -Initially in-house team won contract, since then Memorial seen as route to achieve outsourcing not re-visited. Only needs to show 
10% value for money) value for money in support services 
-Limited relationship as (access to building funds) 
-Capital projects are extensively delayed 
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services outsourcing as contracting for results. The findings also reinforce the central 
premise of the resource-based theories that organisations lacking in resources can 
access them from the external environment (outsourcing) to meet their internal needs or 
build capabilities for competitive advantage (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Teece et al., 1997). 
ý Support services outsourcing, was perceived by some respondents, as a clean up 
exercise of previous cost cutting measures and lack of investment in non-core functions 
like ancillary services. For example agents said: 
YOU have to recognise what your core business is. Our core business is healthcare, not cooking, catering, 
cleaning or building. So there is a balance as to what resources are put into non-core business (Agent R) 
The NHS did not invest money in support services, instead money was taken away to run other more 
important services so now that they need cleaners to keep hospitals clean and proper meals for patients, 
the support services have come to the aid of the hospitals (Agent E) 
Support services were the underdogs of the NHS and any time they needed to cut something to save 
Money or balance their budget, they cut the services and they may have pruned it so much that it is now 
difficult to get it back to an adequate level of service. Now all of us in the Greater London area are cleaning 
UP Problems we created for ourselves (Agent BB) 
In the past 10-15 years, money was taken from domestic, catering and portering services. The hospitals 
had to balance their budgets and they took money from support services which maybe because they had 
a grown too fat" and needed to be toned down a little bit but I think that they went much too far. Also the 
buildings were not refurbished as often as was needed. There was no preventive maintenance years ago 
that should have stopped the rot. Things are better now but much damage was done to the services and 
now we must live with it (Agent BB) 
These statements confirm the argument in the literature that the NHS is trying to "undo 
twenty years of downward pressure on facilities budget" by accessing vendor investments 
to complement in-house resources (Moore, 2007). On the other hand, observers note the 
unprecedented investments the Government has made in recent times to counteract the 
effects of this under-funding (Carlisle, 2007; Eaton, 2007; Kaletsky, 2008; Watson, 2006). 
Some agents acknowledged the vital role of support services in supporting the core 
function of hospitals-healthcare with its liberating effect on some managers and workers. 
These contractors have invested a lot of money in equipment and personnel here. Support services must 
continue or the hospitals will grind to a halt (Agent K) 
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The contractors have also managed to let the public know how important the support services are. 
Hospitals are usually thought of as doctors and nurses, but without the support services, hospitals could not 
function. The support services are critical to this trust (Agent 1) 
This is more investment than I have seen in the thirty years I have been here. At least we have come up 
from that hole in the ground called an office. I was there for thirty years (Agent K) 
These statements reinforce the observations made by others that support services and 
their staff are key players in professional settings, enabling others to focus on their 
specialities, where their skills and knowledge add value (Moore, 2007; Sveiby, 1997). 
Thus this study builds on to complement previous work in support services outsourcing 
and the resource-based theories but with a focus on its liberating effects on workers. 
However the central motive of whether to outsource services or retain them in-house 
- stems from what Freund (1968) calls the dialectics of appropriation based on monopoly or 
competition, which others call the "paradox of consequences" (Dunne, 2006; Greenwood, 
2002). Managers are inundated and confronted daily with a plurality of conflicting goals, 
values and choices. They have a duty of care to workers, consideration for the dominant 
Coalition and personal views from lived experiences, custom, knowledge and training. 
COrlsequently managers prioritise daily choices against conflicting views like monopoly 
Power to control resources (in-house) against relational power sharing (partnership) for 
cOMpetitive advantage (outsourcing). 
Some choose between contracts that deal with future rights and responsibilities, conduct 
and expectation (Freund, 1968) against authority rule of compelling conformity for control 
and domination and the punishment of disobedience (Weber, 1962 and 1978). Thus the 
choice to outsource services is neither simple nor easy but depends on balancing control 
with collaboration, interdependence with monopoly, closed versus open relationships, 
Voluntary union of self interest versus relationships of mutual benefit. These choices are 
based on expediency, past experience, convenience, appropriateness, usefulness, cost 
versus benefits, meaning, suitability to needs against the dictates of the dominant 
coalition and the courage of decision makers. Thus the expressed motives recorded here 
are the culmination of all that went before to make the choices for either decision. 
The analysis now turns to unravel the consequences of services outsourcing grouped as 
themes. 
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5.4. Efficiency theme 
5.4.1 Introduction 
All the managers investigated in the eight NHS trusts expressed the need to show value 
for money, control total costs or what I collectively interpret as efficiency (Table 5.11 
below). For example: 
Many years ago, outsourcing was mainly for cost control but now it is best value for money or best provider. 
Cost control now is imperative in outsourced services. We (contractors) give value for money (Agent A) 
When we tendered the service, we looked at costs and expertise (Agent F) 
We are here to save them money and that is the bottom line (Agent G) 
We outsourced for two reasons-cost savings and better ancillary staff retention (Agent 1) 
We Outsourced services to save money, managing people is costly, I know (Agent K) 
We save them lots of money. Employing one contractor with the knowledge of all the experts within one 
massive organisation is more economical for them. They save on consulting fees, tendering fees, raw 
Material, food and labour costs. There is a lot of savings (Agent 0). 
From the in-house operators, the managers said: 
In-house service is working out more economically for us because contractors have to cut costs to increase 
their profits but we have no shareholders to pay dividends (Agent AA) 
With in-house services, we can contain costs and have the flexibility to make changes without added costs 
(Agent Z) 
The objective of in-house service is to ensure value for money (Agent CC) 
From these excerpts, a common theme was cost savings or value for money either 
through managing people, employing a single contractor with all the expertise in one 
Massive organisation to use scale economies to contain costs or aggressive cost cutting to 
benefit the bottom line. However these observations contradict the argument of some 
critiques of services outsourcing "as purely an obsession with market driven policies" since 
the expected cost savings has not materialised. Cost saving is regarded as the purpose for 
services outsourcing while value for money reflects the level of risk transferred to vendors 
and the resultant consistency achieved in service provision (Rodney and Gallimore, 2002; 
Moore, 2007). Respondents' statements agree with the literature on services outsourcing, 
where hidden costs and the inability to properly measure costs make it difficult to realise 
cost savings. Value for money reflects hidden rewards like freedom from distraction to 
focus on core activity or relief from personnel issues that compensate for disappointment. 
The in-house operators also achieved their expected control over services and the 
flexibility to make changes to services without added costs. For them the containment of 
fear of loss of control and having to rebuild services was evidence of value for money. 
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Furthermore, there is bundling through services outsourcing. Bundling is regarded as 
procuring within one service contract, those services that would have been tendered 
separately (Rodney and Gallimore, 2002: 53). The purpose of bundling is to increase the 
use of scale economies to encourage innovation and make services outsourcing attractive 
to a diversity of vendors. Thus through services outsouicing some NHS trusts can use one 
massive organisation to tender for many services allowing them to pay one contract price 
and so save costs, manage budgets and encourage innovation in food and services. For 
example, some trusts capped all their services and transferred all risks to the contractors 
while some combined real estate management with hotel services in one contract price. 
The theme of efficiency (cost saving) or what Williamson (1975,1996) calls economising is 
central to transaction cost economics (TCE). Support services were outsourced because 
internal production was deemed costly, inefficient and ineffective (Boyne, 2002), resulting 
in huge deficits (Dobson, 2006). The health service has tried market mechanism and found 
it unworkable hence the present hybrid structure of contract relationship. The theme of 
efficiency and the resultant provider specific investments to mitigate possible opportunistic 
self-interest are in keeping with the economising tenet of transaction cost economics. 
Consequently outsourcing and in-house operations aim to economise on transaction costs 
through different routes. But the findings of this study go beyond the purpose of TCE to 
add value through more risk transfers to vendors or bundling as in total outsourcing. This 
contradicts the critiques of TCE that it is only focused on economising while neglecting the 
value adding aspects of transaction (Hunt and Morgan, 1996; Zajac and Olsen, 1993). 
Thus through economising on transaction costs and adding value to services offerings the 
findings of this small study adds weight to both sides of the TCE debate. 
-5-4.2 Examples of commonalities 
Efficiency theme could be inferred as common to all the trusts studied. All the services 
Managers in the outsourced concerns reported that all their ancillary workers were sold by 
their trusts to the contractors to save money. Furthermore, their pensions and allowances 
Were frozen since they could not be transferred but they hope for compensation from the 
Government for their losses. They also said their trusts save money by not employing 
accountants to pay ancillary staff wages, pensions, allowances and benefits. 
All the trusts reported networking with Government agencies, PASA, or NHS Logistics to 
save money. These issues were common in all the outsourced services. For example: 
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PASA provides us with basic templates for national contracts. They help to streamline our tendering process 
because they have expertise in contract management. They are valuable in saving us money (Agents F, Z). 
The trust now has more freedom to save money. There are no accountants to employ to pay the wages of 
400 ancillary staff. No worries about personnel matters or staff disciplinary measures (Agent A) 
We network with agencies like PASA, they save us lots of money (Agents A, F, K, Z, CC). 
We retain Government agencies like PASA and the suppliers they approve because they save us money 
(Agents A, B) and because they are more competitive (Agent F). 
Outsourcing provides us with economies of scale. Being a small firm it is best to become part of a bigger 
concern. We also gain by not having to train ancillary staff, manage them or pay for them to keep up with 
knowledge and technology (Agent R) 
Having all our services provided in one place (by contractors) is much cheaper than transferring patients 
around eight hospitals on a daily basis (Agents C, D). 
There is a marked price difference with the contractors, we know (Agents 1, K). 
5.4.3. Different routes to efficiency gains 
Although all the managers were at pains to stress that their in-house or outsourced 
services were value for money, their routes chosen to attain it differed. For example: 
For the in-house concerns 
- 
With in-house services, we are able to contain costs and have the flexibility to make changes without added 
cOsts (Agent Z) 
The objective of in-house service is to ensure value for money. The trust does not see outsourcing as the best 
way to get value for money (Agent CC) 
- 
But from the outsourced services came these comments: 
Outsourcing provides us with economies of scale. We also outsource our own services to generate revenue 
to offset our costs. Our waste disposal is also outsourced to save on costs and do it in an environmentally 
friendly way. We also burn waste for energy so there is efficiency all round (Agent R) 
We undoubtedly save them on labour and food costs. They don't have to worry about personnel issues, and 
don't have to source anything for us we exceed their expectation (Agent M) 
VVe Outsourced services for economic and operational advantages. Companies are in the business of 
making money but firms also have to be as effective as they can with a long-term view to serve the needs of 
their customers through better tendering and world-wide contacts of knowing who is who in purchasing and 
dialogue with others to learn best practice that we can apply here to get value for money (Agent F). 
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From the foregoing the two in-house concerns in support services seem to concentrate on 
productivity or cost saving. As agents for hotel services in their trusts, they seek best value 
for the money spent by using less workers to do the job while "everyone mucks in to get it 
done" (agent 1313) or "supplement the workforce with temporary staff' (agents BB and DID). 
But in the other six outsourced services the contractors are perceived (Agents 1, M, V and 
X), to have added value to their clients' offering through better customer service, revenue 
generation to offset costs and more areas for cost savings like cheaper raw material from 
an international network of relationships (agents A, F, M, S and X), contractor scale 
economies and applied best practice (agents F and G) to become more effective. Thus 
these six outsourced support services managers seem more effective and efficient judging 
by the bundle of benefits they perceive to have gained through outsourcing. The services 
contractors are said to exceed their clients' expectations (agents 1, K, M and X). 
And the clients were satisfied with their services as shown by these excerpts: 
They would not have renewed our contracts if they were not satisfied with our services (Agent H and L) 
We transferred a lot of risk to them and they procure all our services within one contract price. They come up 
With ideas to help us achieve our goals and objectives and we are satisfied with them (Agents I and K) 
While in-house operations can minimize total transaction costs through efficient system of 
reWard and punishment that mitigate employee opportunism, they also save outsourcing 
Costs of searching, negotiating, coordinating, monitoring and delivering hotel services. 
But outsourced services benefit from intangible rewards like savings in time, effort and 
risk bearing, increased focus on core competence (agent R), contractor relationships and 
innovation (agents F, G, 1, M and X) as valuable resources. These benefits suggest that 
Outsourcing is more meaningful and effective than efficiency considerations alone. Thus 
Operational efficiency means different things to different managers as shown by different 
language in use from value for money or best provider to operational advantages. 
In-house operations also conserve managerial jobs that will otherwise be lost to services 
providers. It allows supplies department and other departmental managers to exchange 
reciprocity for distorting procurement decisions in favour of internal supply. What is more 
in-house operations promote convergent expectations, easier to manage through existing 
hierarchical control that attenuates the uncertainty of interdependent parties with private 
motives, agendas and different ways of operating (Williamson, 1975). Consequently, the 
in-house operators, insulate their sunk costs in facilities, processes and programs against 
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displacement and enjoy the flexibility of making changes to suit internal operations without 
added costs or interference from external others. Support services managers keep their 
jobs and focus on controlling total costs. Thus, for these reasons some support services 
may choose to keep their hotel services in-house rather than outsource them. Hence in 
their pursuit of efficiency gains or cost savings there can be hidden benefits for both the 
in-house and outsourced concerns to balance non-attainment of cost saving or non-trying. 
The six outsourced services benefit through contractor scale economies and paying one 
fixed price despite seasonal variations (agents R, E, 1, M, 0, S, and X). Furthermore, the 
relationship of facilities managers with commercial contractors has enabled some gain 
advice or insight into disposing many properties on prime sites that were previously left to 
weeds and squirrels. For example, Theresa hospital, disposed of its property in Edgware 
road that previously housed few elderly psychiatric patients raising funds to augment its 
bank balance in preparation for foundation status. Without the aid or central management 
Of their contractor, those patients will still be there rather than at Chertsey and there will 
be no new flats built on that site. Consequently, some NHS trusts have become adept at 
disposing dormant functions to raise funds and reduce their total costs (Jennings, 2002). 
Some support services managers benefit from outsourcing troublesome functions like 
hotel services where they acknowledge lack of expertise in cooking, cleaning and feeding 
Patients (agents N and R) and so avoid frequent disruptive industrial actions by ancillary 
workers due to low wages or bad working conditions (Shifrin, 2005; Smith, 2002). Thus, 
Some teaching hospitals can now focus on their core activities and research to gain 
competitive edge in medical expertise, create value for their patients and so become 
More efficient while contractors provide support services where they are specialists. 
Consequently while in-house services managers operate in a more stable and predictable 
services environment (agents Y, Z, AA and CC) the outsourced managers achieve varied 
benefits (agents C, D, E, 1, J, N, R and W) irrespective of efficiency gains or cost savings. 
Examples of contradictions (as opposed to differences) 
Although the in-house operators perceived the attainment of value for money in their 
Operation (agents Z, AA and CC), some of their managers felt constrained, not in control of 
their departments, alienated and frustrated (agent BB and DD). They did not have enough 
staff to do the work because they were "not allowed to spend money on permanent staff 
and could not invent a pot of money to do things" to help their meagre staffing levels 
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<Agent BB). Furthermore there was human misery of unemployment, stress related 
*Vroblems and retrenchment due to constant workforce streamlining to reduce costs. 
ýObservers call these inherent contradictions the "paradox of consequences" (Dunne, 2006; 
qCreenwood, 2002; Sherwell, 2005; White, 2002), where efficiency gains that should make 
, jepartments like support services more stable and smooth running leads to human misery. 
for example: The facilities manager at Dickson memorial claim to liase with Heathrow 
. Oirport to learn how they operate and that his department was running smoothly, managers 
Zould engage staff to help them do the work. But these claims were not evident at this 
1"OsPital as shown by the comments of agent DD, who was recalled from retirement to 
fnanage, serve at tables and man the tills because there was not enough staff to do the job 
properly. She could count and name all her eight staff members on her fingersl They had 
V cater for the whole hospital serving 800 meals per day. For example one agent said: 
fhe objective of in-house service is to ensure value for money. The trust does not see outsourcing as the best 
vvay to get value for money (Agent CC) 
We have an opportunity to work with the private sector. We have been to Heathrow airport to look at their 
cleaning regime and catering since airports are like hospitals working to provide services 24/7. We went to 
Omilar establishments to see what they are doing and if there are any lessons to be leant (Agent CC) 
-- In contradiction to this assertion, the catering manager, said: 
-_VVe don't have proper kitchens to cook for the patients. They all eat cookchill meals and nobody complains. 
-'rwO 
Of us are like work managers. Sometimes we get agency staff but they don't stay long (Agent DID). 
On the issue of staff incentives she said 
*u Must be joking, when we get good staff and they work hard, we just thank them that's all. The staff 
rnernbers here pay for their meals just like anybody else. No appreciation, that's what I say (Agent DID) 
At the other in-house service, the Director of services said: 
With in-house services, we are able to contain costs and have the flexibility to make changes without added 
costs (Agent Z) 
But Agent BB from the same hospital said: 
When I worked as a contract manager, I was the manager in that remit, not answerable to anyone. I 
managed all the staff, managers and supervisors (in complete control). But here (in-house service) we have 
managers upon managers and they do get in the way. There is no sense of belonging as in the contract job. 
There was never any shortage of equipment then because when one contract ended we shared the 
equipment and they always fitted in with ours because it was the same contractor. Here if we have no money 
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to replace equipment we have to wait. We cannot invent a pot of money to do things so we wait sometimes 
for ever for repairs. In the contract job I felt more in control and had more say in my department but not so 
Mere. You can get your hands chopped off for spending money from your own budget without permission 
from your line manager. It is very constraining (agent 1313) 
The issue of overwork and lack of investment are evident as agent BB commented that: 
"they could get their hands chopped off for spending money on staff'. This contradicts the 
views of their bosses with respect to their departments being more economical and 
running more smoothly, perhaps at the expense of their workers. 
However, "as long as you can show that the trust is giving value for money for services", 
_the 
discretionary allowance will be paid and the star-rating helps to increase the amount 
gained (agents B, E, F, G, M, BB and CC). Consequently, many services managers use 
the mantra of "value for money or best value" to anchor consensus for action, explain the 
paradox of their situation or non-attainment of the elusive efficiency gains expected. 
Another contradiction was the assertion by in-house managers (agents Z and AA) that 
their department was running smoothly and more economically. My observation was that 
the departments were chaotic, un-kept and workers overworked even by NHS standards. 
Furthermore agent BB, with commercial experience, longed for the contractors to come 
to her department (perhaps through outsourcing) and bring in "a breath of fresh air" by 
streamlining the "deadwood" staff who mill about doing nothing and get paid for doing so. 
Perhaps she echoed the joy of agent E who had the contractors do just that in her 
department hence advised support services managers to spend time with private concerns 
100pen their eyes" (gain broader based experience) on managing services. For example: 
It is far more difficult to change things when it has always been in-house but if we are dragged through the 
change once, it is less difficult next time. When a contractor comes in it is like a breath of fresh air because a 
lot Of the staff that should have retired or got something more suitable for their needs years ago will go. A 
good contractor will make sure they take on only the good staff from the NHS and get rid of all the 
"deadwood" staff. Working for contractors, staff are more flexible and much more manageable (Agent BB) 
Another outsourced concern manager confirmed that: 
Things are done more professionally than before. The staff realise that YOU cannot have people hanging 
around doing nothing while you pay them for it. Contract work is very useful experience. A lot of people 
working in the NHS should also go and work in the commercial sector to help open their eyes (Agent E) 
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Thus a contradiction exists where experienced managers are recruited from the private 
sector into in-house concerns constraining and frustrating them by not allowing them to 
use their knowledge, management skills and experience to benefit their departments. 
It was interesting to note that agent AA asserted that contractors are able to cut costs to 
increase their profits yet in her department, with six commercially trained managers but 
working in an in-house concern, they could not overtly reduce costs to benefit the 
department or engage more staff to reduce the stress of other workers. Perhaps they did 
and had the funds invested else where to their detriment (subject of another study)l 
5.4.4 Explaining the contradictions 
Structuration theory (Giddens, 1973; 1979: 193) identifies three main areas for these 
contradictions. Firstly where sectional interest is represented as the universal one as in 
maintaining in-house services or attaining legitimacy through representing dominant 
interest, seen here as the need for flexibility to control service level and make changes 
Without added costs. Perhaps this is a case of in-house operations and their departmental 
managers and directors, distorting procurement decisions in favour of internal supply 
either to preserve their jobs or as reciprocal favour for other career advancement or both. 
Furthermore in-house operators can always move funds around to insulate their sunk 
costs and protect their departments and pet projects from displacement and interference 
from external others. Thus managers keep their jobs and the status quo reigns. 
Secondly, maintaining resource asymmetry for the purpose of control and domination. 
Here the departmental managers have no power to spend their budget or employ 
Permanent staff without approval from their dominant line bosses that control both the 
financial and human resources. As stated above if funds are already earmarked to insulate 
sunk costs, it is not available for departmental managers to spend on staff or equipment. 
Financial control is a source of power for domination. Human nature enjoys being powerful 
and in control hence those who control resources, tangible and intangible can bask in their 
Privileged positions and ensure that others are dependent on theml 
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Table 5.11. Analysis of Efficiency theme using Structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) 
Theme 
__ 7 __ - _ 
Agent's 
code 
Knowledge base Communication 
§1 g nifTc atioý A Specialisation -They (clients) concentrate on healthcare while we 
(division of provide them with support services 
S, X, labour) -Its not good for medical people messing with food 
E, K -Things are done more professionally, you no longer 
have people milling around while you pay them for it 
A F, M, Cost control -They pay one fixed contract price and if prices 
KAS, (to aid planning) fluctuate, we (providers) bite the bullet 
X, I, 
F Value for money -We looked at price and expertise to provide the trust 
with value for money 
F -We outsource services for economic advantage 
E, M, B -We provide better quality service at competitive 
prices, not the cheapest but value for money (as 
perceived by the client) 
C, D Cost savings -It cost our transport department a fortune to keep 
transferring patients and staff from one location to 
another, now we all work on this one site 
A, M, -We save them labour, food and raw material costs 
M, L, -We save them cost of re-tendering and contract 
renewal. We source everything ourselves 
A, 0, M -Client engages one contractor with knowledge of all 
the experts in one massive organisation 
1, K -There are cost savings, we procure all services at one 
set price, Price has marked difference - we know 
K, E Standard -Managing people is costly, huge load off my back 
A, S Operating -Trust is running better and more efficiently 
Z, AA Procedures -It is working out more economically for us 
AA (SOP) -Private firms tend to reduce costs to increase profit 
R -We generate revenue from our own outsourcing 
and outsource to benefit from economies of scale 
A, L, M, Tacit -Contractors generate revenue for the trust through 
O'l Commercial vending, canteens and non-variation of PFI prices 
F, G, M know-how -The trust benefits from our network of contacts Domination G Dominant -They engaged us to be more commercially 
commercial aggressive than say in-house teams. We are 
know-how here to save them money, that's the bottom line 
A -Clients demand that providers provide services at a 
higher standard now but we will still be in charge 
A, M Multinationals -We (providers) have financial backing from banks 
M, 0, S, and building societies. We're a massive organisation 
G, M, -NHS cannot provide services due to huge deficits Z, cc, Dependence on -We have to show value for money in resource use BB allocations legitimation Z, CC Rights and -Avoid deficit sanctions, collect budget allocations 1, J, R Obligations, -We balance funds providers generate against costs 't A, E, M SLA -We meet and exceed our Service Level Agreement 
(hence retain or renew contracts) 
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Key to Table 5.12: 
Signification: Language in use, important codes, verbal themes or games respondents 
play 
Domination: mobilisation of resources for administrative or economic decisions or the 
ability to control resources 
Legitimation: actualisation of rights or enactment of obligations. Deep structures may not 
be overt as topics or themes but can be inferred 
Thirdly, where contradiction in terms are denied by dominant groups, like bosses on issues 
Of cost containment and efficiency but with inadequate staffing and lack of equipment to do 
the job properly. It is the culture of the NHS and perhaps large complex organisations to 
deny all or refer to a higher authority to gain time and lose issues or complaints in endless 
hierarchical referrals. Thus, contradictions favour dominant groups who control resources, 
have networks of people in authority and access to information and generally have a voice 
or a platform from which to present their interests as the universal or official ones. 
In sum all the managers investigated sought efficiency gains but through different routes. 
While in-house operators economised on resources like staffing and equipment, and used 
efficient system of reward and punishment that militate against employee opportunism to 
- saVe costs, outsourced concerns benefited from other rewards of outsourcing like focus on 
core activity, innovation and learning to compensate for the elusive costs savings. Thus 
the tenets of transaction cost economics are upheld and this thesis contributes to both 
sides of its debate. The findings here suggest that hotel services outsourcing goes beyond 
the purpose of TCE (economising on transaction costs) to add value to services offering. 
5.5 Relationship theme 
5.5.1 Introduction 
Business relationships are valuable bridges and buffers to the external environment (Ford, 
2003, MbIler and Wilson, 1995). They are bridges to access the resources organisations 
need for building capabilities (Das and Teng, 2000; Gadde and Snehota, 2000; Tsang, 
2000) for competitive advantage (Powell, 2001; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). These may 
be skilled managerial experiences, funds and personnel or expertise in services provision 
as in outsourcing (Cross, 1995; Davis, 2004; Jennings, 2002). Business relationships also 
act as buffers to protect organisations from competitive pressures and threats from the 
external environment like resource scarcity or pressure groups (Westphal and Khanna, 
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2003; Maitlis, 2004). Consequently organisations engage in business relationships to 
access the resources needed, neutralise real or perceived environmental threats to their 
acceptability or legitimacy and engage in knowledge transfer to retain competitive edge. 
_- 
Indeed one of the tenets of the new Labour Government in 1997 was the introduction of 
integrated care based on private sector partnerships, cooperation and collaboration but 
driven by performance and accountability (The NHS Plan, 2000; The New NHS, 1997). 
Support services outsourcing was to help bridge the gap between the public and private 
sectors thus bringing business relationships as valuable resources and bridges within the 
NHS- These contractual relationships are the access bridges to resources, financial and 
human of the commercial services providers. Through such relationships support services 
managers are enabled to access resources like experienced, skilled managers deemed 
eXPerts in support services to run their hotel services or advice them on matters of 
commercial interest (Agents E, F and G). Some managers accessed more reliable and 
guaranteed hotel services through all seasons at one fixed price (Agents M and 0) while 
others met their need for better ancillary staff retention (Agents 1, K, W). Thus contractual 
business relationships enable some services managers access scarce resources for the 
provision of support services some agents (A, B, E, F, 1, J, M, Z, CC) regard as critical in 
supporting better and more effective healthcare delivery in their trusts. 
The perceptions of the value and problems of business relationships from different support 
services managers are shown in (Table 5.12) below. 
5.5.2 Commonalities 
Relationships are valuable: 
Many services managers (both in-house and outsourced operations) perceived that their 
business relationships with Government agencies, PASA and NHS Logistics or private 
services providers or both are valuable (value for money) beyond the cost of managing 
, -, such relationships over time (agents C, D, E, G, 1, K, M, N, 0, Z, AA and CC). 
- Relationships are built on trust: 
Many managers (client and vendor) admitted that their business relationships are built on 
trusting relations of mutual benefit. Some agents explained it thus: 
Trust plaYs an essential role in our relationships. Trusting relationships are allowed to evolve as the 
contracts evolve for without that trust there is no contract (Agent F). 
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This NHS trust allows us to provide services the way we feel best due to the trust they have in us (Agent 0) 
Our relationship is mainly based on trust (Agent 1) 
We provide them with the service so a trusting relationship is important and helpful for our business in 
Keeping with Government regulations and directives (Agent M) 
I Relationships are also partnerships: 
Almost all the managers in the outsourced services stressed that they work in partnerships 
with contractors or clients, as teams, for mutual benefit (Agents A, E, F, G, 1, K, L, M, 0, R, 
S, T, X). This is exemplified in these statements: 
It is all about relationship and how you work well with people. If you work with contractors in partnership as a 
team, you will work well and quickly to achieve goals and if you don't you won't. It is simple (Agent 1). 
We maintain good business relationship with all our contractors, working together in partnership, as a team. 
That keeps everyone alert and available to do the work (Agent E). 
It is one of our goals to maintain good relations with all our contractors. It is a partnership (Agent K). 
We have a no-blame partnership culture and that's how we work here (Agent 0) 
They are our clients and we treat them as partners (Agents M, X). 
We (contractors) work in partnership with the trust for the patients. We don't have different views we have 
the same objectives (Agents L, S). 
The partnership with private contractors has enabled this trust outsource its own hard FM services (estates 
facilities) to the local community and earn needed revenue for the trust. So we work in partnership with the 
contractors of all outsourced FM services (Agent R) 
Relationships managed by constant communication: to help resolve conflicts 
Constant and timely communication is key to benefiting from relationships (Flack, 2002). 
Lateral robust communication and constant dialogue help managers to proactively agree 
on issues resolve disagreements or misunderstandings and thus prevent problems arising. 
Most managers accepted the increase in communication as a price to pay for the benefits 
they get from their relationships (Agents A, E, F, 1, K, M, 0, R, S, U, Y, Z). For example: 
Things are done more professionally now, it may have added a layer of communication but that's not bad, it 
helps to reduce the need for control and gets people working (Agent E). 
We meet informally daily to sort out any difficulties and prevent problems arising (Agents A, E, F, K, M. S). 
We meet face-to-face in constructive, informal ways daily and have contacts by phone or e-mail (Agent M) 
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he formal meetings happen fortnightly when we meet with directors from health and safety, security, 
catering, domestic and laundry to discuss goals and objectives, performance levels and scores, cleaning 
f, tandards and contractor updates, reviews and generally smoothen out problems (Agents E, F, M, R, Y, Z). 
We have a client for life philosophy so we keep in touch with even our past clients. We use personal 
influence to push the business forward and put in the time and effort to make all our relationships work 
(Agents F and M). 
From the above excerpts, NHS managers met routinely while the contractor managers put 
in More effort and time to actively make their relationships mutually beneficial. This maybe 
because contractors have to earn revenue and retain contracts so they are committed to 
satisfying the contracted needs of their clients. Thus for the contractor managers, timely 
communication and speedy conflict resolution with a no-blame culture are important. 
For example: 
If there is a problem, it is not their (clients) problem or our problem but a problem shared (Agents L, M, S, X) 
If there is a problem we rectify it immediately, they are our clients and we have to look after them (Agent L) 
We Will discuss and dialogue to find solutions to problems and implement them right away to rectify the 
problem. They are our clients and we look after them (Agents H, M, 0. S, X). 
When there is a problem I can react as professionally and swiftly and competently as possible to rectify it 
because we always make sure that we have something in place to deal with unpredictable emergencies. Yes 
we react but not like the NHS managers do in what we call "knee-jerk reaction". They react and then pass 
the buck to someone else but I try to make sure that I have something in place so that I can deal with issues 
as Professionally and swiftly and as competent as possible (Agent M) 
If someone pees on the floor after it has been cleaned, I have to get it cleaned up in minutes, no fuss. That 
way we exceed our client's expectations (Agent M). 
Indeed during one of my interviews with (Agent X), I had an opportunity to witness him 
resolve a catering conflict speedily and effectively without fuss. 
On this interview day, a man decided that he was overcharged and refused to pay. The 
catering manager went out to settle the dispute and according to their rulebooks, the man 
gladly paid the requisite amount and no ugly issues arose. There was no referral to a 
higher authority or buck passing observed. The catering staff dealt with it all competently 
and cheerfully without blame or abuse. Thus contractor managers, equipped with standard 
Operating procedure manuals (SOP) or rulebooks are able to routinely resolve conflicts. 
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Relationships provide support: 
Relationships provide much needed personal support within NHS organisation for the in- 
house operators (Agents E, Z, BB, CC, EE) or local and regional support for the services 
providers (Agents A, F, H, L, M, 0, S, T, U, X). This is echoed thus: 
There is no support from neighbouring hospitals but I have no problems with that. I have informal contacts if I 
need them and they are quite useful to me personally (Agent E), 
There is a network of London hospitals and we try to keep in touch and every three months we meet and 
swap ideas or problems. Otherwise the NHS, as far as I know, does not generally share equipment, staff or 
whatever. But as you move around different hospitals, you get to know people personally so when you are in 
trouble you can ring up and get help, that's how I operate and it works well for me personally (Agent BB). 
We are regional but there is local support from other hospitals where we have contracts, we can share staff 
and equipment to support each other (Agents X). 
MY Company is the biggest catering company in the world. We have contracts with airports, industries and 
ministry of defence and we help and support each other (Agents H, S). 
We have three different contracts in this compound and we help and support each other (Agents S, T). 
There are three different contract caterers on the eight sites of this NHS trust, we share equipment or staff if 
we need to and support each other (Agent A). 
Relationship for skill and knowledge transfer: 
There is learning and knowledge or skills transfer from the commercial services providers 
to other managers personally (Agent N) and corporately (Agents E, 1, L, M, X). Indeed two 
NHS managers (Agents A, E and 1313) advised their colleagues to go and work in the 
cOMmercial private sector "to help open their eyes and broaden their experience". 
For example: 
The trust learns a lot from us but they will never be able to do what we do themselves because of their 
enormous overheads (Agent M). 
I have learnt a lot since working with the contractors on this project (Agent N). 
They (contractors) are professionals we learn a lot from them, we are able now to see healthcare as a 
business and keep within our budgets (Agent 1). 
The trust learns from us, we have a different structure and ways of working (Agent Q. 
Things are done more professionally now we learn a lot from them (Agent E). 
VVe learn from each other everyday. No one knows everything, we are constantly learning (Agent L and X). 
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Furthermore some services managers perceived that they use their business relationships 
with other trusts to share facilities to optimise their usage and benefit patients while they 
learn from each other (Agents R and N). For example, Featherstone and County hospitals 
share their more up-to-date facilities and equipment to benefit orthopaedic patients and 
day surgery cases respectively (Agents R and N). During these exercises, medical skills 
are transferred to benefit the local workforce. Thus sharing facilities through relationships 
can benefit patients and aid learning through knowledge and skills transfers. 
5.15.3 Differences 
The contractor managers were more eager to find early solutions to potential problems 
and prevent ugly scenes arising either with clients, visitors, patients or their personnel. 
This was evidenced by the constant visible management and supervision observed during 
-all my visits at the different hospitals. The catering and domestic managers were always 
on the scene pacifying irate customers, ensuring the smooth running of the canteens or 
encouraging workers to do more. This was not the case in the in-house operations. Indeed 
at one hospital, the office of the domestic manager was so chaotic and confusion was 
allowed to reign that I wondered how she (Agent 1313) could manage her department. They 
were short of equipment to do the job and some of the staff were either off sick or have not 
bothered to turn up for work. This was the same on more than one occasion. 
Thus it seemed that the contractor managers were more proactive at problem solving to 
Prevent ugly scenes than their in-house counterparts. 
- Reputation and image management: 
The contract managers were more zealous at guarding their reputation or promoting their 
image, financial status or credibility hence their dominant position over their clients (Agents 
F, G, L and M). For example some of them said: 
We would not supply services to a client who has been in the news in the last two years. Money is not 
everything. Our reputation is more important (Agents F and M). 
What is a dodgy client? I have never met one my company will not get involved with what you call a dodgy 
client (Agent L)' 
My company is one of the biggest food companies in the world. They have a business edge that comes 
through in what they do and the business they provide (Agent X). 
Premier is the biggest food provider in the world (Agents S). We are multinational with thousands of 
contracts outside (Agents A, F, G, H, L, M, 0, S, X), massive reputation (Agent M). We have a "can do 
attitude" in our work and do it (Agents M and T). 
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We are on the stock exchange with financial backing from banks and building societies (Agents A, M and S) 
We have thousands of suppliers worldwide and can supply anything from tea to power stations (Agent M). 
'1 
Relationship for building legitimacy through social care: 
While some contractors had worldwide relationships networks with clients or financial 
institutions that increased their bargaining power (as shown above), the services manager 
used such networks to ensure local relevance and maintain legitimacy. For example: 
We are running an energy campaign in conjunction with the energy trust (Agent R) 
We joined in with the local council in a waste recycling initiative, which was lunched by the Mayor. 
We have also joined in with the local community and local council to save energy and reduce waste in an 
environmentally friendly way (Agent R) 
We did a deal with London Coaches to run a shuttle snug bus and extend the service outside working hours 
to benefit our staff and act as a fare-paying bus service for the local housing estate residents especially in 
the evenings. We have a local youth employment and apprentice scheme here, not many companies still do 
that We extended our CCTV network to include the two local train stations and linked them to the police 
station to help crime prevention (Agent R). 
The non-executive directors were chosen for their social standing, or who they are in the community, the 
work they have done in the past and their standing in healthcare organisations (Agent R). 
We work very closely in partnerships with London Coaches, the Mayor's office, the Local Government and 
most of the community leaders we consulted are also involved. They all support the scheme and the 
Government gives their blessing so we can go on (Agent N). 
Indeed there is a transport rank within the hospital compound making it possible for local 
residents to have easy access to the hospital either as patients or visitors and for shoppers 
at the local superstores to travel with greater ease. Thus these two NHS trusts have 
endeavoured to improve their local image and relevance through support services. 
Relationships make externalities possible: 
Contract managers claimed to have spurned externalities due to their satisfactory 
provision of services that are guaranteed with technical support and financial backup and 
their massive reputation. Some of the claims proved to be true. For example they said: 
If they (contractors) do well they use the contract as a springboard to provide other services elsewhere. It is 
also an incentive for contractors to continue to perform well here (Agent F) 
Another person gave our name (Areno) and we have been asked to produce a document as benchmark of a 
new unit, if that is not writing the specifications for the trust, I don't know what is (Agent M). 
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We supply services to Ministry of Defence, schools, colleges and local authorities (Agents A, M, 0 and S). 
We (contractors) give a lot of hospitality services to other hospitals from here (Agent 0). 
We have no external boundaries only financial constraints. The sky is the limit. Someone asked our client 
who they use. They gave our name and they rang us up to supply them with services. We get our tentacles 
into Local Governments, health authorities and private hospitals. We have seventy NHS contracts (Agent M). 
5.5.4 Discussion 
From all the forgoing, the parties to interaction perceive their relationship as built on trust, 
commitment and cooperation for mutual benefits. This is in keeping with the tenets of IMP 
interaction model, where trust develops through prolonged interaction and transaction. 
Trust in relationships reduces the relational risk and uncertainty inherent in depending on 
external others for services provision and moderates the performance risk of professionals 
not delivering on the quality and standard of services expected. Consequently, the built up 
trust in these contractual relationships balances the need for power or control (Hunt and 
Morgan, 1996; Reed, 2001). Trust in relationships also attenuates behaviour, reducing the 
relational risk of opportunism, hence monitoring costs (Williamson, 1975 and 1999). 
Furthermore, through their trusting relationship, agents help to build in and institutionalise 
"systems trust" where goodwill (obligations) and sanction or rule-based trust alone are 
inadequate to moderate the behaviour of economic actors or agents (Bachmann, 2001). 
Systems trust is trust placed in expert professionals to minimize risks (section 3.7.9). 
There is also a perception of teamwork (partnerships) to smoothen their daily interaction 
and enable some achieve goals more effectively. The relationships are managed through 
constant robust communication that helps to reduce misunderstanding and make conflicts 
functional (Reeve and Warren, 2004). Consequently, the parties to interaction manage 
their interdependence through the dialectic of control (Giddens, 1984) to reduce total 
transaction costs and institutional ise system trust in the expectation of future benefits. 
Business relationships also provide personal and corporate support for the parties to 
interaction. As relationships deepen actors learn more about each other and their business 
processes and are enabled to offer support through their networks and trade associations. 
This is in keeping with the IMP framework and its network effects of business relationships 
(Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Ford, 2003; Sheu et al., 2006). The cooptation of non- 
executive members by some trusts can turn some would-be foes into helpful allies and 
ensures social support, access to scarce resources and local acceptance or legitimacy. 
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There are opportunities for knowledge and skills transfer through learning and the sharing 
of facilities and equipment. These can help to build capabilities for comparative advantage, 
find new ways of producing products and services or build more efficient systems that add 
value to services offerings (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004; Tsang, 2000). Consequently, 
there is a lot of learning in the areas of problem-solving, conflict management without 
blame and relationship management. Thus this study adds weight to other studies in IMP 
and its network effects in offering support, learning opportunities and legitimacy (Barringer 
and Harrison, 2000; Ford, 2003; Ford et al., 2006). 
5.6.5 Reputation and image management (that aids externalities) 
The reputation of both parties to interaction helps to further strengthen their relationship 
bonds. The credibility of the contractors which they refuse to compromise by supplying 
services to dodgy clients or those who have been in the news, enables them gain 
recommendation for externalities thus increasing their areas of influence and network of 
relationships to earn revenue. This is in keeping with the IMP model network effects. As 
interacting agents build trust and commitment, their credibility improves with time to enable 
them increase areas of influence, relevance and legitimacy through networks of social 
contacts and common memberships to trade or professional organisation. Thus this study 
confirms the tenets of IMP model and the findings of other studies on relationship networks 
(Ford, 2002; Easton, 1992; Gulati, 1998; Health Emergency, 2004; Ovretveit, 1995). 
But some managers expressed the need to interact with contractors on strictly business 
terms, keeping the fine line between business and personal relationships separate in order 
to avoid tensions, compromising their business relationships or being accused of having 
"cosy relationships" that can tarnish their image or jeopardise the fair competitiveness of 
contractors at contract renewals (Agents F, 1, K, R). Consequently, some client managers 
personally choose to keep their social distance in liasing with contract personnel. 
Furthermore these public-private sector relationships have also brought changes to some 
trusts raising the profile of support services as crucial to healthcare delivery. It has also 
liberated some ancillary workers from manual labour to professionals with image and 
personal pride, no longer waving banners during pay negotiations or demonstrations but 
instead motivated to be productive at their work stations, giving professional services. 
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5.5.6 Power and control 
The contractors also felt that they were in charge of their clients' departments because 
they had massive support from mega multinational organisations, insurance companies, 
banks and a pool of skilled, experienced and knowledgeable managers that form a 
knowledge base from which they operate. Thus their financial resources, commercial 
know-how, international connections (enabling them source raw materials more cheaply) 
and the ability to supply support services that some trusts could not supply due to their 
huge financial deficits and massive overheads accords them allocative (Giddens, 1984) 
and expert power (Courpasson, 2000; French and Raven, 1959) for domination. Therefore 
their clients become dependent on them for daily provision of services. But some contract 
managers (M, S and X) recognised that the client also had the countervailing power to 
terminate their contracts even at a price. Consequently, the services providers' perceived 
dominance plays out in subtle, behind the scene ways because of their interdependence. 
For example: Some managers best echoed what others said. 
Premier Group is the biggest food company in the world. They (clients) outsourced services to save costs 
and we are very good at what we do (Agent H) 
We (contractors) are international. We have financial backing from banks and building societies. The 
company is so diversified that we could be putting up apartment complexes in the Falklands or building 
bridges in Malta (Agent A) 
We are in many countries. We are experts in providing catering services. We are the best in what we do. 
They (the NHS trust) will never be able to provide the service because of their massive overheads. They 
depend on us to do it and we look after them because they are our clients (Agent M) 
We (NHS trust managers) have the power to penalise them (contractors) by taking money away from them. 
They know all that from the start. We don't have penalty clauses in our contracts because they can be 
fiddled and they get in the way of good teamwork but if we can show that the contractor has not done the 
work as required, we can take money away from them provided you are fair and can provide evidence that 
they have not performed (Agent 1). 
The possession, access and ability to regulate scarce resources accord the vendors, in 
these relationships, sources of power (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The contractors have 
expertise in needs and risk assessment, procurement, contracting and support services 
provision (Belfield, 2007). This is also their allocative capacity or power (Giddens, 1984). 
But services managers also have authoritative position power. Although they may not have 
enough experience in relationship management skills, they can harness the expertise of 
their suppliers in weak areas (Bradley, 2005). As both forms of power are required to 
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smoothen and facilitate transaction for mutual benefit, they use constant communication to 
reduce the intensity of disagreements or misunderstandings, negotiate and agree on a 
consensus and so reduce the need for power plays and make the relationships work for 
both parties (Flack, 2002; Reeve and Warren, 2004). Thus, overt power politics that 
consumes time and energy and distorts information is lacking from the excerpts. 
Valuable business relationships are exercises in power and control (Flack, 2002). As 
clients and vendors struggle to meet their contractual obligation, the subtlety with which 
they handle their relative perceptions of power can derail their relationships. For example: 
agents (A and B) perceived that they are in control because they manage and run the 
facility from which their client operates while agents (S, T, X) said that they were not in 
control. But agents (L, M and 0) said they negotiated the minefield of their contract price 
variations with care and subtlety giving the client lengthy notices to absorb the facts. 
Contractors perceive that they are in control because without the provision of support 
services to sustain healthcare, hospitals will grind to a halt (Agents E, 1, K, M, R). Such a 
dominant vendor, with access to and possession of vital scarce resources and financial 
Connections can be intimidating. But the NHS also has a reputation as the largest 
employer in the UK if not Europe. Consequently, contractors play down their dominant 
Position, cooperate with a spirit of partnership to benefit patients and look after the needs 
of their clients. Thus control and domination are attenuated through the dialectic of control 
(Structuration theory) and the expectation of future interaction (interaction model). This 
results in both parties to interaction, managing their relationships for mutual benefits and 
Making overt power plays redundant. These power plays are in line with the tenets of both 
Interaction Model (IMP) and structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) that knowledgeable 
agents, differentially endowed with resources, can interact meaningfully focusing on 
actions that will ensure a favourable outcome in order to maximize their capacity to make a 
difference while avoiding the use of overt power for control or domination. 
5.5.7 Foundation status 
Since payment by results, there is observable financial transparency within some trusts 
(Cowper, 2007). Some NHS managers striving for foundation status have also come to 
regard healthcare as a business and have improved their financial standing to attain it 
(Kmietowicz, 2006; Timmins, 2007). There is a suggestion from the excerpts that the 
financial awareness and learning gained by these services managers result from their 
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prolonged interaction with commercial services providers. Consequently, the relationship 
between the contractors and some services managers has been shown to be beneficial. 
This builds on other studies in the areas of relationship management for mutual benefit 
and successful outsourcing that delivers beyond contracted specifications and 
expectations. Foundation status has led to the liberation of some trusts from the dictates 
and constraints of Strategic Health Commissioners and constant budgetary constraints. 
Observers watch to see if these managers continue to learn and grow (Seltzer and 
Bentley, 1999; Senge, 1999) in the new culture of commercial awareness (Schein, 2004). 
Valuable relationships however come at a cost and engender constraints. 
5.5.8 Relationship costs and constraints 
The benefits and opportunity cost of business relationships are extensively discussed in 
chapter three and I don't wish to repeat them here. However business relationships can be 
limited and marred by the opportunity costs of alternative relationships foregone and their 
lock-in effects without the flexibility to develop independent ways of working (Ford, 2002). 
These are the golden cages or handcuffs and ugly prisons of IMP business relationships. 
There is a loss of organisational competence in the outsourced services and a cost to 
rebuilding services should their outsourcing relationships fail (Agents Z, AA, CC). 
There is also a relationship management cost. The problem of matching mixed cultures 
and personalities that demand personal influence to avert clashes cannot be over- 
estimated. There is a need to retain the clarity of responsibilities, inter-dependence on 
duties and commitment towards mutual goals and benefits. Changes in support services 
personnel can also necessitate a change in vendor, thus escalating the total cost of 
services provision. This was not the case during this study as all the contractors are still in 
place at the time of writing. Thus the cost of relationship management both personal and 
corporate can constrain and limit the benefits that accrue from valuable relationships. 
Another relationship cost is a financial burden needed to initiate the contract relationship. 
Contractors must have a proven track record of being able to guarantee the service they 
provide with all the necessary technological update and needed backup. This was most 
noticeable with agents (F and M). Consequently contractors are said to be "aggressively in 
the market place looking for contracts to bid for" (Agent N). They have worldwide networks 
to be able to meet the varied needs of their clients competitively in price, skilled personnel 
and quality of service provided beyond the clients' expectations. 
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Having secured a contract, the services provider must then deliver on the contract 
agreement at a fixed price. If conditions change and there are adjustments to be made on 
prices, contractors "bite the bullet" because the cost price is fixed (Agents F and M). 
Thus contractors must manage competitive pressures and deliver on their contracts. 
Customer relationship management (CRM) makes it possible for contractors to manage 
their clients through constant lateral communication, social environment of goodwill and 
motivational incentives in the form of social events, free meals, life and work balance and 
other perks in order to retain their clients and earn longer streams of revenue. Constant 
communication makes demands on contract managers, consumes time, effort, and 
emotional energy, demands personal influence and commitment to provide satisfactory 
services beyond clients' expectations (Reeve and Warren, 2004). But it helps to prevent 
minor issues turning into major problems later. There are courtesy calls outside official 
times that are said to 'keep the wheels of business relationships turning' (Agents F and M). 
These also demand time, effort and commitment. But the contractor managers perceive 
them as a necessary part of doing business more effectively (Quilgars, 2000) and so are 
committed to making them to keep their relationships productive and earn revenue. 
The contractors are committed to providing a relaxing social environment for their staff and 
those of the client organisation to show their goodwill. All are welcome to relax and have 
the opportunity to get to know each other and build relationship bonds (Agents H and L). 
Others use them as opportunity to build up personnel and get communication going 
(Agents M, 0, S, T). There are inter-departmental competitions, annual cricket matches, 
socials, barbecue and beer nights, also Christmas evenings and staff parties for leavers 
and joiners (Agents M, 0 S, T, X). These events are at the expense of the contractors to 
Pacify their personnel, build bridges to the clients' workforce, to show appreciation for their 
clients' custom, in order to retain a productive workforce and earn their revenue streams. 
In all the outsourced services, contract personnel eat free as their duty deal (Agent A) 
While the client staff get discounts from 10% to 20% which some contractors say 
"bankrupts them" (Agents A, B, H, L, M, 0, S, X). These are incentives to motivate staff 
and retain a loyal and committed workforce. Thus, contractors invest time, money and 
effort as costs to them in building and making their business relationships more effective. 
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Table 5.12. Analvsis of Relationship theme 
Theme Agent's Knowledge base Communication 
code 
Signification E, F, I, M, Open, honest, timely -Contract management is all about relationships 
communication avoid and how you work well with people 
tensions and conflicts -We meet informally daily and formally every 
fortnight to discuss issues and agree on them 
Z, cc Beneficial bridges -We tend to network with government agencies 
and charitable organisations rather than private 
A, F, K, -Government agencies save us a lot of money 
F To enforce good -We network with other trusts and dialogue with 
business ethics them to learn best practice and to know who is 
who in purchasing 
F, I Single contractor -We use two or more contractors to even out the 
may have faults or risks and not to play one against the other 
weaknesses -Long term use of a single contractor may be 
anti-competitive and can lead to "cosy 
relationships" that can tarnish our image 
IK Cooperative work for -If you work with contractors as a team, you 
mutual benefit avoids will achieve results but if you don't, you won't 
AEFIK tension Jearn work is the main thing-simple 
LMNO -We all work in partnership for the patients 
RSTX 
EIK -We interact with them as professionals and 
they do a professional job. 
F, I, K There is no social contact by personal choice. 
R Bridges and Buffers -We engage non-executive directors for their 
social standing and work they have done before 
Domination F, I, K, R Blurred relation-ship It is good practice to liase with people from a 
lines can cause distance to keep professional and personal 
tensions interests apart otherwise they get blurred 
F, I -We can extend or revoke their contract. It gives 
them (contractors) the incentive to perform 
E, F, 1, K -It is one of our goals to maintain good relations 
with all our contractors (we need each other) 
K -They are professionals but we manage them 
because we get complaints 
E Mutual respect based -1 don't manage them (contractors) 
E, M on personal influence -We relate to each other on a personal basis 
A, B, M Subtle negotiation -We are in control although seen as contractors 
Legitimation F, I _ If there's no trust - Trusting relationships are allowed to evolve as 
there's no contract contracts evolve. Trust plays an essential role. 
F, R Formal contracts -It is good practice to have contracts that are 
spell out rights and formally agreed to and legally binding 
F, I obligations. -There are no penalty clauses. They get in the 
Penalty clauses can way of good team-work and use up a lot of 
be fiddled manpower without achieving much. Contractors 
know from the start that we will penalise them 
for non-performance to all agreed standards. 
M, 0, X Bridge-building clubs -We have a social club on site. All are welcome 
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Some managers agree that the public are not as forgiving in their unrealistic expectations 
as before (Agents B, E, BB). Many patients now expect their hot meals on time more than 
they expect doctors to turn up or getting their painkillers on time (Agent E). Sometimes the 
public expect what support services cannot provide (Agent BB). For example the domestic 
staff cannot predict when someone is going to throw toilet tissues, water or waste product 
all over a just-cleaned toilet. But the public and patients expect toilets to be clean every 
time. Such expectations are unrealistic and the cleaners, who cannot defend themselves 
or answer back are constantly blamed for lack of hospital cleanliness when there are many 
contributory factors, such as levels of personal hygiene, ethnic mix and aging facilities. 
There is a burden of investment to Government and professional bodies to keep up with 
technological advancements and updates required for the job (Agents F, M, R, Z, CC). 
Consequently, many support services managers benefit from their business relationships 
but at a cost and constraint to the contractors, who pay them. Thus relationships become 
golden cages of benefits and ugly prisons of commitment and obligations (Ford, 2002). 
In sum, most managers interviewed on both sides of the relationship perceive that their 
business relationships are productive, valuable and mutually beneficial but constraining 
and costly. Such relationships of mutual dependence must be managed with mutual 
respect, trust and commitment and constant communication to keep them beneficial and 
avoid conflicts through misunderstandings or disagreements that can derail them. 
5.6 Investment theme 
5.6.1 Introduction 
The central problem of the health service that observers note is lack of adequate funding 
due to many competing demands on a finite public purse or the difficulty of assessing what 
is adequate for providing a service with ever-increasing demands (Enthoven, 2000; Klein, 
2001; Levitt et al., 1995). The legacy of chronic under-funding can be seen as observable 
decay in the old buildings and shortage of staff and equipment, wastage, the inefficient use 
of available resources and the variations in performance across the health service (Portillo, 
1998; Moore, 2007). Similarly, public organisations providing social services like the army 
and navy also need continuous investments to protect their buildings from decay (Harding, 
1999). Furthermore, the level of investments in health service projects reflects, the value of 
that project (Turrill, 1993). Hence where investment for change efforts is lacking, success 
is doubtful as services managers regard such projects as of little value and not worth 
wasting time and effort on to make it work. Against this backdrop, support services were 
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outsourced partly to get private investment into the health service and partly to improve the 
quality, standard and efficiency of services by professionals. Thus there are many areas of 
investment by the commercial services providers ranging from relationship-specific ones 
through staff development, capital projects investments to improve the work environment 
to investing for interest. The perceptions of the managers are depicted in table 5.13 below. 
5.6.2. Commonalities in staff development 
One of the major areas of contractor investment is in ancillary staff development. All the 
ancillary staff were transferred or sold by the NHS to the contractors where services are 
outsourced. The contractors then streamlined the staff to "remove deadwood" of those 
unwilling or refusing to work under them or needed more suitable work than what was 
available under contract (Agents A, B, E, F, 1, M, R, S, W, X). 
The contractors then invested funds to train the staff free of charge and develop them for 
the work they do. The following excerpts exemplify the perceptions of managers: 
When we won the contract, we reduced the number of staff and selected those willing to work hard and we 
rewarded them for their hard work with incentives like free meals and prize competitions. They are willing 
and dedicated to their work after their training so they work hard to keep the hospital clean and Assured gets 
a good report as a good services provider (Agent T). 
We were sold by the trust to this company, I did not wish to become an employee of this (private) company 
but we had no choice. If we did not wish to become an employee of the company, we would have made 
ourselves unemployed. There was no freedom. All our pensions and contributions were frozen when we 
moved over and now they tell us that they cannot transfer a pension scheme (Agent A) 
At Premier everyone has training and you do management training in dispute and learn other things as well 
(conflict management and budgeting) and it is free of charge (Agents H, S and X) 
My staff are impeccably dressed, they are better trained, look more professional and are well motivated. This 
improves morale and they do a better job. Contract relationship Is also about staff development (Agent M). 
The contractors train ancillary workers better than the NHS ever did (Agents E, M, X and BB). 
I used to be a cleaner but Premier trained me at night school and now I manage other cleaners (Agent T) 
Some workers developed by the contractors have also changed their professions to do other jobs (Agent P) 
The commitment of the NHS to staff training was very low. Now we have more staff, better trained than the 
NHS ever did, especially in food and personal hygiene which have direct effects for all who eat and work 
here both patients and staff (Agent A and B). 
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The NHS did not train ancillary staff, they were the bottom of the pile and there was no point in training them 
(Agents E and BB). Now they are better trained, get better uniforms, look more professional and even their 
salaries have improved. They have better recognition for what they are and the work they do (Agents E& X), 
Still on contractors, staff development enables them provide reliable services to clients. 
We have our own dieticians and quality managers on site so that whatever the client demands we can 
provide it. Some hospitals don't have them but that is our commitment to this trust. We are the best at what 
we do be it supplying services to Royalty or the people in the street. We Invest in the business (through staff 
development) to provide value for money and quality service. We believe that we are the best (Agent M). 
Here we have multi-task generic workers. Some are facilities services assistants (FSA). They are all trained 
to NVQ1 level and are able to assist the ward managers in cleaning, portering and any other duties they can 
to help with the smooth running of the wards. It is a local initiative and works very well for us (Agent EE). 
Further to investment in staff development, the services providers also invest in incentives 
to appreciate their staff and keep them motivated, loyal and happy. For example: 
All ancillary staff eat free meals as part of their duty deal built into our contract (Agents A, B, H, L, M, 0, S, 
X). There is staff of the month and employee of the year selected by Premier. All our staff can work 
anywhere we have contracts from London to Milan and it is open to everyone (Agents H, S, T and X). 
At Premier, we have a no-blame culture but team spirit and show appreciation for hard work (Agents S, T) 
In the NHS, they don't want to know where you live or what you have to do, you just turn up for work that's all 
(Agents P and Q). 
At Areno, they allow us to work flexible time. It is good for me because I can go home and pick my children 
from school and then come back in the evening. Also when I moved house, Areno let me change hospitals 
nearer to where I live. Before I used to spend two hours on the bus to and from work and it tired me out. 
Here at Areno they let us eat free meals on duty and I can save money too (Agent P) 
Because of the investment 
, 
we have made, the trust has more freedom to save money. They don't have to 
employ accountants to pay wages and salaries to ancillary staff. They have no worries on pensions and 
contributions. They don't have to deal with personnel disputes, discipline, conflict management or people 
management. They can concentrate on their expertise of healthcare while we concentrate on ours (Agents 
A and B). 
The contractors are able to move resources like personnel and funds around the world to 
wherever they are needed due to their worldwide networks. For example: 
Their (contract) staff can work anywhere within their organisation (anywhere in the world) and also with 
other (local) contracts whereas NHS staff employed by this trust will be confined to the trust or work in 
different departments. As a result (of the incentive for workforce mobility) the contractors always manage to 
hold onto staff but we (NHS managers) can't (Agent 1). 
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Consequently, at one NHS trust the Filipino staff "who could not even speak English" on 
arrival, were recruited, trained, socialised and "kitted out with lovely uniforms" and put to 
work. Since then, the trust has not experienced any further staff recruitment or retention 
problems. Similarly, at another hospital that could not keep ancillary staff especially the 
chefs who were lured away by the many catering firms and hotels around them, the 
contractors, Mediserve, took over hotel services provision, trained the ancillary staff to 
equip them with skills and knowledge for the job and employed them. Since then there is 
no more ancillary staff retention problems there (Agents I and K). Indeed their vacancy 
rates and turnover are greatly reduced (Agent 1). Thus in hotel services where contractors 
train, socialise, motivate with incentives and reward ancillary staff well, they stem the tide 
of staff recruitment and retention problems. 
Also in other outsourced services, NHS managers recognise the importance of staff 
development for building loyalty, dedication and increasing morale and motivation (Agents 
R and 1313). For example: 
The trust spends a lot of money in staff training. We in estates operate an apprentice scheme (Agent R). 
Our staff, have a sense of ownership, they take pride in what they do (maintaining their equipment). There is 
loyalty and it helps to motivate them. Not many organisations do that now (Agent R). 
My staff are impeccably dressed, they are better trained, look more professional and are well motivated. This 
improves morale and they do a better job. Contract relationship is also about staff development (Agent M). 
The NHS now invests money to develop purchasing teams to make them more responsive and effective to 
local needs than before. Purchasing has always been a professional business not the past image of 
backroom boys (Agents FG and K). 
Indeed staff development is credited as a reason for contractors' ability to attract and 
retain ancillary staff better than the NHS and has improved the profile of support services 
(Agents I and W). For example: 
The contractors provide employment for their staff, they took over all the ancillary workers here and now they 
train and manage them better if you will (Agent 1) 
They (contractors) operate services all over the country and can get staff and retain them better. Our staff 
vacancy rates and turnover are greatly reduced (Agent 1) 
Developed ancillary staff, have managed to let the public know how important support services are without 
strikes or placards (Agents E and 1) 
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But the in-house managers continue to experience ancillary staff problems and have been 
forced to rely on agency workers or have everyone "muck in to get the job done" (Agents 
BB and DD). Some "don't have proper kitchens to cook for the patients so they eat cook- 
chilled meals and since nobody complains", they assume that the staff and patients are 
satisfied. There is no investment or incentive for the staff. "The catering staff, pay for their 
meals like all other staff members". "Also when we see good staff, we just thank them for 
their work but there is no appreciation here for hard work" (Agent DD and EE). 
Consequently, where services managers invest in staff development and adequate supply 
of equipment there is perceived staff motivation, loyalty and ownership of work. Developed 
staff have improved their profile and enhanced the image of support services to the public. 
There is a perception that managers in Government agencies have been developed into 
professionals to make them more responsive to local needs and more effective in saving 
costs due to the influence and interaction with their "better trained" commercial managers. 
Obviously, this area needs more studies to validate and confirm what is suggested here. 
Investment in management development will be discussed in management theme below. 
Discussion of staff development 
Observers note that investment in training employees to develop their potential with 
requisite skills and knowledge as organisational valuable resource or human capital is 
rewarded by improved competitiveness and enhanced productivity (Hailey et al., 2005; 
Hitt et al., 1994; Savery, 1996). Human capital refers to the appropriability of economic 
value from employee skills, knowledge and experience as internal resources of the firm 
(Becker, 1993; Hailey et al., 2005: 51). Skilled, knowledgeable and experienced staff, are 
better motivated and committed to organisational objectives and can release their skills 
and talent for building corporate capabilities and improving productivity for competitive 
advantage (Cappelli, 2000; Drucker, 1992; Pfeffer, 1998). Such are the knowledgeable 
agents of change who endowed with resources can make a difference and change their 
organisations through innovation, creativity or improved productivity (Giddens, 1984). 
Indeed Drucker (1992: 100) comments that organisations say that people are their most 
valuable resource but none believes it or they will not treat employees as commodities. 
The managers complained that they were sold to the contractors like commodities. Some 
did not wish to join the commercial services providers but they had no choice. While 
services providers have trained, developed and liberated the ancillary workforce from the 
dungeons of the basement into professionals with image and status, not everyone was 
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willing to work in the private sector. Their forced transfer lost some their pension and 
other contributions near their retirement age and till the time of writing they remain lost. 
The neglect of human capital or employee training and development due to lack of 
adequate investment is seen by some as the reason for loss in competitiveness and 
recurrent staff retention problems (Cappelli, 2000; Hailey et al., 2005; Hitt et al., 1994). 
But the contractors who inherited all ancillary staff where services are outsourced are 
acknowledged as having developed their staff, made them more loyal, motivated and 
committed for better performance at delivering support services to their clients. Indeed in 
one hospital, in-house contractors won the support services contract, and developed their 
staff as multi-task generic workers. This is in accordance with shaping services around the 
needs of the patients for improved effectiveness (DoH, 2000; May and Suckley, 2005). 
Although the relationship between human capital and productivity is yet to be proven, 
observers note that a well-trained workforce enhances sales and can reduce production 
costs through reduced absenteeism (better motivated and loyal staff) and learned skills 
incorporated into routines as valuable resources for capability building (Sveiby, 1997; 
Ulrich and Smallwood, 2004). Staff competence becomes non-transferable, unique, firm- 
specific assets for a more efficient production or innovation for wealth creation. This is in 
line with the tenets of resourced based theories where trusts acquire resources they need 
from the external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and through investments, 
develop them into firm specific assets (Teece et al., 1997). Through knowledge transfer 
and learning these developed staff improve their competence and skills (Akbar, 2003; 
Lam, 2000; Seltzer and Bentley, 1999) and hence increase the knowledge base of their 
organisations for building capabilities for comparative advantage and economic rent (Amit 
and Schoemaker, 1993; Huber, 1999; Knight, 2004; Powell, 2001; Winter, 2003). 
Thus this study builds on the literature on resource-based theories in the areas of resource 
acquisition through outsourcing, the building of a more heterogeneous skills base through 
learning and knowledge transfer for sustainable advantage and wealth or profit creation. 
Others note that staff training and development, as intangible assets, are the greatest 
sources of corporate value for competitive advantage (Lev. 2004; Ulrich and Smallwood, 
2004). Such trained staff can make the difference between organisational success and 
failure. From the excerpts, the services providers invested in staff training to develop and 
improve them for better returns. Through the association with commercial managers, 
procurement managers are now developed into professionals to be more responsive and 
213 
effective to the needs of their organisation. Consequently, contractor investments In staff 
training and development enable some services managers review and regard the problem 
of managerial lack of skills and knowledge (skills gap) in new ways leading to the training 
and development of procurement managers as professionals. Thus, contractor investment 
in this area is perceived to have led to returns for them in terms of reduced recruitment 
and retention problems, and made changes in liberating procurement managers from the 
backroom boys to trained, development and more competent managers. It also Improved 
the stock of tacit knowledge and intangible assets of these managers and their trusts 
(more heterogeneous skills base) for comparative advantage. 
Furthermore although downsizing or staff reduction can reduce costs in the short-term, it 
leads to job insecurity, loss of trust, increased employee stress and vulnerability and 
hence reduces productivity and increases managerial risk aversion. The adverse effect of 
downsizing prompted observers to advice organisations to treat employees as resources 
to be maximised not cost to be minimised (Jolly, 2003: 35; Hitt et al., 1994: 41). 
But the contractors have managed to downsize their inherited staff and developed the 
remainder to improve morale and motivate them to do more. Thus downsizing may not 
always lead to loss of trust and job insecurity or increased staff stress and vulnerability. 
Investment in equipment 
The contractors are reported to have invested much in automation and support services 
equipment to bring them up to date with technological improvement. For example: 
The contractors have changed our kitchen services completely from conventional cooking to cook-chill 
(Agent I and K). Cook-chill provides standard products every time (Agents K, X) 
They invested lots of money in equipment and personnel to meet national standards (Agents I and K) 
They invested a lot of money in kitchen equipment especially in the private wings of the hospital (Agent J). 
We revamped the kitchen to bring it up to date with modern cooking (Agents H, L, M 0, S. X). 
We revamped the restaurant to make it a more enjoyable place to eat in (Agents H, L, M, 0, S, X). 
Thus contractors made relation sh ip-specific investment as commitment to better serve 
the needs of their clients and to lengthen their contracts for future streams of revenue. 
5.6.3 Asset-specific investment: 
The importance of asset specificity lies in the perceptions of power to control the 
dependent party. For example one respondent at Theresa hospital said: 
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When we move over to the new building, there will be many challenges and changes. We are moving away 
from a simple catering manager to facilities management and maintenance. The roles will be different but we 
will still be providing all the services and manage the building for the next 38 years so we will still be in 
control (Agent A). 
Special investment to withstand crisis 
There is also a special investment or what agents (F and M) call a financial burden. It is a 
contingency fund that establishes the willingness and ability of the contractor to meet 
natural disasters and continue to provide services. Contractors without it, in spite of their 
financial standing, will not be engaged. For example: 
There is a financial burden, if something happens can you sustain it and keep providing services? If 
conditions change or the set prices go up, we bite the bullet (Agent M) 
The reasons for choosing the present primary contractors are their reputation, financial standing, 
management structure and their ability to withstand and bear added financial risk (Agent F). 
Consequently being able to sustain the added financial burden is also an investment for 
services contractors and enhances their employability and possible retention by clients. 
However some support services managers may have benefited from these investments in 
exchange for dependence on the contractors. 
But at the in-house organisations there was very little investment as they waited on 
Government to fund everything. For example: 
If we have no money to replace equipment, we have to wait until we do" (Agent 1313). Whereas in a contract 
job, getting equipment was as easy as pie because every time a contract finished, we could go and pick up 
any equipment we needed and they were mostly the same as ours if not better. We could also borrow staff 
and equipment from each other. Lots of things were easier and we felt more in control then (Agent 1313). 
Thus while in-house managers wait for Government funding, their counterparts get on 
with the job in hand because they have the equipment and personnel to do the work. 
Discussion on asset-specific investments 
Most of the investment for equipment, refurbishment and meeting financial burden can be 
classed as relationship specific and subject to what Williamson (1996: 106) calls hold-up 
or contractual hazards (uncertainty). This is because they create bilateral dependence 
between transacting agents, increase total transaction costs and shift the behaviour of 
agents towards cooperativeness. Consequently, mal-adaptation costs can be incurred 
during disagreements of the self-interest type or bargaining in contract renegotiations. 
Asset-specific investment is at the core of TCE and increases the complexity of contracts. 
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They can increase the opportunistic tendencies of vendors who Invest for self-interest. 
They reduce the freedom of choice for best alternatives in the outsourced services 
because they increase the contract duration for the contractors. For example, the 
investment of Urn by Areno at Victoria hospital lengthened the contract from five to ten 
years thus tying both parties to a long time of relationship management. They reduce the 
flexibility of clients to respond to changing need when prices are fixed or incur variation 
costs. They introduce significant asymmetry into future contract bids, where the 
incumbent may gain unfair advantage due to investment to exclude other parties (Gander 
and Rieple, 2004: 64). Hence they can increase the switching costs to other vendors 
should contracts fail or major disagreements arise. Asset specific investments alter the 
perception of power balance within contract relationships and involve opportunity costs of 
foregoing other partnering opportunities (Barth6lemy and Qu6lin, 2006; Brennan and 
Turnbull, 1999). However the influence of trust and commitment in valuable relationships 
can make the overt exercise of power, control and domination redundant. But with all the 
negative attributes, asset specific investments provide evidence of vendor commitment to 
a long-term relationship. Thus asset-specific investments force transacting agents to 
manage their interdependent business relationships for enduring mutual benefits. 
These irretrievable investments also involve the adaptation of routines, procedures and 
equipment that increase the commitment of parties to long-term interdependence in what 
Ford (2002: 90) calls the golden cage or ugly prison of business relationships. Hence in a 
world of incomplete contracts, contracts involving asset-specific investments attract other 
governance instruments such as trust and commitment, valuable relationships and the 
expectations of future benefits to ameliorate the constraining effects of asset-specific 
investments. Thus this study confirms the central role of asset specific investments in 
TCE governance framework that has enabled those involved to benefit with fewer in- 
house resources. The study also extends the validity of TCE for the outsourcing of 
support services in order to economise on in-house production. 
5.6.4 Investing for interest 
Contractors have networks of financial institutions and better access to national funds 
(Agents A, 1, M, 0, S, X). However public services managers cannot borrow money as an 
organisation (except foundation trusts) but are always short of money. For example: 
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We cannot borrow money as an organisation but we are always short of money in these old buildings crying 
out for money but the contractors, as private organisations can. That's just the way it works (Agent 1). 
The contractors operate services all over the country and have wider inputs. They have access to national 
funds and resources and can borrow money or get money from the Government and make it available to us. 
They invest for profit, we don't get the money for nothing. There is nothing wrong with making a profit, they 
are in business to make profit. So we have the privilege of having the money we need to function. We get the 
money we need to do the things we want and we pay it back gradually with interest over time (Agent 1). 
The contractors (Builders International) are aggressively in the market place so able to access national 
resources and make them available to the trust (Agent N) 
The contractor investment enables some NHS trusts maintain old buildings and do what 
they want to stay operational, balance their books and repay debt with interest over time. 
But in the in-house operation, where managers must wait for Government funds to 
complete refurbishing, there is no investment and because "we cannot invent a pot of 
money to do what we need to do", project completion is delayed (Agents BB and CC). 
Thus, investing for interest increases contractor revenue and allows some managers to 
access resources from external others to become less dependent on Government funds. 
5.6.5 Investment in facilities 
Some contractors have invested in rebuilding facilities more suitable for their clients either 
through the mini Public Finance Initiative (PFI) or their own investment. For example: 
At the Theresa hospital, the stakeholders said: 
This is what a hospital should look like, clean, airy, roomy and with much needed privacy for patients and 
staff, we can now work better and not step on each other's toe all the time. The changing rooms are the 
best in the bargain, no more having to change into uniforms in cars, toilets, linen cupboards, broom 
cupboards and patient's bathrooms, we have our own place to change in and you can let your hear down 
without disturbing anyone, very good and very thoughtful of the trust, but it must have cost a lot though 
(Agent C). 
Now I come to work with a spring in my step, not the former Oh Lord not that horrible place again, all day 
long (Agent D). 
One contractor said: We are working with the builders to build this new hospital (Agent A) 
At Victoria hospital, an agent said: 
We refurbished the kitchens and canteens with extensions, built two new restaurants as commercial 
ventures Diners'Den and CaM Locate and run them to collect revenue for the trust to offset their massive 
costs (Agent M) 
At County hospital, an agent commented that: 
The Government was not going to fund it (EDC) and we did not have the funds so (contractor investment 
through a 13171) was a way of raising money to build it (Agent N). 
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The lack of maintenance of hospital facilities is shown by this remark: 
The buildings were not refurbished as often as was needed. There was no preventive maintenance years 
ago that should have stopped the rot. Things are better now but much damage was done to the services 
and now we must live with it (Agent BB) 
Some trusts are enabled to acquire facilities fit for the 21't Century, through association 
with contractors who invested in new facilities. The creativity, quality and design of these 
buildings have greatly added value to services offering by improving the morale of the 
workforce, the image of the hospitals and impacting the local communities. 
Contractors also built new facilities at Victoria hospital to help generate revenue for the 
client to offset costs from their enormous deficits. In the bargain, the contractors tie the 
hands of the trusts to lengthy mortgages and earn themselves long-term revenue. But 
contractor investments may have redressed years of neglect in facilities maintenance. 
There is a perception of value creation for economic rent in these exchanges through 
investments (Dyer and Singh, 1998) or the optimisation of client processes to add value. 
It confirms the concept of capital theory (part of market process theory) that profits and 
value reside in the modes of capital application (Kleinaltenkamp and Ehret, 2006). As 
relationships deepen services providers can detect other options for their resources not 
already served or services not supplied and craft to implement a business solution to 
provide the client with superior added value and extraordinary profits for themselves. 
Thus relational exchange becomes a fertile context for economic rent or wealth creation. 
Discussion on investments in facilities 
The advent of the PFI accorded the public sector the opportunity to assess, manage and 
reduce the risk of providing facilities suitable for its core functions (Jones, 2000c; Okoroh 
et al., 2002; Rodney and Gallimore, 2002). For the support services, the PFI enabled the 
services providers extend their remit to major project investment and risk management to 
some clients. For the services managers concerned, it was an opportunity to improve 
their duty of care to their patients, stakeholders and workforce by using vendor resources 
to provide suitable, more flexible and adaptable facilities to avoid business failure and so 
reduce the risk and uncertainty of services provision. In the design build and maintain 
facilities, the NHS trusts concerned also freed up capital by turning financial assets in 
facilities into business services and saving on maintenance costs. These investments 
through the PFI scheme have increased the participation of the private sector in helping 
to provide public services by acting as a catalyst in services redesign (Bosanquet and de 
Zoete, 2006; Walton, 2007). Thus, investment and know-how of contractors in FM 
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became the "sinews of power" (Harding, 1999) that connect and incorporate the PFI 
framework into NHS trusts to help some reduce the uncertainty, risk and cost of providing 
suitable healthcare facilities, while avoiding business failure and costly investments. 
Facilities Management (FM) enables services providers extend the scope of support 
services by bundling support services with facilities management and maintenance 
(Rodney and Gallimore, 2002). FM and real estate management also offer NHS trusts, 
new ways of adding value to support services offerings and solving the problems of 
effective use of business spaces. These give support service managers the opportunity to 
learn how to combine resources (Akbar, 2003; Jamali et al., 2006). For example, 
University College sold its redundant real estate in London to turn its deficit into surplus 
and so profit the trust through resource combination (Gainsbury, 2008). Some managers 
share the control and management of the buildings where they work but do not own. 
The successful management of interdependent relationship helps reduce opportunistic 
tendencies and the complexity of contracts through trust, loyalty and commitment. 
Thus FM extends the opportunity of some services managers to develop in areas of 
resource combination and relationship management to avoid control and power politics. 
The present state of FIVI 
But FIVI is a young discipline with no solid body of theories and few published research 
(Salonen, 2004). It presently relies on general and relationship management literature 
(Ventovuori, et al., 2007). Also, studies in support services are relatively rare (Salonen, 
2004), while those in risk assessment and management are lacking (Alexander, 1992; 
2003; Okoroh et al., 2002; Rodney and Gallimore, 2002). But FIVI and real estate 
management are essential services, offering firms new ways of addressing the problem of 
optimising the use of business office spaces. Consequently there is a challenge to secure 
the future of FIVI as a credible discipline built on strong theoretical foundations dedicated 
to understanding and developing the discipline. There is also need for more research to 
identify best practice and benchmarking worth pursuing (Ventovuorl, et al., 2007). 
This thesis contributes to FM studies in the areas of inter-firm relationships involving FM 
built environments and estate management. It also adds to the literature on innovative 
designs and the change they bring to the workforce and the local community and hence 
accords FIVI providers the role of catalytic agents using their resources and knowledge (as 
inward investment) to bring about change to workers, managers and local communities. 
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Table 5.13 Analysis of Invest ment theme 
Theme Agent's Knowledge base Communication 
code 
Signification F Investment in -One of the reasons for choosing the present 
training ensures primary contractor was their management 
skill, knowledge structure and investment in personnel. It shows a 
and experience in long-term view of the firm for management 
serving customer effectiveness, success and better image 
F, K needs NHS has invested a lot in developing purchasing 
teams to be more responsive and effective today 
Ancillary staff were 
A, E, M bottom of the pile so - The commitment of the MIS trusts to training 
BBSX why train them ancillary staff was very low. There was no point 
-But (contractors) invested a lot in staff training 
A, E, M Trained staff are -Now we have better trained staff especially in 
BBSX more effective in food and personal hygiene, which has direct 
A, E, M responding to effect on all who eat here both staff, patients and 
B, S, X customer needs visitors. Also we do management training 
BBEX Better trained staff -Now my staff are well trained, more motivated 
means better quality They get better uniforms, look more professional 
products and services They have better recognition for what they do. 
R, -We in estates invest a lot of money in staff 
training. The staff have a sense of ownership and 
pride in maintaining their equipment 24/7 
R Bigger specialist -In areas where we do only a few a year, we 
firms invest in staff outsource services because we cannot afford to 
training to do more have trained personnel on site to deal with them 
R Local community -We invest in a snug bus to help our staff and the 
involvement prevents local community with night time transport 
possible disruptions 
R, I, N -Contractors have access to national resources. 
They can borrow money and make it available to 
the trust. We payback over time with interest 
E, H, 1, Relationship-specific -Contractors invested a lot of money in canteens 
K L, M, investments lengthen cafes and revamping the kitchens to raise funds 
0 S, X, contract tenure 
Domination R, I He who has the gold, Contractors can get money from Government for 
makes the rules new buildings but we can't. That's the way it is. 
R, I Worth making effort One benefit of foundation status is the ability to 
to achieve autonomy borrow money and do the things we want to do 
I, K Dependence on Our support services vacancy and turnover rate 
contractors for are greatly reduced due to the contractors 
I, K, M reliable services Support services are critical to this MIS trust 
Legitimation I, Has right to profit via They are in business to make money we know 
annual uplifts in cost that. We don't get their money for nothing_ 
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5.7. Pooled Managerial skill and experience theme 
6.7.1 Introduction 
The concept of management has been studied through different lenses resulting in varied 
views (Handy, 1997). The inability of the classical view of management, to deliver profit 
maximization through formalised control and co-ordination of economic activity, led to the 
search for alternative forms of management (Reed, 1984). These are management as a 
social process aimed at achieving organisational goals (Child, 1972,1997; Dalton, 1959; 
Kotler, 1992; Mintzberg, 1973,1990; Pettigrew, 1973) and management as a resource of 
skilled, educated and knowledgeable professionals using organisational routines and their 
formal authority to effectively neutralise environmental threats and access resources for 
organisational survival and profitability (Kanter, 1989; Kleiner and Roth, 1997; Thompson, 
1967; Uhlenbruck et al., 2003). This pool of skilled and experienced managers are the 
knowledgeable agents of structuration theory (Giddens, 1979,1984) who given access to 
resource can make a difference to their departments, roles, positions and organisations. 
Management process focuses on the power struggles over resource allocation and the 
problems of reconciling different organisational views and diverse and divergent political 
agendas. Consequently, managers become skilled negotiators, (Mintzberg, 1990) adept at 
loosening controls on themselves and tightening them on others (Dalton, 1959) or using 
access to resources to build relationship networks of dependent coalitions for support and 
influence (Kleiner, 2003; Kotler, 199 2; Krackhardt and Hanson, 1993). Some become 
skilled at resource mobilisation for organisational survival (Reed, 1984; Mintzberg 1990). 
Thus, management time and effort are expended on resource mobilisation and group 
manipulation to control and dominate decision-making agenda over resource allocation or 
change processes for the achievement of organisational goals (Perrow, 1986; Hall, 1991). 
But salaried managers were not employed to make decisions on organisational design, 
operations and investments that determine the ability of corporations to compete, grow 
and maybe become successful (Chandler, 1990) -until after the separation of ownership 
from control (Berle and Means, 1932; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Professional -managers were then expected and indeed engaged to discipline and control 
workers (Foucault, 1984) in effective production for the appropriation of surplus value and 
profitability (Burawoy, 1985; Marx, 1990; Stanworth and Giddens, 1974; Wood, 1982). The 
subsequent use of managers in large complex organisations to coordinate economic 
activity and their search for legitimacy helped to justify managerial role as disciplinarians 
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and controllers in support of productive functions in large complex organisations like NHS 
trusts (Britnell, 2004; Famdale and Brewster, 2005; Hailey et al, 2005; Wray-Bliss, 2002). 
Hence the role of services managers as controllers of financial and human resources in 
productive support services to provide better services to their local communities. 
In the context of the NHS, medical consultants control the decision-making agenda and 
outcome, mobilising forces to neutralise decisions, policies and processes regarded as 
detrimental to their autonomy and professionalism (Llewellyn, 2001; Maynard, 2005; 
Thorne, 1997). Consultants and medical managers dominate resource allocation 
decisions through "priority setting" and the inclusion of "wider views" in budgetary 
planning hence such decisions become lost in pluralist agendas (Bachrach and Baratz, 
1962). The refusal of some consultants to engage in medical audits and subsequent 
delay in implementing a uniform information technology across the health service, are 
cases in point (Anderson and Goodman, 2002; Foster, 2005; Haeksma, 2002). Thus the 
support services managers have had an uphill task in dealing with other healthcare 
professionals and managers as other researchers have also noted (Niven et al., 2005). 
However, professional managers were not introduced in the NHS until after the Griffiths' 
Report (1983) which argued that the differences between the public and private sector 
organisations were much overstated. Subsequently, general managers were drawn from 
the private sector (with limited knowledge and experience in healthcare management) into 
the NHS to support and strengthen line management against professional doctors and 
nurses in decision-making and to be more accountable for public funds as better resource 
allocators (Klein, 2001; Pettigrew et al., 1992). This action was seen as a prelude to the 
separation of ministerial control from the daily operational management of individual NHS 
trusts in order to devolve power to frontline staff like support services managers for better 
accountability, transparency and local relevance (Levitt et al., 1999; Lewis, 2005). 
5.7.2 Managers as key to departmental function (Depicted in Table 5.14 below) 
Many managers were perceived as key to support services irrespective of services being 
outsourced or in-house (Agents E, F, G, 1, M, R, Z). For example managers said: 
If the facilities are well managed it make no difference whether they are outsourced or in-house. Depending 
on the size of the operation, the key to it is really management. We are a very big trust so we can afford to 
do things smaller organisations may not be able to do so there is a degree of training involved, affordability 
of trained personnel and the necessary knowledge and equipment to do a better job or give better service 
(economies of scale) and have the technical knowledge to be able to maintain the equipment (Agent R) 
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It all depends on how you manage the service. It is all about having a good clear strong management 
Structure to manage the contracts because you are ultimately responsible for providing the services. If 
You are a very good manager, waste in catering should not be a problem (Agent Z). 
One of the reasons for choosing the present primary contractor Is their management structure. It shows that 
the company is taking a long-term view and is not just out for short-term profit. It is to the advantage of the 
trust to get better value for money through the contractors Investing In management structure. 
So when we tendered the service, we looked at cost and expertise that can benefit the trust (Agent F). 
Experienced and skilled managers care for the customers, project a better company Image and make the 
business more effective and successful (Agent F). 
We went for the best services provider, not the cheapest. It all depends on the management (Agent E) 
From these excerpts the skill, experience and expertise of the managers were regarded 
as key to management and getting value for money that benefits the client organisation. 
5.7.3 Contractors as professional 
Many client managers saw contractors as professionals in their chosen fields doing 
professional jobs with pride and commitment in meeting their contractual obligations. 
For example managers said: 
They know what is expected of them and they are professionals so they take it seriously (Agents I and K) 
Contractors are big conglomerates able to meet the needs of the trust. We interact with them as 
professional and they do a professional job (Agents 1, J) 
The contractors bring a lot of skills and knowledge and they are professionals in their chosen fields (Agent 1) 
They have their pride as professionals, we in purchasing know (Agent K) 
They are very professional and they do a professional job we are satisfied with them. Patients now have 
More choices in food (Agents I and K). We won the best hospital award last week (Agent K) 
Now things are done more professionally than before (Agent E) 
They are professionals and work to set standards. We set rigid standards for them to meet Government 
regulations and we are satisfied with their work (Agent N) 
The contractors also see themselves as experts individually and corporately in their 
chosen fields with the requisite training, skills, knowledge, expertise and experience to 
Meet the contracted needs of their clients or in some cases exceed them. 
For example some managers said: 
It is important to see that people (managers) are properly trained and that they properly serve the needs of 
their customers (Agent F). 
We (contractors) have pooled together a lot of experience here, we have come from different walks of life, 
We are very (very) experienced as purchasing managers, they (the trust members) benefit from what we 
have got, our contacts, knowledge, skills and experience (Agent G) 
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Oh yes we have professional managers who are well trained, they have both technical and managerial 
qualifications some are studying to gain their full diploma or second higher-level management degrees and 
Some are going on to masters degree level (Agent Z) 
As World Agents, we network with others to learn best practice and know who is who In purchasing. 
This is one of the advantages as purchasing contractors to the trust. We advise the facilities manager on 
Matters of commercial interest and best practice. Purchasing has always been a professional business and 
We advise the trust with their commercial purchasing (Agent F). 
We are a catering firm now in facilities management. We are experts in catering services to whosoever from 
Royalty to the man in the street. We believe that we are the best In what we do (Agent M) 
At Premier everyone gets training and you do management training in dispute and learn other things as well 
(conflict management and budgeting) and it is free of charge (Agents H, S and X) 
They employed Areno to bring in customer service rather than having to employ Individual experts. They only 
have to employ one contractor with the knowledge of all the experts within one massive organisation as a 
one-stop shop (Agents M and 0) 
I am trained. I worked in the armed forces as an electrical and mechanical engineer. I then went and trained 
as a chef and worked in many hotels and restaurants in Britain, France, Austria, Italy and got into catering 
management and from there to facilities management. Now I manage the full facilities (Agent M). 
I have worked for World Agents for eight years in different countries but before that I was In the armed forces 
so there is a lot of experience outside purchasing (Agent F). 
I have qualifications in hotel catering and management. I have lots of experience in and out of the NHS, I 
have worked for contractors in the commercial and private sectors and will recommend it to my colleagues 
to help open their eyes and broaden their experience (Agent E) 
was head chef at a hospital in Melbourne before I went in to do the office side of the job. I started to 
understand about budgeting and ordering and slowly moved into where I am today (Agent X) 
I have been in this chair for ten years, as a contract domestic manager for nine years and in and out of the 
NHS so I am qualified and have experience to manage this lot (Agent BB). 
I used to be a cleaner but Premier trained me at night school and now I manage other cleaners (Agent T) 
I have been in the NHS for twenty years having graduated with a degree in public administration. I then 
joined up as a graduate trainee manager in support services. I have had three commercial breaks working 
for public service companies and major hotel chains so I have experienced both sides (Agent Z). 
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5.7.4 Competence of contractors testified 
The ability of services providers to satisfactorily meet the contracted needs of their clients 
Was a testament to their competence. For example some said: 
We adhere to the same Government benchmark of services and standards of service whether outsourced 
or in-house but a good contract manager makes the difference. If you have a good manager you will work 
well, and quickly with them otherwise you will have problems and conflicts and it becomes difficult (Agent 1) 
We have standardised monitoring systems for performance. The star rating Is an issue. But they know what 
is required of them and they take it seriously and meet the needs of the trust (Agent 1) 
They would not have renewed our contract if they were not satisfied with our performance (Agent L) 
We capped all our services within one contract price and transferred a lot of risk to them but they met all the 
needs of the trust. They bring a lot of skills and experience. We are satisfied with them (Agents I and J). 
We have one primary contractor with all the expertise to maintain all our existing contracts and we are 
satisfied (Agents E and F). They bring a lot of skills and experience and we are satisfied (Agent K) 
5.7.6 Skills and knowledge transfer 
The professionalism of the contractors also resulted in skills and knowledge transfer to 
some support services managers in their work. For example some admitted that: 
They are professionals we learn a lot from them, we are now able to see healthcare as a business and keep 
Within our budgets (Agent 1). 
We learn from their network of prudent management to see healthcare as a business (Agent 1). 
The contractors bring a lot of skills and knowledge and they are professionals in their chosen fields (Agent 1) 
Things are done more professionally now we learn a lot from them (Agent E). 
6.7.6 Dependence and control through expertise 
Because of their individual and corporate expertise, services managers perceived their 
dependence on contractors for the smooth running of their support services, which they 
said is critical or vital to effective healthcare delivery. 
For example some managers said: 
On a daily basis, they are dependent on us (contractors), we save them labour and personnel costs, we 
come up with ideas to make them look good, we improve cleaning and performance standards so they get 
better scores, we exceed their expectations (Agent M) 
Hospitals depend on contractors for support on patients' services to continue or the hospitals will grind to a 
halt. Support services are crucial for the smooth running of healthcare delivery (Agent K) 
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They will never be able to do it because of their massive overheads (Agent M). 
Hospitals are dependent on them (contractors) for food and services (Agents J and K) 
Things are done differently now. We provide services to a higher standard than the NHS ever did (Agent A) 
We may be seen as contractors but we are still in control (Agent A and B) 
The contractors have managed to let the public know how important the support services are. Hospitals are 
usually thought of as doctors and nurses, but without the support services, hospitals could not function 
(Agent 1) 
5.7.7 Discussion 
Although services providers are aggressively in the market place and need no introduction 
from anyone (Agent N). There are certain criteria for choosing suitable ones. For example 
some were chosen on their reputation and credibility, which they guarded jealously, their 
financial standing or the ability to withstand a financial crisis and previous performance but 
mostly on the strength of their management structure as stated above. This was evidence 
of their commitment to long-term service of value to their clients. They are regarded as 
expert professionals and they perceive and regard themselves as such. The contractor 
managers come recommended due to their skills, experience, know-how and corporate 
reputation from all walks of life with diverse experiences they can transfer to their client 
Managers. 
To be a competent professional entails lengthy education, prolonged training and 
apprenticeship. Having served the requisite time and become approved by peers and 
officially accredited, professionals gain experience in their chosen fields to become 
proficient in the know-what, know-how and know-why of knowledge. Consequently, the 
knowledge, skill and experience of the services provider managers enable them to regard 
themselves and be regarded as professionals. Their professionalism is subject to ethical 
code of conduct that reduces the performance risk of sub-optimal service delivery and the 
relational risk of opportunism. Thus the support services managers involved have the 
Opportunity to acquire skills, knowledge and expertise from their vendors to enable them 
negotiate with other healthcare professionals in resource allocation and decision-making. 
There is a lack of leadership and financial management skills in the NHS, which has been 
blamed for their financial problems (House of Commons, 2003; Kmietowicz, 2006). The 
transfer of 
* 
knowledge, skills and commercial acumen from providers to services managers 
is helping to meet this need and improved the financial standing of some trusts enough to 
attain foundation status (Timmins, 2007a). Furthermore, the lived experiences of these 
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managers from diverse works of life and their role help to structure their experiences and 
perceptions in their jobs. The vital role of support services is acknowledged, as Is the 
importance of good contract managers. Both have evolved in the context of refocusing on 
core competence, the outsourcing of support functions and the need to access scarce 
resources from the commercial sector for mutual benefits. Thus, managers have become 
change agents (Drucker, 2004; Handy, 2000; Jennings, 2005; Senge, 1999), using the 
power of agency and the opportunity accorded by support services outsourcing to change 
their roles, positions and departments through learning and professional conduct to 
improve the image and status of support services and add value to patientst offerings. 
Most of their clients are satisfied with their performance and renewed their contracts. At 
the time of writing no contractor has lost his contract. Managers as professionals with the 
knowledge to perform effectively use communication to inform all concerned, set priorities 
for action and so strengthen their relationships for improved services (Barnard, 1938). 
Meetings are also used to solve problems to prevent damage to relationships through 
conflict (Drucker, 2004) and reduce wastage through duplication of services. 
Both client and vendor managers draw on the resources of their respective organisations 
(Giddens, 1984) to enable them listen, negotiate, and successfully prioritise and exploit 
opportunities and implement decisions (Drucker, 2004) to get the job done and obtain the 
scarce resources needed to reproduce organisational resources. Consequently, support 
services outsourcing investment in managerial expertise can be said to prove beneficial to 
services managers through professionalism and effective performance of the provider 
managers in coordinating activities to meet the contracted needs of the trusts. This 
confirms the tenets of the effectiveness of executive managers (Barnard, 1938) and the 
knowledgeability of agents in structuation theory (Giddens, 1984) as what they know and 
what they can do (Pleasants, 1999) to bring about changes (Kaspersen, 2000). 
Indeed in some trusts, the client managers allow the services providers the freedom 
to provide services within the agreed specification. This is in line with the tenets of 
professional experts not requiring external control to function effectively (Giddens, 1984; 
Stephen and Pollitt, 1994; Weighman, 1996). Thus, their long-term relationships have 
endured with built-in trust and mutual respect to reduce the overt use of power and control. 
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But the client managers perceive themselves as being dependent on contractors for 
effective healthcare delivery through a more reliable and continuous support services. 
It has been established that the contractors have the power over the scarce resources 
needed for support services delivery. These are financial, expert know-how, knowledge 
and skills and in some cases, control over the facilities of operation. But the client 
managers also have authoritative power at their disposal. Consequently, both parties to 
interaction negotiate and agree on ways of meeting their objectives without resorting to 
power plays and organisational politics. Thus control is shared through interdependence 
using discretion and consensus in place of power or control for mutual benefits. 
This study adds to the literature on successful inter-firm relationships, contributing to the 
debate on power and how those in contractual outsourcing relationships have managed to 
contain it for mutual benefit (Zukin, 1991). Thus, there is learning and knowledge transfer 
from the vendor managers to client managers who are being developed as professionals. 
Observers watch to see if a bureaucratic organisation like the health services can become 
a learning organisation (Jamali et al., 2006; O'Hara et al., 1996; Senge, 1990,1999) with 
the new partnership culture for comparative advantage (Reeve and Warren, 2004; Schein, 
2004). Consequently, this study goes beyond the concepts of structuration theory and the 
requirements of effective executives to liberate services managers from backroom boys to 
knowledgeable agents coordinating hotel services activities and professionals able to 
negotiate with other healthcare professionals (Niven et al., 2005) in decision-making 
involving the effective use of scarce human and financial resources. 
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Table 5.14 Analvsis of Pooled Managerial skill and experience theme 
Theme Agents Knowledge Communication 
code base 
Signification E, R, I Expertise is -If facilities are well managed, it makes no difference 
the key whether it is outsourced or in-house 
-The key to it is management 
-We outsource services where we don't have expertise 
in-house to maintain them 
-There is a degree of training involved 
-There is constant knowledge updating and keeping up 
with technology 
-When trained personnel are in place then you can 
benefit from economics of scale 
-Experts have the necessary knowledge, equipment and 
better facilities to do a better job or give better service 
-They have technical knowledge to maintain equipment 
-The key to a good contract is a good contract manager 
E, 1, K, -They bring a lot of skills and knowledge as 
professionals in their chosen fields 
E, F -The present contractors were chosen for reputation 
past performance, and management structure 
H, S, X -All Premier managers have training 
EMRZ -I am trained to manage the full facilities 
LMOS -We do a professional job 
TX 
G Experience & -We have pooled together a lot of experience here 
Know-how -We capped all our services, transferred a lot of risks to 
them and they met the needs of the trust 
-Our staff canteens are based on commercial ventures. 
-They manage them, provide us with income to offset 
our costs 
J, K -They recruit and manage their own staff very well 
F -We engage a contractor with expertise to maintain all 
our existing contracts 
G -We are more commercially aggressive and we are here 
to save them money-that's the bottom line 
A, B -We provide a higher standard of service than the NHS 
1, K, W Skills transfer -We learn a lot from them especially commercial skills 
N -1 have learrit a lot from contractors during negotiations 
A, B, H -Su2port services is changing in ways managers work 
Domination E, K, R Dependence -Hospitals depend on contractors for food and services 
M -They depend on us to supply support services 
Commercial -We maybe contractors but we are in control 
A, B Know-how/ -They are professionals but we manage them because 
we get complaints 
Legitimation M Rights and -We exceed our clients expectations 
I 
I 
obligations -They met all the needs of the trust 
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5.8 Innovation theme 
5.8.1 Introduction 
Global competitive environment demands that firms use scarce resources like funds, 
personnel and expertise more efficiently and effectively to retain a competitive edge and 
profitability (Osborne and Brown, 2005). Commercial services providers routinely innovate 
to stay ahead of the competition in providing such services to more clients and hence 
increase their profits. One aim of support services outsourcing was for a more efficient and 
effective utilisation of such resources. Innovation is an opportunity to exploit the vendor 
resources to creatively produce something novel and new to benefit customers (patients 
and clients). Thus by association, innovation in food and services is implicit in the supply of 
support services to hospital trusts for mutual benefits. 
Innovation is a specific form of change, radical, transformational, disruptive yet creative, a 
many faceted approach that can meet new needs in services, products or processes 
(Christensen et al., 2004; Henry and Mayle, 1991; Jolly, 2003; Osborne and Brown, 2005). 
Hence organisations both public and private engage in innovation to meet customer need. 
Innovation means different things to different people and at different times (Innovation, 
2002: 42). In short it is difficult to define but seen as the ability to turn creative ideas into 
commercial reality that meet changing needs (Christensen et al., 2004; Innovation, 2002; 
Seltzer and Bentley, 1999). Innovation is the life blood of development or upgrades (Jolly, 
2003: 27; Morita, 1992), central to wealth creation, driven by challenges to widen business 
scope, increase customer choices, meet latent demands or add value to market offerings 
(Innovation, 2002). Innovation is about profitability, economic growth, gaining competitive 
advantage and success in the market place (Jolly, 2003; Osborne and Brown, 2005). It is 
productive change, discontinuous with the past and said to be 10% inspiration 90% 
acquisition, changing values and creating employment (Kanter, 1983). It is also about 
creating surprise by doing something different or in a different way through the Interaction 
between material, technology and the organisation (Harding, 2005). Thus, organisations 
are driven differently, to innovate or improve through continuous adaptation. 
In the health service where budgets are perennially tight, specialisation and professional 
tribes rife, there are many obstacles to change hence innovation that is radical and 
destructive yet creative in meeting the changing needs of patients can overcome the 
barriers to meaningful change and progress in support services and in the organisation. 
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Thus contractor innovation has been the force driving change and innovation in hotel 
services. By the aid of services providers, many services managers found new ways of 
raising revenue, delivering care, serving food like the executive chef menus and cleaning 
with A-plus equipment to better meet the changing needs of their patients or departments. 
5.8.2 Reasons for innovation (Analysed in table 5.15 below) 
Innovation can stem from chance observation of a need. For example the visitors' caf6 at 
Victoria hospital was a chance observation that visitors prefer places to meet with patients 
and relatives and chat rather than use staff canteens (open to the public). This 
observation spurned two caf6s and two commercial ventures, Diners'Den and Caf6 
Locale, which are now in town making money for the contracted firm. The new caf6s also 
provide revenue for the trust and help them to offset their total costs. This Is shown as: 
We created two new restaurants, two new commercial ventures, Diners'Den and Caf6 Locale for them and 
come up with other ideas to make them look good. We look after them. They are our clients (Agent M) 
The same idea has been incorporated at County (Agent 0) and Karena hospitals (Agents 
I and K) with success. Thus services managers in partnership with commercial services 
providers are enabled to mobilise provider's scarce resources of investment for innovation 
to generate revenue for their trusts and increase provider's profit or reputation. 
The idea for Cafý Novo here came from Victoria. We have Diners' Den there and we provide the same 
service here. Visitors like it because staff canteen is upstairs and some people prefer it down here (Agent 0). 
Our coffee shop for visitors' restaurant and staff canteen are based on commercial ventures. The contractors 
manage them to provide us with income to offset our total costs (Agents I and K) 
Services providers collaborate to enhance the profile and profitability or meet the 
changing need of their client in order to retain their custom or enhance their own 
reputation. This was'the case at Theresa Hospital, where one services provider said: 
We are working with the builders to build this new hospital with creativity and imagination In mind 
It will be the flagship of the hospital and we are a part of it (Agent A). 
Government agencies also have to find new ways of helping trusts function better or lose 
their relevance. For example: 
PASA now has electronic catalogues as well as hard copies so we can keep records and see what we are 
ordering (Agent K) 
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Commercial services providers need the edge provided by innovation to win new contracts 
to increase their influence or retain existing ones. For example: 
We may be on site and have been up and down with the client but It Is the Innovation that helps us win new 
bids so we keep at it (Agent 0) 
You have to know how to cope with the new things that the trusts want done, that Is the challenge (Agent 0) 
Clients expect innovation from services provider. For example: 
We look to the soft FM (support services) contractors for innovation in food and services. There are things 
that the trust feels a moral obligation to do even though they are contracted out (Agent R). 
Innovation is seen as a benefit from support services outsourcing. For example: 
The main benefit 
, 
of outsourcing to this trust is innovation. We may know what we need as an organisation 
but the contractors have visions and views of how they can provide more services and do it better with wider 
input and more sources of supply than we ever did (Agent 1). 
They (contractors) come up with ideas to help us achieve our goals (Agent 1) 
There are more patient choices in food especially on the private wing of the hospital (Agent K) 
I think that Assured is doing a better job than when I was in the N HS. They are getting the latest products to 
the patients. It helps to give patients a choice and to reduce possible wastage (Agent X). 
There are new products coming through from Assured. I think the next few years will be Interesting (Agent X) 
Premier has a business edge that comes through in the services they provide (Agent X). 
We revamped the restaurant and made it a more enjoyable place to eat (Agent X) 
Food wise -1 don't think that there are masses of changes with the NHS but there is more innovation with 
Assured. Ideas come in to help patients get better service through Assured. On this site we have a green 
acre garden a kind of a la carte for the children to get better choice of menu. There Is a housekeeper on site 
to cook it straight for them no matter what time of day (Agent X) 
This place was a dump when we came here. Not just here at Featherstone but at the other hospital wings 
too. But look at it now, no more buckets and mops, no chemicals either. We implemented the new (Al -plus) 
special group of cleaning equipment. We use linco machines with microfibre cloth to clean and polish floors 
in public areas in no time at all, very efficient and saves labour cost. The hospital is cleaner and more 
hygienic (Agent T) 
The new floor we built are padded and softer so our feet don't ache from walking all day and night, very good 
for nurses and doctors and for cleaners too (Agent T) 
We also have the electronic palm pilot for monitoring cleaning areas, which makes it consistent every time 
because it is standardised. We work with the times and make the place more hygienic. (Agent T) 
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We have this new catering steam simplicity dishes you just microwave and it retains its taste and flavour 
even though it is cook-chilled (Agent S) 
All our cleaning equipment and cloths are electronically marked so they are automatically returned to 
designated areas and not lost or cross used like before (Agent T) 
Other benefits from outsourcing seen as innovation: 
There is a special vacuum machine that sucks up broken glass or medical waste so cleaning Is easier and 
contamination or cross infection of staff is reduced. Then there is the microfibre flat cleaning cloth. It Is new, 
not disposable but has disinfectant incorporated in it so no more chemicals and buckets for toilets or dirty 
areas. Cleaning with this cloth, we can kill 99% of the bacteria in those places so it Is good for Premier and 
the cleaners. It is really good for cleaning and does it in less time so we have less staff to do the work and 
do it better. It helps with hospital infection (no MRSA here so we keep out of the news media) (Agent T) 
There are new automatic washing machines with computerised correct temperature for all kinds of soiled 
linen and equipment so no more cross infection while cleaning laboratory areas or washing out the rags and 
cleaning cloth we use (Agent T) 
We seem to have created a multicultural environment in this trust, which has its many challenges and 
problems so we work with contractors like Assured to make changes that we feel will make a difference and 
improve patients' experience through the trust. Years ago patients could get by with sandwiches and tea for 
lunch but not any more. The multicultural patients we have here demand certain diets that only 
professionals like Assured can consistently provide so we work with them to make that possible (Agent V) 
These excerpts reflect the variety of benefits managers perceived they received as 
innovation from support services outsourcing. Since the managers regard these as 
innovation, they are treated as such. However in some trusts, there was limited innovation 
because they Were in an interim period as the agents explained: 
There is no innovation here since we aim to close this site in four years and move into a brand new building 
but we have protected meal times and celebrity chef dishes for the patients (Agents A and B). 
Discussion 
Many managers in the contracted support services perceived that the contractors have 
brought innovation in food, services, new ventures to generate revenue and new facilities 
with alternative ways of working as a consequence of support services outsourcing. Some 
trusts outsourced for or expected innovative services from the contractor and got them. 
Thus innovation can be regarded as an extension of contractual relationship benefits. 
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Many managers reported working as teams in a spirit of partnership with the commercial 
operators. Team spirit and partnership provide the special environment for innovation to 
thrive (Christensen et al., 2004; Kanter, 1983). It allows the cross-fertilisation of ideas for 
problem solving to enable creativity to flourish. Innovative staff must be allowed to explore 
possibilities, spend time to imagine, take risks, experiment and be allowed to fail without 
ridicule (Jolly, 2003: 34; Innovation, 2002). Through constant communication, managers 
negotiate, agree on consensus and implement their agreements and find new ways of 
providing support services to their trusts to meet the ever-changing needs of customers 
and save on total costs or generate revenue to reduce their perennial deficits. 
The contractors must continuously innovate to stay ahead of the competition, avoid 
obsolescence, win new contracts or increase their areas of influence, maintain reputation 
and increase profits to retain their competitive edge (Drucker, 1998; Osborne and Brown, 
2005). To spur them on in the race to innovate, some contractors coined slogans to this 
effect. For example, Assured has "unlock the problem and make it happen" showing their 
focus on problem-solving while NHS motto should read "refer to higher authority and if in 
doubt, deny everything". This reflects their lack of accountability and constant reliance on 
higher authority positions. Consequently, a confident "can do attitude" (Agents M and 0) 
with the ability to take initiative and shun inertia (seen as enemy of innovation) can turn 
creative ideas into innovation. Thus an environment of team spirit and partnership for 
mutual benefit does support innovation and enable creative ideas to grow and flourish. 
The creativity, combination of materials from complementary assets of services providers 
and their clients, technology and know-how have creatively produced something different 
in new ways of doing things. For example, domestic workers were content cleaning with 
wet mops, rags and dusters till the new A-11 Plus equipment from Premier arrived and 
displaced wet cleaning, mopping and media attention on hospital infections especially at 
Featherstone hospitals. Now Karena hospital has adopted the "linco-machine" that cleans 
and polishes and needs less people to clean the same square meter of floor space. Thus 
new products resulting from innovation can displace outmoded ones and spurn its own 
usage beyond its origins. 
In the in-house operations there was very little sign of innovation but they incrementally 
improved services. This may be because the health service has been described as the 
embodiment of stability, conformity and continuity, being welded to political timetable of 
quick fixes, under constant financial pressures hence favouring only episodic incremental 
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and adaptive or non-disruptive changes (Moore, 1992; Osborne and Brown, 2005; 
Pettigrew et al., 1992). This maybe because most people in the NHS believe that they 
work in it (security of tenure) while contract workers work for their private commercial 
company and must prove themselves (by meeting contract obligations). Consequently, 
contractor workers have more ownership of their activities (due to incentives and no 
blame culture) than in some trusts, where people focus on their job levels and keep their 
heads low, out of the firing line hoping that the torrent fads of change may pass them by. 
Although innovation has benefited some trusts beyond the confines of their origin, as in the 
adoption of new ventures (caf6 Novo) and A-1 Plus cleaning equipment, the contractors 
lengthened their contract period through protracted mortgages or investments or both and 
aim to earn longer streams of revenue. Thus innovation can be a double-edged sword 
cutting both ways for most managers but mostly benefiting private contractors (Day, 2007). 
Innovation also entails costs as unintended consequences. 
5.8.3 Cost of innovation 
Although organisations that innovate reap rewards in increased business scope and 
customer choices or added value for competitive advantage, there is a cost to innovation. 
Innovation in hotel services such as cook-chill (frozen food) and the A-plus cleaning 
equipment have led to jobs losses and de-skilling of cooks (Barley, 1990; Wood, 1982). 
Although these creative ideas enable domestic staff improve hospital cleanliness or 
uniformity of food served to patients, their constraining effects on ancillary workers can 
reduce their social value hence themes, like innovation with beneficial outcomes can also 
exhibit unintended outcomes detrimental to a section of society like ancillary workers. 
The effect of the job losses has been mitigated by ancillary staff job mobility within the 
health services and the ability of contractors to transfer staff wherever in the world they 
happen to have contracts. But the in-house ancillary workers have no such options. 
Consequently many trusts benefit from their partnership with commercial contractors in 
new ways of working (new facilities), new ways of revenue generation (new ventures) and 
improved food and services to meet the changing needs and tastes of multi-cultural 
patients. But such benefits can be marred by unintended consequences of job losses. 
Another unintended consequence of innovation is perceived dependence of the client 
managers on their services providers since they have lost in-house skill, knowledge and 
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know-how to provide their own services. The loss of jobs and deskilling of cooks, cleaners 
and ancillary personnel forces some to change jobs or be moved to where contractors 
have other contracts. But the trusts that outsourced services were not disappointed with 
their overall benefits gained. Thus this thesis adds to the literature on the benefits and 
costs of innovation this time in the context of pubic sector support services, 
5.8.4 Innovation in facilities 
FM innovative open plans turn real estate into tools that can be used to improve business 
results and achieve objectives (Jones, 2000c; Okoroh et al, 2002). This is done through 
revenue generation from dormant spaces, new ventures like canteen and change In work 
place relationships and'working environment. The improvement in work places inspires 
workers to give of their best and improve the support to the core function of the NHS, and 
their accountability to public funds (Alexander, 2003). FM designs also improve health 
and safety and reliability of facilities as well as customer satisfaction (Drucker, 1998). It 
enables private investors assume responsibilities for risk assessment and its minimization 
in support of organisational effectiveness and business transformation (Linder et al., 
2002). Thus FM services are beneficial to some services managers and their trusts. 
FM built environment promotes change by providing a facilitating environment for task 
performance and fostering mutual staff interaction and collaboration for more effective 
work (Alexander, 2003; Ilozor et al., 2002). They are of low cost to trusts and offer them 
the flexibility of adapting them into more suitable facilities without relocation. The case of 
Department of Social Services (DSS) sited by Jones (2000c), and Theresa hospital in this 
study are testaments to this. Thus FM built environment can enable some public sector 
managers achieve quality, innovation, cost savings, revenue generation and 
distinctiveness in affordable and deliverable facilities (Clews, 2005; Walton, 2007). 
5.8.6 Other areas of change 
The shift in ideology from state sponsored to commercial partnership has spurned change 
and organisational transformation in outsourced support services beyond their department 
into other areas of the trusts. For example, there is more private-public sharing of medical 
facilities to share costs, utilise capacity and improve quality of patient care. In the trusts 
with new facilities, the patients have more privacy, better food choices and frontline staff 
have less patients to deal with due to contraction in bed capacity to achieve better privacy. 
Some services managers have imbibed the ethos of seeing healthcare as a business 
instead of a perennial cost to the national purse. 
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Table 5.15 Analvsis of Innovation theme 
Theme Agent's Knowledge base Communication 
code 
Signification E, I, K Cook-chill provides -Contractors helped change our kitchen service 
standard products from conventional type to cook-chill to suit the 
every time needs of the trust 
E -Patients are less forgiving now. They want their 
meals hot and on time more than they want their 
doctors or painkillers so cook-chill mects the need 
A Innovation through -We (contractors) arc working with the builders to 
partnership build this new hospital facility with a lot of 
creativity to make it the flagship of the hospital 
A, B -We can't embark on creative ideas while waiting 
to close this hospital and move into the new one 
H Commercial -There is the new Nevitto canteen we nurtured 
ventures help here. They are at many petrol stations nationwide 
M, 0 generate revenue -Diners' Den and cafd Locale are doing well 
Coffee shops have been included to serve visitors 
I, J, K -Our staff and guest dinning services are based on 
commercial ventures to provide us with revenue 
to offset our total costs 
I Contractor's creative -The main benefit of outsourcing in this trust is 
know-how innovation. 
I acknowledged We may know what we want but contractors have 
visions and ways of providing more and better 
I services with wider input than we ever did 
-They (contractors) come up with creative ideas to 
help us achieve our goals 
I, J, Commercial -Contractors advice us on new ways of estate 
Knowledge transfer management to increase income to offset costs 
1, J, N -Our unused spaces are rcntcd out for income 
F, K, Z Government agency -PASA helps us with new ways of tendering and 
is also creative purchasing to save money. There are now on-line 
templates in line with European standards 
M, 0 -We innovate and push the business forward. We 
created the Cafd Locale as our brand for visitors 
who don't like to use the patients or staff canteen 
T Creative automation -We created A-1 Plus cleaning equipment for the 
can reduce staff levels trust and the new carpets to relieve aching feet 
S, x Contractors innovate -1 don't think that there are changes in the NHS 
for competitive edge but new ideas come in all the time from Assured 
to help patients get better service 
ABO X -New menu system gives patients a choice and 
helps to reduce possible wastaEc 
Domination S, X Food companies Premier is the biggest food company in the world 
should dominate with a business edge and the latest products 
provision of food No good having medical people messing about 
and services withproviding food for the patients and staff 
Legitimation I, R Contractors obliged We look to the contractors for innovation in food 
to innovate for profits and services to meet needs and avoid complaints 
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Indeed, some support services managers and their chief executives are now commercially 
aware. They no longer see profit making in the NHS as anathema to the ethos of a public 
service like the NHS (Vize, 2008). For example, the chief executive of University College 
Hospital and his managers assisted by their contractors have managed to dispose of their 
redundant real estate in a prime site in central London to turn their deficits into surplus and 
make a profit (Gainsbury, 2008). Perhaps this is why the said chief executive, Robert 
Naylor, was knighted (Evans, 2008). Managers have become financially prudent as their 
trusts are poised for foundation status (Featherstone and Karena hospitals) while Theresa 
Hospital has proven its prudent use of resources and attained foundation status. 
The financial prudence of some chief executives, who have led their NHS trusts to gain 
foundation status has been recorded (Goldman, 2005). This same financial prowess has 
enabled the same chief executive to succeed in acquiring and absorbing a failing hospital 
and turning it into an operational one (Santry, 2008). This chief executive, with decades of 
experience of the health service succeeded, where teams from the private sector but 
devoid of the intricacies of the health services, failed. Consequently, managers already 
versed in the operations of the health service can succeed in turning around failing trusts, 
given the transfer of knowledge in the form of financial prudence and commercial ethos. 
The "revolution" in healthcare facilities design and accomplishment enhanced the local 
landscape transformed some trusts'working relationships and mobilised community spirit 
as currency for legitimacy and relevance to their local hospitals. For example, FM built 
environment has won the (LIFT) award in Excellence in building healthier communities 
(Bradshaw, 2008) and the prestigious (CABE) award for architectural design, innovation 
and excellence at its facility at County hospital (one of the hospitals in this study). 
But the redesign of new healthcare facilities has aided new working relationships and 
forced some workers to relocate, resulting in leavers and joiners for improved services. 
Cultural considerations, design and serendipity have also forced changes in dominant 
values and beliefs to redistribute organisational power and control and confer legitimacy to 
subordinates. For example, there is now a change in the perception of some dominant 
groups regarding procurement managers and their workforce. These erstwhile underdogs 
of the health service, regarded as being at the bottom of the skills heap are now treated 
with some respect (Restell, 2008). 
The culture of some trusts studied has also changed to include team-working partnerships 
and less caustic blame that has been the bane of the health service for so long. 
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The support services staff have been trained, educated and developed as intangible 
assets of their organisations able to generate higher efficiency and productivity for them. 
The resultant increase in knowledge and expertise and the professional standing of 
managers and workers add value and help to move their trusts towards knowledge 
organisations to further enhance their image and reputation. Hence some services 
managers are now able to effectively and efficiently deploy human and financial resources 
for their departments through better financial capital utilisation and perform better. Thus 
this small study has evolved to unravel some of the documented conditions for change, 
power for control and domination, organisational regeneration or transformation and 
community renewal with enhanced public image of support services and their Institutions. 
But the in-house operators have not made meaningful changes during this study perhaps 
due to HR dominant coalitions blocking the financing of changes through political intrigue 
and agenda setting and filtering of environmental information that sees most contractors 
as risky, unreliable and problematic or their cash constraints and tight budgets. These 
activities and conditions derail change efforts due to agents' inability to mobilise enough 
transformative capacity to overcome dominant oppositions. Thus, the management of 
organisational politics, managerial skills, access to cash and the ability of agents to draw 
on appropriate rules and resources for mobilising power become prerequisites for lasting 
change, organisational transformation and possible community renewal. 
The unintended consequences common to all outsourced services are firstly the deskilling 
of cooks who will no longer be "roasting joints of beef and lamb or grilling big trays of fish 
and chicken but will be handing out ready cooked and chilled meals". Thus de-skilled chefs 
need motivating, encouraging and supporting during these changes till they can be found 
something more suitable or reassigned. Secondly, ancillary staff inherited by contractors 
were streamlined and trained to be more effective through active but friendly supervision 
(agents P and Q) in order to reduce total costs. Automation led to total staff reduction and 
reassignment of duties or unemployment with the attendant human pain and misery. 
But through it all services managers confess that the changes since services outsourcing 
have helped them to improve support services for better clients (patients) satisfaction. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
This last chapter attempts to draw the threads together without repeating what has been 
discussed in detail in the previous chapters. This thesis has been an enjoyable journey of 
discovery illuminated by the evolving patterns of change and perceptions of power In the 
selected support services studied. This reaffirms the decision to recast the thesis In the 
light of the predominant issues of change and liberation as perceived by those directly 
involved. The highlights of these changes are made through relationship investments 
resulting in institutional, personal and community changes. For instance, relationship- 
specific investments made by services providers in different outsourced services enabled 
them refurbish kitchens, canteens and provide caf6s for visitors. From these canteens and 
caf6s much needed revenue was generated for those concerned to offset their costs while 
refurbished kitchens became a more pleasant work environment for improved services. 
Investment in ancillary staff training equipped them with skills and knowledge and gave 
some the confidence to venture outside the confines of the drudgery of manual labour into 
frontline services and so improve their job mobility. Services managers also gained skills 
and experience in negotiations and conflict management and commercial matters while 
capital project investments have changed some community landscapes. These findings 
strengthen and support the notion that knowledgeable agents differentially endowed with 
access to resources (investments) can maximize their transformative capacity to intervene 
in pre-existing state of affairs and make a difference to change their earning power, role, 
organisation or perceived power differential and help to transform their local community. 
Furthermore support services were outsourced to solve problems of resource scarcity 
such as ancillary staff retention, lack of expertise or managerial skills. In return many 
outcomes elicited from this study suggest that services outsourcing is beneficial beyond 
resource acquisition, cost savings and some services managers' expectations. Thus the 
economic uncertainty and resource vulnerability that necessitated support services 
outsourcing, the innovativeness and ingenuity of commercial services providers and the 
agential capacity of services managers have acted co-determinedly to achieve a bundle of 
benefits for possible comparative advantage. These findings also support and strengthen 
the use of resource acquisition theories in the context of the public sector. 
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The theoretical and empirical conclusions, which can be drawn from this research, are 
discussed in the sections below. They begin with implications for theory and areas for 
future research through to management applications and concluding remarks. 
6.2 Implications for theory 
The empirical findings from this study support the conviction of other writers that social 
research has a broad mandate and no one single lens can be expected to inform all the 
relevant issues (Stones, 2005; Williamson, 1996). But by using multiple complementary 
theories many aspects of the subject under study can be illuminated. For example, support 
services were outsourced in search of cost containment and resource acquisition. These 
areas involve theories of decision-making for outsourcing (not dealt with in this study since 
the decision to outsource services was already made for those directly involved), resource 
acquisition theories for accessing resources and transaction cost economics as a suitable 
governance structure for economising on total transaction costs. 
But resource acquisition theories are criticised for being silent on how to use the acquired 
resources to build capabilities for comparative advantage. Similarly transaction cost 
economic is criticised for focusing on economising alone while neglecting the value adding 
nature of business relationships and alliances. Consequently it is left to interaction model 
(IMP) to illuminate the study on the value of business relationships while structuration 
theory puts agents centre stage as knowledgeable and having both authoritative and 
allocative capacity to make a difference and bring about change and transformation. 
The complementary nature of these theories comes to the fore in this study. The result 
findings validate their combined use and advance the usage of some of them. For instance 
the results confirm the suitability of resource acquisition theories in a public sector context 
and show how complementary resources can be combined to build capabilities through 
skills and knowledge transfer, learning and innovation. Transaction cost economics has 
sensitised agents towards hybrid arrangements for economising on total transactions and 
adding value. Similarly, the tenets of interaction model (IMP) have been advanced to add 
value through business relationships over and above acquiring resources and support 
through networks and safeguarding of specific investments. Structuration theory has been 
shown as a valid and appropriate tool for analysing complex data. Its concepts of power 
and change enabled me understand to explain the underlying structures hidden in the 
perceptions and voiced experiences of respondents. 
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Thus this small study has advanced the concepts of structuration theory from a sensitisIng 
device of action to a theory of change and liberation. 
Figure 6.1 Conceptual Framework of power flows 
(Providers) (Clients) 
Allocati 
Powe 
Confracting relationships of 
mutual trust and commitment 
Transformative 
Power of interaction 
uthoritative 
Power 
10% outsourced (in-House) 
Feel management pressure 
Outcomes 
100% outsourcbd 
Feel in control 750/o"outsourced 
Feel in control 
Key: 
p, Lines of outsourcing outcomes 
4-4- Lines of power flows 
Theoretical discussion 
50% outsourced 
Feel in control 
Power is ubiquitous and no relationship is independent of its subtle effect due to resource 
asymmetry. The concepts of power are evident in this study. For instance, the support 
services managers possess the authoritative power to outsource services or keep them in- 
house. Those in 10% outsourced services chose to keep services in-house. Consequently, 
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the in-house services managers interviewed complained of management pressure In the 
use of their budget and staff discipline. There was minimal change in this sector but they 
had stability and were able to be flexible in controlling costs and quality of services. 
But in the 50% -100% outsourced services, managers felt they were in control and not 
under pressure. Although there was visible management, workers had freedom of work 
movement and were not under pressure. Through interaction these managers were willing 
to share their authoritative power and combine it with the allocative power of the services 
providers to realise the transformative capacity for change and liberation. Consequently, 
there are tangible changes in all three sectors. For example, there are changes in the 
physical environment at Theresa hospital (100% outsourced) and County hospital (75% 
outsourced) where services managers in association with the contractors own and 
manage the facilities in which the hospitals operate from. Thus liberating the erstwhile 
ancillary workers from manual labour to possessors of built environment fit for the 21 ,, 
Century. Theresa hospital is also liberated from budgetary deficits and the dictates of 
Strategic Health Commissioners through foundation status. Consequently, the findings of 
this study suggest that the ideological change of NHS managers being able to operate like 
their commercial counterparts in the use of human and financial resources can be realised. 
The image and reputation of support services and facilities management have been 
enhanced. In the outsourced services, ancillary staff have been trained and equipped with 
skills and knowledge as professionals in support services. Services managers have also 
gained insight into commercial ethos, negotiation and conflict management to add value to 
their institutions and are enabled to compete with other health service professionals. There 
is a "revolution" in healthcare facilities design and accomplishment seen at Theresa and 
County hospitals. These new buildings have helped to transform the local landscape and 
mobilised community spirit as currency for support and legitimacy for their local hospitals. 
Furthermore, the re-distribution of power symbols in new offices, car parks and work areas 
has resulted in altered perceptions of power differentials benefiting services providers, 
support services managers and their workforce more than the dominant medical teams. 
The association of services providers with the health service enhances their reputation. 
Thus both the support services managers now with improved image, professionalism and 
profile, their commercial services providers and FM providers of new built environments 
can all bask in each other's reputation for competitive advantage. 
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These successes have led to the extension of outsourcing to other areas in the health 
service. These are clinical imaging, non-emergency ambulance services, sterile services 
patient appliances and information technology. Outsourcing in the health services is also 
expected to continue for the foreseeable future. Thus this small study validates the use of 
outsourcing in resource acquisition in a public sector like the health service and advances 
the concepts of allocative power from investments as a liberating device. 
Furthermore innovation by the services providers in food and services has added value to 
patient offerings for better services to the satisfaction of support services managers and 
their patients. There is creativity and innovation in new built environment and real estate 
management. Consequently the findings of this thesis adds to the scarce literature on FM 
and estate management as catalytic agents of change, using their resources and expertise 
to enable some trusts extend their outsourcing objectives, while extending the scale and 
scope of their services. This has liberated workers and their managers from aging and 
decaying facilities into better work environments. Thus the benefits of services outsourcing 
is shown to go beyond value for money and professionalism of ancillary staff to include 
innovation in food and services and real estate management for comparative advantage. 
This thesis can be said to answer the call of Alexander and Young (1996), to show the 
value of outsourcing. There is perceived value. For example, in the outsourced services, 
the uncertainty of support services provision is reduced. The streamlined and more skilled 
staff, provide a smaller, more flexible and manageable workforce for task accomplishment. 
There is perceived change in the outsourced services from blame culture to teamwork. 
The complementary assets of clients and services providers make innovation possible 
while the investments of the services providers enhance the flexibility of trusts to meet 
changing business needs in support services and free up assets for other use. Services 
outsourcing also enables managers to focus on their core activities where they can add 
more value and so become more efficient. Thus this project builds on other studies that 
confirm significant cost savings in capital projects and business operations (Harland, 
Knight and Lamming, 2005; Jiang, Frazier and Prater, 2006, Linder et al., 2002). 
However services outsourcing has also produced some unintended outcomes in ancillary 
staff de-skilling, redundancies, exit to better jobs and possible dependence or domination 
of support services by commercial providers through control of information services and 
loss of in-house competence in support services. But the job mobility of some contract 
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workers and the incentive to work anywhere they have contracts, have mitigated the 
hardship or human misery that would have ensued. For example, some trained ancillary 
workers have gone on to do other jobs in the trusts while deskilled cooks are redeployed In 
contractor kitchens cooking the meals they chilll Most of those displaced by streamlining of 
staff have also been re-deployed and absorbed elsewhere. 
There is a perception of hollowing out and creeping privatisation of the health service as 
the central Government acts as an M-form holding company overseeing private vendors 
supply and deliver services to healthcare organisations through extended outsourcing, 
Thus services outsourcing has been beneficial but with some unintended consequences. 
6.3 Implications for further research 
The issues raised by this exploratory project suggest the need for further research to 
investigate and validate some of these findings. A list of suggested areas is given below 
1. Because the findings of this study are context specific and reflect the personal 
experiences and perceptions of those directly involved, further investigations of the 
risks, benefit and impact of hotel services outsourcing in different hospital settings 
but within the health service is needed to complement this study 
2. Investigation of services outsourcing using a mixed model approach, comparing in- 
house and outsourced services, as in this study would also complement this project. 
3. Studies on the consequences of support services outsourcing extended to the 
private health sector and perhaps compared with those from the NHS as 
documented here will provide a more holistic picture of this interesting exercise. 
4. The evolving role of outsourcing in the health services needs studies in clinical 
outsourcing to complement what has emerged from support services outsourcing 
and thus present an overall picture and model of health services outsourcing. 
5. Theresa hospital has been enabled to attain foundation hospital status during this 
study. But other NHS trusts-Featherstone and Karena hospitals are now poised to 
go the same way. Studies in how these foundation hospitals fare In the coming 
years will be interesting since there is no policy at present on the likely event of their 
bankruptcy or failure. 
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6. The extension of private-public partnerships through the PFI is an interesting 
initiative. However studies will be needed to investigate the impact of this millstone 
on the precarious finances of NHS trusts now enjoying new facilities made possible 
by PFI funding. 
7. The prediction that the health service is probably in the throes of being "hollowed 
out and privatised" will be worth watching in the years to come. Further research Is 
needed to confirm or refute the prediction 
8. Investigation into the impact of ancillary staff training in other outsourced support 
services is needed to quantify the level of job mobility within and beyond NHS trusts 
6.4 Managerial applications 
The findings of this project confirm the value of relationships and partnerships as powerful 
avenues to achieving change in hotel services that benefit patients, services managers 
and the workforce. Consequently, support services managers need to maintain good 
relationships with all stakeholders, internal and external, as valuable resources for change. 
The maintenance of internal and external goodwill amongst stakeholders confers needed 
legitimacy and ownership for decisions, actions and their outcomes. Hence services 
managers should also nurture the goodwill of all stakeholders to maintain social legitimacy 
that supports and sustains their org'anisation. 
Services managers need to be aware of the importance of constant, clear and timely 
communication. Also early conflict resolution is beneficial for success in contractual 
relationship management since working together in harmony has been shown here to add 
value beyond the negative effects from conflicts of interest that can breed antagonism and 
undermine organisational effectiveness. 
Services providers have trained and developed ancillary workforce and their managers in 
the know-how of support services and some of this knowledge has been stored in routines, 
procedures and technology. But whether this knowledge can be translated into the know- 
why of lasting learning and knowledge transfer will be up to the support services' 
managers and their workforce to decide. 
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Managers should be aware that subordinates can and do rise above manual tasks given 
the opportunity and access to knowledge as resource. Consequently workers should be 
treated with dignity if not respect in whatever capacity they choose to work. 
Managers should recognise that a trained and supported workforce becomes motivated, 
dedicated and loyal to organisational ethos and can be more productive than a controlled 
and constantly blamed or criticised one. Furthermore visible management was shown to 
be key to improved performance. Therefore managers who preach improvement in 
productivity and services should perhaps learn to walk the talki 
On the issue of innovation or continuous improvement, idea generators, from whatever 
level of the workforce they come, need champions to apply their ideas, boundary spanners 
or gatekeepers to disseminate ideas and supportive mentors to provide the resources for 
development before innovation can occur. Consequently, services managers need to 
welcome ideas from different levels of the workforce and provide the needed conducive 
environment to nurture and bring them to fruition if improvements and innovation are to 
continue in support services of the future. 
This research demonstrates the role and power of resources (investments) in the 
transformation of individuals, departments, organisations and their local communities. 
Managers should recognise the importance of workforce development as investment to 
equip them with skills and provide the necessary equipment to carry out their duties. 
Managers need to recognise the ubiquity of power within organisations, and the perceived 
change in power differentials due to hotel services outsourcing. While some services 
managers may have the authoritative power to make decisions, others can exercise the 
power not to implement such decisions. Consequently managers need to take cognisance 
of the delicate balance of power and dependence as a continuous balancing act and 
respect the holders of other forms of power and influence (economic, social, information) 
that can aid organisational effectiveness beyond authoritative power. 
Lastly, as the whirlwind of change gusts through NHS trusts and their support services, 
perceptions of power may change. Consequently, those in dominant coalitions today, may 
find themselves reallocated or redeployed into areas devoid of influence hence services 
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managers should treat all concerned with equity and fairness knowing that tomorrow Is an 
ill wind that can bring change and upheaval in positions and status. 
6.5 Concluding remarks 
The ideology that a public sector organisation, charged with the social service of providing 
healthcare funded by the public purse, can function like a commercial organisation, without 
the incentives to focus on profit maximisation is a contradiction in terms. Besides, support 
services and provider managers regard this commercial mandate as a contradiction but 
were determined and became committed to make it work for mutual benefits. Out of this 
contradiction this project set out to find out how those directly involved in hotel services 
outsourcing relationships structure their experiences. In the process other questions arose. 
For example, observers note that 30-50% of outsourcing ventures between commercial 
firms fail for reasons ranging from lack of well-defined focus to unrealised expectations, 
divergent motives or dissatisfaction with outcomes (Davis, 2004; IPD, 1998; Moore, 2007). 
Can services outsourcing succeed to the satisfaction of all concerned in a local context? 
Secondly, many professionals other than support services managers control the decision- 
making agenda and resource allocation in the NHS. Can a private-public outsourcing 
relationship work amidst priority setting and dominant professional group interest? 
Thirdly can theories developed with data gathered from commercial sector be applicable to 
a public sector organisation with its political timetable, in a social services context? 
The jury is in and the verdict is out. Those directly involved in hotel services outsourcing 
structure their experiences in terms of their local context of operation and content of their 
daily work experience. Consequently, many projects seem to proffer different findings due 
to differences in locales and the lived experiences or perceptions of those involved in their 
study. The ideology of social organisations working as commercial firms without the same 
incentives is a contradiction. But out of this contradiction, client and provider managers 
used their agential capacity for action to overcome the contradiction and make outsourcing 
mutually beneficial. What is more, services outsourcing has been extended in the NHS 
trusts investigated and all the services providers are still in place at the time of writing. 
Outsourcing of support services has been shown to work and be extended despite priority 
setting and other professional agendas in the health services studied. Multiple theories 
from other sectors have enabled me unravel the mountains of data and analysed them. 
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The result findings here suggest that outsourcing has benefited most of the trusts studied 
as seen in the "bundle of benefits" gained and have also informed other areas of the public 
services (civil service and public utilities) leading to the rethinking of Government funding 
alone in public sector organisations. Thus data generated here have helped to completely 
answer the research question posed while the effects of hotel services outsourcing Is 
reverberating beyond the confines of the trusts studied and the health services In general. 
Figure 6.2 Framework of outsourcing outcomes in selected NHS trust 
NHS Trust 
Outsourced 
Support services 
Managers & 
In-House 
Support services 
Managers & 
Charitabic 
Organisations 
Commercial 
Services Providers 
T 
MNC 
Government 
Banks Business Agencies: Relationships 
Insurance Houses (Partnerships) 
)4--* 
PASA and 
Pooled managerial NHS Logistics 
Expertise 
II 
Ancillary Personnel 
Minimal change 
Staff under pressure 
Innovation 
Trained and skilled staff 
Managerial skill, expertise 
Built environment (FM) 
Constant communication and problem solving 
Efficiency (Value for money) in resource use 
Performance effectiveness (Better resource use) 
Key: 
4--* Lines of interaction ON. 
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Appendix 1 GUIDE TO INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
1. PERSON SPECIFIC: 
Name of interviewee 
Gender /Sex /Age 
JOB SPECIFIC: 
Job title 
Job specification 
Actual work done and perception of role played 
How long on job/in NHS 
ORGANISATION SPECIFIC: 
Type of organisation 
Specialization (division into specialist roles) 
Qualifications 
Standardisation (standard rules/practices/procedures) 
Formalisation (written down instructions/descriptions) 
Centralisation (authority for decision-making) 
Configuration (span of control) 
4. ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT: [environment] 
Origin/history /ownership (public/private) 
Size (number of employees) 
Size of annual budget 
Charter (number of services offered) 
Location (closeness) 
Technology (automation and integration with suppliers/customers) 
Interdependence (stakeholders-government, suppliers, customers) 
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5. OUTSOURCED SERVICES: 
What services outsourced 
Who decided to outsource 
Outsourcing process (How) 
Portfolio Analysis - Degree of involvement 
6. SUPPLIER/BUYER 
Search/ Eva I uation/C hoice/Eng agement 
Motivation for present supplier 
Objectives/expectations 
Performance monitoring agreed 
Cost /Benefit analysis of supplier portfolio 
7. INTERACTION PROCESS 
Contract terms/duration 
Associations (transactional / relational /social /legal) 
Partnerships: Suppliers 
Competitors/government 
Internal customers (departments/employees) 
Customers 
Resources exchanged: importance /complexity /alternatives /evaluation 
Adaptation (specific) / flexibility in accommodating customer needs 
Coordination (terms of the trade) 
Perception of degree of dependence 
8. NATURE OF INTERACTION 
(a) Trust 
Communication: Frequency /Mode /Problem type 
Shared values (common beliefs, goals, policies, behaviour) 
Incentives/rewards 
(b) Commitment (contractual/social) 
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Benefits of interaction 
Exit cost 
Cost of alternatives 
Dependence (investments) 
Satisfaction with service 
Social bonds formed 
Exit clause/reasons 
(c) Termination process: dissatisfaction 
cost/benefit 
dissolution 
(d) Performance: set targets to achieve 
Monitoring (reactive/proactive) 
9. DRIVING FORCE FOR INTERACTION 
Market forces (profits) 
Creating value / creativity and innovation 
Power /Conflict / Cooperation 
Commitment / Trust 
10. INTERACTION OUTCOME 
Cost / Benefits 
Expectations fulfilled? 
Outsourcing objectives realised? 
Value created 
11. INTERACTION MANAGEMENT 
12. INTERACTION MAINTENANCE 
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Appendix Ib 
Full Interview Transcript-a sample 
Interview conducted with a catering manager, I have called Roland (R) from Mediserve 
International at Karena Hospital NHS trust in March 2004 
MJ: Thank you for agreeing to talk to me about the services you provide here. As I 
promised before, I will not ask your name or any personal details from you but I would like 
to know what you do here, your position and your job title 
Roland: I am a catering manager in hotel services 
MJ: how many catering managers are there at this hospital? 
Roland: there are four managers here but I am in charge of catering 
MJ: what do the other managers do? 
Roland: one of them is in charge of domestic services and another for patient services 
then there is our general manager 
MJ: why is it called hotel services? 
Roland: why is it called hotel services? That's the name it is given 
MJ: but why? 
Roland: I don't know why 
MJ: okay, I want to know what you think. Why do you think it is called hotel services? 
Roland: I haven't got a clue why it is called hotel services 
MJ: do you mind telling me the company you work for and why you work for them 
Roland: I work for a certain catering company and I like working for them 
MJ: Alright, the name of the company does not matter. How long have you worked for 
them? 
Roland: I have worked for them for 13 years on and off 
MJ: when you were not working for them where else did you work? 
Roland: Oh here and there (telephone interrupts) 
MJ: You were telling me where you worked when you were not working for this company 
Roland: I was working 
MJ: What exactly do you do here for your company? 
Roland: we provide hotel services for our clients 
MJ: Is this the first tenure here for your company? 
Roland: Tenure? 
MJ: I mean have you served this hospital before? 
Roland: we have been here before 
313 
MJ: yes. How long was that for? 
Roland: (inaudible) 
MJ: so what area of business is your company known for? 
Roland: we are into catering, cleaning and all that sort of thing 
MJ: do you have porters as well? 
Roland: yes we have our porters 
MJ: what do they do? 
Roland: what do you mean what do they do? They transport patients around the hospital 
MJ: what else do they do apart from transporting patients around the hospital? 
Roland: Boy. They collect specimens from the wards to the labs and letters and 
equipments 
MJ: Thank you but I do need to know what your views are so I don't get it wrong 
Roland: why are you asking all these questions anyway? 
MJ: like I said before, I am conducting a private research into support services of which 
hotel services is a part. 
Roland: So you do know what hotel services mean. But what exactly is the research for? 
MJ: it is for a personal degree programme 
Roland: so you go about asking people all sorts of questions for a personal degree? 
MJ: how else will I know what you do here and be able to tell it to my bosses? So do tell 
me again what area of business is your company into? 
Roland: everybody has an idea what a business is 
MJ; Yes but why are you here? Some businesses come to make money 
wh i le... (i nte rru pted) 
Roland: there aren't any business that operates to make money 
MJ: Good so why is your company here at this hospital at this time? 
Roland: I don't know. I wasn't part of the start up contract 
MJ: so you came in when the business was up and running? 
Roland: when the contract started up, many people did different things but it was all done 
by outside people from the head office 
Mi: so where is your head office? 
Roland: why do you ask? It does exist 
MJ: But where is it based? In London'or the UK? 
Roland: we have a head office and people there set up contracts 
MJ: so what do you think is the reason this contract was set up? 
Roland: The reason why they came here? 
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MJ: yes why did your company come here? 
Roland: we are here to clean the hospital and serve the patients good meals in a clean 
environment. We also built a restaurant for this hospital 
MJ: Very good. How much did that cost your company? 
Roland: I am not sure 
MJ: But the hospital could have built itself a restaurant 
Roland: we have just refurbished it 
MJ; why did you refurbish it? 
Roland: because it needed refurbishing 
MJ: so was it a new restaurant or did you just refurbish an old one? 
Roland: Boy, this is tedious. I just told you that we refurbished it because it needed 
refurbishing and we also built them a new restaurant 
MJ: I am sorry that it is tedious but I really do need to know what you make of your 
presence here - 
Roland: so what else do you want to know? 
MJ: do you have a purchasing manager? 
Roland: we haven't got a purchasing manager. The hospital has one but he has nothing to 
do with what we do here 
MJ: do you think I should talk to him for his views? 
Roland: Yes why not. We work in partnership with the hospital. We don't have different 
views we have the same objective 
MJ: Good, what does partnership mean and how do you work in partnership? 
Roland: it means that we are partners and what they require we deliver 
MJ: how else do you work in partnership and what do you deliver? 
Roland: we deliver the services they require 
MJ: such as? , 
Roland: They require the hospital environment to be clean so they get good scores and 
the patients to be fed 
MJ: how do you deliver these requirements? 
Roland: what do you mean how do we deliver it? 
MJ: I mean do you go to the market and buy the food you provide for the patients? 
Roland: well we deliver the services they require and we are not talking about fruit and 
vegetables 
MJ: Okay. What are we talking about then? How do you make the food you give the 
patients? 
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Roland: how do we make it? 
MJ: yes 
Roland: it comes in ready cooked and chilled from the company supplier 
MJ: so somebody else cooks the food and you negotiate for them to supply it chilled? 
Roland: yes 
MJ: what sort of food do they supply you? 
Roland: the right sort 
MJ: what is the right sort for your company? And who else do they supply food to? 
Roland: I don't know. The food goes into different countries 
MJ: so how do you know that it is the right sort for your clients? 
Roland: because that is what the client ordered 
MJ: you say that you are partners with the hospital so what links do you have with it? 
Roland: the other links we have is to provide the services they require within the catering 
and domestic services 
MJ: so what links do you have with your opposite number in the hospital? 
Roland: we talk 
MJ: what do you talk about? 
Roland: About the business 
MJ: Good. What about the business? 
Roland: how the business is going 
MJ: in what ways do you talk about it? 
Roland: just talk, you know talk 
MJ: Good. Talk about what? This is like pulling out teeth 
Roland: Pulling out teeth? I think you are pulling my tooth 
MJ: sorry about that I did not come to pull your tooth but to get your views on what your 
company does here and as their catering manager, I need to hear it from you 
So what is your relationship with your opposite number? 
Roland: strictly business 
MJ: You do not interact socially? 
Roland: No unless there is a special trust do to which we get invited and then only if it is 
appropriate for us 
MJ: so you don't meet socially except by invitation? 
Roland: we meet everyday on business, otherwise only if we are invited to social dos 
MJ: so which invitations do you consider to be appropriate to attend? 
Roland: the ones that are appropriate for us to attend 
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MJ: how do you monitor what you do here? 
Roland: it depends on the service but it is all done on paper 
MJ: If there is any variation how do you know about it? 
Roland: when we go around with the palm monitor, we know if there is something wrong 
MJ: so you use a palm monitor, how does it work? 
Roland: yes there is a standard monitor. If there is something wrong it shows up on the 
monitor 
MJ: what if the hospital monitoring is different from yours? 
Roland: it is the same procedure so there is no difference. But if there is a problem, we 
rectify it immediately 
MJ: how do you rectify it? 
Roland: by e-mail, phone or face to face 
MJ: what is your commonest mode of contact? 
Roland; it depends on the problem but mostly we use the phone 
MJ: what would you say is the gain for your company here? What is the benefit of this 
contract? 
Roland: to give the hospital a good service so they get the right food in a clean 
environment 
We get the satisfaction that the patients are being fed in a clean environment 
MJ: Good. What else does your company gain from this contract? 
Roland: that is the gain (a visitor interrupts) 
MJ: does your company make any profits here? 
Roland: I don't know about the company accounts. I just do the day to day running of the 
catering department. I have no idea of the accounts 
MJ: Okay. Do you think that your company makes any profits from this contract? 
Roland: well I am pretty sure that they are not losing money here 
MJ; Good what about your company's reputation? 
Roland: what about it? 
MJ: would your company take on a client that is say "dodgy"? 
Roland: what is a dodgy client? I have never met one. My company will not get involved 
with what you call a dodgy client. No 
MJ: you haven't? 
Roland: No 
MJ: how do you provide new products to your clients? 
Roland: it certainly has to be agreed first 
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MJ: Agreed with whom? 
Roland: Normally the company works across the board. If we provide service or food in 
one place and it is good there then it is good for everyone else. But it has to be agreed 
with the client because they pay for the service 
MJ: what is the relationship between the hospital and your company? 
Roland: it is fine and on the level. It is a good relationship 
MJ: what is the level? 
Roland: it is a business relationship and it is good 
MJ: what makes it good? 
Roland: we supply what the client requires 
MJ: what about politics, does it come into the relationship? 
Roland: an emphatic NO 
MJ: not even underground? 
Roland: again NO 
MJ: Ok what about decision-ma king? How do you people make decisions here? 
Roland: How do we make decisions? 
MJ: Yes for example how did you decide to supply chilled food? 
Roland: I didn't know because it was already going on when I arrived. Besides I don't look 
after the kitchen. Somebody else does that but I know that the client ordered cook-chill so 
that's what they get. 
MJ: what about disagreements or any other major issues who decides what to do? 
Roland: there are no disagreements. I mean the only thing that could happen is if there 
was a major incident, like a bomb or train crash, then we have got the right resources and 
the right procedures to follow. We use our manuals for everything and it covers most 
things 
MJ: so it is all in the manual? 
Roland: yes it is and we follow it to solve anything you call disagreements or major Issues 
MJ: What about learning? Have you learnt anything from being here? 
Roland: Everyday we learn many things 
MJ: What have you learnt personally or is it your company that learns? 
Roland: we all learn. I think that in every job, everyone is learning everyday, I don't think 
that there is anyone who does not learn everyday. If we all knew everything then there will 
be nothing to do or learn 
MJ: what do you think is the limit of your company? I mean where is the boundary? 
Roland: the sky 
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MJ: the sky is your limit? 
Roland: Yes 
MJ: Good but what is the limit around you as a contract firm? 
Roland: what do you mean, my limit on earth? 
MJ: I mean the limitations of your company as a contractor. For example if your suppliers 
don't supply the goods, you cannot provide what the client requires 
Roland: We have no limits because we have many suppliers 
MJ: How many suppliers do you use for this contract? 
Roland: I don't know exactly how many but there are a lot of them approved by my 
company 
MJ: do you have any competitors in this contract? 
Roland: No we don't compete. We are not in the business to compete 
MJ: you don't compete even in the stock exchange? 
Roland: No 
MJ: so your company is not listed on the stock exchange? 
Roland: I did not say that but we don't compete with anyone 
MJ: so what is so wonderful about your company that it has no competition? 
Roland: everything we do we do wonderfully 
MJ: what do you do? 
Roland: well in this hospital, as I have told you already about six times, 
MJ: Laughs, do tell me again so I don't forget 
Roland: we deal with catering, portering and domestic services 
MJ: what about your suppliers don't they compete for your custom? 
Roland: I don't know. We have many suppliers 
MJ: Well your suppliers could be your boundary because if they don't supply, you cannot 
provide the services 
Roland: Yeah but we have no boundaries because we always have procedures in place. I 
mean we don't just have one supplier. A good supplier cannot just ring up and say we are 
not serving you no more, goodbye, so supplies will not be an issue, as you call it 
MJ: so what will be an issue with your meeting the requirements of the client here? 
Roland: Inaudible due to interference 
MJ: what is your relationship with your suppliers? 
Roland: Just business 
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MJ: what would you say is the core competence of your company? What are they known 
for? What sets your company apart from the other hotel services suppliers? 
Roland: we are back to the monitoring again. We monitor everything we do so we know 
MJ: What role does trust play in your relationship with the hospital and your suppliers? 
Roland: what do you mean play 
MJ: I mean does trust have any role in your relationships? 
Roland: I mean we trust them 
MJ: Yes but how exactly does that trust play out on a daily basis? 
Roland: trust? 
MJ: everyone has an idea what trust means 
Roland: it means honesty to me 
MJ: Good so give me an example of how you show that you trust your suppliers or your 
opposite number in the hospital 
Roland: well they are our client and we supply them a service. That's it. We thank them for 
allowing us provide them with the services. They are happy and we are happy with the 
relationship we have. I can't give you a better example than that 
MJ: What does your company do to improve the image or reputation of the hospital? 
Roland: The government inspections are successful and the hospital gets a good score so 
the image of the hospital is improved. We are a part of that 
MJ: how do you know that the government inspection was successful? 
Roland: Because we scored three and that was the top mark 
MJ: Very good. They were satisfied with your work. What about quality what does it mean 
to you? 
Roland: Er, good question. What does it mean to you? 
MJ: Well I am not supplying anything but you supply quality products and services so how 
do you measure that quality? 
Roland: Yeah but don't you know what quality means? 
MJ: it is not what I know that counts but what you, as the supplier, think and say that it 
means to you. That is what I take to be important to you 
Roland: Yeah but what do you think that quality means from your research? What kind of 
qualities are you trying to get from what I am telling you? 
MJ: Well some people tell me that they give quality services so I ask them what they mean 
by quality so that I can compare what they tell me with what others say 
Roland: Then we are back to the standardisation of services again 
MJ: Yes. Standard service is not necessarily quality service 
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Roland: Yes it is. If you have a set standard, which is the right quality for the hospital, then 
that standard is the quality for that hospital 
MJ: who decides the standard service? 
Roland: The trust and us agree on it 
MJ: You agreed on a set standard? 
Roland: yes. We agreed on what they need and that is the standard and the quality for 
them 
MJ: Relax. I am not taking you to task. I only want to make sure that I understand what you 
mean 
Roland: You have got 4 minutes left and I am timing you 
MJ: laughs 
Roland: after one hour now I cannot wait to get out of here. I have loads of work to do and 
qualities to achieve 
MJ: Very good and I am grateful for your time. Enjoy the interview. It may never happen 
again. Now what about the mixed cultures you have working for you here? 
Roland: We have a multicultural workforce from different backgrounds 
MJ: so what about their salaries and entitlements are they the same between the hospital 
workers and your staff? 
Roland: the hospital does not have the same level of staff that we have 
MJ: What is the level of your staff? 
Roland: they are better workers than we met here 
MJ: in what way are they better? Do you have other hotel services workers like porters, 
working for the hospital? 
Roland: No the hospital has no porters apart from our porters 
MJ: In some hospitals there are hospital workers and contract workers so we can 
compare 
Roland: Here the hospital has no hotel services workers so there is no comparison. They 
don't have their own cleaners or caterers for certain 
MJ: Okay 
Roland: the standard of our workers are slightly higher obviously 
MJ: in what way? 
Roland: If they had all the standard and quality, why did they engage us to supply them? 
MJ: You tell me. That's why we are having this interview to find out why they engaged your 
company to supply them with the services you provide. What about the food supply, is it 
also of a higher standard? 
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Roland: Yes it is actually. The food comes in chilled 
MJ: How? , 
Roland: How do you think they chill the food in the oven or washing machines? 
MJ: well some companies have great big freezer-lorries that bring in food supplies 
Roland: and where are they kept on site, in lorries? 
MJ: You tell me. As the catering manager, you know how your company supplies food to 
the hospital so'you just tell me what you do. How do you resolve conflicts here? 
Roland: It depends on what you call conflict 
MJ: Well lets say one of your workers disagrees with another one over some issues and 
one worker slaps the other. How do you deal with such issues? 
Roland: we go through the company procedures. They guide everything that we do so that 
everyone knows that they are fair 
MJ: so your company must be a big company with all these procedures. How many staff 
members do you have here? 
Roland: here we have 15 
MJ: What is your position amongst them? 
Roland: I am the hotel services catering manager as I told you 
MJ: Laughs, what does that mean? Is there a director above you? 
Roland: Oh Yes I have my bosses 
MJ: Are they on site or at the head office? 
Roland: On site 
MJ: how many people are above you? I want to know how many tiers or levels you have 
Roland; Oh boy 
MJ: sorry but that will give me an idea of your company structure 
Roland: we have the unit business manager and the lead hotel services manager then 
there is myself and the workers 
MJ: so there are four levels on site here? 
Roland: No because this is only the managing structure but not who is in charge 
MJ: Ok how do you see it, how many levels are there? 
Roland: this hasn't stopped (meaning the tape recorder) 
MJ: No it lasts for two hours (laughs) and I will specially write yours up as a difficult case 
Roland: No I don't mind it but I just wonder what you are trying to gain from all these 
MJ: as I told you before, it is for a personal degree course 
Roland: In what? 
MJ: In support services 
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Roland: In what field, general management of support services? 
MJ: Well I am trying to find out what I can about support services from the people who are 
actually doing the work like yourself not those who only seem to think and talk about it. I 
want to find out if the talk matches with what is actually done on the ground or in the field. 
That is how policies can be changed if what is actually done is found to be different from 
what is said 
Roland: But different policies work for different places, don't they? 
MJ: sure. That is why we interview many people to find out their differences and what 
makes them different. It may be the local culture or the people involved or something else 
Roland: Mn 
MJ: Not convinced? 
Roland: I wonder 
MJ: That's why I asked about your relationships with the hospital and your suppliers and if 
your staff interacted with the hospital staff or if there are other hotel services workers apart 
from your contract workers 
Roland: well, I have told you all that 
MJ: I am grateful to you. Well I think I leave you alone for now. But can I call you or come 
to clarify any issues that are not clear? 
Roland: Yes you can call me or come by but not for so long. I have standards and qualities 
to achieve 
MJ: laughs. Thank you very much for your time 
Roland: That's alright and good luck with the research 
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Appendix 2 Interviews conducted 
Totally (100%) Outsourced NHS trusts 
1. Theresa Hospital NHS trust on eight locations transferred to a single location 
Roger Catering manager, Kingsland 
Aged 63 3 years with Kingsland, 32 years with NHS at the same post 
Was angry about being sold to contractors and reprimanded for giving 
interviews and speaking his mind about the woes of the NHS 
Dennis Patient services manager, now with Kingsland 
Aged 42 3 years in post but 10 years with NHS, in the same post 
Young and energetic, rose from the purchasing ranks 
Two administrative stakeholders (agents C and D) herein called Joanna and Sue, were 
interviewed during working hours along the corridors but their interviews were not taped 
2. Helina Hospital NHS trust 
Pauline Facilities manager 
Aged 57 25 years in post, commercial experience opened her very green eyes 
Recommends all NHS managers go through commercial experience 
Andrew General purchasing manager, Interviewed twice. Army trained 
Aged 56 8 years in the post, national and NHS experience-valuable contact 
Oliver Purchasing manager for medical supplies 
Aged 36 3 years in post, commercial experience, aggressive for profits 
Steven Catering manager, Assure (Premier Group) 
Aged 59 4 years at present post but worked for Assure for > 20years 
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75% outsourced NHS trusts 
3. Karena Hospital NHS trust (on two locations) 
Morrison General manager, Facilities and estates (the boss) 
Aged 62 40 years in NHS, very experienced, rose from the ranks 
Informative and helpful, was there when outsourcing began 
Yusuf Estates and facilities manager (limited interview) 
Aged 52 10 years in the post, has varied commercial experience 
Anthony Purchasing manager, Interviewed X3 
Retired at 65 36 years with the NHS at the same post, had seen it all come 
and go, very informative. Was there when outsourcing began 
Roland Catering manager, 13 years with Mediserve International 
Aged 30 4 years as catering manager, still rather insecure 
Other stakeholders, many from previous studies were spoken to again and again at work 
4. Victoria Hospital NHS trust (on two locations) 
Lawrence General manager, Areno 
Aged 56 8 years in post now general coordinator for Areno 
Ex-soldier, trained as chef and rose from the ranks 
International experience, very good ambassador for his firm 
Peter Director of estates and facilities (declined to be interviewed) 
Margaret Project manager at County hospital 
Aged 58 2 years in post, ex-theatre nurse, got tired of nursing and 
wanted commercial experience within the NHS, informative 
Gideon Catering manager for Areno 
Aged 42 8 years in post but worked on other Areno contracts 
Experienced and informative 
Stakeholders from domestic services, nurses and security men were interviewed at work 
325 
50% outsourced NHS trusts 
5. Featherstone Hospital NHS trust (on four locations) 
James Manager, estates and facilities, was interviewed twice 
Aged 52 8 years in post, rose from the ranks as a structural engineer 
Has leadership qualities, was informative and constructive 
Damien Catering manager, Assure (Premier Group) 
Aged 58 4 years in post, worked 7 years for NHS before transferring to 
Assure. Now will not work for any firm except Assure 
An experienced leader, informative and helpful 
JO Manager, domestic services, for Assure 
Aged 57 4 years in present post, worked at other Assure contracts 
20 years in NHS before transfer. Informative and experienced 
Domestic and catering services workers, their trainer and ward manager were interviewed. 
6. Reinhard Hospital NHS trust 
Sussanah Manager, estates and facilities 
Aged 42 Graduate structural engineer, straight into the NHS 
10 years in NHS posts. No commercial experience 
Juan Catering manager, Assure (Premier Group) 
Aged 48 2 years in present post but worked on other Assure contracts 
7 years in the NHS as a young man-said never againl 
Experienced and informative, a good ambassador for Assure 
Other stakeholders from domestic, catering and friends of the hospital were interviewed 
10% outsourced NHS trusts 
7. Charlston Memorial Hospital NHS trust (on three locations) 
Stanley Director of estates and facilities (Projects) 
Aged 56 Structural engineer (maintenance) rose from the ranks. 
30 years in NHS posts. No commercial experience 
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Florence Director, support services 
Aged 56 3 months in post but in NHS for 20 years 
Varied commercial experience, likes to move around 
Informative and experienced, left before she was pushed to go 
Agnes Catering manager (one of eight managers) 
Aged 38 2 years in post, poached from a commercial firm 
Experienced and informative 
Linda Domestic services manager, interviewed twice 
Aged 58 10 years in post, 9 years commercial experience 
Very experienced in both, informative and helpful 
Other stakeholders from nursing and domestic services were also interviewed 
8. Dickson Memorial Hospital NHS trust (on three locations) 
Neville Estates and facilities manager, Interviewed twice 
Aged 47 19 years in post 
Engineer by profession but likes NHS maintenance 
Informative and helpful, has no commercial experience 
Rhoda Catering manager recalled from retirement 
Aged 64 3 years in present post, worked for 35 years in the NHS 
No commercial experience, very informative and helpful 
Albert Domestic services manager 
Aged 48 4 years in post with varied previous commercial experience 
Informative and helpful 
Other stakeholders from'domestic, catering and portering services were also interviewed 
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Appendix 3 SYNOPSIS OF ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED 
Figure 1 Pattern of NHS Hospital Supply Network 
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HOTEL SERVICES PROVIDERS (information culled from Annual Reports) 
1. Areno-based in the UK, with headquarters in IRELAND 
Driving force for the organisation: innovation is the life-blood of our organisation 
Innovative products are field-tested for six months before they are transferred to our 
subsidiaries and client organisations 
Cost containment through operational efficiency is now a given for us and help us add 
value or return value for money in our offerings to customers 
Areas of interest: defence, leisure, education and healthcare 
Number of sites now served in the UK: 2,3000 
Number of staff employed in the UK: 48,000 
Service offering: Cost effective solutions to improve the quality of daily life and the 
comfort of our customers 
Relationship guide: Aims for life-long relationships as preferred services supplier 
Other interests: ISO 9000 quality standards registered 
Aims to provide high quality products and services at fair prices 
Undertakes recycling, biodegradation and other environmentally friendly 
actions to reduce pollution and care for the local community 
For NHS trusts served: relentlessly paring funds to invest in cleaning wards and feeding 
patients as hospitals strive to meet evermore demanding cost-saving targets 
Provides 24hours catering service with consistent menu of high quality food in all trusts 
Develops branded retail outlets (Diner's Den and Caf6 Locale) to generate streams of 
revenue for NHS trusts served and to help them balance their budgets 
2. Premier Group with headquarters in Surrey 
World leading food service company, operating globally in 90 countries 
Has 5% global market worth E 250bn 
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Driving force of the organisation: Innovative high quality solutions to food and domestic 
Services 
A passion for quality 
A can do attitude to business solutions 
Teamwork 
Lasting business relationships 
Areas of interest: Travel, leisure, vending, canteen, hospitality and industry 
A favourite hotel services provider in the NHS, involved in (3/8) of the NHS trusts 
investigated. 
Kingsland International, based in Berkshire 
Driving force for the organisation: continuous improvement in support services. 
Applying best practice innovatively developed worldwide to enable clients' businesses run 
more efficiently 
Saves clients time and money, enhances quality of services, adds value to offerings 
Driving and managing change through productivity improvements 
Areas of interest: power stations, banks, prisons, water supply and facilities design, build, 
refurbish and manage projects 
Change management skills gained through knowledge transfer 
Favours long-term business relationships that generate sustainable revenue streams in 
the public and private sectors not interested in mere support services alone 
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Appendix 4 Foundation Hospitals 
The Health and Social Act, 2003, amended 2005 established foundation hospitals as a 
part of the state Government plan to devolve decision-making and resources hence power 
away from the centre to professionals at the frontline of healthcare provision-NHS trusts, 
Primary Care Trusts, local organisations and communities. This would be more responsive 
to the needs and wishes of the local people (www. doh. qov. uk accessed 18/4/05 and again 
7/9/06). Foundation hospitals are to be modelled on co-operative and mutual traditions and 
hence not for maximizing profits but for maximizing healthcare and will be publicly owned 
by the health secretary but managed by local boards of governors hence a hybrid system. 
Their creation is deemed a profound change in the history of the NHS and the way hospital 
services are provided and managed (DoH, 2002; Morgan, 2006). This change is regarded 
as the greatest post-war reform to improve health standards and address inequalities. 
Thus there is a trend to change the health services are provided, which the Government 
maintains is not a shift in policy, privatisation or hollowing out of the services as observes 
contend (Day, 2006; Hunter, 2002; Kmietowicz, 2006) but re-organisation (DoH, 2002). 
Control 
Foundation hospitals are to be controlled and run locally for the benefit of the local 
community in order to give consumers a wider choice and help to reduce health inequality. 
They will be freed from central Government control and performance supervision and also 
management by health authorities. Thus foundation hospitals will be corporations for 
public benefit and independent legal entities with unique governance structures as self- 
standing and self-governing organisations free to determine their own future. 
investments 
They Will have the freedom to invest their own money, keep any surpluses made from sale 
of land and assets and borrow from both the public and private sectors for their future. 
Their borrowing capacity will only be limited by their cash flows of up to 40% of their 
income hence affordability (Moyes, 2005). They can hire and fire their own staff, set 
conditions of service and wages above national and local agreements or offer performance 
related pay. Put siMply, foundation hospitals will be able to'enjoy considerable autonomy, 
freed from direct management of the Health Minister, the Department of Health and 
Strategic Health Authority but accountable to the state through the independent regulator, 
or Monitor, whose POWers exceed those of the Health Secretaries. The framework for 
foundation hospitals Was finally launched on 1 April 2004. 
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Ownership 
A Board of Governors representing the interests of patients, local community, hospital key 
stakeholders, local businesses, universities, Local Authority and Primary Care Trusts will 
run foundation hospitals and set their strategic direction and manage their affairs. 
Technically, the Health Secretary will own foundation hospitals for the nation. 
The aim is to create a more efficient dynamic and responsive healthcare that taps into 
local talent and entrepreneurship while maintaining national standards and quality of 
treatment to safeguard public interest in what the Health Secretary, Alan Milburn, calls a 
change of organisation but not a shift in ideology (www. doh-gov. uk, accessed 18/4/2005). 
Who can apply? 
Only hospitals that have performed consistently well by achieving three star-ratings will be 
allowed to apply. Thus foundation hospitals will be centres of excellence with high clinical 
standards, top quality leadership, sound financial management, a good level of patient 
responsiveness and clear evidence of staff and local community support. 
Some NHS trust like Wirral that qualify for foundation status can decline from applying due 
to the untold distraction such work-up to application and subsequent maintenance of the 
elite position gained can cause to NHS trusts already burdened with more immediate 
concerns like performance targets, financial deficits and waiting lists (Wirrel, 2005). 
Opposition to foundation hospitals (culled from frequently asked questions) 
Opponents argue that foundation hospitals will reward elite hospitals and create a two-tier 
system because foundation and failing hospitals will be competing for staff and funding 
and they fear that foundation hospitals will have an edge over other hospitals through 
better staff incentives and profitability of private financial providers. Furthermore, funding 
for healthcare will follow patients who are more likely to opt for treatment at foundation 
hospitals than what obtains locally. Also the elite nature of foundation hospitals, they argue 
will attract investors and ultimately lead to the privatisation of the health service. 
Others argue that the scope to generate and keep financial surpluses may lead to inward- 
looking NHS organisations that ignore innovation in primary and community care hospitals, 
where more patients are treated long-term than in acute hospitals (Austin, 2002). 
Furthermore foundation hospitals will contract out services to private contractors, allowing 
them to gain from scarce NHS resources. The Government has rebutted these claims and 
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maintains that eventually all NHS trusts will be expected to become foundation hospital by 
2008 (www. doh. gov. uk) 
Observers comment that there is no insolvency regime from the Department of Health 
regarding foundation hospitals (Slipman, 2006). Consequently any borrowing from the 
private banks will be seen as risky and so cost more not less. But others see foundation 
status as access to capital, opportunity to perform better given a new focus and to develop 
financial skills and the entrepreneur awareness of healthcare as a viable business option 
(Carlisle, 2002a; Crisp, 2005a and 2005b). 
Many maintain that foundation status is a route to privatisation of healthcare as indeed all 
NHS trusts can subcontract services, but foundation hospitals with their sound financial 
standing will attract private investors allowing shareholders to profit from scare national 
resources (Clews, 2005; McGauran, 2002; Smith, 2002). Furthermore, elite foundation 
hospitals will only treat profitable cases leaving chronic patient care to failing some 
hospitals (Smith, 2002a). However directors of foundation hospitals claim that it has been 
a chance to regenerate their local community, become financially sound and develop local 
services according to local need not national standards (Goldman, 2005; Lewis, 2005). 
Others argue that local control and accountability are pies in the sky since locals may be 
na*fve in the running of large complex hospitals hence can be hoodwinked by the multiple 
vested interests of medical consultants and other dominant groups. Besides many warring 
stakeholders may leave hospital managers in strong positions to carry out their own plans 
unencumbered, making light of local accountability (Shifrin, 2005a; Smith, 2002a). For 
example in the case of Bradford hospital, local stakeholders wanted their chief executive 
David Jackson and the chairman, John Ryan to stay but the regulator, "Monitor" sacked 
them anyway because they failed to ensure effective financial planning, stewardship and 
control through value for money strategies. So where was the local control? Besides, there 
is no official mechanism or precedent for accountability in foundation hospitals. Thus 
foundation hospitals are new hybrid structures that the Government seems to be still 
shaping into form. But whatever the argument, foundation hospitals will remain within the 
health service for the moment and cannot be sold by law. 
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Appendix 5 Private finance Initiative (PFI) 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) [(www. local. dtlr. gov. uk/pfi/intro) accessed 18/4/2005] 
The private finance initiative was set up in 1992 by the Conservative Government as a 
public-private partnership to aid Local Governments gain access to improved capital 
assets such as new buildings, roads, plants and vehicles without public funds (DoH, 2003). 
This was later expended to include design, build, finance and manage capital assets while 
transferring all risk involved in the procurement and operation of such facilities to the 
private sector with appropriate incentives for a more efficient and effective performance. 
These incentives include long-term contracts with regular streams of payments, genuine 
risk transfer to ensure best value in total FM, freedom of imagination and innovation in 
providing facilities with flexible usage and a share in the performance related rewards. 
Consequently, the public sector does not own or buy the assets or facilities but pays for 
the use of asset and services provided for them over an extended period usually over thirty 
years. This is to enable private providers recover investments with handsome profits. 
The Labour Government improved and extended the remit of services providers to include 
PFI to NHS trusts. This has allowed some NHS trusts build facilities fit for the 21st. Century 
without having to fund it. Furthermore these NHS trusts in total FM bear no risks and only 
pay for leasing the facilities with the attendant maintenance and services provided. 
The value for money in such contracts, stems from contractors building projects to higher 
standards, delivering them on time without over-runs or additional costs and maintaining 
them in good conditions to allow continuous healthcare provision without interruptions. 
Critiques of PFI 
Many state that the case for PFI in a publicly funded health service is "fatally flawed". The 
reasons proffered range from the shrinking of hospital capacity at a time when demand for 
beds is rising, the over estimation of the inefficiencies of public sector procurement that 
necessitated the invitation of the private sector to help with investment finance and the 
lack of clarity on the level of risk transferred to the private sector (Jones, 2000b; Pollock, et 
al., 1999). Consequently, observers note that the PFI exercise is fraught with irreconcilable 
difficulties that will be made manifest in the future and saddle the health service with debts. 
Others argue that the PFI has saved NHS trusts huge amounts under the watchful eyes of 
the National Audit Office (NAO) to prevent private investors making windfall profits and 
were designed for the economic use of scarce resources (Clews, 2005; Reeves, 1999). 
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Some of these difficulties stem from the inexperience of public sector managers in 
commercial discipline and the time needed to negotiate the learning curve of wheeling and 
dealing in contract negotiations, risk assessment in projects and relationship management 
(House of Commons, 2003; Machiavelli, 1940; Macniel, 1980). But they are learning and 
many are aware of the difficulties and are taking steps to address and correct them. 
However for some observers, the PFI schemes offer the NHS value for money in an open 
competitive environment, which allows both the private and public organisations to retain 
their independence while working together as partners (White, 1993; and 2002a). 
Besides PFI brought improvements and the "wow" factor to hospital buildings and added 
private sector innovation in design and facilities management to them (Dix, 2002a; Ward, 
2002). Private sector creativity and innovation they argue manifest as improvements in 
good working conditions for hospital staff and more space and privacy for patients, hence 
the buildings are healing environments for patients, staff and communities, making positive 
contributions to local neighbourhoods (Dix, 2002a; Reeves, 1999). Furthermore, hospitals 
can now bundle several projects and get them done cheaper, better and more attractively 
through PFI schemes than ever before. Thus PFI schemes are beneficial to NHS trusts. 
Some commentators say that the PFI schemes are value for money because there is no 
initial capital outlay with no risks to the health services involved and their long leases are 
incentives for facilities management and maintenance of high standards (Clews, 2005). 
However some agree that the cost benefit analysis of PFI schemes are difficult to gauge 
due to the inflexibility of making changes to building projects and since the facilities are 
built to last for thirty years instead of the normal NHS lifespan of sixty years (Atun and 
McKee, 2005; Day, 2007; Kingsfund, 2005). But whatever the arguments the Government 
maintains that commentators should be more concerned with the quality of health facilities 
that are built on cost rather than who builds, maintains or manages them (Blair, 2005). 
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